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Abstract 
 
Since 1988, the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in 
conflict over the enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. The conflict has developed 
into one of the most intractable and complicated disputes in the international 
arena, with the main parties being the two rivalling sovereign states plus the 
“unrecognised state” of Nagorno Karabakh. Despite the optimistic statements 
and claims by the OSCE and after many years of negotiations and talks, the 
peace process remains in stalemate. The research argues the virtues of 
Track Two diplomacy and highlights the successful instances where it has 
made important contributions to the ‘official’ or Track One diplomatic process. 
It also explores the potential of a ‘no war no peace’ situation by discerning the 
factors influencing the progress of the conflict. The research shows that a 
deeper understanding of the obstacles to peace is achieved by appreciating 
the significance of historical events as well as recognising the motives and 
interests of the different parties. The study reviews all major factors which 
have led to the failure of resolution efforts, particular the negative role played 
by Russia. It concludes that the scholars in the field of conflict resolution can 
bring about a lasting peace to this region, provided there is a fundamental 
change in the structure of the co-chairs of the OSCE. 
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Introduction 
 
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the formation of the newly-
established states in 1991, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, created 
confusion in the structure of the international order. This situation, which 
came about at the end of the tense Cold War period in the domain of global 
policy and international relations, seemed to promise a new world order which 
would largely be composed of common concerns and interests such as global 
harmony, stability and international cooperation. Many experts in the field of 
international relations had predicted that these conflicts and instabilities in the 
international sphere would be replaced by global stability and international 
cooperation. But after a short while, it emerged that this was not the case. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some local and regional conflicts that 
were a result of the Cold War, ended or somehow began a process of 
settlement. But at the same time the world also observed the intensifying of 
ethnocentrism and extremist micro-nationalism in different areas, particularly 
the former Eastern Block. As a consequence, this was to produce fresh 
instability, insecurity and fresh conflicts, and in most of these, no bright 
outcome was envisaged. During this period, the number of regional and 
supra-regional outsiders who were in some way interested in either settling or 
stirring up the dissension, increased and finally caused these conflicts to 
become more and more complicated. 
 
The NK conflict was and still is one of these examples, involving the republics 
of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Its origins are a consequence of the intensifying 
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ethnocentrism and extremist nationalism which continued for a long time. The 
conflict still exists today and has at times shown signs of getting worse. There 
is unlikely to be an imminent resolution to the conflict. 
  
The NK dispute is rooted in Russia’s actions and discrimination during their 
occupation of this territory in the middle of the Russo-Iranian second periodic 
war which ended in 1828 and was followed by the Turkamanchai peace 
treaty. Thereafter, the inhabitants lived reasonably peacefully together up to 
the 1980s when the Communist regime ended. During his dictatorship, Stalin 
aimed at a settlement of the ethnic problems by merging Karabakh - with its 
4800 square km area and a population of 140,000 - with Azerbaijan within the 
Soviet Republic, to form an autonomous republic with the Moslem population 
gradually being replaced by Armenians. 
  
Stalin was well aware that if the Armenian majority engaged in a struggle in 
the region, located within the new borders of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, 
the hostilities would be solely between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians 
and would guarantee Moscow’s role as a power dealer. The igniting of the 
conflict dates back to 1988 during the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev when 
restraints were cast aside. With the introduction of glasnost, the differences 
between the Armenians and Azeris became apparent and the attacks 
commenced. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the main reason for the 
escalation of the fighting and the beginning of a fully-fledged and destructive 
war between the two states in the final years of the twentieth century. The 
war resulted in 35,000 casualties and over 800,000 internally-displaced 
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people and war refugees in Azerbaijan, and about 350,000 in Armenia. 
Although Armenia was able to successfully settle the refugees in the NK 
battle area, 80,000 Azeri refugees from NK and other occupied neighbouring 
regions are still waiting in temporary camps for the resolution of the dispute. 
In addition, about 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory, including a vast area 
outside of NK was occupied by Armenian forces. 
  
At the present time, despite almost fifteen years since the signing of the 
cease-fire treaty (12th May 1994) and the numerous mediating efforts and 
initiatives advanced by regional and international negotiators, the outlook for 
a settlement is as bleak as ever. 
 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NK conflict was considered a 
domestic affair, but after the independence of the Republics of Azerbaijan 
and Armenia in 1991, it was regarded as a struggle between two states which 
was then transformed into a regional conflict through the interference of 
external powers and by the continuation and escalation of the crisis. Lastly, 
the geo-political importance of the region along with the exploration of its 
considerable energy resources shown by the proposal of restoring the Silk 
Road and north-south, east-west corridors, transformed the conflict into an 
international issue. In the initial stages of the crisis, achieving mutual 
agreement and understanding was easy, due to a lack of deep hostility and 
the sole involvement of the contending parties in the conflict, but the 
interference of outsiders deepened the confrontation and the settlement 
became more difficult and complicated. This caused those involved in the 
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dispute to feel disillusioned with its resolution. 
   
Since, a “no war no peace” situation leads to fear amongst people about the 
resumption of military operations, it can be said that the longer such a 
situation continues, the greater the feelings of insecurity in the region and the 
longer it continues, the worse it will get. Although for most political analysts 
on regional issues, the likelihood of an escalation of the crisis leading to the 
recommencement of hostilities shortly before the Russian intervention in 
Georgia, was weak; after Russian involvement in Ossetia and Abkhazia the 
hostile atmosphere in NK itself became disquieting.  
Furthermore, the prolongation of the settlement process had damaged both 
countries economically. It has to be said that breaking the economic ties 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia not only had an extremely negative effect 
on the livelihoods and public welfare of the people of both states but also on 
the Caucasus region as a whole.  With the passing of time, the grounds for 
resuming ties has faded, and both parties have had to rely on the support of 
other states. This has happened while hostile attitudes have intensified, so it 
is quite natural that under such circumstances, the mutual confidence and 
convergence of viewpoints necessary for peace negotiations have been 
damaged. 
 
It is only natural that in any conflict, especially a prolonged one, there will be 
negative geo-political consequences, such as instability and insecurity in the 
warring region. Furthermore, it causes regional coalitions and unions to be 
formed, some of which are asymmetrical between the interested outside 
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powers and consequently an atmosphere of distrust towards each other’s 
intentions. Moreover, it is evident that the opposing interests and goals of 
external powers  are not only an obstacle to the settlement process but also 
pave the way for a continuation of the crisis and its spread to neighbouring 
regions. It is clear that this conflict is deep-rooted and has significant 
international implications. 
   
It seems that there is a basis in the NK conflict for opposition and the 
confluence of outsiders’ goals and interests. In addition, it has transformed 
the crisis into a regional and international one which has also obstructed the 
resolution process. It is more likely that the continuation of the “no war, no 
peace” stalemate is the consequence of the same opposition and the 
convergence of different and oppositional postures. Thus, the NK conflict has 
spiralled out of control in Azerbaijan and Armenia to the extent that neither of 
the two sides is able to solve it without the will and cooperation of all the 
neighbouring and external powers. Therefore, the often detrimental conduct 
of these powers is the most decisive factor in the development of the 
disagreement in comparison with the aspirations of both factions in the 
dispute. For instance, Russian expansionist policy and its wish to maintain its 
superiority in the region, as well as the negative reactions of other regional 
states - especially those opposed to Russia’s policy, such a parts of Europe 
and the US - is without doubt the most important factor in the continuation of 
this situation. Also, Turkish, Pan-Turkish, and Pan-Turanist policies in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus and the position of those opposed to this policy 
occasioned by the national interests and goals of Russia, China, and Iran, 
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have played a prominent role in maintaining the status quo. 
  
In addition, it is clear that the Caucasus enjoys a special standing in US 
global strategy, so that the White House, like the Kremlin, has declared the 
region to be within the orbit of its national interest. Clearly, the disparity 
between the US and Russian policies and their rivalry about their sphere of 
influence in the area are considered obstacles in solving the regional issues, 
especially the NK crisis. For example, the Caucasus, situated in the heart of 
Eurasia, is considered to be the gateway to Russia as well as to east, west 
and south Asia. It also enjoys strategic superiority and extensive human and 
natural resources. In sum, it is not a place to be easily relinquished by the US 
or Russia. 
 
As the disputed area between Azerbaijan and Armenia is located on the 
northern borders of Iran, it has a two-dimensional importance for that country, 
both economically and in terms of national defence. Thus, the NK conflict 
directly overshadows Iranian national security and regional interests and Iran 
is interested in a mechanism for settling the crisis, whether or not it relates to 
the continuation, escalation or process for establishing peace in the region. 
Consequently, the conflict is closely related to the national interests and 
security concerns of Russia, Turkey, Europe, and the United States, and all 
these powers are affected and have roles to play in the advancement of 
conflict resolution. 
 
In short, the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the Caucasus, and 
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the serious and extensive antagonism of the powers in the region have 
caused it to be referred to as a “great game” once again, with the difference 
that this time it is not only an issue between Britain and Russia but also 
involves many regional and supra-regional outsiders in close rivalry for 
influence in the area. 
 
However, it should be explained that the supra-national factors which are 
outside the control of the conflicting factions played a fundamental part in the 
origins and the continuation the NK crisis. The role of domestic factors are 
also significant, such as NK’s geo-political importance and its special 
situation, militarily and economically for both Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well 
as the existence of extremist parties whose minds feed on historical events 
like massacres, wars and religious differences. Successful conflict resolution 
will occur with a comprehensive understanding of the situation, so the role of 
domestic politics in particular and the influence of regional and outside 
regional powers will be discussed in detail in this study. Lastly, this conflict 
has remained unresolved for more than 15 years and the cease-fire has been 
in force since May 1994.  
 
This study will look at the origins of the dispute, the reasons why a solution 
has not yet been found and proposals for how this bitter conflict might be 
settled. These are the principle factors motivating the author in this research. 
This work will conclude that because of the reasons below, the attempts at 
mediation which have been exercised thus far to settle the conflict have not 
been successful, and will continue to be unsuccessful in the future. The work 
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concludes by expounding the idea of Track Two diplomacy to resolve the 
dispute. This conflict has had many proposed solutions – all of which have 
failed up to the present time. The author puts forward the virtues of Track 
Two as a means of resolving the dispute from the bottom up to bring peace, 
development and prosperity to NK and the wider Caucasus region.  
 
There have been many reasons – direct and direct, internal and external, 
short-term and long-term - which have led to the lack of resolution of the 
conflict. For these reasons, the aim of this study is to propose a formula, 
based on experience of modern mediation methods to settle it. 
 
Therefore, in order to do this, this research will explore the factors that 
caused the continuation of the NK hostilities and the lack of success in 
mediation. Thus, the central question of this work is what were the reasons 
that caused CSCE (now known as the OSCE) mediators to fail in the 
resolution of the NK conflict? Thus, the main intention is to show that by not 
cooperating with those interested outsiders who have a role to play in the 
dispute and especially by ignoring the interests of the regional powers and 
also by not applying the findings of scholars in conflict resolution, any peace 
plan would have failed. 
 
In this study, the method of composing and processing the subjects is 
grounded in causality, analysis and theory. Also, the mode of compiling the 
information, proofs and documents is based on field research and interviews 
with officials and relevant authorities. Besides, in using the library facilities, an 
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attempt has been made to benefit as much as possible from the most up-to-
date resources and texts. In this respect, numerous problems and 
shortcomings were confronted. So despite spending a great deal of time and 
expense, it should be mentioned that there was real difficulty in accessing 
many objective, comprehensive, neutral or reliable sources regarding this 
conflict.  
 
However, it is hoped that this research will be comprehensive. It can certainly 
be claimed that, up to the time of this study, there are no sources to be found 
concerning the conflict, in which the different aspects of the subject have 
been completely and exhaustively covered. There are a few Armenian, Azeri 
and Russian informants whose research covers a special period of time or 
subject, in each of which the topics directly reveal the political, national and 
religious leanings of the authors. In other words, their prejudice and partiality 
towards one or other of the warring parties is quite perceptible. It is also true, 
of course, that some studies that have been written in the scientific and 
research centres of developed countries have a number of glaring errors so 
we can claim they are not valuable scientifically, because the researchers 
and authors are not sufficiently familiar with the history of developments and 
the culture of Caucasian nations and tribes before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
In particular, some writers have tried to promote and justify their own regional 
viewpoints and aims. In short, the sole purpose of their research has been to 
investigate the national goals and interests of their respective countries. 
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Thus, it is no surprise that none of the peace plans proposed by these 
researchers for the resolution of the NK dispute has been accepted by the 
conflicting factions. As with any peace proposals, the interests of the 
opponents and some regional powers have been ignored, either erroneously 
or intentionally. This is indicative of the fact that the mediators were not aware 
of some of the basic issues and rules for playing the game in the region. It is 
noteworthy that this problem is easily proven even by the propositions of 
some of the mediators. Another similarity between the agreed resolutions and 
those proposed by mediators in the past is that both seek to settle the quarrel 
through traditional methods instead of applying objective and scientific ones. 
 
All in all, such issues strongly motivated the author to compile a complete, 
documented and scientific set of sources, based on historical realities, and to 
try and establish stable peace and justice in the region. Because the area has 
been seriously damaged by the continuation of the “no peace, no war” 
situation, it is evident that if a just and stable peace is established in the 
region, enormous political and economic benefits will accrue to Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as well as the wider region. 
 
In any event, in order to give a thorough and balanced account using a range 
of sources and to make the work as objective as possible, the following 
research methods were used, in addition to Armenian, Azeri, Russian, 
Persian, English and other texts: 
 
1 Interviews with appropriate scientific and academic figures from the 
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various parties to the conflict 
2 Using interviews of the parties to the dispute that had been reported by 
the media and news agencies 
3 Interviews with several authorities of the regional states who had played a 
role in the conflict, i.e. those of the Turkish and Russian foreign ministries. 
4 Interviews with the Iranian authorities who had mediated directly. 
5 Using the official positions and declarations issued by the governments 
and ruling parties of the opposing groups and other effective states. 
6 Using essays published in those newspapers that normally indicate the 
official positions of those states. 
7 Making use of many articles found on different web sites and in the media 
regarding the NK conflict 
8 Using the Regional & International Research Centres’ web sites, 
particularly the European and American ones that were active both in war 
and peace and in conflict resolution.  
9 Using Armenian, Azeri and Karabakhi web sites. 
10 Studying the research done by scholars concerning conflict resolution and 
the methods that could be applied in this conflict. 
 
Also, the author’s interest in peace keeping and security concerns was the 
main consideration in accepting this mission in the conflict region and was 
also the strong point of this research. 
  
It is necessary to explain that the author is a career diplomat with over 
twenty-five years’ experience. He was the first Iranian ambassador to 
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Armenia and was stationed in the region for five years under the most critical 
conditions. He worked directly with Armenian and Karabakh officials and 
indirectly with Azeri officials, he was also the founder of Iranian studies in the 
Caucasus and was the special envoy at CIS meetings. It should also be 
mentioned that because of the efforts and considerable success of the Iranian 
embassy in establishing and developing cooperation (especially economic), 
which was considered to be of vital assistance to Armenia in the war 
situation, he (as the ambassador) enjoyed the respect and trust of the 
Armenians in Yerevan and Stepanakert. He was among the few diplomats 
who travelled to Karabakh and closely followed the NK situation. Moreover, 
since concluding his mission in Yerevan, he has followed developments in the 
region.  
 
During the past few years, one of the author’s greatest privileges has been 
the opportunity to work with Professor Paul Rogers. The chance to work with 
him for more than a decade has allowed the author to develop a sound 
appreciation and understanding of the general area and theories of conflict 
resolution. During this time the author has also been able to familiarize 
himself with the work of various scholars such as Azar, Burton, Curle, Doob, 
Fisher, Roger and Ronald, Hare, Kelman, Saunders and Wedge amongst 
others. 
The author has been particularly inspired by John Burton’s work, career and 
achievements as he saw a number of parallels with his own experience. 
Towards the end of the Second World War, in his capacity as diplomat, 
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Burton attended the San Francisco Conference, which set up the United 
Nations and in the 1960s in the UK he drew up ideas for conflict resolution. In 
a similar fashion, the author’s ambition is to pursue an academic career after 
years of working as a diplomat. 
As both countries in the confrontation were within the ambit of Iranian territory 
and civilization in the not-too-distant past, they enjoy deep historical and 
cultural ties with Iran, so it is not surprising that the author possesses an 
extensive background knowledge and precise awareness of the 
developments of the region. 
However, in order to increase the scientific level of the study, every effort has 
been made to use all the available relevant documents and research. Thus, 
over 200 published books in different languages such as Persian, Russian, 
Armenian, Azeri and English have been consulted. Furthermore, over 50 
specialized magazines have been used and all the scientific and specialized  
web sites that were active during the war and peace and conflict resolution. 
 
This study consists of nine chapters. The first two present important 
background information and a modern history of the conflict. In the third, the 
issues and positions of the conflicting parties are presented. In the fourth, an 
analysis of Karabakh geopolitics is put forward with an analysis of the 
interests and politics of outsiders. Chapter five and six analyse the early 
mediations and solutions and the Minsk Group process. Chapter seven looks 
at the legal overview of the conflict and how the domestic and international 
legal process impacts upon the dispute. Chapter eight looks at the socio-
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political atmosphere in the region. Chapter seven presents the conclusion by 
looking at the solutions and plans that have previously been introduced and 
also an understanding of why they have failed. Finally, chapter nine proffers 
the virtues of Track Two diplomacy in resolving this conflict. 
 
Lastly, it should be stated that the author produced this study, with the aim of 
helping further peace and stability in the region and of developing cooperation 
not only between the two Caucasian nations under review but also creating a 
favourable environment for cooperation, harmony and confidence for the 
entire region. Therefore, it is hoped that it will be of benefit to authors and 
researchers in academic centres and be of practical application in achieving 
these ends.  
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Chapter 1: Context  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will endeavour to give some necessary background information 
on the Caucasus region and also on the NK conflict. It will look at the natural 
geography of the region, the political geography and also the natural 
resources and economy. More detailed background information regarding the 
people and culture and monuments is detailed in appendix 3. 
 
Because of its vast natural resources, Nagorno Karabakh (NK) was one of 
the first regions selected by human beings for settlement. The three regional 
powers, Iran, Turkey and Russia, have influenced NK in many ways including 
its name. Nagorno-Karabakh means “mountainous dark gardens”. Nagorno is 
a Russian word which means “mountainous”, kara in Turkish means “black” 
and bagh in Persian means “garden”. The Azeri name of the region is 
Khankandi and the Armenian term for it is Artsakh, meaning “strong forest.” 
This region of 4,400 square kilometres or 1,699 square miles is officially 
located in the Republic of Azerbaijan and is situated in the south west region 
of that country. The Soviet Union created NK in the state of Azerbaijan in 
1924. Appendix 1 shows the position of NK in the Caucasus region.  
 
The language spoken in NK is Armenian but the dialect is considerably 
different from that spoken in Armenia. This region has no borders with 
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Armenia but because of Armenian success in the current conflict, it now has a 
border with that country. 
 
NK enjoys geo-strategic and geopolitical importance in the Caucasus and has 
six administrative districts. Karabakh is mountainous and rich in mines 
particularly of gold, silver, copper and zinc. Although the economy of this 
region largely depends on agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry and 
cattle breeding, new industries such as carpet and rug-making have also 
been established. NK has many rivers, inland waters and springs and its 
most important rivers are the Aras and the Kura. The latter flows through 
Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan while the former separates Karabakh from 
Iran. NK has played a great part in economy of the south Caucasus. This 
area is geopolitically important because of its natural barriers. Both the 
Armenians and the Azeris historically claim NK. During its annexation by 
Russia, 80 per cent of the population were Azeris and only 20 per cent 
Armenian.  Since the start of the current dispute, however, the population 
demographics have changed, as approximately 75 per cent are Armenian 
and 25 per cent are Azeri. The government in NK announced that the 
population in 2007 was 138,000. 
 
Natural Geography 
 
NK is an ancient and historic territory, one of the first regions of the world 
selected by humans for settlement due to its attractive environment, fertility, 
and its rich natural resources. For example, the Azyakh cave, located in the 
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mountains of Karabakh is a relic, which shows that this ancient region has 
been one of the first places in the world inhabited by primitive men called 
Antrop Azyakh.1 
This zone consists of lowlands and mountain ranges and, since the dispute 
first erupted, has been known in Azerbaijan as the Autonomous Province of 
“Nagorno Karabakh.” 
 
The area of NK is 4,400 sq/km. Its north-south length is 120 km. and the east-
west width varies from 35 to 60 km. NK includes about 12.5 per cent of the 
entire Karabakh zone. Geographically, Nagorno Karabakh is located between 
39º, 25' and 40º, 30' N, and 46º, 20', and 47º, 20' E.2 
 
Karabakh is situated in the south-east of the Lesser Caucasus region, 
between the Arax and Kura rivers. To the north, it reaches the Lesser 
Caucasus Mountains (Murovdog range with a maximum height of 3,724 
metres). The northern slopes of the Karabakh range (with the peaks of Ghiz 
Ghalehsi 2,843 metres, Ghirakh Ghiz 2,827 metres, and Boyork Kirde 2,725 
metres) are located in the western and southern parts of the region.3 The 
north-east and northern slopes of the Karabakh mountain range extend to 
Moghan and the Karabakh lowlands. Thus, the mountains surround the major 
part of the region. The height of the volcanic plateau in the western area 
(located between the Zangezur and Karabakh mountains) ranges from 2,000 
to 2,500 metres. From north to south, the plateau’s height decreases and its 
width also narrows. This plateau is shaped like a triangle between the basin 
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of the Hagaru and Vorotan Rivers, and it continues along their whole length. 
In this part, the plateau’s height decreases to 500 metres.4  
 
Karabakh territory is bordered by the “Arax” river and extends from 
“Khodaafrain” to “the broken” bridges of the south. To the north it extends 
from the Goran river in Ganja province to the Kura river. The peaks of 
Kushbak, Salvarteli, and Erikly are at the boundary of the territory to the west. 
The eastern border is the Kura River which joins the Arax River in Javad 
village (Saber Abad).5 
 
There are some deep valleys and depressions in the region as the rivers 
spring from the mountains. The Arax and Kura are the two most important 
rivers in the area, which are fed by rain as well underground sources. The 
Tartar, Indja, Khachen, Kar-kar and Vorotan are other rivers in the province. 
The Kura River, which flows through Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, is 
1,364 km long, and is the longest in the Caucasus. The area of its basin is 
18,800 sq/km. The Arax River is 1,072 km long.6 The water from both rivers is 
used in agriculture and electricity production. 
 
There are also some lakes in NK like the Algal on the volcanic plateau, which 
is the greatest in the area. It is 5 km across and 8 metres deep.7 This lake 
was formed by melting ice caps in the Caucasus. 
 
NK’s flora is unique. The plain is overspread by various kinds of wild and 
semi-wild plants.  The “broad-leaved” trees and shrubs cover the 
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mountainous parts. The highlands (2,000 to 2,300 metres) are covered by 
alpine and semi-alpine plants. In general, about 33 per cent of the region is 
cloaked by forests, and shrubs. There are various species of trees, such as 
the Pistachio, Ash, Linden, Hornbeam, Yew and the Turmeric (the most 
prized). Also, there are fruit trees and plants, such as apple, pear, walnut and 
tomato.8 In the forest clearings flowers grow: violets, tulips, wild roses, lilies 
and carnations Blackberry bushes are abundant. The forest covering of NK 
varies in different parts from chestnut brown and grey to alpine and black 
steppe.9 
 
With regard to the diversity of its wildlife and fauna, NK is a special territory. 
There are animals such as wild goats, bears, wildcats, deer, wolves, foxes, 
rabbits, squirrels, porcupines and birds like pheasants, partridges, wood 
pigeons, and many others.10 
 
Climatically, the lowlands have dry winters and temperate summers. The 
highlands are cold. Karabakh has three climates: temperate warm, temperate 
cold, and cold. In winter, the average temperature in the lowlands is 0.5 to 2ºc 
and in the highlands it is -3 to -4ºc. The hottest months are July and August, 
when temperatures are 720 F (220 C) and 710 F (210 C) respectively. The 
warmest places of Karabakh are the lowlands of Varanda and Jraberd 
provinces.11 
 
In the lowlands, the average rainfall is between 400 and 550 mm. and in the 
highlands, between 800 to 900 mm.12 Most rainfall is recorded in the months 
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of May and June. It is usually very heavy tropical-type rain often accompanied 
by hail. On average, some 100-150 days a year are foggy.13 The Morovdog 
uplands are covered with snow throughout the year. 
 
Political Geography 
 
At present, Karabakh, with an area of 4,400 sq.km, consists of six 
administrative districts. The capital city, Stepanakert or Khankendy is located 
in the south-west. The other main towns are Martakert, Askeran, Martuni, 
Shusha and Hadrout. 
 
NK is a patch of fertile, mountainous land on the eastern rim of the Armenian 
plateau overlooking the broad Azerbaijani plain to the east. To the west lies 
the Republic of Armenia, less than 5 miles away at the nearest point. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran is within 15 miles, to the south.14 
 
Karabakh is connected to the Republic of Armenia by the Lachin corridor. NK 
has no border with any country except the Republic of Armenia and the 
occupied Lachin territory, and it is surrounded by the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
The seven regions, which were occupied by the Armenian forces during the 
1991-1994 war, consist of Fizuli, Jabrail, Aghdam, Zangilan, Lachin, Qubadli 
and Kalbajar. 
 
The Armenians claim that their reason for occupying the region was its 
importance for maintaining the security of the people of Karabakh. The 
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Armenians believe that if the Azeri people had control of the region, they 
would be able to bombard the inhabitants of NK. It must be explained that NK 
is for the most part a geo-strategic and sensitive region, and it is considered 
to be a very important geo-political zone in the area. 
 
It is clear that NK enjoys rich resources: mines, forests, lush meadows. It has 
many advantages and is totally different to the Azerbaijani lowlands. This 
mountainous region is the natural border of Armenia too. The Armenians 
believe that only NK can achieve the unity and physical integration of 
Armenia, since in the past it acted as a protector against Azerbaijan and 
Turkey and safeguarded Armenia against Pan-Turkic movements. (The 
Armenians have a very negative perception of this matter). Therefore, it is 
evident that NK has a crucial part to play in the economic development and 
security of the Armenians in the region. 
 
It should be noted that NK has a more strategic function for the Republic of 
Azerbaijan than for Armenia. In fact, the Azerbaijanis believe that if another 
country gains control over the territory, which is a natural border, they will be 
put in an extremely vulnerable position. Also, they are well aware of the 
economic advantages of this region for their country. They also know that the 
separation of the uplands of NK from the lowland of Azerbaijan would deprive 
the cattle of the green meadows and destroy cattle-breeding in this state. 
More importantly, the Baku River originates in the mountains of NK. 
Azerbaijani’s do not forget the great advantages they enjoyed from different 
industries and mines, suitable agriculture and cattle-breeding during the self-
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determination of NK as they had a great share in the economic development 
in the Southern Caucasus.  
 
Moreover, militarily, NK has a great geographical advantage, since, as a 
natural barrier, it protects the region from any kind of attack. 
NK overlooks Iran to the south, so it acts as a strong buffer zone against any 
military attack from that direction. It also dominates the Gharadog, and 
Moghan plains to the east, so it can act as a look-out and defensive 
headquarter against Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and central Asia. The 
northern mountain range is also a constant defence. NK connects Armenia, 
and therefore Georgia, and the Black Sea with the west by way of the Lachin 
corridor.15 
 
This region also represents the confluence of the eastern and western 
civilizations, and the two different ideological worlds: Islam and Christianity, 
as well as the two nationalities and languages: Turkish and non-Turkish. If 
such a place did not exist, the Turkish world would extend from western 
China to the north-west of Turkey and Bulgaria. Therefore, challenging and 
trying to access such a strategic region is quite natural.  
 
Since the era of Russian dominance in the region, the importance of the 
political geography of NK has been thoroughly clarified. In his report “No19” of 
12th May 1905, Tsitsianov – the commander of the Caucasus troops - related 
that Karabakh was a gateway for both Iran and Azerbaijan, because of its 
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geographical situation. Therefore, every effort must be made to keep its 
stability.16 He himself did his best to achieve this vital goal. 
 
Thus, the importance of the political geography of NK gave rise to rivalry for 
dominance in the region, and this undoubtedly has been the main cause of 
the dispute and its continuance up to now.17  
 
Resources of Economy 
 
NK is rich in valuable mines, such as gold, silver, zinc and copper, and other 
minerals like mercury, chromate, poly-metal, tar and pyrite. There are also 
quarries of decorative and building stones (marble, plaster, travertine, lime, 
and high-quality clay) and a considerable amount of hydro-carbon, oil and 
coal. It also possesses reserves of iron ore and crude oil.18 Granite, basalt, 
tuff, limestone, as well as raw materials for cement, graphite, gypsum and 
sand can be found in Karabakh.19 It is also well-provided with 120 sources of 
mineral water, which contain iron and carbon. Generally, water is one of the 
most important natural resources of NK, as it constitutes about 18 per cent of 
Azerbaijani water reserves. The rivers Tartar, Hagaru and Khachen originate 
in this region, and join the Arax and Kura, supplying the water of these two 
main rivers. These provide the opportunity for generating hydro-electric power 
and electricity. In places, they have been harnessed for irrigation and power 
generation. There is already a hydro-electric power station on the Tartar 
River 20  Establishing power stations on the rivers such as the Hagaru is 
possible too as these can provide energy and be exploited for cultivating fish 
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and other aquatic species.21 At present, NK has achieved self-sufficiency in 
electric power.22 
 
NK enjoys productive forests too. The forests of the region play an important 
role in providing wood and raw materials for parquet, furniture, musical 
instruments, fire-wood reserves and also different kinds of wild fruit. 
Therefore, they play a vital part in the economy of NK. 
Another economic feature of the region is its industries. The most important 
ones in NK are to do with electricity generation and the dietary industries 
related to agriculture and domestic animal husbandry. There are also 
factories which produce household equipment. Among the other large sectors 
of Nagorno Karabakh industry are factories for drinks, dairy production, silk, 
lumber and wood, shoes, carpets, textiles, cotton and tobacco. 
 
In the 1970s, grape production was 3,400 tons per year. The meat, dried fruit 
and carpets of NK are well-known, especially the rugs which have been very 
famous for centuries.23 
 
NK enjoys an important position in the agriculture of the region. The unique 
climate, rich resources, nutrients and fertile soil, especially on the margins of 
the rivers and mountain slopes, provide ideal conditions for agriculture and 
horticulture. The region is also famous for its grapes, mulberries and corn.24 
 
There are about 162,000 hectares of vineyards and 1,000 hectares of market 
gardens in the region.  
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The cereal production rate reaches 56 thousand tons a year, which supplies 
the demands of the inhabitants. The agricultural sector is able to feed up to 
one million people.25 NK also enjoys favourable conditions for cattle breeding. 
 
Another economic advantage of NK is its tourist attractions. With the 
settlement of the conflict, this industry could have good prospects in the 
region, because NK enjoys a unique natural landscape suitable for the 
development of tourism and rest areas. 
 
With regard to the economic situation of the territory, it can be stated that it 
has a considerable role in the southern Caucasus. Unfortunately, the 
production process has stopped and the region suffers from economic 
stagnation. This was caused by the war and the economic blockade. 
However, the number of work-places in factories, offices and in the 
agricultural sector ensures that 96 per cent of the working-age population is 
employed.26 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear to see that NK and the Caucasus is a very diverse region. An 
understanding these elements informs the rest of this work. We have seen 
how the natural geography, political geography, and the resources and 
economy of the NK and the wider region are characterised. An understanding 
of these issues gives the reader an idea of how these issues interrelate and 
26 
are further developed by chapter 2 and appendix 3 which looks at the people 
of NK. Of particular note, this chapter has shown the importance of NK’s 
economy to the wider Caucasus region.  
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Chapter 2: Modern History of the Nagorno Karabakh 
Conflict 
 
Introduction 
 
It is important to have an understanding of the history of NK in order to 
understand the events which have shaped the present day situation. This 
chapter will look at Nagorno Karabakh’s modern history. Appendix 4 details 
the ancient history of N K and the wider region. 
 
From the Collapse of the Soviet Union to the Present 
 
The demise of the Soviet Socialist Republic transformed the Karabakh 
conflict from an internal Soviet dispute into an international political issue, and 
simultaneously opened the door to mediation attempts by various countries 
and international organizations.27 After independence, the authorities of both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia considered the Karabakh issue as a danger that 
could threaten their new independence. Also, the risk of interference by 
influential regional and supra-regional players and the transformation of the 
conflict into a global crisis, made them anxious. After Russian troops attacked 
Azerbaijan, about seven thousand Soviet soldiers were deployed in Karabakh 
under the command of General Safonov. They immediately arrested 
members of the Karabakh National Council. A few days later, Azerbaijani 
representatives entered Stepanakert to carry out the resolution of the Soviet 
Supreme Council based on the restoration of Azerbaijani sovereignty over 
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Karabakh after the abolishing of direct Soviet command. The Karabakhis 
continued protests against the presence of the Azerbaijani authorities in 
Karabakh. Although 25 Armenian leaders were arrested by Soviet forces, 
Azerbaijani direct control over Karabakh was not achieved in practice.  
 
Although Karabakh was now under martial law, the demonstration of 24th 
April 1990 was staged with 40,000 Armenians attending. The Karabakhis 
even participated in the parliamentary elections in the summer of 1990 and 
elected their 12 representatives to sit in Armenia's parliament. In short, the 
deployment of Soviet troops in Karabakh and their joint efforts with the Azeris 
to restore Baku`s sovereignty over Karabakh led to nothing but an escalation 
of the racial conflict. 
 
In this period, Karabakh was practically out of control and in the final stages 
of obtaining independence but the Armenians were seeking its union with the 
country and not self-determination. In fact, their participation in the Armenian 
parliamentary elections was based on this thought too. This state of affairs 
continued for another year until the Karabakhis desisted from their earlier 
policy to attach themselves to Armenia. On 2nd September 1991, the NK 
Supreme Council proclaimed the Independent Nagorno Karabakh Republic, 
situated within the same borders as the Autonomous Oblast, with the addition 
of the Shaumian district in the north. The Karabakhis also held a referendum 
on 10th December and confirmed Karabakhi independence by a majority 
vote.28 
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It should be mentioned that, based on Soviet law29 the Karabakhis legitimized 
their action. Needless to say, on 26th November, the Azerbaijani Supreme 
Soviet voted to abolish NK’s autonomous status.30 
 
By declaring independence, the conflict was ostensibly changed because 
thereafter it was considered to be a dispute between the Karabakh 
Independent Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan (before that time, it was 
viewed as a quarrel between the Soviet Republics of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan). As a result, this action was counted as a victory for the 
Karabakhis, because they had disengaged Armenia from the conflict and 
created space for the Armenian’s to manoeuvre, especially in view of the fact 
that the Republic of Armenia had not recognized Karabakh’s independence. 
However, this issue intensified the hostility and tension between the two 
parties. 
 
From September onwards, by cutting off the roads and railways, the Azeris 
had laid siege to Karabakh. In early November 1991, they intensified their 
blockade by disconnecting telegraph and telephone lines as well. 
 
In such conditions, the Popular Front launched an attack on two fronts – both 
inside and outside the country. In spite of some victories on the internal front, 
they suffered tremendous defeats at the hands of Armenian forces in the 
following weeks. In November, there was ample proof that Azerbaijan and 
Armenia were on the verge of a real war.31 
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At the same time, efforts continued to resolve the conflict peacefully. In late 
November, during their visit in Moscow, Ter-Petrossian and Mutalibov, the 
presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, laid stress on a peaceful settlement of 
the disagreement as the Azerbaijani president promised to restore the 
autonomy of Karabakh to Ter-Petrossian. But the opponents regarded the 
Karabakh dispute as an internal issue and condemned Armenia's interference 
as an outsider. 
 
A lack of success on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena caused the 
opposition groups of Mutalibov to increase their pressure on the government. 
The Popular Front asked Mutalibov explicitly either to settle the situation on 
the fronts or resign from his post. They staged a demonstration in Baku and 
asked Mehdiov, the Defence Minister, to resign. Mutalibov, who was already 
under pressure, was forced to relieve him of his position. At the same time, 
certain events had Mutalibov’s political opponents worried, such as Yeltsin`s 
speech about the need for the peace-keeping forces to intervene, and the 
agreement of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers with the CSCE 
in Prague, to dispatch CSCE observers to the region. These developments 
resulted in an escalation of military action in the region.  
 
In early February, fresh Azeri forces were dispatched to some regions such 
as Karabakh’s northern borders, Aghdam, Shushi and Malybeili, but the 
Armenians were the victors on all these fronts. During the siege of one city – 
Khodjaly - the Armenian troops called on the Azeri forces to surrender. This 
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city was counted as one of the Azerbaijan’s important military bases and the 
Azeri unit relinquished it with little resistance.  
 
During this battle, the Khodjali civilians who were trying to reach Aghdam 
through the Askeran valley, were hit by intense gunfire from Armenian 
fighters around Nakhichevink village, with many killed. It should be mentioned 
that according to Armenian sources, the Azeri casualties resulted from their 
counter-offensive, but killing more than 450 civilian Azeris in Khodjaly 
provoked the anger of the inhabitants of Baku.32 
 
The fall of Khodjaly was the beginning of fresh internal and external 
developments in Azerbaijan. It caused an intensification of the activities of 
local opponents and Ayaz Mutalibov was forced to resign on 6th March 1992, 
after a few days of demonstrations.33 In April 1992, Ayaz Mutalibov declared 
that the massacre at Khodjaly had been "organized" by his political 
opponents in order to force his resignation.34  
 
Following Mutalibov’s departure, a council consisting of a number of cabinet 
members such as the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Secretary of 
the Nakhichevan Supreme Council and two leaders of the Popular Front took 
the helm under the supervision of Yaqub Mamedov.  
 
After the Khodjaly massacre, international attention on the conflict became 
more acute and concentrated. Since that time, influential regional and supra-
regional states, especially France, Iran and Turkey, played a prominent and 
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conspicuous role in the affairs of the region including France and Iran who 
provided some services and aid.35 Turkey issued a warning and rigorously 
championed Azerbaijan. It cautioned the European states and the US that 
continuing support for Armenia would result in a regional war. Suleyman 
Demirel, the then Turkish Prime Minister, explicitly threatened that “all states 
should know this issue has made Turkey and other Turkish-speaking 
Republics worried”. Also, Hikmet Cetin, the Turkish Foreign Minister who was 
visiting Baku when Mutalibov was about to fall, stressed the local nature of 
the Karabakh conflict and the need for all the regional powers to participate in 
its settlement, while declaring  his government’s support for the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
 
In its first action after the Khodjaly massacre, which occurred in February 
1992, the Iranian government launched an all-out effort to end military 
hostilities and pave the way for negotiations between the two parties. After a 
few weeks of talks, the parties in dispute agreed to cease fighting and 
consider a peaceful solution to the disagreement, but subsequent events 
showed that this relatively short period of ceasefire, which lasted only a week 
had been used to prepare and arrange for a re-launch of the war, because on 
29th March 1992, the Azerbaijani forces attacked on two fronts: Askeran and 
Martakert, and captured the centre of the latter. Soon after however, the 
Armenians regained this region. Following this, the Martoni district witnessed 
violent attacks by the Azerbaijani forces and some areas were actually 
captured by them. Their next assault on the Askeran front was met by a 
counter-attack of the Armenian forces. After a period spent in strengthening 
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their positions in different areas of Karabakh, the Armenians captured some 
villages near the Stepanakert-Martakert line of communication. 
 
In these circumstances, high-ranking Armenian and Azeri officials travelled to 
Tehran on 15th March for negotiations to pave the way for an end to the 
conflict.36 
 
During the mediating efforts of the Iranian authorities to finalize the peace 
talks, the scattered clashes in the region and especially in the suburbs of 
Stepanakert were indicative of the fact that the declared ceasefire brokered 
by the presidents had not been kept. However, Iranian political efforts 
continued to find a just solution to the conflict. Iran's mediation resulted in an 
eight-article agreement in Tehran37, which was signed on 6th May 1992.  
 
However, a few hours after signing the agreement, Armenian forces captured 
Shusha, Azerbaijan's most important and powerful base and their last front in 
the entire region of Karabakh.38 Thus, the peaceful settlement of the conflict 
was abandoned at this stage. 
 
On 14th May, less than a week after the fall of Shusha, the Azerbaijani 
Supreme Council voted to absolve Mutalibov of responsibility for the Khodjaly 
massacre, and reinstated him as President.39 When Mutalibov was recalled 
by a parliament with a communist majority, the internal conditions of the 
Republic became critical. The Popular Front's supporters attacked the 
presidential palace, the parliament, the radio and television stations, the 
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airport and, on the whole, captured the rebellious centres of the capital and in 
just one day overturned the government. Mutalibov meanwhile escaped to 
Moscow. 40  When Yaqub Mamedov abdicated from the post of acting 
President, the Supreme Council of the Republic appointed Isa Gambarov, 
from the APF, who confirmed that the presidential elections would take place 
on 7th June. The Supreme Council dissolved itself, vesting its authority in the 
Azerbaijani National Council, which was under the control of the Popular 
Front. 
 
Whilst the Azeris were engaged in this power struggle, the Armenians did not 
lose the initiative. Taking advantage of the victory in Shusha, they captured 
Lachin on 18th May. Thus, the Karabakh-Armenia land bridge, which had 
been cut in the early stages of the crisis, was re-established.41 Thereafter, the 
military position of the Karabakh Armenians improved and the defence 
positions of Zangezour were strengthened.  
 
Since the scope of developments extended in a southerly direction (Meghri, 
Ghapan and the frontier localities of Nakhichevan and Turkey, Sadark and 
Yaraskhavan), there were several diplomatic changes in the region, as the 
vital and strategic Karabakh-Zangezour-Nakhichevan axis became the focal 
point once again. 
 
With the fall of Lachin, the Turkish Foreign Minister unexpectedly travelled to 
Baku on 5th March 1992. Then the Turkish Prime Minister and the President 
warned of the need to dispatch forces to Nakhichevan. But a counter-warning 
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from Russia and the US made Turkey understand that the international 
situation was not timely for the fulfilment of Turkish plans. 
 
In the chaotic situation following the fall of Lachin, the Popular Front swept to 
power. Elchibey’s rule marked the beginning of an upturn in Azerbaijani 
military fortunes. At the end of June, the Azeri forces captured the greater 
part of the Shaumian district, to the north of NK, and the Martakert district in 
the north-eastern sector.42 Military development such as this had a special 
effect on political developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Supreme 
Council of NK declared a state of emergency and general mobilization.43 
Also, by the end of June, large rallies were calling for the resignation of Ter-
Petrossian and his government and the Dashnaks picketed the television 
station, demanding a live transmission to broadcast their views.44 
 
These victories bolstered the authority of the Popular Front. Military activities 
generally focused on the Martakert axis until the winter. Up to the end of the 
year, the Azeri forces tried to retake Lachin several times but their efforts 
were in vain. In the early winter of 1992, 2,000 out of 5,000 sq/km of 
Karabakh was under the authority of the Azeris. 
 
During that winter, military operations decreased but the economic embargo 
on Armenia and Karabakh (and its consequences) was intensified. Georgia, 
which supplied its oil and gas through Azerbaijani facilities, was put under 
pressure to sever Armenia's only access route with Russia. This avenue was 
unsafe because of widespread civil strife between Georgia and Abkhazia, so 
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it was cut off for most of the time. Armenia's gas pipeline, which passed 
through Georgia, was blown up several times as a result. These conditions 
led to a bad situation for the Armenians, to the extent that in 1991, and 
especially in the winter of 1991-1992, the energy and food supply situation in 
Armenia became critical. Many enterprises and factories were closed, with 
large numbers of workers laid off. Educational institutions were closed and 
houses were left unheated. Furthermore, about half a million homeless 
people and refugees, who had escaped from Azerbaijan, became a great 
burden on Armenia.45 
 
However, some improvements were made in their foreign relations, the most 
important of which was the change in Moscow's policy towards the Caucasian 
turn of events.46 After the meeting between Ter-Petrossian and Yeltsin in 
Moscow (11th January 1993), the Russians criticized Azerbaijan for their 
attack on civilian targets in Karabakh. In addition, they promised to assist 
Armenia to overcome their difficult plight. 
 
As the Armenians were engaged in the retaking of lost territory, in late winter 
of the same year, they recaptured ten villages in Martakert in early February. 
Such military developments had an immediate effect on the Azerbaijan 
interior, and the Executive Committee of the Popular Front criticized Elchibey 
for the recent defeats.  
 
Meanwhile, the Armenian advances continued in Martakert and districts such 
as the Sarsang dam, which was economically important, and the city of 
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Kalbajar to the far west of Martakert was captured by the Armenians. In none 
of these districts, were the Azeri counter-attacks successful. With the fall of 
Kalbajar, the Armenians took possession of a vital area between Karabakh 
and Armenia and about 60,000 Azeris were made homeless. The capture of 
Kalbajar, like Lachin, consequently provoked a negative reaction and 
condemnation from the international community. In effect, the capture of 
Kalbajar and the take-over of territories in the northern areas of Shaumian, as 
well as the advance towards the city of Fizuli (on Karabakh’s southern border 
with Iran), proved to be another turning point in the Karabakh struggle. 
 
Iran’s mediating efforts produced substantial results by achieving a primary 
agreement for a ceasefire, the deployment of forces as observers, as well as 
the resolution of issues such as the exchange of prisoners of war and the 
raising of the economic blockade, but thereafter, with Europe performing an 
active role, the conflict process entered a new stage. In this period, in spite of 
the complicated situation and the fact that all existing evidence pointed to the 
fact that there would inevitably be a breaking of the ceasefire and the 
recommencing of the war, Iran continued its efforts as before and even took 
part in the Armenian and Azerbaijani summit. The Russian ambassador was 
also present there. In this summit, the tacit agreement of the Azerbaijani 
authorities had introduced serious issues like the presence of Karabakh 
representatives in the upcoming talks, but since some Azerbaijani groups 
only cared about their own personal and group interests, this caused the fall 
of Shusha and Lachin. Moreover, with rumours that Iran was supplying 
armaments to the Armenians, some groups tried to prevent Iranian activities 
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at all costs. Thus, although the gravity of the situation was small in 
comparison to future developments and the achieving of peace was quite 
likely, in practice, such a valuable opportunity was missed. Now, it was the 
Europeans’ turn to increase their efforts to mediate peace.47  
 
In January 1992, the CSCE which had by now admitted Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as members, decided to send a mission to the area in order to 
examine the solutions to the ceasefire and the deployment of observers. Two 
missions visited the region in February.  
 
The Foreign Ministers of the CSCE then organized the Minsk conference to 
settle the Karabakh problem. The members of the conference were 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Sweden, Turkey, the United States and Belarus. The conference was held in 
the city of Minsk, the capital of Belarus. 
 
Since the fall of Lachin had been condemned by the CSCE and the Azeri 
government had declared that it would not agree to attend the negotiations 
until the Armenians withdrew from Lachin, the work of the Minsk Group was 
delayed for a while. Following the military victories in the eastern part of 
Karabakh, Azerbaijan agreed to attend the negotiations and several meetings 
were held in Rome from June to July 1992. At this stage, the presence of 
Karabakh representatives in the negotiations was in dispute. But these talks 
were suspended in mid-September as a result of the Azerbaijani delegation's 
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adamant refusal to recognize the Karabakh Armenian delegation as a 
negotiating partner.48 
 
During the Minsk Group negotiations, an effort was made to resolve the 
disagreement in the following way: after consultation with the governments of 
the conference members, the Chairman of the conference was to invite the 
elected and other Karabakhi representatives as key parties.49 This method 
was to no avail, because the Karabakh Armenians and Azeris both sought to 
be invited as selected representatives. 
 
Because of the absence of the Karabkhi representatives, the negotiations had 
no effect, Azerbaijan and Turkey rejected direct negotiations with the 
Karabakhis and intended to recognize Armenia as the party involved in the 
conflict. In spite of the declaration that it was not the party in direct dispute, 
Armenia attended the negotiations in a capacity different from its official 
position. In effect, during the summer, the Azeris and Armenians declared 
that the commencement of the negotiations was dependent on the withdrawal 
of the opposing forces from the designated areas. Hence, in the summer and 
autumn of 1992, the efforts of the Minsk Group and even Russian measures 
to arrange a ceasefire had no effect. In fact, it seemed that the Armenians 
were pessimistic about the outcome of the CSCE mediation at this stage, so 
they called for UN intervention to settle the disagreement. The Armenian 
ambassador to the UN petitioned Boutros Ghali (the UN General Secretary), 
to dispatch observers to the region in order to help establish a ceasefire. Two 
days later Azerbaijan declared that it was only calling for the presence of 
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CSCE observers and would not allow UN or other observers to interfere in the 
region.  
 
During the next round of negotiation in December and January, both parties 
agreed to withdraw their military forces from Karabakh and to demilitarize the 
region through the presence of foreign observers in Karabakh. They also 
agreed that until the final settlement, the Lachin corridor was to be controlled 
by international observers. For a combination of reasons, the agreements did 
not manage to bring about a solution. The main reason was that the Minsk 
Group could not convince Russia to accept multinational peace keepers, as 
Moscow’s position was to monopolize peace-keeping in NK.  
 
In the negotiations from 26th February to 1st March 1993, it was decided to 
take the necessary steps regarding the deployment of CSCE observers and 
the administrating of the Minsk conference, but taking into account the 
military developments in Kalbajar and other areas of Karabakh, a resumption 
of the agreements and negotiations was delayed. The next developments in 
the NK conflict were again affected by Azerbaijan's internal situation.  
 
With approval of parliament and Azerbaijan's acting President, Suret 
Hussienov was appointed Prime Minister. The US and Turkey opposed this 
move and recognized Elchibey as the legal President and supported him as 
before. 
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In such chaotic conditions, the Armenians used the opportunity to capture the 
entire province of Martakert in Karabakh. They also launched violent attacks 
on the Azeri positions in June 1993. The chaotic conditions that persisted in 
Karabakh, together with Azerbaijan's critical economic and political situation, 
prompted the opposition to start a rebellion in Ganja, the second largest city 
in the country, which led to the capture of the city under the leadership of 
Suret Husseinov, one of the army commanders. Husseinov, who was 
supported by outside powers, especially Russia, called for the resignation of 
the President, the Prime Minister, and the parliamentary Chairman. He 
intended to place Heydar Aliev, the then President of the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Republic, in power.50 
 
In the opinion of the public, Elchibey was responsible for the political, 
economic and social disarray and for Azerbaijan's ignominious defeats. It 
should be said that during his one-year rule, Elchibey had no intention of 
making concessions to Russia, as he lent towards Turkey and the West. 
Taking advantage of different forms of leverage, Russia in return 
endeavoured to control the Popular Front's policies by exerting economic 
pressure on the Karabakh crisis. On the other hand, it supported the 
Armenian’s on some fronts and was responsible for Azerbaijan's losses in 
different battles. Most importantly of all, opponents argued that Elchibey 
always favoured the interests of the western governments and the Israeli 
regime, as opposed to the demands of the people. In short, under such 
conditions, Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, national security and 
governmental sovereignty suffered fundamental damage. In fact, it was a 
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consequence of the Popular Front’s policies, which led to Shusha, Lachin and 
entire sectors of Karabakh being virtually handed over to the Armenians. 
When two large regions - Talyshi and Lezgi - declared their independence 
and Azerbaijan was on the verge of civil war and collapse, Elchibey 
summoned Heydar Aliev, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the 
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, to Baku to stamp out the rebellion. 
 
When Suret Husseinov advanced on Baku and deployed his troops in one of 
its suburbs, Elchibey, knowing he would be defeated, left the city for his 
native Nakhichevan. This time, Heydar Aliev, who was strongly supported by 
Russia and other regional powers, was elected as Speaker of the Aghdam, 
one of the largest cities in the western part of the country.  
 
The continuation of such a predicament in Azerbaijan and the beginning of 
separatist riots in Dagestan and Lenkoran worsened the situation. Under 
such circumstances, the Armenians attacked Aghdam again and because 
there was no resistance, they took possession of other areas in the south of 
Karabakh along the border of the Iran. Finally, they reached the Arax River 
and when they saw a small number of Iranian border guards, found that 
further advance was impossible. At this stage, the Armenians captured 
Aghdam, Zangilan, Ghobadli, Jebrail, Kalbajar and Fizuli, in addition to 
Karabakh.  
 
The situation became intolerable for the Azerbaijani government and they had 
to withdraw from their previous positions. Thus, they contacted the Karabakh 
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Armenians and, while partially agreeing with them, asked them to stop the 
attacks and arrange a ceasefire. On the other hand, Heydar Aliev cancelled 
the oil contracts with western companies and stated that he was joining the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and accepting the Rouble as the 
official currency, in order to attract and appease Russia. 51  In short, the 
battlefield conditions remained the same until both parties signed the 
ceasefire treaty in Bishkek on 12th May 1994.  
 
It has now been more than 10 years since the cessation of hostilities, and 
many observers are of the opinion that the balance of power and military 
forces has been the most important obstacle to the resumption of war.  
 
During these years, many mediators have assumed responsibility, collectively 
and/or individually, for the settlement of the conflict: Iran from 1993 to 1995, 
France from 2000 to 2001, the US in 2001, the CIS from 1993-1994 and 
Russia from 1991. But, as stated above, the most important mediator was the 
Minsk Group which originated from the CSCE. Recognizing the Minsk Group 
as the mediator, the UN Security led four resolutions in the first years of the 
dispute and entrusted the promotion of the conflict settlement to this group. 
 
After the Minsk Group had proposed different solutions - none of which was 
agreed by the disputing parties for a variety of reasons - the Presidents of the 
two sides’ resorted to direct meetings. These have been held on 20 
occasions in different countries, and have not as of yet produced any 
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effective results, because neither party has been prepared to compromise on 
basic issues.  
 
It is clear that throughout history, Karabakh has been under the rule and 
influence of many powers, ranging from the disparate invaders in antiquity, 
through to the Persians, the Tsars, the Russian and Soviets to the present 
regime. Although Armenia has been under the domination of different powers 
throughout its history, it has been able to preserve its religion, culture and 
language.  Furthermore, Armenia has always deemed NK to be the locus of 
their identity. The Azeris or Aranis on the other hand have a culture very 
much like that of the Iranians and a religion and a language similar to the 
Turks. It can therefore be said that they identify with each other.  
Russian attempts to control the Caucasus led to the 1812-13 war with Iran 
which resulted in the Gulestan Treaty. With this treaty NK came under the 
hegemony of the Russians. Ten years later the second Iran-Russia war broke 
out and the Turkmanchai Treaty was signed. The annexation of NK by Russia 
culminated in what amounted to the destruction of the Caucasus’ identity and 
historical consciousness as they implemented policies and programmes for 
the diminishing of Islamic and Iranian influence in the region. 
 
As a result of Armenian loyalty to the Russians, the latter were able to change 
the demography of the region. Their policies encouraged Armenians from 
other parts to come and settle in the Caucasus which had been dominated 
mostly by the ruling powers. Under the Turkmanchai Treaty 50,000 
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Armenians emigrated from Iran. The total number of Armenians who migrated 
to the Caucasus was 150,000. 
 
The fights between Azerbaijan and Armenia from 1918 to 1920 resulted in 
Russian involvement. In 1920, after the Bolshevik take-over of Russia and the 
operations of the Red Army in Karabakh, Goris, and Zangezur, Moscow 
gained control of the situation and stressed that the disputed areas could not 
be entrusted to Dashnak, Armenia. Stalin stated that if Armenia became 
communist, this outcome might be possible. 
 
The NK issue was referred to the Caucasian Bureau of the communist party. 
Under Stalinist pressure, the Bureau agreed to consign NK to Azerbaijan. 
This was due to the implementation of Joseph Stalin’s policy of divide and 
rule. Under this policy, NK was established in 1921 as an autonomous oblast 
within Azerbaijan, in spite of Armenian opposition. 
 
Sixty-five years later, Gorbachev's policy of glasnost provided an opening for 
the resurgence of debate on the issue. The Armenians held numerous 
demonstrations protesting against Azerbaijan's control over NK and 
demanded unification with Armenia. In spite of the strong Armenian lobby in 
Moscow, the ruling government prevaricated and failed to give a decisive and 
clear response. 
 
These developments resulted in a direct struggle between the Armenians and 
Azeris. The massacre of civilians in several townships intensified the violence 
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nd consequently a massive demonstration was staged in Yerevan in protest. 
Gorbachev`s government finally announced that any alteration in the borders 
of the Republics was prohibited. This declaration also led to a new wave of 
demonstrations in Yerevan. After that, the NK movement changed its policy 
from legal hostilities to direct confrontation with the ruling government. In 
1989, with the intensifying of the activities of the armed forces, the ethnic 
conflicts were transformed into military operations. 
 
In October 1991, when Ayaz Motallibov became President of the Azerbaijan 
Republic, he officially proclaimed its independence. In a referendum held on 
21st September 1991 the Armenians voted for and promulgated self-rule and 
on 23rd September Leon Ter-Petrossian was elected as the first President. 
Thus, after 70 years, the communists were displaced. After the collapse of 
the USSR, the NK conflict was transformed from an internal to an 
international problem.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to explain the ways in which past events impact on 
the current situation of the conflict. The turning point in this history was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, which transformed the conflict from an 
internal to an external one, thus making the conflict more complex and 
therefore harder to resolve. 
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Chapter 3: The Issues and Positions of the Conflicting 
Parties 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to develop a model that can allow an analysis of the NK conflict, an 
examination of the main actors and decision-makers in the conflict together 
with their role and involvement is required. As this conflict is frozen and 
intractable it is important to find out the sources of this intractability. 
 
Scholars such as Azar, Burton, Rubin, Pruitt, Kriesberg and Cole have tried to 
define the complex nature of intractability. Based on their findings, this 
chapter will examine and analyze the economic, political and socio-cultural 
issues of the parties involved in the NK dispute. But before that, this chapter 
will begin with a brief background to the three main parties 
 
The following map shows the position of Azerbaijan, Armenia and NK: 
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Map 1: Geographic Position of Armenia and Azerbaijan and NK 
 
Policies of the Conflicting Parties 
 
Armenia 
 
Armenia is a relatively small state with a population of four million and it 
shares borders with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and Turkey. Since 
independence, one million Armenians have emigrated from their country. 
Ninety eight per cent of the Armenian population is Armenian, 1.2 per cent is 
Yezidi and the remaining 0.8 per cent is made up of Russians and Greeks. 
The main language spoken in Armenia is Armenian and the majority of the 
population is Christian and follows the Armenian Apostolic Church. 
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The Armenian Republic gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 
1991 and follows the constitution that was approved by a referendum in 
November 2005. The main active political parties in Armenia are the 
Republican Party of Armenia, the Prosperous Armenia, the Country of Law, 
the Heritage Party, the People's Party of Armenia, the National Accord Party, 
the Republic Party, the New Times Party, the United Labour Party, the 
Dashnak Party, the National Democratic Union, and the Armenian National 
Movement. 
 
The position of the Armenian Government has always been that any 
negotiation aimed at a resolution of the NK problem should be a complete 
solution and include a resolution of the political status of NK. 
 
The view of Yerevan and Stepanakert is that NK should either be 
independent or be unified with Armenia. The Armenians believe that the 
defeated party should pay for the concession not the winners. It can be said 
that they have military advantages and a substantial area of Azerbaijani 
territory is under their occupation. The Non-governmental International Crisis 
Group estimates that about 14 per cent of Azerbaijan’s territory, including NK, 
is controlled by NK Armenian forces. Other sources however estimate this 
figure closer to 20 per cent.52 
 
In April 2001, Presidents Kucharian and Aliyev attended talks in Florida and 
met with the US President George Bush. Ghukasyan, the president of NK 
emphasized during these talks that other options would mean “that we move 
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not towards peace but towards war.”53 Armenians have always reiterated that 
they do not accept vertical relationships between Karabakh and Azerbaijan.  
 
A 2005 survey conducted by the Armenian Centre for National and 
International Studies (ACNIS) showed that 90 per cent of Armenians believe 
that the persisting memory of the genocide 54  was part of the Armenian 
national identity along with its language, culture and history.55 
 
Also 40 per cent of 1900 people supported unconditional normalization of 
Turkish-Armenian relations, 29 per cent disagreed with it and 31 per cent 
were undecided. The survey also suggested that the Turkish recognition 
should entail territorial and financial compensation to Armenia as well as the 
relatives of genocide victims.  
 
The conflict with Azerbaijan has led to the closure of Armenia’s borders with 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, and this has created vast economic problems for the 
Armenian Government. The economies of both countries are important for 
development and economic cooperation in the region.  
 
Azerbaijan 
 
Azerbaijan has a population of eight million and shares borders with Armenia, 
Georgia, Iran and Russia. It is flanked on one side by the Caspian Sea. Due 
to economic difficulties, a million people have emigrated from Azerbaijan 
since its independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991. Eighty five per 
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cent of the Azerbaijani population is Muslim and the majority follow the Shiite 
faith. The official language spoken in Azerbaijan is Azerbaijani. 
 
The constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic was approved in November 1995 
by referendum. The main active political parties in Azerbaijan are the New 
Azerbaijan Party, the Popular Front Party, the Musavat Party, the National 
Independence Party, the Civic Solidarity Party, the Social Democratic Party, 
the Communist Party, the Liberal Party, the Azerbaijan Democratic 
Independence Party, the Islamic Party and 50 other minor parties. The ruling 
party of Azerbaijan is Yeni which was founded by the late President Heydar 
Aliyev who is the father of the current President.  
 
Violence against the Armenians started in Azeri cities. Before the conflict, the 
first cases of mass violence were recorded in Sumgait, an industrial town 
located not far from the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, when in February of 1988 
an angry Azerbaijani crowd came onto the streets and for three days 
engaged in massacres in the Armenian quarter of the town. At least twenty 
six people were killed and injured including hundreds of Armenians.56 The 
conflict soon spread beyond Baku, and inter-communal violence led to the 
deaths of several thousand Armenians and Azerbaijanis.57  
 
Turmoil in Baku and political competition for power in Azerbaijan provided 
opportunities for the Armenians to capture the last Azeri town Shusha on 9th 
May 1990. The Armenians then secured Lachin to form a corridor joining 
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Armenia and Karabakh. The fall of Shusha resulted in a change of 
Government in Azerbaijan. 
 
For a better understanding of the internal situation in Azerbaijan it is also 
important to mention the changes and internal political rivalries prevalent in 
the country. In March 1992 the Communist government of Ayaz Mutalibov fell 
after he and his Prime Minister were forced to resign following mass 
demonstrations over the ineffective Azeri response to Armenian military 
advances in. He tried to return to power but fighting in the streets resulted in a 
victory for Abulfaz Elchibey from the Azerbaijani Popular Front who aligned 
the country closer to Turkey, whereas before it was closer to Iran and Russia. 
After an Armenian victory at Kelbajar, Suret Huseinov overthrew the Elchibey 
government in June 1993 and brought Heidar-Aliev, a former Communist 
leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, to power. 
 
The position of the Azerbaijani government regarding the NK conflict is that 
this dispute has come about as a result of Armenian aggression and its 
demand for a full withdrawal of Armenian troops from all the occupied 
territories. President Aliev stated in July 2006 that the withdrawal of NK forces 
from occupied territories must be followed by the return of Azerbaijani 
refugees who could then help to decide the status of NK.58 Yerevan however, 
has always rejected direct involvement in the conflict. 
 
The fact that Azerbaijan has virtually lost the war has put it in a comparatively 
disadvantageous position. The Armenians use the occupied territories outside 
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Mountainous Karabakh as a bargaining chip in the issue of the status of the 
territory and a security guarantee against Azerbaijan.59 The death toll of this 
war is estimated to be 25,000 to 30,000 people.60 
 
The UN. High Commissioner for Refugees had reported that at the end of 
2005, there were still about 581,500 people considered refugees or displaced 
persons in Azerbaijan and 219,550 in Armenia.61 Armenia has granted full 
citizenship to Armenian citizens who fled Azerbaijan. The question of 
refugees has always been part of all the negotiation agendas and this issue is 
discussed in greater detail in this chapter.  
 
Nagorno Karabakh 
 
NK is a region of 1,699 sq/ m (4,400 sq km) with a population of almost 
200,000. 146,000 Armenians and 49,000 Azeris live in NK. It declared its 
independence from Azerbaijan on 12th July 1988. In February 1988 the Soviet 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast passed a resolution with a 
majority of 110 to 17 requesting its incorporation into the Armenian SSR.62 
Azerbaijan did not accept this resolution and called the decision illegal. On 
1st December 1989, the Armenian Supreme Soviet declared NK a part of 
Armenia. 
 
In addition to economic issues, the internal, external, stable and unstable 
factors which have formed the policy of the disputing sides are discussed in 
this chapter. This chapter also reviews the latest positions of the parties, and 
54 
the present peace process and the position of refugees which has always 
been an important issue regarding Armenians and Azeris 
 
Factors Shaping Azerbaijan’s Policy 
 
Azerbaijan has its own unique natural and human characteristics, such as 
rich resources, weak infrastructures and people with idealistic views. 
Politically, the Azeris have been under the influence of two camps / positions 
during the 20th century: the first being Turkey with its nationalist thoughts and 
- at the opposite extreme - the Russians with their cosmopolitanism through 
which they, themselves, played a basic combative role against the East. The 
Administration of the Eastern Nations Congress in Baku in 1920 was the high 
point of Moscow’s ascendancy over Azerbaijan, and this formed the first 
government of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus with the support of the Red 
Army. Azerbaijan, which hastened the decline of the Caucasus Independent 
Republic by supporting the Ottoman Government and its claims to the 
Caucasus territories in Georgia and Armenia, was the first state to accept the 
Communist Regime after two years and Baku was the first city to demand 
independence 70 years later in 1990, though it was rigorously suppressed by 
the Red Army.63 
 
With such a background, the Azeris never imagined that they had provoked 
such a deep crisis within their state. On 18th October 199164, Azerbaijan 
declared its independence and on 23rd November it annulled the NK 
autonomy65 and 99.89 per cent of Karabakhis supported the separation from 
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Azerbaijan.66 However, in spite of these extensive arrangements, the result of 
the war was nothing but a series of defeats not only on the battlefield but also 
in the administrative capital, which was sometimes threatened. Thus, at the 
present moment, a return to the state of autonomy is regarded as a national 
goal for the Azeris. In this respect, the Azerbaijani leadership is trying in an 
informal way to recognize the identity of NK. In the middle of 1993, Heidar 
Aliev announced that he was ready to accept temporary borders for the 
Karabakhi Armenian separatists.67 However, preparing the internal grounds 
for this has always been a problem and a drawback for Azerbaijani officials, 
especially the lack of national determination, which was due to difficulties with 
the forming of a “national concept” which has placed Azerbaijan in an 
embarrassing situation. The existence of several traditional, autocratic, 
eastern dictatorships, who enjoyed high status under communist 
totalitarianism, caused the Azerbaijanis a lot of trouble when expressing their 
opinions and developing political goals.68  
 
Moreover, the political differences, which were due to the opposing socio-
political groups, deflected attention from the NK conflict onto internal 
problems. In fact, the NK conflict became a struggle for power between the 
political groups. Therefore, the lack of national determination as a result of 
internal differences activated their power system against Armenia which 
enjoyed national unity and integration. For instance, the “Popular Front” made 
every effort to encourage strategic harmony with Turkey and the West and, at 
the same time, radical opposition towards Russia and Iran. This was 
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happening while Elchibey’s aggressively Pro-Turkish bias was alienating both 
the moderate intelligentsia and the ethnic minorities.69  
 
It is fair to say that having such a simple view of the environment and 
interpreting it in such a simplistic way indicated an intense idealism in 
Azerbaijan. Although the era of the “Popular Front” had ended and the 
present regime is moving towards realism, the political division still remains. 
Naturally, if Azerbaijan can bring about internal unity and national 
determination, it will be able to overcome its main behavioural restrictions. 
Since the Azerbaijani effort has reached a deadlock, and progress in the 
political-military arena against the Armenians of NK has proved impossible, 
their main behavioural constraint has remained as it was before. It is certain 
that overcoming this limitation will accelerate and facilitate the achieving of 
the national goal. Another curb on the behaviour of Azerbaijan is its relations 
with Russia and other countries. Despite efforts to alter the effective causes 
of the NK problem, Azerbaijani leaders have always had to confront their own 
limitations and the activities of influential forces in the region, so it is logical 
that they will not be successful in developing their national goals in NK unless 
the restriction is modified or eliminated. 
 
By virtue of its geopolitical location and its strong resources Azerbaijan lies at 
the intersection of Turkish, Russian and Iranian interests.70 Another handicap 
for the economy of Azerbaijan is the seventy years of Soviet hegemony which 
have resulted in serious structural imbalances. For decades, the prime 
emphasis was on production of raw materials such as oil, gas, cotton, and the 
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Azerbaijani economy was heavily dependent on exports to and imports from 
Russia.71 
 
After this brief introduction about Azerbaijani behavioural restrictions, one can 
discuss their attitude towards the factors which shaped its policy regarding 
the NK conflict. The policy concept of the Azerbaijani authorities is that the 
fighting, which began in 1988, was the consequence of Armenian military 
aggression to bring about “Land Separation’ and annexation by Armenia. 
Consequently, the Armenian forces occupied the territories outside of NK, 
and hundreds of thousands of people became homeless in the process. 
Thus, the Azeri authorities called for the Armenian forces to withdraw from 
the occupied territories and for the homeless people to return to their homes. 
The Baku authorities are ready to adopt the best arrangement by their 
government with respect to the NK conflict, the fulfilment of which will be 
determined through the process of talks. Therefore, the principal basis of the 
Azerbaijani position is to maintain its territorial integrity, an issue which 
cannot be negotiated.72 
 
The Azerbaijani authorities have always insisted on the restoration of the 
1988 NK conditions (as explained in chapter 4). Azerbaijan reported the 
measures taken by the Armenians during the occupation as an aggression, 
and tried to gain international support.  
 
Under present conditions, by using the oil element along with the increase in 
the number of foreign oil companies to exploit the Caspian Sea resources, 
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Baku has not only modified its position to settle the NK conflict, but has 
instead aggravated the situation. By inextricably linking the NK conflict to the 
oil and energy pipelines issue, Baku is trying to secure assistance from its 
western associates, and to frustrate the Armenian efforts for recognition of 
the proclaimed Republic of NK. 
 
Heidar Aliev, the Azerbaijani ex-President has announced explicitly that any 
country that helps to settle the NK crisis and to terminate the occupation of 
Azerbaijani territory will have access to the resources of the Caspian Sea. 
However, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Hasan Hasanov, hinted that any 
agreement might be nullified, arguing that the pipeline would cross the 
territory of the countries that supported them in resolving the Karabakh 
problem. He claimed that until the NK issue had been resolved no final 
decision on the route of the pipeline would be taken.73  
 
It can be said that the settlement of the NK conflict and the establishment of a 
stable peace in the region is a fundamental challenge for the Baku 
authorities, primarily to settle the economic problems in the country.  
 
Factors Shaping Armenia’s Policy 
 
The essential doctrine of Armenian foreign policy is to establish ties with all 
countries in the world, especially those in the local area, based on mutual 
respect, and it includes four priorities: 
 To maintain territorial integrity 
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 To establish friendly ties with all neighbouring states  
 To guarantee the security of NK and its residents 
 To participate actively in the new processes of European security 
 
While NK is included in the four essential priorities for Armenian foreign 
policy, “gaining Karabakh” is also a modest goal for the Armenian state74. In 
fact, the national goal of the Republic of Armenia is still to annex NK. After a 
complete occupation of the autonomous region, the Karabakhi people were 
apparently forced on 6th January  1992 to change their objectives and to 
declare independence, and because of the involvement of the international 
community, they relinquished their past slogans. However, on account of 
Armenia’s’s complex behaviour which expresses a national aspiration, we 
cannot be certain that they have desisted from the plan to annex NK.  
 
In these circumstances, the protracted nature of the conflict has consumed 
the resources of the country, but the leaders of the Republic follow the issue 
persistently because of its national importance. So the first priority for 
Armenian foreign policy is the NK issue75 and while there are many facets to 
this policy, all are in some way related to the conflict in NK, whether they are 
economic or political.76 
 
Armenia like Azerbaijan, however, faces some restrictions and problems in 
adopting an appropriate policy and decisions. The political development of 
NK is one of the curbs on the actions of the Armenians. During the first 
period, from 1988 to 1992 Armenia dominated the conduct of the Karabakhis. 
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From the beginning of the second period, from 1992 until now, they have 
shifted their policy. Although they unexpectedly approached Russia for 
support, this development could not be transferred to other aspects of their 
foreign policy. Thus, the kind of leadership which shows no opposition to the 
macro-politics of Yerevan is desirable for Armenia. 
 
Russia constitutes another limitation on Armenian policy as the latter is 
heavily dependent on Russia for security. Iran is another restriction on 
Armenian political diplomacy, considering the 46 km border between Iran and 
Armenia which is of huge strategic significance. We find that Iranian political 
considerations are vitally important and sometimes crucial in the region. This 
led Iran at an early stage - virtually as soon as the two belligerents became 
independent - to offer its good offices to seek a peaceful solution to the 
conflict.77 However, Iran’s mediating role ended after Elchibey’s opposition.78 
 
In short, Armenia’s location in the Caucasus amongst the three powers, 
Russia, Turkey and Iran who are also political rivals has caused some 
limitations to Armenia’s foreign policy, and the leaders of that country are 
forced to make controlled decisions.79 
 
The Republic of Armenia, much like Azerbaijan, has suffered and continues 
to suffer economically as a result of the NK conflict, and if the uncertainty of 
the “no war, no peace” situation continues, there is little hope, especially for 
Armenia, of improving its economic standing. The NK conflict had also made 
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impossible the creation of a larger, regional market for goods that could be 
produced in Armenia.80  
 
Armenia’s vulnerable economic position means that it can afford a long-drawn 
out dispute even less than Azerbaijan.81 On the other hand, following the 
aggravation of the conflict, Armenia is suffering from the effects of economic 
sanctions imposed by Azerbaijan from the east and Turkey from the west. 
This has caused problems for the people in that country, and the survivors of 
1992-1994 war are exposed to serious danger. Moreover, foreign trade has 
had an insignificant role in the economy of the country and the industrial yield 
has been 63 per cent of GDP. 82  These conditions along with sanctions 
against transportation and energy paint a sorrowful picture of Armenia. One 
of the consequences of the sanctions has been widespread unemployment. 
Thus, in 1993, out of a total population of 3.7 million people, only 1.7 million 
of the working-age population was employed; though, according to an official 
statistic of the Armenian government, the unemployment rate in that year was 
estimated at 5.4 per cent.   
 
It is fair to say that this figure is unreliable, because in January 1994, 
unemployment in Armenia was reported by UNICEF at 59 per cent, or equal 
to one million individuals.83 These conditions forced the residents to leave the 
country in such great numbers to obtain jobs that emigration became one of 
the national security issues of that country.84 At the present time, about 20 
per cent of the population has moved abroad. Experts have predicted that 
emigration will continue for the next decade.  Regardless of any discussion 
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about the verity or untruth of these statistics, what is obvious is that 
emigration will not stop until the tangible benefits of economic growth are 
experienced by the population.85 
 
80 per cent of government financial income is provided by taxation. Foreign 
aid to the Armenians (Spiurka) was considerable during the first years of 
independence, but, when the Spiurka were informed about the financial 
corruption of some sectors of the government and the embezzlement of 
foreign aid, they shifted their funds to provide investments. Anyhow, Spiurka 
has had an undisputed role in the development of Armenia’s economy and 
policies.86 For example at the time of transition to a market economy, the 
diaspora’s financial support played a key role in the recovery of the economy 
in 1994-1999. 
 
Briefly, because of these problems and restrictions, Ter-Petrossian, the 
Armenian ex-President, was convinced during the last year of his Presidency 
(1997) that the Karabakhi request regarding either annexation or 
independence was consistent with the present realities and conditions. The 
proclamation of the Republic of Karabakh has not been recognized by the 
international community, and the material-spiritual support by the Republic of 
Armenia may have brought about negative and irretrievable consequences 
for Armenia’s economy. He also construed that the NK issue was the reason 
for the disarray in the Armenian economy. In one of his news conferences, 
Ter-Petrossian announced to the Armenians that they must choose either 
economic prosperity or NK, since their welfare was dependent upon 
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establishing peace in NK.87 Both of these conditions could not be achieved 
together. For some reason, he appointed Robert Kocharian – the incumbent 
President of the Proclaimed Republic of Karabakh - as the Armenian Prime 
Minister. Ter-Petrossian accepted a phased approach to the conflict which 
had been proposed by the Minsk Group in September 1997. He decided to 
compromise and settle the dispute, but he resigned under pressure because 
the members of his cabinet – Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, Defence 
Minister, Vazgen Sargsian, and Minister of the Interior and Security, Serge 
Sargsian, opposed his acceptance, arguing that the proposal was not to the 
benefit of Armenia and Karabakh.88 
 
In March 1998, after Kocharian had become Armenian President with the 
support of the Nationalist Party, and those in the government who wanted an 
independent NK, the policy of aiding NK was propounded more than ever 
before, as a traditional concept. Kocharian also expressed his opposition with 
the phased solution after he was elected. Azerbaijan had also accepted this 
solution at that time. Kocharian asked the Mink Group to find an all-out 
solution. However, Kocharian also understood, like Ter-Petrossian, that by 
this policy of prolonging the conflict, Armenian advantages would be devoted 
to the interests of NK. The policy of not normalizing relations with Turkey and 
the unquestioning support for NK are not acceptable to the people of 
Armenia.  
 
At the present time, Armenian officials are trying to maintain their authority in 
NK, by a variety of means.  For example, they have tried to influence the 
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military structure of Karabakhi Armenians through their own Defence Ministry 
so as to prevent them carrying out the harsh military actions which could be 
carried out, if need be, by the appointed government. By taking advantage of 
NK’s economic dependency on Armenia, they have increased their influence 
on NK.  
 
Yerevan sets the price for NK staple food commodities by controlling the 
routes leading ininto Karabakh. In the meantime, their financial contribution to 
the NK annual budget is another of Armenia’s controlling forces. However, 
internal developments in Armenia are still under NK control, in the sense that 
many Armenian officials are from Karabakh. The Armenian authorities believe 
that their power is somehow related to the settlement of NK 
 
Factors Shaping the Policy of the Proclaimed Republic of Nagorno 
Karabakh 
 
The Karabakhi Armenians have a considerable and decisive role in the 
conflict. Although, the Armenians of Armenia and NK have the same 
interpretation regarding the NK conflict, we can observe occasional 
differences between Yerevan and Stepanakert and we must consider the 
possibility that these differences may become strategic problems in the 
future. As mentioned before, the development of the conflict from the 
viewpoint of Yerevan-Stepanakert relations covers two distinct periods. In the 
first period, 1989 to 1992, NK maintained its political stance in Armenia and at 
the same time followed Yerevan and conducted its political diplomacy in the 
guise of Armenian policy.  
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During this period, the dominant idea in Stepanakert and Yerevan was the 
annexation of NK by Armenia. This was even approved by the Armenian 
Supreme Council. At that time, the slogan “one nation, one state”, which was 
chosen by the leaders of the NK Committee, was strongly supported by 
Armenia and gave them power in the short term. Also during that phase 
which we can call the period of the emergence of emotion and nationalism, 
Yerevan confronted lots of problems resulting from sanctions, but sustained 
NK by providing fuel and foodstuffs. The whole of Karabakh and some 
regions of Azerbaijan were gradually occupied by the Karabakhis, and 
Karabakhi leadership achieved power and then political differences arose 
between Yerevan and Stepanakert.  
 
After the declaration of independence by the Autonomous NK in 1992, the 
conflict changed into a regional one. In the second period, the Karabakhi 
Armenians established direct contact with Russia because they believed this 
approach to Russia was needed as they would be able to play a key role in 
solving the dispute. In this connection, the Dashnaks 89  stood for a close 
relationship with Russia and in particular with the centrist political forces such 
as the Civic Union.90 The Karabakhis believed at that time that appealing to 
Russia could release them from different pressures The NK policy was to 
persuade the Russians to support their demands. On that occasion, it was not 
also acceptable to Yerevan that the Russians should support NK 
independence directly. 
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 Another obstacle for the proclaimed Republic of NK was their unrecognized 
position. They were trying to legalize their numerous successes and victories, 
such as those on the battlefield over the Azeris. The Armenians believed that 
the achieving of such a goal was more important than political guarantees. 
 
At its inaugural session in January 1992, NK's new legislature adopted a 
declaration of independence, which was not recognized by the international 
community as it was not able to alter the framework of the nation-state, which 
was the basis of the contemporary international system. Moreover, Russia 
together with the CIS and other regional nations, did not support the idea of 
independence for NK because this development could cause a revolution 
within the framework of the regional states, especially in states such as 
Georgia, Ukraine and even Russia. Thus, the Karabakhi goal remained 
suspended because of these restrictions. However, despite the political 
problems and constraints and their ambiguous goals and stances, the 
Karabakhis continued to try and achieve their goal. They also demanded 
Karabakh be legally recognized and subject to International Law, while on the 
other hand, they spoke about unity with Armenia. 91  Regarding the 
developments during the past few years, especially the sensitivity of the 
international community and some regional states, the Karabakhis not only 
did not relinquish the subject of annexation by Armenia, but gradually became 
convinced that achieving independence was impossible. Thus, according to 
their last position, they discussed the idea of a broad and conditional 
autonomy. If this strategy succeeded, Karabakh would be independent in 
practice and not just nominally. Thus, they called for an autonomy which 
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included a horizontal relationship with Baku. Moreover, other Karabakhi 
conditions included the guaranteeing of their security by the international 
community and the protection of the Lachin connective channel with Armenia. 
 
The Position of the Parties over the Disputed Issues 
 
In this section, we review the disputed issues and consider the viewpoints of 
both parties regarding the settlement of the NK conflict. The most significant 
issues in this respect are: the occupied territories; the issue of refugees; the 
homeless and security; as well as NK political status or identity. These issues 
are directly dependent on the conflict and result from it. They are also inter-
connected. 
 
The Occupied Territories  
 
One of the most significant issues in the settlement process of the NK 
conflict, and which has always been followed seriously by Azerbaijani 
leaders, is the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which were taken over by 
Armenian forces in 1993. 
 
These territories include eight regions in the west and southwest of 
Azerbaijan, namely Kalbajar, Zangilan, Qubadli, Jabrail, Fizuli, Aghdam, 
Shusha and Lachin. In all the bilateral and multilateral negotiations, 
Azerbaijan has always condemned Armenia’s violation of Azerbaijani lands 
and called for an immediate and unconditional evacuation by Armenian forces 
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from the occupied areas and for the Azeri refugees and homeless to be 
returned to their homeland.92 Azerbaijan believes that about 20 per cent of its 
land has been occupied by the Armenian forces, and thus one million Azeri 
refugees have to live in makeshift camps. For the Baku authorities, returning 
the occupied territories has been viewed as a prerequisite to the solution of 
other key problems, including the legal status of Karabakh.93 Former Azeri 
Foreign Minister, Hasan Hasanev even went so far as to say that any talk of 
political settlement was a “political bluff” unless Armenia freed Azerbaijani 
land.94 
 
On the contrary, the Armenian position regarding the occupied territories, 
except Shusha and Lachin, is abundantly clear as they believe that the 
survival of the Karabakhis lies in keeping these regions. While they accept 
Azerbaijani ownership over the said regions, they state that freeing them is 
dependent upon solving the problem of the legal status of NK.95 Besides, 
having regained certain strategic heights, they fear that any unilateral return 
could be used by Azerbaijan as a means to halt the talks and restart the 
war.96 Furthermore, this issue is compounded by the ambiguity of the border 
positions to which their armed forces are to be withdrawn, and this is also 
unacceptable to the Armenians.97  
 
Obviously, the Armenians are ready to liberate the occupied areas outside of 
NK, such as Aghdam, Fizuli, Jabrail, Kalbajar, Qubadli, Zangilan, if they 
achieve their goals. But they state that their continued possession of Shusha, 
inside NK and Lachin which provides them with a land bridge to Armenia, is 
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not negotiable. For Azerbaijan, the loss of both regions is unacceptable.98 
Clearly Armenia has a clear advantage at the current time compared to 
Azerbaijan. 
 
Since, the Karabakhi position regarding Shusha and Lachin is different from 
other occupied regions, and because of the strategic importance of these two 
regions, it is necessary to discuss them separately.  
 
Lachin 
 
At the present time, the only land connection between the Republic of 
Armenia and the Proclaimed Republic of NK is the Lachin corridor. It is a vital 
and strategic area and is the main link between Armenia and NK. The town of 
Lachin and the surroundings play an important and strategic role in this 
regard. Before occupation by Armenians on 15th May 1992, the name of 
Lachin was Abdaliyar.  It was under the control of Armenia.  This corridor was 
opened in 1992, and the 11 million dollars (US) construction costs were 
donated by the Armenian diaspora mainly from Europe and the United 
States.99 This passage plays a vital role for the Armenians because it not only 
connects Armenia and NK, but also links NK with other countries. The 
Karabakhis showed no compromise when liberating this region because it 
provides a strategic tie with Armenia and overseas territories. On the other 
hand, considering that one of the most fundamental Armenian demands is the 
need for the international community to provide security guarantees for the 
Karabakhis, the Armenians make every effort to keep the Lachin corridor 
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because they regard it as a vital guarantee of their security.  During the 
Soviet period, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast existed as an 
enclave which was separated from Armenia by the Lachin province. At its 
nearest point, Karabakh was separated from Armenia by only nine 
kilometres.100  
 
Today, the officials of Stepanakert will not consent, under any circumstances, 
to becoming an enclave once more. But on the other hand, the Republic of 
Azerbaijan strongly rejects any change in its territorial integrity. 101  Vafa 
Guluzade has illustrated the point in the following way: You understand it if 
Britain began to say “we can no longer be an island; we have to be connected 
with dry land. We have, therefore, to build a bridge to France and take a 
piece of France’s territory.”102 The officials of Yerevan prefer Lachin to be 
either part of NK, or at least be under the control of their forces. But this is 
unacceptable to Azerbaijan. The Baku officials insist that Lachin be 
demilitarized, that “refugees” be allowed to return and that formal Azerbaijani 
control over the corridor be restored. In return they would introduce a 
humanitarian link (sometimes referred to as a transit corridor) manned and 
controlled by international observers acting as guarantors.103  
 
It should be mentioned that the matter of a 99-year lease of Lachin to 
Karabakh was recommended by Boris Yeltsin in 1995, but it was rejected.104 
While it was initially resisted by Stepanakert, the Karabakhis have recently 
been more amenable to the idea. They have even mooted exchanging an 
(unspecified) part of Karabakh territory, in return for Lachin.105 Alternatively, 
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the possibility of Kalbajar, to the north of Lachin, providing a crucial link with 
Armenia has been raised.106 In this respect, Paul Goble posed the plan for a 
“territorial swap”, followed by access corridors from NK to Armenia, in return 
for Azerbaijani access to Nakhchivan. If it accepted this strategy, Armenia 
would require it either to hand over some lands in return, or to grant 
unilaterally the occupied regions plus the Megri area to Azerbaijan, instead of 
NK. Some Armenian intellectuals consider the carrying out of this solution as 
a form of suicide. According to what is mentioned above, the Lachin corridor 
is a critical and very important part in the settlement of the conflict.  
 
The Azeris are unwilling to compromise over the issue of the restoration of 
the occupied territories, especially Lachin, as it is entirely Azeri-populated. 
The mediators recommended that the Lachin corridor should be controlled by 
international peacekeepers. But it seems that if this solution is accepted by 
the conflicting parties, it will cause problems and complications because, in 
this respect, some regional powers like Iran and Russia oppose the presence 
of American, Israeli or western European forces in the region.  
   
Shusha  
 
Shusha is another zone that the Armenians need to keep in order to 
guarantee their security. In fact, the Karabakhis believe that Shusha is an 
inseparable part of NK and is of geo-strategic importance for them. In their 
view, the only problem for Azerbaijan is the Azeri refugees. But its liberation 
and return to Azerbaijan would reduce the status of Karabakh security. It is 
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obvious that Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has no reason to agree to the 
cession of part of its country which has considerable political, military and 
cultural importance for the Azeris. 
 
Based upon the commitments of the Stepanakert authorities to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Karabakhis guaranteed the 
safe return of the refugees and IDPs.107 But there is some ambiguity about 
repatriating the refugees to Shusha. This strategic city (the population was 
primarily Azeris before the war) is located at the top of a mountainous area 
and is totally controlled by Stepanakert. It was from Shusha that Azeri heavy 
weaponry bombarded the Karabakh capital, at the beginning of the war in 
1991-1992. The “liberation” of Shusha (Shushi to the Armenians), on 10th 
May 1992, marked a highly symbolic gain (victory) for the Karabakhis, but for 
the Azeris it was a terrible psychological blow. 108  Stepanakert fears the 
restoration of Azeri administrative control over Shusha and the effects this 
could have on the future sustainability of Karabakh. Troop withdrawal and the 
return of Azeri IDPs, in their eyes, are counted as a threat.109  
 
An idea propounded by the (former) Minsk Group co-Chairman of the OSCE, 
Kazimirev on the future status of Shusha was that: “Shusha should not be a 
city inhabited by a single ethnic group; it should be transformed into a 
historic-cultural centre, a symbol of coexistence between the two nations and 
their religions.” 110  It should be mentioned that the Azeri authorities have 
proposed that they allow Armenian refugees to return to Shaumian (which 
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was an Armenian community before the war and is now under the control of 
the Azeris), in exchange for returning their own refugees to Shusha 
     
Refugees   
 
According to a UN estimate made during the recent war that took place from 
February 1988 to May 1994, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NK, 
approximately 800,000 to one million Azeris became refugees. 111  During 
1991-1994, 620,000 refugees escaped from the western part of Azerbaijan 
where the military operations resulting from the NK conflict were continuing. 
The number of Azeris who were banished between 1988 and 1991 was 
198,000.112 As of 31st December 1993, the Azerbaijani government reported 
that there were in total 778,000 internally-displaced persons resulting from 
the NK conflict.113 
 
Considering that refugees experience critical and difficult conditions in the 
camps and that the Azerbaijani government faces numerous problems for 
their resettlement and accommodation, the Baku authorities believe that in 
the first stage of the peace process, the return of the refugees must be 
negotiated. Therefore, they call for the withdrawal of the Armenian forces 
from the occupied regions, and then the way will be paved for returning the 
refugees to their homes. Also taking into consideration the complication of the 
resolution to define the legal-political status of NK, the Baku authorities 
announced in 1993 that they were ready to solve this complicated problem at 
the next stage. This position taken by Baku was based on the proposition of 
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the Minsk Group of the OSCE, regarding a phased approach to the conflict. 
The UN Security Council through four resolutions - 822, 853, 874 and 884 - 
stressed in 1993 the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied 
territories and prepared the ground for returning the refugees.114 
 
In contrast, the Armenian authorities have their own position regarding the 
return of refugees. Taking into account their improved situation as a result of 
the military victories, they remained silent in regards to the UN Resolutions, 
and furthermore expressed their opposition to the peace plan proposed by 
the Minsk Group. Thus the Armenians believed that the refugee problem had 
to be solved through a complete and comprehensive plan whereby the 
returning of the Azeri and Armenian refugees, together with their security en 
route and during their residence, should be considered at the same time. In 
this respect, Arkadiy Gukasyan, the President of the Proclaimed Republic of 
NKK announced in 1997: “I believe that all refugees must have the right to 
return voluntarily to their homes and when I speak about refugees, I mean 
absolutely everyone, including the 500,000 Armenians who fled 
Azerbaijan.” 115  The Armenians claimed the conflict has caused a huge 
displacement of people, including 345,000 of their countrymen, who lived in 
Azerbaijan before 1988, and sought asylum in Karabakh, Armenia and other 
countries from 1988 to 1991.116 
 
The Armenians also claimed that from June to August 1992, following the 
Azerbaijani forces’ occupation, more than 20,000 Armenians escaped from 
Shahumian to the Mardakert regions. In the meantime, 154,000 Azeris left 
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Armenia. Also 418,000 Karabakhis, including 38,000 Azeris were obliged to 
leave the regions where military operations were ongoing. It should be 
mentioned that the figures vary according to the different sources. On the 
Azerbaijani side, 185,000 people left Armenia itself, and a further 45,000 
came directly from NK.117 As stated by the same source, more than 500,000 
Azeris became refugees in the occupied regions around NK. According to 
Armenian sources, 91,000 out of a total 447,000 Azeri refugees were settled 
in the houses of Armenians who left their properties during the war and the 
others were sheltered in refugee camps and other centres. Meanwhile, the 
official United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website 
announced that over 60,000 Azeri refugees had gone back to their homes 
near the war zone and more than 50 per cent of them had been settled in 
temporary camps.118  However, based on the Armenian position, the safe 
return of the refugees would be possible only when the political and 
administrative conditions of the region to which they were returning, had been 
defined.    
 
Security  
 
Security is the most significant priority in the peace process for Armenia and 
for NK. Here, Armenia defines it as an international guarantee for the assured 
safety of the Armenians who reside in NK. In fact, they are extremely 
concerned about the security of Karabakhi residents since peace was 
achieved. During the past few years under ceasefire conditions, Karabakhi 
Armenians have not had any problem in this respect, because both sides 
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have observed the provisions of the ceasefire agreement. Based on this 
accord between the conflicting parties in 1994, a contact line was set up 
between their forces and defensive structures were established along the 
line. According to the agreement, no one has the right to break the line, 
except in a situation where they have sustained heavy losses. Also, although 
there have been no military observers or peacekeeping forces stationed 
there, both sides have complied with the ceasefire provisions.  
 
The Karabakhis believe that both sides are keeping faith with the armistice 
agreement and continuing the “no war, no peace” conditions because of the 
balance in military forces and equipment. In other words, the Armenians 
believe that the non-violation of the ceasefire is because Azerbaijan is not 
certain about the end of the fighting otherwise they would have no hesitation 
in recommencing hostilities. The Armenians are trying to suggest that they 
will not begin a second war, because the reinforcing of military units and the 
access to strategic military positions, which have been achieved through the 
occupation of Azerbaijani territories, makes it unnecessary to restart the 
war.119 NK refuses to withdraw from the occupied territories, because it views 
this as a means of ensuring its own security and as a lever in the peace 
talks.120 
 
Stepanakert has remained in this position from the outset as any kind of 
change or modifications to the contact line, made through territorial advances 
depends solely on international security guarantees. According to the 
Armenian view, an acceptable international guarantee would be feasible 
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merely by establishing a buffer zone and deploying multinational 
peacekeepers.121 Another issue in respect to the security of the Karabakhis, 
is that in any political agreement, the Karabakhis intended to claim the right to 
use foreign forces (from Armenia), if Azerbaijan restarted the war. In other 
words, the Karabakhis called for the legitimizing of Armenia’s military support 
in the case of Azerbaijani aggression against NK. This means that an 
Azerbaijani assault on NK would be regarded as an attack on Armenia.122 But 
the Azerbaijani authorities do not intend to submit to this Karabakhi demand 
and they even want the Karabakhi military forces to be disbanded after the 
agreement.123  
 
It should be mentioned that in the summer of 1993, the Minsk Group 
mediators reached several solutions with the parties in dispute about the 
basics of setting up a buffer zone and the deployment of peacekeepers. They 
even assigned the necessary budget for the peacekeeping forces. In this 
respect, a group of experts was commissioned to prepare the plan and the 
ground to bring the agreement into effect. According to the OSCE, after UN 
approval and the final peace agreement between the conflicting parties, 3,000 
multinational peacekeepers were to be deployed in the region.124       
 
Legal-Political Status of Nagorno Karabakh  
 
The most important and complicated issue in the peace talks is the final 
political status of NK when the situation is resolved. Azerbaijan insists that the 
status of Karabakh should be “accommodated” within the framework of the 
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territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Armenia and Karabakh insist that the latter’s 
status should be defined from a “clean sheet.”125 The Karabakhis also stress 
that NK has never been within Azerbaijan, but rather there were two 
independent states in the territory of the former Azerbaijani Soviet Republic, 
and both seceded at the same time from the Soviet Union, according to the 
principle of “the right to self-determination” mentioned in the Constitution of 
the Soviet Union.126 Although the Armenian side does not intend to recognize 
Azerbaijani territorial integrity, in 1988 the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast was a constituent part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic; in 
1918 Karabakh was, at least according to the Armenian side, an autonomous 
entity (albeit disputed) within Armenia.127 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan is opposed to any solutions, except a broad 
autonomy for NK. In his visit to the United States during his speech for 
students in July 1997, Heidar Aliev explicitly stated that “we will not allow a 
second Armenian state to be created on the territory of Azerbaijan, nor will 
the world community, the global society, allow this. Nevertheless, we are 
prepared to grant Nagorno Karabakh (within Azerbaijan) the very highest 
powers and very highest status.”128  
 
On the other hand, NK and Armenia reject any peace plan in which 
Stepanakert-Baku relations are “vertical” and NK is within the realm of 
Azerbaijan and its hegemony. Moreover, NK insists on a solution in which 
Stepanakert would have a direct relationship with Armenia and the world and 
this would be incorporated in the NK political status. In short, under no 
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circumstances will NK accept any solution which forces it to return to its 
former position as an enclave. They believe that the proposed solution might 
have repercussions for the present political realities. This means that the 
Proclaimed Republic of NK has kept its independent status for more than a 
decade. During that time, NK has retained all the characteristics and 
elements of sovereignty, because Karabakh was a defined territory with a 
permanent population which also enjoyed an elected government. Indeed, 
Karabakh is de facto independent, while the Republic of Azerbaijan only lays 
stress on a broad autonomy, which is in itself ambiguous.   
 
In short, the legal and political standing of NK, and the issue as to whether to 
be independent or part of Azerbaijani territory, is the main question. It must 
be said that, in 1998 the Minsk Group mediators proposed a “Common State” 
to solve this problem. It meant that Azerbaijan and NK would be a joint 
confederation. At the same time, they would be separate but have 
coordinated political units. Armenia accepted this proposition but Azerbaijan 
did not, because its authorities believed that this plan prevented them from 
restoring the territorial integrity of their country, and they believed this was the 
same as creating the Independent State of Karabakh – a position they were 
totally opposed to.129  
 
As we can see, the legal-political identity of NK is very complicated, because 
any proposal needs to consider carefully the old and new conditions of the 
region, the demands of the conflicting parties and numerous historical and 
contemporary facts. What is clear is that there is no easy solution. In addition, 
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there are other issues such as the withdrawal of military forces from the 
occupied territories and their demilitarization to create a security mechanism 
to resettle the refugees of both sides safely and permanently to guarantee the 
physical security of the Karabakh population. All these are issues that have 
resulted directly from the conflict and are inter-related. 
 
As mentioned above, Armenia and NK emphatically call for a comprehensive 
solution, not a phased one. Therefore, the aforementioned issues cannot be 
solved in phases or in isolation before the final agreement over NK’s political 
status. However, despite differences about the conflict, the parties in dispute 
undertake to seek a peaceful solution based on compromise. They have 
struck some agreements as well. The first breakable but very significant 
accord was their fulfilment of the ceasefire and the stability of the 
battlegrounds from 1994 up to the present, without any international security 
and peacekeeping forces. This confirms the good intentions of the 
antagonists. The exchange of prisoners of war in May 1996 is another 
example of agreement between the two parties. These steps indicate that 
reaching a compromise to settle the conflict is possible.        
 
The current position taken by Azerbaijan, Armenia and NK regarding the 
conflict is based on their views in the past few years and during the war. 
Azerbaijan insists on the restoration of its territorial integrity, implying the 
return of the lands occupied by the Armenians, including both NK itself and its 
neighboring territories. The Karabakh Armenians, backed by Armenia, view 
the ideal solution as the granting of independence and international 
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recognition to the Republic of NK, which would include the Lachin corridor. 
They reject any solution in which NK would fall within the (even nominal) 
jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. More importantly, they refuse to enter into “vertical” 
relations with Azerbaijan. Therefore, the minimal solution the Karabakh 
Armenians are ready to accept is a form of union, confederation or federation 
which would guarantee Armenia and NK unrestricted contact opportunities130, 
because, as State Advisor to the Azerbaijani President, Vafa Guluzade 
commented, in autumn of 1996, “a confederation means an independent 
state.”131 
 
As mentioned above, independence or unification with Armenia is still the 
ultimate goal for the NK Armenians. In fact, in negotiations they have the 
upper hand by dint of the fact that this has in practice already been achieved 
and therefore any other solution would be a concession to the other side.132 
On the other hand, Azerbaijan is not ready to allow the partitioning of its 
territory and refuses to grant NK the right to secession but is prepared to give 
the Karabakhis “the highest degree of self-rule and autonomy”, claiming it 
would be less than independence but more than autonomy. This proposition, 
however, remains on an abstract level only, and there is a need to articulate it 
and translate it into a clear proposal. When asked about the details of the 
Azerbaijani position, officials are unwilling to divulge them during 
negotiations. Azerbaijan’s position is that NK would enjoy self-rule but no role 
in foreign affairs, defence or nation-level taxation.  
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As regards the thorny question of the NK army, the Azerbaijani Foreign 
Minister, Tofiq Zulfugarov, was unequivocal and somewhat ironic: “In any 
form of solution within the framework of the Azerbaijani state, what would be 
the need for a separate Nagorno-Karabakh army? Against whom would it be 
directed? Obviously, Azerbaijan. Can you have within one state two separate 
armies which are moreover confronting each other? Give me an example of 
any such solution that works, and we shall study it.”133 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that Azerbaijan has not clarified its position and its 
vision of the future of NK lying within Azerbaijan’s borders is a problem. It is 
also a fact that when asked about details, the Azeris – their intellectuals, 
journalists or government officials – seldom offer a coherent view of what 
such a “broad autonomy” would mean in practice. This, in turn, further 
increases the Karabakh Armenian’s suspicion that Azerbaijan has no 
intention of giving NK any real autonomy in the long run.134  
 
Thus, Karabakh officials put the problem as follows: “There are many 
different levels of autonomy, the highest being independence. Azerbaijan has 
to decide which one it is talking about. Is it Bosnia, Tatarestan, or what? The 
problem is that they are unwilling to specify their proposal.”135 
 
It must be said that Robert Kocharian, the President of the Proclaimed 
Republic of NK, voiced his interest in discussing a “loose confederation with 
Azerbaijan”. He also endorsed this plan, reiterating that Karabakh must be 
accorded equal status with Baku in such a confederation.136 In other words, 
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the insistence of Stepanakert remains the subject of what the Armenian side 
terms “horizontal” relations with Azerbaijan. Consequently, the positions of 
the parties remain relatively distant, because a horizontal relationship with 
Baku was a precondition which was virtually laid down by the Karabakhis. On 
the other hand, Armenia’s government has advocated a confederal or federal 
solution. For this reason, the Azerbaijani government also stipulated a 
precondition for the negotiations which was the acceptance of its territorial 
integrity. Neither the Karabakhis nor the Azerbaijani authorities will 
compromise over their preconditions, hence the deadlock.137   
 
Finally, it must be said that, although in the peace process, including the 
multilateral negotiations in the presence of mediators and face-to-face talks 
between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, little information was 
made public and the idea of a compromise between the conflicting parties as 
regards their fundamental positions seems improbable. The remarks about 
the need to resume negotiations from “point zero”, made by Ilham Aliev, the 
Azerbaijani President, after taking office in October 2003, adds to this belief.  
 
According to the statements of Velayat Guliev, the Azerbaijani Foreign 
Minister, the opposing parties have not reached any full agreement on any 
principle. Therefore, Azerbaijan has the right to resume negotiations from 
point zero. This indicates that a settlement is still a distant one.138 
 
Vartan Oskanian, the Armenian Foreign Minister announced in 2004, that as 
before, the stances of Yerevan and Baku are different.139 It was only to be 
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expected that in the two rounds of negotiations between Ilham Aliev and his 
Armenian counterpart on 10th - 11th February 2006, nobody envisaged any 
progress. In other words, it is improbable that they arrived at any agreement 
during that time. Thus, in the present circumstances, the status of the conflict 
is the same as the time when it began and the positions of the parties have 
not shifted. But some political observers and mediators believe that in the last 
round of negotiations between the Azerbaijani ex-President and his Armenian 
counterpart, especially in Key West, they achieved some progress and 
reached some conclusions.140 
 
However, because one of the Presidents did not observe the agreements, 
they were abandoned, so the two sides must resume the peace talks with this 
difference that the demands and goals of the conflicting parties will not be 
able to accomplish as much as today’s. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is fair to conclude that this conflict has stifled the social and economic 
status of Armenia and Azerbaijan for over two decades and this situation 
seems set to continue for the foreseeable future for the people of these two 
countries. Both countries, but particularly Azerbaijan, are centralized states, 
and corruption, lack of transparency, poverty, the security of the refugees, 
unemployment and migration are the main problems. The refugees still 
depend on international organizations for support and most Azeri refugees 
are still displaced. The most significant issues related to this conflict such as 
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occupied territories, refugees and security are not answered and solved and 
there is no political will to bring about a final solution. 
 
One of the peculiarities of this dispute is that there are disagreements over 
which countries are actually involved. This is the main reason why the conflict 
has not undergone a clear legal and political assessment by the 
corresponding international organizations and scholars. There is no clear 
definition as to whether this conflict is intra- or inter-state. To be able to 
address the fundamental problems of this conflict there is a need for a clear 
explanation of the interests of the different parties involved in the clash, which 
we have seen above. 
 
Armenia has indicated that the conflict is between Azerbaijan and the 
Armenians living in the NK region. Based on this thesis, the Armenian 
government has refused to recognize the independence of NK and has also 
stated that it agrees with any resolution that is accepted by the Karabakhis. 
 
The Azeris, on the other hand, do not agree with this position. They believe 
Armenia is directly involved in this conflict and they identify Armenia as an 
aggressor. As the late Azerbaijani President indicated in December 1997: 
“Azerbaijan will not acknowledge Karabakh Armenians as an entity separate 
from Armenia.”141 
 
In 1997 the Step-by-Step plan was proposed by the OSCE calling for the 
withdrawal of Armenians from the occupied Azeri territories except for Lachin 
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which links NK with Armenia. In addition, this proposal demanded a full return 
of refugees and the lifting of economic embargoes before the negotiations 
regarding the status of Karabakh could proceed. 
 
Azerbaijan and, after some hesitation, Armenia both accepted the plan, but 
the Karabakh Armenian authorities rejected this proposal and demanded that 
the independence and security of NK should be guaranteed before any talks 
could start.142 
 
President Ter-Petrosian accepted this proposal and by doing so caused a lot 
of controversy and protest in Armenia. These demonstrations were a major 
contributory factor to his resignation in 1997 and resulted in the election of 
Robert Kocharian who had earlier served as head of Government in 
Karabakh and as Prime Minister of Armenia in 1998. 
 
The Armenians occupied certain territories of Azerbaijan to use as a 
bargaining tool in the negotiations to gain independence for NK. Armenia 
faces internal and external obstacles in defining its national security and 
independent foreign policy. NK, Russia and Iran are the main external 
obstacles.  
 
The presence of hardliners in the Armenian Government indicates that there 
will be no acceptance of any plans which would provide territorial integrity for 
Azerbaijan and compromise the independence of NK. It is also important to 
consider the issues related to the internal security of Armenia.  
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In October 1999, there was a serious incident in Yerevan in which two 
gunmen entered the Parliament building, shooting the Prime-Minister Vezgen 
Sarkisian and other politicians, including the former Presidential candidate 
Karen Demirchian. 143  These two figures were among the most powerful 
politicians in Armenia. The gunmen were individual terrorists and they didn’t 
claim affiliation to any group, although the leader of the assault was identified 
as a previous member of the ARF (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation). 
This party however denied carrying out the attack. 
 
The national security strategy of the Armenian government reveals the basic 
need of the state for survival, perceiving itself as an isolated country in a 
hostile environment and resorting to external assistance as a way of 
strengthening its position.144 
 
The Armenians have had a number of disputes with the Azeris over the 
years. Between 1988 and 1990 - initially in Sumgait, a city close to Baku - 
and later in Baku itself where Armenians were beaten and murdered. The 
Armenians also count the 1915 genocide when one and a half million of them 
were killed in Ottoman Turkey. These historical factors influence their 
perceptions and their security concerns in the conflict. The Armenians almost 
always refer to Azerbaijanis as Turks. 
 
This is why the Armenians are so concerned about their security and insist on 
self-determination and the formation of an independent state. The problem of 
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status is their priority in solving the dispute and they believe they should be 
recognized as an independent state under international law.  
 
Just like other CIS countries, Russia has a great military presence in Armenia 
and uses its energy and power and growing financial capacity to reassert its 
influence. Russian capital has been invested in Armenian 
telecommunications, the banking system and electricity and gas networks.145 
 
Azerbaijan has also been afflicted by economic conditions as a result of the 
NK conflict, and if the “no war, no peace” stalemate continues, there will be 
no hope, especially for Armenia of improving its economic circumstances. 
The NK struggle has made the creation of a larger, regional market for goods 
that could be produced in Armenia impossible.146 
 
Such a heavy Russian presence in Armenia has been repeatedly denounced 
by the opposition who believe that “the Armenian authorities are trying to 
preserve their illegitimate power by selling the nation’s economic facilities.”147 
 
The former Russian representative to the Minsk Group, Mr Kazimirov, on 25th 
April 2002, at the conference on the Formation of Environments for Peace, 
Stability and Trust in the South Caucasus, stated that he had always warned 
the parties involved in the dispute that “God forbid that you should seek a 
solution in the sphere of law. It is a deadlock. The solution can be found in the 
political sphere only. Like it or not, the solution of the Karabakh conflict will 
never be purely juridical; it is likely to be mostly political.”148 This is a clear 
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indication of the Russian position because Kazimirov was at the centre of 
Russian policy during this conflict. 
 
The Republic of Azerbaijan has been able to access additional funds through 
rising oil production. This economic imbalance between the two countries 
certainly has the potential to alter the balance of power in favour of 
Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said in 2004: “I believe we 
should not be in a hurry, we should wait... Azerbaijan will achieve what it 
desires by consolidating the country’s economic potential and settling 
problems connected with this.”149 
 
The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline has been a triumph for Azerbaijan, not only in 
helping the economic development of the country but also in its foreign policy. 
As a non-OPEC source of energy, Azerbaijan will contribute to the European 
energy market. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline contract also enhances the role of 
Azerbaijan in the region. The Azeri authorities believe that this pipeline, which 
became operational in May 2006, will receive support from both the US and 
Europe and will help to strengthen the integrity of their state. 
 
The construction of the pipeline began in September 2002 and was 
inaugurated in mid July. The pipeline has a capacity of 1 billion barrels of oil 
per day. The route is from Azerbaijan, passing through Georgia and Turkey. 
The total length of the pipeline is 1,760km. the cost of building the pipeline 
was $3.9 billion (US). The decision to build the pipeline was taken on 18th 
November  1999 at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul 
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This pipeline promotes competition and diversity by circumventing Iran and 
Russia. The route through Iran and Russia could give them strong economic 
and political leverage. Igor Ivanov said in the Eurasia summit, in New York 
that the pipeline is commercially unprofitable because Azerbaijan does not 
have enough oil for the pipeline. The US was clearly against any route 
through Iran and any Iranian participation. Iran was opposed because of its 
national interest was threatened and the pipeline could affect the balance of 
power. 
 
The pipeline weakened Russian influence in the Caucasus region and it has 
been a counterbalance to Iranian and Russian influence in the region.  
 
The security of this pipeline and the vast gas and oil resources of the region 
are very important to both the European Union and the US who believe that 
oil and gas development can only be secured with peace and stability. The 
Russians and Iranians opposed the contracts. Why did they fail to stop the 
project? They argued that the Baku-Ceyhan had no chance to be operational 
and Iran warned the Azeris that the legal status of the Caspian Sea should be 
agreed upon prior to any exploration help for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline.  
 
The most visible sign of agreement between the US, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey, was expected to lead to a countervailing union between Russia, 
Armenia and Iran. 150  The different strategic interests of the Russian 
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Federation and the European Union and the United States are very 
substantial in the Caucasus. Although the conflict is frozen, it could still 
degenerate into war. 
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Chapter 4: Nagorno Karabakh Geo-Politics: Interests and 
Politics of Outsiders 
 
Introduction 
 
Transcaucasia, or the Caucasus, is one of the most geopolitical, geo-
strategic, ethnographical, historical, and cultural regions in the world, and is 
home to over 50 ethnic nationalities. Comprising a surface area of 440,700 
sq/km, the Caucasus is situated between Russia to the north, the Black Sea 
to the west, the Caspian Sea to the east, and Iran and Turkey to the south. 
Located on the peripheries of Armenia, Turkey and Russia, the region has for 
centuries been an arena for expansionism and political, military, religious and 
cultural rivalries. During its history the Caucasus was incorporated into the 
Iranian world. 180,000 Armenians citizens live in Iran and the two countries 
have cooperated in many areas, including the building of a permanent bridge 
on the Aras River connecting the two countries, an electricity network link, 
and the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia. Armenia’s main 
transport route is via Iran, as both the Turkish and Azerbaijani borders are 
blocked. The other transport route, which is of low quality, is through Georgia. 
 
More than 20 million Azeris live in Iran, over three times the entire population 
of Azerbaijan. The people of both countries are predominantly Shia Muslims 
and culturally they have much in common. When the Armenians attacked 
Nakhijevan in May 1992, Iranian Azeris demonstrated against Armenia. Iran 
has different views concerning Azerbaijani relations with NATO, Israel and 
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the US, as well as the exploitation of oil from the Caspian Sea and the 
pipeline route. In July 2001 Iranian fighters and warships threatened an Azeri 
research ship, operating under contract with British Petroleum in the Caspian 
Sea. 
 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian Empire conquered the 
territory from the Qajars. 151  The historical name of the Caucasus is 
Transcaucasia, from the Russian word zakavkazie, "the area beyond the 
Caucasus Mountains”. These mountains divide the southern area from the 
north, which is part of Russia. 
 
The southern part comprises the sovereign republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. This region serves as a bridge between Asia and Europe and is 
located at the centre of the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-
Asia), which was initiated in May 1993 at a conference in Brussels. It runs 
from London to Tokyo following the Silk Road, the cheapest and shortest 
route between the Far East and Europe. It was financed by the EU under the 
TACIS programme. Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, the region has 
turned to ethno-nationalism and conflict. At present, there are two disputes in 
Georgia and one in NK. Ethno-political rivalry has traditionally been at the 
centre of Caucasian politics: "The internal conflict, fragmentation, and 
marginality tendencies encouraged and exploited by its larger neighbours.”152 
Because of their historic, linguistic and cultural similarities, Azerbaijan has 
considerable economic, cultural, political and trade relations with Turkey as 
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well as with Iran.  Turkey has no diplomatic relations with Armenia and 
supports Azerbaijan in the NK conflict. 
 
The rivalries in this region are so unique that Jones has identified three types: 
firstly, between the regional hegemony of Iran, Turkey, and Russia; secondly 
between the Caucasian states themselves; and thirdly between the nations 
within the states.153 Other powers like the US and EU also have stakes in the 
region. It is an arena of inter-relationships and of different political, security 
and economic interests, none of which are integrated. 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has changed and reshaped the political 
and economic landscape and the security of the Caucasus. Knowledge of the 
political and economic games, as well as an understanding of the interests of 
the players in the conflict is necessary in order to propose a settlement of the 
disputes. 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, powers from near and far were 
attracted to the Caucasus and rivalled each other in an attempt to influence 
the area. Regional developments and especially the existing hostilities were 
the chief pretext for the powers to impose their presence. It is only natural 
that the NK conflict should be the focus of outsiders’ attention because of its 
geopolitical and sensitive location in the Caucasus. This remains true to such 
an extent it can be argued that the settlement of the conflict depends on 
finalizing the conditions governing the sphere of influence of each power in 
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the region. In other words, the role of outsiders in the NK conflict will not only 
determine the result of the disagreement but also the destiny of the region. 
 
It is clear that each power has entered the Caucasus with its own interests 
and strategic goals. Furthermore, outsiders’ perceptions differ regarding the 
regional issues. Because the powers have such contradictory concerns, 
victory for one will result in the exclusion of its rivals. The destiny of the region 
and its current issues, particularly the NK conflict, will correspond to the 
ambitions of that particular outsider. 
 
It is questionable whether Russia, Iran, and Turkey, the US, Europe and the 
UN have all played a substantial role in the conflict. Nevertheless, they have 
had either a direct or an indirect influence on the peace process. In this 
chapter, therefore, the importance of the Caucasus and the positions of 
Russia, Iran and Turkey towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK are discussed 
and it will explore the strategy of the US government and the OSCE towards 
the NK conflict. 
 
The Russian Federation 
 
The Transcaucasus has been a region of vital strategic interest to Russia 
since the 7th century. After two centuries of competition between Persia and 
Ottoman Turkey for influence in the region, the area was absorbed into the 
Tsarist Russian Empire in the 19th century. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the independence of the three republics of the Caucasus, 
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Russia, which dominated the region for nearly 200 years, considers it the 
most vital part of its national security and calls it the “backyard” of its country. 
The interests of Tsarist Russia were originally geopolitical and strategic, i.e. 
geopolitically the Caucasus has a unique role as a natural barrier for Russia 
with its Muslim rivals, and secondly economic, because Baku evolved during 
the second half of the 19th century into one of the world’s most important oil 
resources. These Russian advantages have remained constant and are still 
relevant today.154  
 
However, factors such as weak management, security problems, a crisis in 
the racial-religious groups, economic problems, poverty, joblessness and 
unsuccessful rivalry with the west have caused vital parts of the Trans-
Caucasus to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Only Armenia remains as 
the last secure bastion in the Caucasus region. This has forced Russia to pay 
far too much attention to Armenia as a strategic ally and to protect and help 
the Armenians, especially in the NK conflict.  
 
Unlike in the early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, from 1992 the 
Moscow authorities made efforts to present a harmonious picture to the West, 
but it was not long before geopolitical realities put paid to this image. Robert 
Barlyski’s “From Atlanticist Idealism to Eurasian Realism” found expression 
inter alia in the shift away from a concentration on relations with the West 
towards assigning greater importance to Russia’s evolving policy towards 
Turkey and Iran.155 Most newly independent states were grouped under the 
organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for a variety 
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of reasons but especially because of pressure from Russia. The Russian 
authorities compared their presence and interests in the neighbouring 
republics to the role and position of the US in Central America. In fact, they 
talked about a kind of “Russian Monroe”. According to this, Moscow intends 
to act as a stabilizer and redresser of the balance between the republics 
separated from the Soviet Union.156 Thus, according to the Russians, the 
separated republics of the Soviet Union were to remain under Russia’s 
sphere of influence. It should be noted that the Russian Monroe Doctrine is 
based on the following guidelines: 
 
 To protect Russian minorities beyond the framework defined by 
international law, which includes recognizing Russia’s right to support 
those Russian minorities who live in the independent states of the region; 
recognizing equal rights for Russian-speaking residents in the republics; 
accepting dual citizenship for them and also the equality of the Russian 
language and the native languages in the republics. 
 To support the traditional economic union as a lever exerting economic 
pressure to achieve political goals.  
 To continue paying the enormous subsidy (despite internal problems) and 
even offering sums greater than Russia’s financial aid during the years 
before 1989, so that while Russia herself would receive just 10 billion 
dollars from western sources in 1992, the Commonwealth States and the 
Caucasus would collect a sum of 17 billion dollars credit from Russia.157  
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 To protect Russia’s interests in the oil and gas fields by controlling the 
pipelines and communications and by preventing the creation of parallel 
transportation routes. 
 To use military intervention in the form of peacekeeping forces in the 
racial and political conflicts of the region.  
 To warn foreign countries not to interfere in Russia’s sphere of 
influence.158  
 
It is clear that to Russia, the position of the Caucasus is different from that of 
other parts of the region. It is called “the heart of Russia” because of its 
geopolitical importance and the special role it fulfils in Russia’s national 
security as its natural southern border. Thus it is imperative for the Russians 
to implement their ‘Monroe Doctrine’ with more sensitivity and precision in the 
Caucasus. 
 
Consequently Russia has designated the Caucasus as part of its domain and 
announced explicitly that Moscow has vital interests there. Over the last few 
years the Russians have resorted to using political, economic and military 
leverage to extend their influence in the region. The Trans-Caucasus has 
been a zone of vital strategic interest to Russia since the 17th century. 
However, the real reason for Russia’s power and influence must not be 
attributed entirely to re-establishing its past Empire, but relates to interests 
and concerns created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite 
economic and political problems, Russia has a strong interest in maintaining 
99 
and developing its influence in the region. A few of the reasons are listed 
below:   
 
Strategic and Security Considerations 
 
The Caucasus enjoys high strategic priority for Russia, since its concern 
about the region springs from economic considerations and relates to the 
protection of its identity.  In fact, Russia’s policy in Chechnya showed that it is 
prepared to resort to military measures to maintain its security and integrity. 
Thus the sensitivity towards foreign and neighbouring regions and the 
recourse to similar actions to preserve its security in the region are 
predictable. Russia is aware that the Caucasus has a vital role in the 
perpetuation of the Russian Federation, so any unusual developments there 
are regarded as tantamount to putting the security and territorial integrity of 
the state at risk.  
 
As for the importance of the Caucasus, in creating and consolidating its 
security doctrine Russia has made every effort to take advantage of the crisis 
in the Caucasus to develop its influence and to strengthen its bases and 
military presence. Furthermore, through actions such as developing strike 
forces, organizing frontier guards and establishing new military bases in the 
Caucasus, it has made its military presence more powerful.159   
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Economic Considerations 
 
The Caucasus is also vital for Russia in economic terms and the main issue 
is “oil”. Russia views its hegemony as essential to allow the exploitation of 
natural resources such as oil and gas from the Caspian.160 Oil is important to 
Russians in three ways: first, the Russian oil structure ties in with this region; 
second, the presence of foreign elements during the exploitation and 
exploration operations; and third, the position of oil exploitation in supplying 
the international markets.161 
 
The Caucasus Transportation Role for Russia 
 
The Caucasus is a key corridor and transportation route linking Russia to the 
sea. In some ways this is a strategic advantage. Firstly Russia, unlike the 
Soviet Union, has a limited shoreline on the Black Sea; secondly, the Black 
Sea joins the Mediterranean by way of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; 
and thirdly, the Caucasus is the key to Russian relations with the Middle East. 
In comparison to the Soviet Union, Russia has less influence and power in 
the Middle East. However, it has interests there, and the Caucasus provides 
key access to that area.162 
      
Russians’ Racial Ties in the Region 
 
The presence of about 25 million Russians in the republics of Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, who occupy sensitive positions, is an important factor in 
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maintaining Russian influence in the region. Thus supporting Russian citizens 
and their interests is very important to Russia.163   
  
To Fill the Power Vacuum 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in the region. It caused 
the regional and supra-regional states to make extensive efforts to exert 
influence in the area considered by the Russians to be a vital component of 
their interests, creating an intolerable situation for Russia. Through political, 
economic and military means, Russia showed an interest in dominating the 
region. The remarks of Boris Yeltsin at the beginning of 1994 were an 
example of this attempt to fill the power vacuum: “Historically and 
economically we are joined so that in practice we cannot live separately and 
we all share the same destiny.”164  
 
It is clear that Russia has had different goals and interests in the region at 
various times: both in the short- and the long-term, for instance by using 
economic or political tools to impose its influence on neighbouring Asian 
countries and states in strategic and economic positions, such as Iran, 
Turkey, and Afghanistan. Even after the evacuation of their army from the 
area, the maintenance of a significant military presence must be considered a 
long-term strategic goal for the Russians.165    
 
Russia’s relations with the former republics, i.e. the newly independent states 
during recent years clearly show the constant efforts made by Moscow to 
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retain an all-out connection and to create and foster a new network of mutual 
relations.  At the same time, by using this effective lever it has always sought 
to confront the influence of outsiders in the region.166 Russia’s prevention of 
Turkey from intervening in the NK conflict and its warning that military 
intervention in the Caucasus by Turkey might lead to World War III shows 
that Russia does not tolerate the interference of other states in a region it 
considers its own domain. For example, Mikhail Demurin, the spokesman of 
the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated in 1992 that Russia was responsible for 
establishing peace and stability in the region, as well as improving the living 
conditions of the people who lived either in Russia or in the neighbouring 
states, while preserving their territorial integrity.167    
 
As for Russia’s leverage, the state uses various forms of enforcement in the 
region, the most important and effective of which is military pressure. 
Considering that Russia possesses the greatest army and military might in 
the area, and that the newly independent republics lack the necessary power 
to protect their borders, this is the most significant lever and the main tool for 
developing Russian foreign policy within the CIS community. While 
international and regional organizations avoid areas of crisis and conflict, 
Russia maintains a presence in the region to increase its credit and influence, 
even though it may suffer losses and casualties.168 Not only does the Red 
Army protect the borders of these republics, but it is also deployed in all the 
sensitive locations inside these states. This military cooperation is based on a 
mutual agreement signed by Russia and each of the republics in the 
locality.169 It is evident that any movement that is in the least contradictory to 
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Russia’s interests will be severely suppressed. The most obvious examples 
of Russia’s military intervention in the area include its naked presence in 
Tajikistan, its military interference in the NK conflict, and its support for 
Abkhazian separatists in Georgia. In addition, Russia is active in countries 
which have no intention of joining the CIS Union or fail to follow Russia’s 
regional policy, and it has used these instruments whenever required.170   
 
The economic structure and ties with the republics are other significant 
mechanisms on which Russia relies to keep these republics dependent. 
When the economic system of the Soviet Union was united and 
interdependent and the republics were not able to enter the global market 
because of monetary problems, they had to create economic links within their 
former union. Thus all these republics need each other and depend on 
Russia as the heart of their unity. Under present conditions, the foundation of 
economic and productive business lies in Russia and the lines of 
communication - railways, roads and pipelines - end up there. Controlling the 
economy of the republics is in the hands of the Russians and they use it to 
augment their influence.  
 
Political policy is another tool that serves Russian diplomacy in the region. 
Russia has been successful in creating a political apparatus in these states 
by supporting Russian-oriented statesmen and the former communist 
authorities in the republics and helping them to gain positions of power. 
 
104 
Another practice that Russia uses to strengthen its influence in the republics 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus is the threat to break up the territory of the 
republics that have been separated. Russia has an undeniable presence in 
the crisis regions that want to withdraw from the republics, such as Abkhazia 
and Northern Ossetia in the Republic of Georgia. Examples of Russia’s 
interference in the affairs of regional states are the riots in Dinstain located in 
the Republic of Moldova, the Crimean trouble in the Ukraine, the NK crisis 
and the provocation of the tribes and nationalities residing in Azerbaijan like 
the Talysh, as well as the inhabitants of Khojand (the second largest city of 
Tajikistan), who have shown separatist and autonomous tendencies. Russia 
threatens them with the disintegration of their country in order to ensure that 
they agree with Russia’s regional policies.171  
 
Against this background, we can examine Russia’s role in the NK conflict.       
 
Russia’s Position regarding the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict 
 
During the past decade, the crisis has been an important arena 
demonstrating Russia’s regional policy. It has provided Russia with a pretext 
to force the parties in dispute to conform to its interests. Russia thereby 
prevents regional and supra-regional outsiders from implementing their plans 
in Azerbaijan and Armenia during the peace process. At the same time, the 
western outsiders who are aware of this have made every endeavor to wrest 
this tool from Russia’s hands. Thus the NK conflict has become an important 
arena in which to analyse the interests of Russia and the West.  
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The hypothesis that the NK conflict serves Russia’s diplomacy in the region, 
and for that reason it does not seek to settle the conflict and establish peace 
and stability there, is widely accepted by analysts. Most analysts believe that 
despite the many efforts that have apparently been made by the Russians to 
resolve the NK conflict, Russia herself is an obstacle towards achieving 
peace between the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, because all the 
measures carried out by different states and organizations to establish a 
ceasefire have been aborted by Russia, whose objective in the conflict is to 
safeguard its own interests in the region.172  
 
An analysis of Russia’s policies regarding NK reveals the following: 
 Russia refrains officially from accepting either the annexation of NK by 
Armenia or its independence. It calls for the keeping of the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan.  
 Russia, as one of the three chairmen of the Minsk group, is officially 
obliged to act as a neutral peacekeeper in respect of the NK crisis. 
Therefore Russia’s backing of Armenia cannot be interpreted as official 
support for Armenia over the NK crisis, but is due to its desire to establish 
friendly ties with a member of the CIS in order to promote peace in the 
region. Besides, Russia does not intend to champion the separation of NK 
from Azerbaijan by promoting Armenia.  
 The Russian authorities are trying to prevent their relations with 
Azerbaijan from being unnecessarily spoiled because of their granting aid 
to the Armenians. Otherwise Russia’s presence in the peace process 
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would be denied and this would mean an arena of no competition for the 
West. 
 At present, Russia may intend to obstruct the NK dispute in order to 
confuse the Republic of Azerbaijan into entering a security scheme and to 
show the regional conditions as critical. In this way Russia can justify its 
presence in Armenia and also the need to bring back its troops to 
Azerbaijan to restore security there. 
 
It should be mentioned that the Russian stance on the conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia does not follow the same process. In fact the posture 
adopted by Russia regarding the NK conflict depends upon its interests, 
internal developments in the region, and the attitudes and perspectives of 
outsiders. Thus in order to explain Russia’s position precisely, it is necessary 
to analyze separately its behaviour towards Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
 
Russia’s Position regarding the Republic of Armenia  
 
Throughout history Armenia has played a special role in preparing the ground 
for Russians expansionism in the Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus. Russia 
therefore has a historically positive approach towards the Armenians. In all 
the wars over the Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus involving Russia, 
Armenia has welcomed it and indeed actively helped it, especially in the war 
against the Ottomans and Iran. Moreover, Armenians fought side by side with 
Russian troops on the battlefields of the Crimean war (1768-1774) and their 
officers showed courage in the mid 19th century wars in the northern 
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Caucasus and Dagestan, which led to Russian dominance over those 
regions. 173  Because of its historical loyalty towards the Russians, the 
Republic of Armenia, on independence, strenuously tried to attract Moscow’s 
attention regarding its role and their old special relationship, while taking into 
account Russia’s fundamental security and military and economic 
weaknesses. Of the three Trans-Caucasian Soviet successor states, Armenia 
has proved the most amenable to building a reasonably harmonious and 
mutually beneficial relationship with Russia within the parameters of the 
CIS.174 It was one of the first states to become a member of the union of the 
CIS and it never intended to reject the Russians or to suspend its 
dependency on them (Armenia became a member of the CIS on 26 
December 1991, and on 15 May 1992, it signed the Tashkent agreement.)175  
 
For Armenia, in a region where security is a luxury, Russia’s role in ensuring 
it is critical. This is why Armenia accepts the basing of Russian forces on its 
soil and the patrolling of its borders with Turkey and Iran.176 During the past 
decade the Armenians have tried to increase their cooperation with Russia. 
One US commentator has gone so far as to describe this as a patron-client 
relationship.177 However, although the two states have become strategically 
allied, the author believes that Armenia worries about the potential loss of 
Russian support because of a long-term involvement with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. But as mentioned before, for reasons such as military dependency 
during the conflict with Azerbaijan and a growing distrust of Turkey, and 
because Armenia was economically heavily dependent on Russia for fuel, 
raw materials for industry and basic foods, it was inclined to be pro-
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Russian.178 It was when the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted a right-about-
face policy towards Russian interests during this period that it inclined to the 
West and Turkey. The Azeris openly excluded the Russians from their 
country by entrusting the Caspian Sea resources to Western companies, 
paving the way for Russia to support Armenia overtly in the NK conflict. This 
political aid for the Armenians sometimes resulted in Russia’s blatant 
interference in the NK conflict against the Azeris. It has been claimed, for 
example, that Russian troops from the 366th regiment, who participated in the 
attack on the Azerbaijani village of Khojali at a turning point in the NK conflict, 
played an effective role in killing the Azeris and supporting the Armenians.179  
There is one further aspect to the Russian strategic/military policy in Armenia 
that is of relevance, namely the use of Armenian forces as a component of 
Russian policy in Azerbaijan.180  
 
In 1994, Moscow’s support for the Armenians was proven. When Moscow’s 
peace plan was rejected by Azerbaijan, Vladimir Kazmirev, Yeltsin’s envoy in 
Karabakh, criticized the Baku policy and warned of an imminent occupation of 
other Azerbaijani territories by the Armenians forces which, after being given 
the “green light”, attacked and occupied some parts of this country.181 We 
should also mention the Russian military and human contributions to 
Armenia. The Republic of Azerbaijan frequently accused Russia of helping 
the Armenians militarily by providing them with Russian weaponry worth one 
billion dollars from 1993 to 1996. This was condemned by the international 
community, especially the Islamic governments. Moscow’s upholding of the 
Armenian position in Karabakh, which called for its direct presence in the 
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negotiations as a main party in the conflict, is another example of Russian 
support for Armenia. This was why the Baku authorities in 1994 considered 
Armenia to be their ally in the struggle and, since they considered this dispute 
to be a local problem in their country, they rejected the participation of the 
Karabakh representative in the negotiations in order to prevent legitimizing 
the Karabakhis. Finally however, under severe pressure from Moscow the 
Republic of Azerbaijan was forced to accept the Karabakh spokesman in the 
meetings concerning a ceasefire at the Bishkek summit. Although Baku 
accepted them without signatories, their presence at that time was 
considered to be a step forward in the settlement process.182  
 
Russia’s Position over the Republic of Azerbaijan  
 
During the period of Russian sovereignty over Azerbaijan, religious 
differences were always a factor causing conflict in Russo-Azeri relations.  
Even Russia’s closeness to the Azeris while it was ruling the Soviet Union, 
and when it was trying to use Azerbaijan as a base to develop its influence 
over the Islamic states, particularly Iran and Turkey, did not remove the 
Azeris’ and Russians’ negative memories of each other. Over time Azeri 
distrust of Russia increased, especially when it clashed with Armenia over a 
number of regions such as Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. The 
Azerbaijanis became suspicious of Moscow, and on examining Russia’s 
cautious policymaking came to the conclusion that the latter intended to 
support Armenia instead of Azerbaijan. This gave rise to deep anxiety among 
the Azeris and a hidden indignation towards Russia. The Red Army’s attack 
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on Baku in January 1990, which caused many Azeri casualties, turned their 
veiled anger into open resentment and paved the way for Azerbaijan to revolt 
against the Communist party, becoming the first country in the Soviet Union 
to declare its independence.183       
 
Besides the religious differences that were the main factor in distancing 
Azerbaijan from Russia and bringing it closer to the Islamic world, language 
was another compelling reason for Azerbaijan to reject Russia in favour of 
Turkey. When Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, warning bells rang in Russia. At that time, Russia 
considered the power vacuum in the region to be a threat, and felt that other 
countries wanted to influence its traditional domain. Russia interpreted the 
stability and peace in the Caucasus as an invitation to both neighbouring and 
distant rivals to enter the area and strengthen their bases there. Because of 
its geopolitical position and rich energy resources, the Republic of Azerbaijan 
represents a great attraction for the regional and supra-regional powers. For 
this reason, the Russians have always considered Azerbaijan the “achilles’ 
heel” of their sphere of influence.184 It is also perceived as the ’key’ to the 
increase of Turkish penetration into the former USSR. Thus overt and 
excessive orientation towards Turkey on the part of the Azerbaijani leadership 
was to be discouraged. Russia was also attracted to Azerbaijan on account of 
its oil resources and aimed to participate in its energy exploitation and put the 
transportation system on a sound footing.185  
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To Moscow, the Republic of Azerbaijan is seen as an unreliable republic 
because it acts mostly without regard for Russia’s interests. Russia believes 
that Azerbaijan is preparing the ground for rivals to encroach on Russia’s 
political domain. Since the Azeris believe Russia is historically an ally of 
Armenia, they naturally seek their own ally. This is an invitation for other 
parties to trespass on the Russian sphere of influence, which is unacceptable 
to Russia.186  
 
However, it should not be supposed that Russia has always been opposed to 
the Azerbaijani position in the conflict. As mentioned earlier, Russia’s view of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan and the settlement of the NK conflict has not 
always been the same. In fact, Russia adopted a friendly attitude towards 
Azerbaijan when they saw that the behaviour of the Azeris was to their 
advantage, or while it did not pose a threat to their interests in the region. In 
contrast, whenever Azerbaijani policies have been against Russian interests, 
especially over the presence of Russia’s rivals in the region, Russia has 
assumed a hostile stance towards the Azeris.  
 
The Russian outlook towards the Republic of Azerbaijan after its 
independence can be divided into four periods. The first was from 1994 to 
March 1992, during the presidency of Ayaz Mutalibev. At that time, 
cooperation with Azerbaijan was on Russia’s agenda. Russia could not ignore 
Azerbaijan, which enjoys significant and geopolitical importance and also 
possesses large gas and oil resources. Moreover, in that period about 
500,000 Russians were stationed there. After the pro-Russian authorities took 
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office in Baku, all the conditions favoured the establishing of a special 
relationship and the preserving of a constructive atmosphere. During that 
time, Moscow embraced a policy based on supporting the Azeri position over 
Karabakh. At the same time, the Armenians claimed that Russia’s support of 
Azerbaijan had prevented the fulfilment of their former goal for the unification 
of NK with Armenia. Armenia believed that when Armenian troops were 
making progress on the battlefield, Russia prevented them from further 
victories by pressurizing them politically and by supplying the Azeri troops 
with military equipment.187 
 
The second period dates from June 1992 to July 1993, coinciding with the 
advent of the Popular Front in Azerbaijan, but when this party stepped down, 
Russian policy changed. In this phase, Azerbaijani oil resources were 
invested in western companies and Russian interests were ignored. 
Moreover, Russian minorities were regarded as second-class citizens. The 
measures taken by the Azeris thus paved the way for greater intervention by 
the West and Turkey in the Caucasus, putting the traditional Russian 
geopolitical sphere at risk. At the time Russia was trying to restore its past 
reputation in the region by organizing the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) which was founded in December 1991. Therefore it would not 
agree under any circumstances to recognize a government with such anti-
Russian and pro-Turkish and western orientation. The Azerbaijani authorities 
expressed their opposition towards the Russian plan to organize the 
Commonwealth Society and refrained from joining.  
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Moscow used political and economic factors together with the Karabakh crisis 
as two pressure points to undermine the anti-Russian policies of the Popular 
Front.188  For that reason they set up and carried out difficult policies for 
trading and customs in their relations with the Azeris. Furthermore Russia 
supported Armenia militarily in the NK dispute, particularly in the 1992 winter 
operations, which led to the occupation of Lachin and Shusha. Russia also 
used its political leverage to interfere in local affairs and tacitly encouraged 
nascent separatist movements among the Lezgins, the Talysh and the Iranian 
minority living in the extreme south-east of Azerbaijan. They continued these 
measures up to the time of the disintegration of Azerbaijan (the Talysh self-
styled leader subsequently took advantage of the Hoseinev revolt to proclaim 
an independent republic).189 It is almost certain that they were behind Abulfazl 
Elchibey’s downfall in planning a coup with Suret Hoseinev.190 Some have 
suggested that the Russians had a hand in ousting Elchibey, thereby 
thwarting the signing in late June of the long-awaited agreement in London 
between the Azerbaijani leadership and the western oil companies on joint 
exploitation of three Caspian oilfields. 191  However, separatist movements 
among the minorities led by Russia subsequently resulted in it losing the 
initiative on the battlefield. While the Azeri troops were disunited, the 
Armenian forces were unified and better organized and, by intensifying their 
attacks, they succeeded in occupying new territories in Azerbaijan.  
 
Most analysts of Russian policy in the Caucasus, particularly western 
commentators, believe that Russia ostensibly intervened to topple Elchibey’s 
government by organizing revolts in various Azerbaijani cities and 
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encouraging the Armenians to intensify their attacks in order to undermine the 
Popular Front’s power. During the rule of the Popular Front, the Azerbaijani 
Lezgins, backed by Moscow, organized a group called “Sadval” in order to 
gain their autonomy. Within an hour of the group being set up after Elchibey’s 
downfall, Sadval was banned by Moscow and the Talysh-Mugam Republic 
was dissolved.192 After Aliev swept to power, all anti-Azerbaijani propaganda 
by the Russian media came to an end and they were ordered to use the term 
“NK” instead of “The Republic of NK.”193   
 
Thus the third period of Russian ascendancy began with the dismissal of 
Elchibey in July 1993 and Heydar Aliev’s assumption of power, and ended 
with the signing in September 1994 of the agreement to grant the oil 
concession to the western companies. In this phase, Aliev tried to show his 
loyalty to Russia and adopted and implemented several Russian policies. His 
decisions included the revision of the Azerbaijani plan accepting membership 
of the CIS, and the announcement that the agreement between the Republic 
of Azerbaijan and the western companies was illegal. However, although 
Aliev was under considerable domestic pressure as a result of the ongoing 
Armenian offensive that had created several hundred thousand Azerbaijani 
refugees, he repeatedly refused at that juncture to agree to the stationing of 
Russian troops in Azerbaijan on a permanent basis and to the deployment of 
Russian border guards along the Azerbaijan-Iranian frontier.194  
 
However,in addition to concessions granted to Azerbaijan, Russia forced the 
Armenians to cease their offensive, and in the meantime sent arms to the 
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Azeris to help them liberate their occupied territories. In November, Kozyrev 
threatened the Karabakh Armenians with retaliation if they did not stop their 
activities. Russia also sent 200 military “advisors” to help the Azerbaijani 
army. 195  The changes in Russian policy are shown by the Azeris’ major 
victories, which coincided with Aliev’s arrival, and the defeat of the Armenian 
offensive.196 
 
The fourth period commenced on 20th September 1994, when the oil 
agreement was concluded between Azerbaijan and the European and US oil 
companies, and has continued up to the present. In this period, Aliev 
developed his foreign policy goals and responded to domestic problems such 
as the NK dispute by relying on the oil factor as a weapon. As soon as he had 
consolidated his power, he revealed his intentions for independence in the 
face of Russian dominance. Russia had actually prevented Azerbaijan from 
achieving its aims by applying its own policies. Russia also created many 
problems for Azerbaijan so that its political stability would not be secured. It 
can well be imagined then that the stalemate in the Karabakh conflict and its 
conversion into a regional crisis depended largely on the oil factor in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan.197 Some analysts predicted that the Popular Front’s 
mavericks in the Republic of Azerbaijan would be eliminated with Aliev’s rise 
to power, and Baku would orient itself politically towards Russian regional and 
supra-regional interests. Initial evidence supported this idea, but time proved 
the hypothesis to be false. Although the tense Russo-Azeri relations ended 
when Aliev came to power, a few years later, in June 1993 he tried to 
distance Azerbaijan from Russian dominance.  
116 
 
Thus Aliev moved towards independence by signing an oil contract with 
western companies. This was met by Moscow’s objections and quickly 
earned the name “Contract of the Century” due to its groundbreaking 
character and huge financial value.198 In reaction against this, Russia issued 
a strongly worded manifesto calling for the implementation of the measures 
needed to sustain their rights and interests in the region. Russia then took a 
series of steps to encourage Baku to follow Moscow’s regional policies. For 
example, it has been claimed that two high government officials, who played 
a prominent role in drawing up and signing the contract, were assassinated 
(Afieddin Jalilev, the deputy speaker of the National Parliament and Shamsi 
Rahimev, the special head of the Presidents office) as well as four political 
opponents of President Aliev, incarcerated on charges of treason. Some of 
these, who were reputed to be close to Moscow, escaped from custody.199 A 
coup staged by Suret Hoseinev and others indicates the degree of Russian 
interference during this period. 
 
Russia resorted to other actions: 
 Encouraging the Armenians to attack and occupy extensive areas of 
Azerbaijan 
 Strengthening their naval base in the western basin of the Caspian Sea 
 Cooperating with Iran in order to put Aliev under pressure 
 Pressurizing Baku to repay its dues to Moscow  
 Encouraging Abulfazl Elchibey and Colonel Hematev to detach 
Nakhichevan and Talysh from Azerbaijani territory 
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 Finally the Russian experts who worked in the Azerbaijani oil industries 
left Azerbaijan. (Washington Post Tuesday, October 11th 1994. By Lally 
Weymouth) 
 
The second factor leading to the aggravation of Russo-Azeri relations was the 
Azeris’ opposition to Russia’s proposals to deploy their troops as 
peacekeepers in the warring zones. Despite Russian pressure, Azerbaijan 
rejected this and stipulated as a condition the presence of other forces 
alongside Russian troops. Russia threatened to intervene militarily in order to 
restrain the hostile parties and also to terminate the conflict and establish 
peace in the region.200 In this period we therefore observe tensions between 
the Republic of Azerbaijan and Russia. It is likely that this state of affairs will 
continue in the future if Azerbaijan does not change its policy. 
 
Finally, regarding Russian opposition to the presence of other regional and 
supra-regional outsiders and the tough contest between these rivals and their 
conflicting interests, that while it was predicted that the newly independent 
states might benefit from such a situation to achieve their goals, in practice, 
not only were they unable to take advantage of it but they also sustained 
some damage. In order to prevent the intrusion of outsiders, in the 1990s, 
Russia took several domestic and local measures in the regional states to 
demonstrate that the region was unsafe for investment in energy pipelines. 
Examples of such a policy were clear in Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Russia was trying to induce the western states and other 
governments to see the regional states through Moscow’s eyes.201   
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Russian Proposals concerning the Nagorno Karabakh conflcit  
 
In 1991, Russian representatives in the Minsk Group propounded a concept 
known as the “Common State” to the conflicting parties. The proposal was 
accepted by the Armenian authorities, but Azerbaijan rejected it, pointing to 
the “Lisbon Principles” based on guaranteeing Azerbaijani territorial 
integrity.202   
  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
The record of Iranian sovereignty over the Caucasus is as long as the entire 
history of this region. To be more exact, Iran’s supremacy dates back to the 
time of the Medes, when the Persians extended it over the Caucasus and 
even beyond. Herodotus mentions that Iranian domination covered the 
Caucasus mountain ranges too.203  
 
The Iranians defended these regions against numerous attacks and armed 
expeditions, especially during the Parthian and Sassanian eras, when the 
southern Caucasus was a battlefield. They also protected these areas against 
Roman attacks. Even when the Romans took control of parts of these 
regions, the Iranians liberated them again. In addition to their historical 
defence of their own territory, the Iranians defied non-Iranian peoples who 
overran the Caucasus from the north.  
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Following the arrival of Islam and the collapse of the Sassanid Empire, Iran’s 
absolute hegemony over the region became insecure. From then on, the 
Muslim Caliphs appointed governors in the regions, paving the way for those 
areas to be freed from Iran’s control. In the same period, in 1511,  when 
Iran’s independence and territorial integrity were threatened by neighbouring 
great powers, Shah Ismaeil Safavi finally, after eight and half centuries, 
managed to re-establish the national unity and independence of Iran through 
numerous wars. He unified more than 50 local governments in different states 
and provinces of Iran, particularly in the northern sectors of present 
Azerbaijan and created a powerful single government.204 At the beginning of 
the 16th century, the Kingdom of Armenia was subject to the rule of the 
Persian Safavid Empire, where together with the region of Yerevan, it formed 
one of the four administrative districts (beglerbeg).205 
 
The next developments in the Caucasus happened during the Chaldoran war 
against the Ottomans, after which, through the Amasyie Treaty of 1555, the 
Caucasus and especially Azerbaijan were divided between the Iranians and 
the Ottomans. During the second war in 1578 the Caucasus escaped from 
Iran’s dominance.206 In the war of 1604 to 1606 Shah Abbas I liberated the 
entire Caucasus region and re-annexed it to Iran’s territory once more. But 
the powerful presence of Iran in the Caucasus did not endure much longer. 
Although the appearance of Nader resulted in the entire Caucasus being 
liberated from the Russian and Ottoman occupation with the region once 
again under Iran’s rule, when Nader died the Caucasus and the 
Transcaucasus slipped from Iran’s control, except for a short period during 
120 
the era of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar. In 1805 the Khanate was annexed 
by Russia, and the Russo-Persian Treaty of Gulistan (1813) handed it over to 
the Russian Empire. The Khanate of Yerevan and Nakhichevan did not come 
under Russian rule until the Peace of Turkmenchai in 1828. 207  The 
Turkmenchai treaty and subsequent protocols demarcated a border between 
the two empires along the Arax River – a line that cut through the lands 
inhabited by the Azeri people. Iran was naturally dissatisfied with this situation 
and found an opportunity to review it at the Paris peace conference of 1919. 
At the time the central power in Russia was weak, and Moscow was 
consumed by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. In effect, it had lost control over 
the south Caucasus and recognized the independence of the three states of 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.208  
 
As a result of the new conditions in the Caucasus, the Iranian claims at the 
Paris Conference were left unanswered and the three short-lived “democratic” 
republics of the South Caucasus lived on for three difficult years, only to be 
incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1920-21 after the Bolsheviks had 
secured power in Moscow and were able to reassert control over its 
peripheries.209 After these events, Iran, which seemed to have accepted the 
loss of the South Caucasus, formalized the border with the Soviet Union 
through a treaty in 1921.210 
 
After about 150 years, following the Soviet dominance over the Caucasus, 
the ties between Iran and this land were cut. During that time, the Iranian 
authorities had no opportunity to adopt an efficient policy towards events in 
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the Caucasus because of the expansionist policies of the Russian and British 
Empires and the necessity to fight against the probable consequences of that 
opposition.  
 
Following the demise of the USSR in 1991 and the independence of the 
Caucasian Republics, Iran’s role in the development of the region provided a 
valuable and needed opportunity. For Iran, which suffered great losses from 
Russia’s violation of its territorial integrity, no circumstance could bring 
greater rejoicing than the collapse of the USSR and the independence of the 
Caucasian States and Central Asia. Since the Transcaucasus had been 
under Iran’s rule for a long time during the 18th and 19 century, Iran has 
played the role of supreme power in the region after the collapse of the USSR 
and the elimination of Russian influence in the region, Tehran’s attention was 
drawn once again to the historical dependency of the area.211   
 
Although Iran was the first state to open its embassy in the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, it was not among the first to recognize its independence. Iran was 
in no hurry to acknowledge the republics because of security considerations. 
If Iranian policy seems illogical at first glance, the reason can be found in its 
domestic concerns. Because of the downswing in the economic indicators212 
and the constant fear of irredentism in its multi-ethnic society, the Iranian 
government was less than pleased by the emergence of an Azerbaijani state 
to its immediate north.213  
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As for Iranian relations with the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, since 
they are both located on the neighbouring north-western border of Iran and 
have experienced thousands of years of common history with it, the two 
republics enjoy a special place in Iran’s eyes. Since the Republic of Armenia 
lies within the realm of Iranian civilization and the Republic of Azerbaijan in 
that of the Iranian Islamic culture, Iranian policy has been based on 
developing and deepening mutual cooperation and establishing close and 
friendly ties with both states. Regarding the conflict between the two 
countries, Iran has followed its national interests through a policy of 
redressing the balance in its relations with both entities. This policy 
guarantees an unbiased relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia, so Iran 
has not been absolutely Armenian-oriented or Azeri-oriented at any period of 
time.214  
 
Iranian Goals and Interest in the Caucasus 
 
With the collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the newly 
independent governments in Central Asia and the Caucasus, basic changes 
happened in the geopolitical structure of the region. These changes have had 
a great influence especially on the security calculations of the neighbouring 
states, on their regional relations and on the goals of the interested states. It 
is natural that Iran, which has the longest border with the former USSR and 
deep cultural, historical and racial ties with most of the newly independent 
states, should be particularly influenced by events, so that in recent years, an 
important part of Iranian foreign policy has been devoted to the issue of “how 
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to protect the country against potentially destructive developments from the 
northern neighbours”. At the same time, Iran is making efforts to find a role 
appropriate to its size and strategic position, as well as to its prospects and 
potential.215   
 
Regarding the importance of the Caucasus for Iran, this region lies within the 
scope of Iranian national interests for two reasons: first, these republics are 
located in the vicinity of Iran and this issue demands a great deal of sensitivity 
and consideration. A few of these factors are: 
 The appearance of any instability in the region impacts directly on Iranian 
national security. 
 The most common regional difficulties, i.e. ecological problems, especially 
those connected with the Caspian Sea, are necessarily related to the 
whole region. Thus they require the joint support and cooperation of all the 
regional states. 
 Risks apart, the neighbouring states can profit from each other’s economic 
advantages. The Caucasian regional states can benefit from Iran when 
establishing relations with other countries of the world, and Iran in turn can 
develop its exports through their local markets. 
 
The second reason to confirm that the Caucasus is within the ambit of Iranian 
national interests is that the historical, racial, cultural and religious ties 
between Iran and the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus draw them 
towards it and, in turn, Iran towards the countries that share a feeling of 
kinship and proximity.216  
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As Herzig notes, the Karabakh war has been the most direct threat to Iran’s 
national security emanating from the north since the 1940s. For Iran, the NK 
conflict has had a special importance for a number of reasons. First, as noted 
above the fighting threatened to spill over into Iran at times, notably in the 
autumn of 1993. Furthermore, the two states involved in the dispute are Iran’s 
neighbours and hence the hostilities directly affect Iran’s security. Most of all, 
the fighting has played a role in the larger regional constellation in which Iran 
has a prominent place. This led Iran at an early stage – virtually as soon as 
the two belligerents became independent – to offer its good offices to seek a 
peaceful solution to the conflict. Iranian mediation was hampered first by the 
repeated Armenian military conquests. To a certain degree, then, Iran has 
acted to resolve the disagreement in a positive manner.217  
 
Iran’s Security Goals in the Region 
 
Iran’s security goals are relevant to the factors threatening its safety, the most 
important of which are ethnocentrism, irredentism and conflicts arising there 
from. Because there are several cultures in the region, this issue is of great 
importance. The risks resulting from ethno-social problems are other security-
threatening elements.  
 
Basically it is crucial for Iran to establish stability and security in the region. 
One reason is the close cultural-racial structure that exists in most territories 
on Iran’s long border with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Iran cannot ignore 
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the risk of contagion from unrest inside its own country. To Iran, instability 
along the northern borders is the greatest menace. Because of Armenia’s 
escalation of attacks on Azerbaijan, and the bringing of the war to Iran’s 
border, Rafsanjani, the former Iranian President, announced in 1994 in a 
strongly worded communiqué: 
 
“The Karabakh conflict is very important for us because it severely 
affects Iran’s security. We have talked to Armenia seriously and 
frankly notified them that we will not tolerate their aggression any 
more.”218 
  
At the same time, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying:  
 
“Iran cannot be indifferent to such aggression. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, as announced several times, condemns any kind of aggression 
by Armenian forces to the Republic of Azerbaijan and expresses its 
concern about the continuation of attacks that can ignite passions and 
plunge the whole region into war.”219  
 
Based on official sources, maintaining the status quo and preventing any 
change in the geopolitical borders in the region of the Caucasus is very 
important.  
 
As for the security goals, keeping things as they are is conditional on the 
following: 
126 
 Preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the regional states 
 Establishing peace and political stability there. 
 Strengthening the convergent factors and weakening the divergent ones 
in  the region. 
 Preventing the development of chauvinism, ethno-centrism, ultra-
nationalism and micro-governments from developing. 
 Making efforts to prevent absolute domination of any regional rivals or 
outsiders.220    
 
Iran’s Economic Goals in the Region 
 
Taking into account the special geopolitical conditions, the fact that the 
regional states are land-locked, and the unique situation of Iran, which has 
both potential and de facto advantages in the region such as extensive port 
facilities in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea, there are excellent possibilities 
for Iran to exchange commodities with the states of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Providing lines of communication and developing transportation 
networks are the most important axes for Iran’s economic cooperation with 
the region because, in comparison with other regional states, Iran enjoys the 
nearest, cheapest and safest transit routes for goods and passengers. 
We can categorize Iran’s most important functions and economic goals as 
follows: 
 Exploring markets and developing bilateral business 
 Taking advantage of new opportunities for economic growth  
 Taking advantage of strategic privileges  
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 Investing in different economic sectors, especially in energy production 
and pipelines  
 Contributing to the global economy through regional economic 
cooperation. 
 
Iran’s Cultural Goals in the Region 
 
It is clear that the dominant culture of the regional states (the customs, arts, 
painting, architecture, literature and history) has much in common with Iran’s. 
Considering that these strong ties have gradually slackened since the rule of 
the Tsars, Iran’s aims regarding communication and cultural cooperation with 
these states are, in the first instance, to aid in renewing the weakened cultural 
bases and structures and in preparing the ground for connecting them to their 
origins, that is, Iranian culture and civilization.221   
 
Iran’s Political Goals in the Region 
 
Iran’s main policy in the Caucasus is security and economic considerations. 
One of the most important political aims of Iran is to be free from isolation. 
Tehran’s authorities believe in “regional cooperation” as a solution. This 
matter is very important, especially because Iran currently faces problems 
from the east, west and south. Thus the north is not only a vital route for 
Tehran, but it also helps obviate Iran’s insularity.  
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Regarding the regional cooperation plan as a way to make Iran more 
accessible, Tehran’s plan is achievable through two important processes: 
first, intra-regional collaboration, and second partnership within the framework 
of a more comprehensive union i.e. the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO). 
 
Iran’s foreign policy has paid special attention to cultural and economic 
relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. For example, Iran shares a 
660 km border with Azerbaijan. 
 
Iran’s Position regarding the Conflicting Parties 
 
Because of interference with national interests and security and the 
convergence of economic and security goals, the position of Iran regarding 
Azerbaijan and Armenia is complicated.  
 
It is plain that Iran’s achieving of its economic aims and interests demands 
enduring peace and stability beyond its northern borders. However, removing 
problems and attaining immunity from likely threats requires a certain amount 
of confrontation to deal with the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The 
existence of subversive ideas such as “Greater Armenia” and “United 
Azerbaijan” can put Iran’s national security and territorial integrity at risk. 
Thus the settlement of the NK conflict gives both states the opportunity to 
quietly enforce their own territorial plans and claims on other states.  
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However, it may be argued that the Iranian authorities are not particularly 
worried about the idea of a “Greater Armenia” or a “United Azerbaijan” 
because firstly, Iran is a powerful state in the region and would use its military 
power to neutralize any clear security threats. Secondly, it can be argued that 
it was Armenia and Azerbaijan that separated from Iran under pressure. For 
this reason, if it was decided, for instance, to constitute a Unified Azerbaijan, 
it is the Republic of Azerbaijan that would have to join Iran’s Azerbaijan and 
not vice versa. Iranian officials are worried about the increase of US influence 
in Azerbaijan and have adopted policies to bring it into its political sphere of 
influence. This is to counter any influence on Iranian Azeris. It should also be 
remembered that there is a demand for cultural autonomy by the Azeris in 
Iran. The Shiism is the religion of the majority in Azerbaijan which is an 
element of Persian heritage. They accepted Shiism under Safavid and the 
Safavid united the people of Iran under this faith. 
 
In short, neutralizing the security threats and, at the same time, achieving 
their economic interests, requires the adoption of clever diplomacy by the 
Iranian authorities. While the warring factions, especially the Azerbaijani 
authorities, appear to think that their decision to maintain friendly ties with 
other states is the stance they should take regarding the conflict, the Iranian 
authorities know only too well that holding strong opinions for or against any 
opponent not only does not help to settle the dispute but complicates it further 
and even prepares the ground for an intensification of regional and supra-
regional confrontation. 
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Iran’s national security and interests in the region are overshadowed by the 
NK conflict. Its position regarding the dispute not only directly affects its 
mutual relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also has an impact either 
on the continuation of the fighting or on the settlement process. Because of 
Iran’s prominent role as mediator, the US officially invited it to the Key West 
talks in 2001 to take care of the mediation process and negotiations and 
gradually to play a role in the settlement of the NK controversy.222  
 
With regard to the re-implementation of the Iranian role, Iranian officials 
believed, following the Presidents talks with Iran, and generally because of 
Iran’s participation in the peace process, that the US intends to marginalize 
and weaken Russia in the settlement process of the NK fight, especially in the 
Caucasus.223  
 
The Armenian authorities immediately made a positive response to Iran’s 
mediation, but in his reply to a reporter’s question, Heydar Aliev announced 
guardedly that he did not believe Iran’s mediation would lead to any 
substantial results at the present time.224 
 
What we understand from the decisions taken by Tehran’s authorities 
regarding NK is that Iran is interested in a balance of power between the 
warring parties with the aim of neutralizing the threats to its borders and 
providing for its minimum economic interests. Since the independence of the 
Caucasian Republics, Iran has therefore adopted and implemented a middle-
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of-the-road policy in its relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Professor 
Halliday, argues:  
 
“In the republics of the former Soviet Union, Iran has not pursued particular 
advantage in the former Muslim republics of the USSR. It has implemented 
what has been termed siasat-i-dast-i-gol, the policy of the bouquet of flowers, 
i.e. greeting whoever turns up at Tehran airport from those countries 
irrespective of ideology. In Tajikistan, Iran has, in conjunction with other 
Central Asian States, sought to mediate. In the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute 
Iran has, contrary to any supposition of Islamic solidarity, formed an alliance 
with Armenia against Shi’ite but pro-Turkish and pro-American Azerbaijan.”225  
 
Because of the ruling Islamic government in Iran, it is surprising to witness 
the same behaviour shown towards co-religionist Azerbaijan and Christian 
Armenia. Accordingly, outside observers suppose that Iran’s middle-of-the-
road policy in the region is nonetheless to the benefit of the Armenians 
despite religious and cultural similarities. 
 
Iran’s Position regarding the Republic of Armenia 
 
Historically the relationship between Iran and Armenia is amongst the oldest 
in the world. Records of such relations date back over 3,000 years. It is not 
possible to study and understand Armenia’s history without also knowing the 
history of Iran.  
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Taking into account Armenia’s geopolitical location, surrounded by other 
nations, the Armenians consider Iran as the most important factor in 
protecting them against the Turkish World, so they greatly value their 
relationship and their 40-kilometre border with Iran.  
 
After World War One and Armenia’s independence on 28th May 1918, 
Iranian-Armenian relations entered a new phase because, on that occasion, 
the Armenians were threatened by Turkey from the west, and they were at 
war with Azerbaijan in the provinces of Zangezur and NK. They also had 
some differences on the northern border with Georgia in the vicinity of Luri. 
The Bolsheviks had initiated efforts inside the country to subvert the reign of 
the republic so at that time, Armenia’s only safe border was the southern one 
with Iran. Armenia therefore greatly esteemed this vital border and its 
relations with Iran.226   
 
Iran was one of the first states to recognize the independence of the Republic 
of Armenia on 26 December 1991, and bilateral relations were promptly 
developed on different points. At the same time, Iran commenced its work as 
mediator in the NK dispute. Worried about the continuation and escalation of 
the clash, Iran spared no effort to stop the war. The result was the ceasefire 
agreement signed by Ter-Petrossian, the Armenian President, and Mamadev, 
the Azerbaijani acting President, with the mediation of Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
the then Iranian President.227 
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Because other regional and supra-regional powers, particularly Russia were 
not happy with the rise of Iran’s influence in the region, each one started to 
obstruct peace in some way. This blockage by the regional and supra-
regional and global powers and the loss of the opportunity secured by the 
international community and the UN during the ceasefire led to the 
breakdown of Iran’s mediation.228  
 
The political and security aspects of Iran-Armenia relations generally 
outweigh their economic and commercial ones. Iran is endeavouring to 
maintain a power balance in the region through its regional policy; hence 
Armenia sees Iran’s policy on the NK conflict as being positive. It also 
considers Iran’s mediation as effective.  
 
Although Iran is always proclaiming its neutrality regarding the NK dispute, 
some of its actions are indicative of a significant bias towards Armenia. Such 
a tendency is because of its security interests and Turkish and Azeri 
extremist attitudes threaten Iran’s territorial integrity and also make 
Azerbaijan more disposed to develop relations with Turkey, Israel and some 
western states. 
 
This is why Iran considers Armenia as an ”equipoise” on its northern borders 
and a deterrent factor against nationalism and separatist provocations. 
Armenia also considers Iran as a guarantee of survival against Turkish 
threats. For these reasons, Iranian-Armenian relations are very important and 
strategic to both states. Therefore this collaboration plays a decisive role and 
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affects the peace and stability of the region. On the whole the two states have 
lots of common interests and there are bright prospects for the development 
of political and economic cooperation.  
 
The Republic of Armenia is of great importance because: 
 It is counted as part of Iran’s strategic strength 
 It is an assured buffer zone between Azerbaijan and Turkey 
 It enjoys effective lobbying power in the world 
 It has good relations with Russia 
 It maintains a historical enmity towards Turkey – Iran’s long time rival 
in the region 
 It is Iran’s only Christian neighbour. This is important because 
according to Iranian officials, as an Islamic republic, having good 
relations with Armenia can improve the international image of the 
country. 
 
Iran’s Position regarding the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Despite the fact that Iran was the first state to open its embassy in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, it was not among the first to recognize its 
independence. Because of security considerations, Iran was in no hurry to 
acknowledge the new republics in Central Asia and the Caucasian states 
except Armenia. At that time, Aliakbar Velayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister, 
announced that Iran looked at the Central Asia and the Caucasian states 
through Moscow, as in times past. Some experts in international relations 
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argue that the unequal relations between Iran and Azerbaijan during the time 
of the Popular Front were related to Iran’s preliminary attitude towards 
Azerbaijani independence.229 Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan are not 
only influenced by the NK conflict, but also strongly affected by domestic 
political developments in Azerbaijan.  
 
However, Azerbaijani local and racial characteristics and strengths such as 
their culture, language, Iranian history and civilization, religious beliefs, 
Islamic customs, Russian culture and civilization, political geography and 
history require Azerbaijan to refrain from either denying them unilaterally or 
showing a bias towards one or two of these characteristics. On the contrary 
Azerbaijan should adopt a policy based on a positive balance between these 
elements.230 The observations of the Popular Front and its leader, Abulfazl 
Elchibey, and its divergence from the policy of Heydar Aliev, the Azerbaijani 
former president, are a clear illustration of the above ideas.  
 
When Elchibey was toppled in June 1993 and replaced by Aliev, the time 
seemed ripe for a rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Iran. However, 
Aliev’s sense of political tact and his awareness of Iran’s importance for 
Azerbaijan’s security led him to follow a conciliatory path.231   He quickly 
moved to restore some kind of balance in Azerbaijan’s foreign relations, 
seeking to distance himself from the tight alliance with Turkey that Elchibey 
had built, in order to diversify his international contacts.232     
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During that period, many observers and analysts of international relations 
interpreted the fall of the Popular Front and the replacement of Aliev as a 
victory for Iran and Russia against Turkey and its advocates in the Caucasus. 
The position taken by Russia and Iran regarding Azerbaijan’s development 
also confirmed this idea.233   
 
Although Iran made strenuous efforts to establish a ceasefire between 
Armenian and Azeri forces before Aliev’s replacement, Iran’s position 
regarding Armenia never went as far as a condemnation. By the time Aliev 
swept to power, Iran condemned Armenia’s assault on Azerbaijani territory, 
and called on the international communities and the OECD to fend off attacks 
from Azerbaijan. Although this change in Iran’s conduct was influenced by the 
escalation of Armenian attacks and the bringing of the war to within close 
proximity of Iran’s northern borders, it was also affected by the change of rule 
in the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
 
After Aliev came to power, a new phase started in the relationship between 
the two states. Although the tension eased, Azerbaijan abstained from 
approaching Iran, as it had done before, especially after 1995 when Iran was 
abruptly removed from the “Century Compact” and membership of the Oil 
Consortium. Subsequently various differences grew regarding the legal 
arrangement of the Caspian Sea and other issues. Thus the development of 
relations between the two states has not enjoyed ideal conditions.234  
 
137 
As mentioned, the Iranian position regarding this crisis has always been 
cautious. When Armenia retired from the conflict, Iran’s declared policy was 
to criticize its aggression in caustic terms, but it did not adopt any drastic 
measures and restricted itself to comments and regrets. Meanwhile Iranian 
nationalists pressured the regime to side with Azerbaijan, reasoning that the 
Azeris of Azerbaijan were in fact Iranian citizens, as the whole of Azerbaijan 
belonged to Iran.235 Some extremist newspapers also called for the outright 
condemnation of the Armenian side by the Iranian government.236  
 
However, Iranian-Armenian relations in economic, security, cultural and 
strategic aspects, along with Iran’s viewpoint on the NK conflict, caused the 
Azerbaijani authorities to become dissatisfied. With 20 per cent of their 
territory occupied, the Azeris considered that the Iranian fence-straddling 
policy in the Karabakh crisis and the adopting of a conciliatory approach to 
the occupation implied tacit support for the Armenians.237   
 
In short, the NK dispute was a double-edged sword, which if it continued to 
escalate and was not resolved would put Iranian national security at risk. If 
the conflict continued, it would probably spill over into Iran because it was 
close to the Iranian border and because both factions shared a common race 
and religion with Iran. Thus tension and hostility would appear between the 
Azeris and Armenians living in Iran and threaten Iranian national security.  
 
Furthermore, if the dispute intensified, it would be more probable that 
insurgents would interfere from outside and then the conflict would turn into a 
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regional or supra-regional war. If it was settled by exchanging territory, 
changing borders, or setting up a buffer zone with the deployment of 
peacekeepers, it was clear that in such a case Iranian national security and 
territorial integrity would be directly at risk, particularly through the changing 
of borders – something to which Iran would never agree. As the Secretary of 
the Iranian National Security Council declared bluntly in 1994: “We have 
always declared that under no circumstances would we agree to any change 
in our borders. We believe this would disrupt the stability and security of the 
region and it would be the start of a dangerous war in the region.”238   
  
Perhaps it was for this reason that Iran was concerned about managing the 
crisis and establishing a balance between the adversaries rather than a 
settlement, because the preserving of Iran’s national security and interests 
required that there should be no winner or loser in the NK conflict.  
 
From the actions and remarks of the Iranian authorities concerning the 
dispute, it seems that their strategy has been based on the following: 
 Keeping the present political geography of the Caucasus, especially in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan 
 Supporting a peaceful solution to the NK war  
 Maintaining neutrality in the conflict  
 Being ready for mediation and playing a role in respect of a fair settlement 
of the quarrel 
 Avoiding turning the clash into a religious issue 
 Keeping a balance in relations with the Armenians and Azeris 
139 
 Seriously supporting all those processes that help in settling the 
disagreement and establishing peace and stability in the region.  
 
 
 
Iranian Strategy and the Interests of other Regional & Non-regional 
Powers 
 
One of the main factors in the perpetuation of the NK dispute is hostility 
towards the interests of regional and supra-regional outsiders in the 
Caucasus. The policy of each outsider in the achieving of its goals and 
interests in the area is to oppose the policies of the others. The consequence 
of such opposition is the formation of informal coalitions, which will finally lead 
to the establishing of a balance of power between the two parties. The 
settlement of the crisis by one overcoming the other is highly problematical. 
The result of such a balance is nothing but the perpetuation of the discord. 
 
The conflict of outsiders’ interests in the Caucasus and the balance resulting 
from that is to some degree ambiguous and an exact demarcation line 
between the two sides is impossible. In such conditions, the established 
balances are usually fluid and the coalitions vary depending on the interests 
generating them. Iran’s aspiration to establish a balance in the region is in 
accordance with Russian interests and as a result, a coordination and 
harmony is observable in the positions of both states. On the other hand, it is 
against Russia’s interests in some cases. The positions of both states are 
therefore incompatible and even neutralize each other. For instance, Iran and 
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Russia are not particularly interested in Western influence in the region. They 
consider the Pan-Turkic role of Turkey to be an aggravation of the instability 
in the region and a threat to their territorial integrity. In the meantime, Iran 
does not want to see a resurgence of Russian military dominance in the 
region. Conversely Russia is pessimistic about the spread of Iran’s cultural 
influence.   
 
They also have differences regarding the routes of the oil pipelines in the 
region. Russia considers that the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) 
restricts its influence in the area, but Iran views it as a tool by which to 
develop its influence there.239 ECO is a Tehran based organization and was 
founded by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in 1985 for the purpose of promoting 
economic and cultural cooperation. Other members of the organisation 
include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
Iranian regional policy also faces different reactions from Turkey. Many 
examples can be found in regional developments that confirm the rivalry of 
Iran and Turkey for influence in the region. This is why the US prefers Turkey 
to play a dominant role In particular, it believes that Turkey’s policy in the 
region can forestall Pan-Islamism and a pro-Iranian bias.  
 
Tehran is not generally interested in the unilateral development of Turkish 
cultural-political influence in the region, and neither is Russian military 
dominance intended to guard the borders of the Commonwealth Republics. 
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Besides, Iran does not conceal its dissatisfaction with the influential 
development of the West over the region, especially the US It is clear that 
such positions hinder the other outsiders’ interests and the final result is the 
unsettling of the conflict. 
 
In the end, as long as the interests of the outsiders in the NK question 
continue to be at variance, they will tend not to integrate and cooperate with a 
negative impact on settling the conflict.     
 
 
 
The Republic of Turkey 
 
The fall of the Soviet Union was warmly welcomed by certain circles in 
Turkey, which quickly rediscovered that Turkey had “lost cousins” in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.240 The independence of five republics inhabited 
by people of Turkic origin (one in the Caucasus and four in Central Asia), 
presented Turkey with good opportunities to become a leading regional 
power. 241  The unexpected emergence of these states, especially in a 
geographical area which had been greatly affected by Turkey’s history, 
bolstered Turkish nationalism and once again there were rumours about 
forming a Turan United Territory. Thus Turkey, which played a passive role in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus before the demise of the Soviet Union and 
harmonized its position with the western states, changed its position and as 
the main outsider was granted a decisive and key role in regional affairs when 
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the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold Ward ended. Under these new 
conditions the Ankara authorities, with an eye on their own political 
geography which was indicative of the rise of their strategic importance in the 
Middle East, the Near East and Central Asia - the Caucasus and the Balkans 
- considered that pursuing such a pivoting role was within their competence.  
 
Since the turbulent years of World War One, Turkey has never severed its 
contacts with the nationalist Turkish-language communities in the Caucasus. 
Now, by reinforcing relations with the supporters of the Popular Front, Turkey 
began to exercise influence and played a leading role from the moment that 
they laid down their arms during the time of Ataturk in March 1923. Thus 
Turkey, as the first state to recognize the independence of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, adopted the Popular Front policy of explicit support. The Ankara 
authorities played a more active part than others in the region in order to 
regain their standing. Accordingly the West introduced and supported Turkey 
as the model of a secular government. After the Ottoman forces lost during 
World War One, the young Turks under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal - 
Ataturk - created the modern state of Turkey. One of their goals was to unify 
all the Turkish-speaking territories and bring them under a single power, 
namely “Turan”. This view has always been taken into consideration by the 
Turkish authorities in their position taking and policymaking.242  
 
Since 1989 Ankara has founded its foreign policy on the basis of developing 
ties with regional states and sought to implement a decisive and sensitive role 
in all the affairs of the region.  
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In this context the first problem to arise in the region that attracted Turkey 
was the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over NK. Such a 
consideration was quite natural because this conflict could undo Turkey’s 
efforts to influence Central Asia and the Caucasus. The development of 
Turkey’s influence in the region would only be possible if Azerbaijan were not 
defeated, otherwise Turkey would lose the land passage leading to the states 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus. It would not then be able to achieve its 
ultimate goal, the formation of a Turkish-speaking community. For obvious 
geopolitical reasons, Azerbaijan provides the principal link between Turkey 
and Central Asia. 243  In fact, in arranging its long-term strategy Turkey 
founded its foreign policy on the basis of an all-out and overt support of 
Azerbaijan. To confirm this, some important Turkish strategies regarding 
Azerbaijan merit examination: 
 Support for Azerbaijani independence  
 Support for Baku’s sovereignty over NK 
 A desire to prevent or limit a Russian return to that country 
 Participation in Azerbaijani oil production and export of significant 
amounts to Turkey 
 Preserving friendly and strong ties with Baku.244  
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Turkey’s Goals and Interests in Central Asia & the Caucasus  
 
Turkey has a number of goals in Central Asia and the Caucasus and it 
organizes its activities in the region to achieve those objectives.  
 
We can arrange the interests of this state in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
under three headings: political, economic and cultural. The most important 
political aims of Turkey in the region are as follows: 
 Serving as a example of a secular government as the only desirable 
system to replace the Communist regime in the region 
 Presenting Turkey as the only safe communication link between the West 
and Central Asia and the Caucasus 
 Fighting against Islamic fundamentalism and revolutionary ideas and 
preventing them from developing in the region 
 Confronting Armenian territorial claims  
 Preventing the defeat of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the war with 
Armenia  
 Publicizing Pan-Turkish notions for some 200 million Turks (from Central 
Asia to the farthest Balkan peninsula.245)  
 
As for Turkish economic interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, factors 
such as its geographical size, natural resources and economic potential in the 
area have a special place in the economic policies of that country. The focus 
on Caspian Sea energy and pipelines is one of the main ways in which 
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Ankara seeks to fulfil its long-term interests and advance its regional status. 
Historical records of Turkey’s presence in the region and its relations with the 
Turkish-speaking residents have presented this state with an ideal 
opportunity to penetrate this area more effectively. Since the economic 
stagnation of the republics of the CIS and their political instability are 
regarded as the main problems, and because Turkey’s economic cooperation 
with these republics is to strengthen the bases of their independence, the 
Soviet Union has failed to offer Turkey an opportunity to strengthen its role in 
the region, even though its economic cooperation could have a positive effect 
on the political stability of the republics.246  
 
However, this situation provides Turkey with a great opening, not only 
because it is a state developing according to European criteria but also, 
according to Baku and Tbilisi, it is looked upon as a modern and progressive 
regional power. 
 
Considering that the Caucasian and Central Asian countries are economically 
in a state of transition and that they are planning for a free market economy, 
they are obviously in need of financial resources as well as the technical and 
technological aids of the West. Some international economic experts believe 
that one of the main routes for the spread of Turkish influence in the region is 
to offer the republics financial and technical help.247      
 
When considering Turkish goals and cultural interests, the most important 
aim pursued by the Turks in Central Asia and the Caucasus is that of 
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developing a Pan-Turkish ideology. The Ankara authorities are well aware 
that in order to stabilize and deepen their influence in the region, they must 
first of all balance and strengthen their cultural presence. Thus they are 
especially concerned with strengthening the position of the historical and 
cultural communities of the region. Taking into account the achievement of its 
cultural objectives there, one of the Turkish strategic goals is to introduce and 
propagate Pan-Turkish ideas to fill the existing vacuum resulting from the 
decline of Marxist ideology. By achieving this aim, the mainstay of its cultural 
influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus will be assured.248   
 
Turkey’s Efforts to Influence the Region 
 
In the present circumstances, several factors encourage Turkey to forge links 
with the states of the region. This country enjoys appropriate ways and 
means to ensure a presence in the area. The existing historical and cultural 
communities, with their racial, religious and linguistic unity, are the most 
important agencies on which the country depends to guarantee a share in 
regional developments.  
 
Another stimulus for other countries like Turkey to fill the power vacuum 
results from the liberation of the neighbouring areas from Russian control. 
Since the Turks believe that if another outsider gets in first, this could be 
problematic, it is only natural for them to seize the opportunity for influence. 
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The cooperation of Turkish-populated states in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus also frees Turkey from isolation. Turkey, which felt internationally 
isolated, was only too pleased to discover some “cousins” looking to her with 
expectant eyes.249 The in the formation of a newly independent state, there is 
a golden opportunity for Turkey to free itself from this “chronic isolation”. 
Moreover, by developing cooperation with these states, not only will it escape 
this segregation, but it will also act as a bridge between them. The western 
states will be forced to show special attention towards such an important 
entity through which they communicate with the newly independent republics. 
Therefore their strategic position is an important tool in the hands of the 
Turks. It may be that one of the reasons that Turkey’s membership of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was approved (signed in 
December 1991) was its special importance following the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
Although these unifying factors present Turkey with opportunities to establish 
ties with the regional states and it has the power of manoeuvring in the area 
by virtue of its organization and facilities, it faces a number of problems and 
restrictions that attenuate its dominance in relation to powerful rivals like 
Russia and Iran. Russian policies, particularly with reference to the region, 
are regarded as the main limiting factor for Turkey to influence the area.250 
Russia is the main player in the region as in the past, and no policy can be 
successful without considering Russian interests. Russia cannot allow these 
mainly Turkish-speaking republics to approach Ankara with the aim of 
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establishing a “Greater Turkistan” in the domain of the former Empire of the 
Soviet Union.251  
 
Moreover, the Russians intend to confine Turkey to its own borders. For that 
reason Moscow is sensitive to Turkey’s interference in the NK conflict. 
Furthermore, on every occasion that Turkey has signalled its intention to 
involve itself in Karabakh, Moscow has responded promptly, without trying to 
conceal its discontent with Ankara’s policies.252 
 
On the other hand, after World War Two, the Ankara authorities dispensed 
with the East because of threats from the Soviet Union and they adopted a 
policy of approaching and establishing ties with the West and Europe. Since 
then, they have made every effort to forge such links. It has been years since 
Turkey tried to join the European Union and the sudden change of course 
and greater attention to the East will probably prevent Turkey from achieving 
this enduring wish.  
 
Another limitation on Turkey’s influence in the region is its economic position. 
Economically this state cannot match its rivals because it can suffer from a 
financial crisis with debts of over 100 billion dollars, so it is not able to meet 
the increasing needs of the republics. In fact Turkey’s economic plight has 
contributed to the unsatisfactory fulfilment of Ankara’s promises for 
investments to the republics.  
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The newly independent countries suffer from political instability. These 
countries do not follow an unchangeable foreign policy, with a firm belief with 
regard to their future. Just a few months after confirming the “Turkish Model”, 
Islam Karimev talked about the “Chinese Model”, and Kazakhstan turned its 
back on previous policies by praising the “Korean Model.”253  
 
Furthermore, the economic, social and political situation in the republics is 
another important factor that impedes the presence of Turkey in the region. In 
particular, most ruling elites and politicians there are former communists and 
it is probable that they disagree with Turkey’s “free market” solution.254  
 
Another important factor that limits Turkish influence is Western pressure. 
However, the US and Europe do not want Iran, as Turkey’s rival, to exercise 
authority in the region. Nevertheless the West’s support of Turkey is 
conditional on the republics’ acceptance of the Turkish Model alone in the 
framework of a secular democracy and market system, and also on Turkey 
not resorting to religious movements. It follows that if the US and especially 
Europe are in time forced to choose between Turkey and Russia.255  
 
We can therefore consider NATO and the western countries among Turkey’s 
constraints. Turkey’s NATO membership does not permit it to pursue an 
“adventurist” policy in its “near abroad” (to use the Russian term). In a wider 
context, Turkey’s relations with and its will to integrate into Western Europe 
give the Western powers a certain amount of pull over it.256  
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Another limiting factor is the lack of territorial or geographical connection with 
the republics. The only Turkish link is currently a 12-kilometre common border 
with Nakhichevan, which is under constant siege by Armenia. Thus it is not 
counted as part of the region and is forced to go through Iran or Armenia to 
gain access to the other republics. Competitive relations with Iran and hostile 
relations with Armenia prevent Turkey from relying on these routes.257  
 
Turkey’s Position regarding Both Parties in the NK Conflict 
 
The Turks’ new position regarding the newly independent republics of the 
former Soviet Union is based more on realistic foreign policy considerations 
than ideological interests. Hence it is expected that Turkey’s regional and 
global role will increase politically because of the cultural relations that it has 
with a large number of groups in the republics, as well as its support for Israel 
and the US  
 
Turkey is therefore regarded as the main regional player in the affairs of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus and especially in the dispute between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh. Because Turkey considers itself an 
interested and responsible state playing a role in how the conflict is settled or 
perpetuated, Ankara’s viewpoint has a decisive effect on the resolution of the 
Karabakh fighting. For this reason, it is very important to consider the Turkish 
position regarding the two adversaries.  
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 Turkey’s Position Concerning the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Since the birth of independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey has 
been trying to establish a special relationship with it. The relations between 
the two countries, particularly when the Popular Front, which had strong pan-
Azerbaijani and pan-Turkish views, came to power, were greatly enhanced, 
and Azerbaijani foreign policy was basically harmonized with Turkish 
diplomacy. Elchibey’s attraction to the Turkish model for Azerbaijan, his 
militant secularism and his anti-Iranian views undoubtedly corresponded to 
what many Turks thought privately.258 But in 1993, after changes in the ruling 
administration of Azerbaijan, its relations with Turkey, which strongly 
supported Elchibey, became frosty. After a short while the strained relations 
were relaxed by Aliev, through the adoption of special ties of friendship.  It is 
clear that Aliev (unlike Elchibey, who gave priority to Turkey) played the 
Turkish card whenever it suited his purposes, but was nevertheless unable to 
turn his back on Ankara when such was required.259  
 
However, the Ankara government had no intention of losing a great Turkish-
speaking country like Azerbaijan, so Turkey remained its chief ally.  
 
As mentioned, factors such as a positive historical antecedent, cultural, 
religious and language affinity and the unique and vital location of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan for Turkey to continue its influence over the republics, 
are all significant in increasing the cooperation between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. Thus Turkey does not envisage any obstacle to its unlimited influence 
in Azerbaijan. It was the first state to recognize Azerbaijani independence by 
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opening an embassy there. Its granting of scholarships to thousands of 
university, college and theological students, constructing bridges over the 
main rivers in Nakhichevan and Turkey, making investments in the 
exploration and extraction of oil, granting loans and credits, starting live 
broadcasting of Turkish television programmes, publishing the Turkish 
newspaper “Time” in Baku, arranging a constant interchange of teams from 
high-ranking to common people, openly supporting Azerbaijan in its conflict 
with Armenia, pressurizing the Armenians, sending light armament and 
dispatching military advisors to Baku - all were indicative of the enhanced 
relations between the two states.260  
 
Based on the treaty of March 1923 between Ataturk and Lenin, Turkish 
leaders believe that Turkey, like Cyprus, is charged with guaranteeing the 
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan against Armenian attacks. Turkey never 
concealed its undisguised support for Azerbaijan during the hostilities. 
Moreover, during the advance of the Armenian forces in Aghdam, Kalbajar 
and Tartar, which carried the conflict into Nakhichevan, Turkey officially 
threatened Armenia with military intervention in the war, put its forces on full 
alert and called on the international community for explicit and prompt 
condemnation of Armenian aggression against Azerbaijani territory. This is 
despite Moscow’s strong Republic of Azerbaijan. This obligation has required 
Ankara to make an all-out effort to defend reaction to this declaration and the 
failure of the western allies to dissuade the Turks from military action, the 
adopting of such positions was indicative of the level of support of the Ankara 
authorities for Baku in the NK clash.261 Azerbaijan, however, never officially 
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asked for Turkish intervention in the conflict. According to Azerbaijan’s 
ambassador in Ankara, Mehmet Novruzoglu Aliev, the main help that 
Azerbaijan wanted from Turkey was that of using its contacts in the Western 
alliance to explain the Azerbaijani side of the story to the world.262 Turkey’s 
stance regarding Azerbaijan was natural and understandable. As mentioned, 
Azerbaijan links Turkey to the republics, but the NK conflict had obstructed 
this geographical connection. Azerbaijan’s defeat in the NK dispute was thus 
tantamount to Turkey’s failure to exert influence in the region. Turkey was 
defending its own interests before shielding those of Azerbaijan. Certainly 
Turkish interests would probably be in contradiction to Azerbaijan’s. A clear 
example of this occurred when the peace plan proposed by Goble, based on 
a territorial swap, was presented in 1992. With the implementation of the 
Goble plan, Turkey’s access to the region would be greatly facilitated, so it 
agreed with the plan without considering Azerbaijani interests. Based on 
Goble’s proposals, the Karabakh region would be exchanged for the 
Armenian Zangezur area. But under no circumstances would Azerbaijan 
agree to losing the strategic territory of Karabakh and it claimed that 
Zangezur had also been part of its domain, which had been separated from it 
by Stalin’s colonialism.  
 
Turkish efforts to support Azerbaijan were not just for reasons of so-called 
brotherhood or cultural, religious and language affinity, but because Turkey 
was in a sense fighting against Armenia’s expansionism and territorial claims 
against Turkey by supporting Azerbaijan in the NK conflict. In the “Greater 
Armenia” plan, which extremist Armenians hoped to put into effect, not only 
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were Karabakh and Nakhichevan included but also some regions of Georgia 
and the eastern part of Turkey (Anatolia) and even some provinces of Iran. 
Evidently the mere thought of such a possibility could threaten Turkish 
national security, territorial integrity and political-economical interests in the 
region.263     
 
Turkey’s Position Regarding the Republic of Armenia 
 
Since the independence of the Republic of Armenia, the establishing of 
relations with Turkey has involved many obstacles such as Genocide in 1915. 
The Turkish support of Azerbaijan in the NK war, the verbal threats of 
Armenia, the spy flights by Turks over Armenian airspace, the cutting of 
Armenian links with the Mediterranean and the besieging of that country, the 
abrogation of the March 1993 agreement by Armenia, were compelling 
reasons for the deepening of differences and the intensifying of hostilities.264 
Yerevan has stated that is ready to normalize relation with Turkey without any 
precondition but Turkey is requesting Armenia to give up the policy of 
international recognition of Armenian 1915 Genocide. 
 
However, it seems that observable realities have put both countries under 
pressure to establish good relations. Armenia in particular has repeatedly 
talked about the need to normalize its ties with Turkey, despite the implicit 
denial of what they call the genocide of the Armenians by the Ottoman Turks 
in 1915, whose ceremonies on 24th April every year have lost their intensity 
during the past decade. Turkey on the other hand, which badly needs the 
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Armenian links to connect it with Azerbaijan and other Central Asian and 
Caucasian republics, is aware of Armenia’s financial plight and is trying to 
achieve its political goals through economic means. Turkey has also recently 
been under pressure from the US to normalize its relations with Armenia. 
Another gesture on the part of Turkey was to invite Armenia and Azerbaijan 
to take part in the foundation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation 
Programme, which was from the onset a Turkish initiative. Furthermore, 
Turkish business circles are pressurizing the government to open trade 
relations with Armenia. Turkey has a strong interest in opening the border 
barriers to Armenia.265  
 
Because the Armenians needed Turkish routes to gain access to the 
Mediterranean, they focused on present conditions, and instead of looking to 
the past and stressing controversial issues, they accepted the Turkish offer 
and were admitted as a member of the community of Black Seas States. 
 
In a joint move, both states agreed to establish provincial commissions and 
trade relations with the neighbouring provinces. But at the beginning of 2004, 
after the remarks of Ankara’s high-ranking officials about their desire to re-
open their borders to Armenia and to establish trade relations between the 
two states, the Azeris vented their anger with a stark warning announcing that 
if the borders were re-opened, Turkey should pull out of the peace process. 
Subsequently Turko-Azeri relations became strained, at least for a while. It is 
often claimed, especially by Armenian observers, that Baku holds the key to 
Turkish-Armenian relations, as Heydar Aliev himself said more than once.266 
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During the recent visit of the newly elected Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliev 
to Ankara in 1993, the Presidents of both states redressed the balance in 
their relations. They also issued a declaration on 14th April stressing the unity 
of the two states concerning the peace process of NK, and reiterated their 
assertion that the Armenians must withdraw from Azerbaijani-occupied 
territory. They added that the Karabakh peace solution must be based on 
respect for territorial integrity and borders.267  
 
Thus we can perceive from Turkish-Armenian dealings that, despite the 
efforts made by the Armenian and Turkish sides to normalize relations, the 
re-establishing of the ties between Armenia and Turkey have encountered 
many obstacles, just as in the past. In Armenia, some parties like the 
Dashnaks continue to unite people against the Turks and in Turkey there is 
also much opposition to a normalization of ties with Armenia.  
 
Perhaps one of the most important measures taken to manipulate public 
opinion and solve the differences between the two states was the forming of 
the Turkish–Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), in July 2001, 
which was established to improve relations between the two countries with 
support of the US  
 
However, despite the efforts made by both countries to relax the existing 
tensions, their contacts have been less than friendly. While the NK conflict 
remains unsolved, the normalization of bonds between Turkey and Armenia 
is unlikely because in this conflict, Turkey looks on Armenia as an aggressor 
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and has insisted on the evacuation of the Azerbaijani occupied territories by 
Armenian forces as a precondition to the re-establishing of diplomatic 
interchanges. But the Armenians will not accept any condition for establishing 
diplomatic ties. Moreover, Nikolay Hovhannissyan believes that Armenia has 
never been an aggressor, but merely tried to guarantee the security of NK. 
Thus the Turkish demand and precondition is baseless and unacceptable, 
and Armenia considers it an insult to its national prestige.268  
 
On 21st September 2004 the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdollah Gul, in a 
meeting with the Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian, announced that 
opening the Turkish border to Armenia was dependent on the withdrawal of 
the Armenian forces from Azerbaijani occupied territories and also on 
Yerevan abandoning its support for Spiurka, which is at present in the 
European parliament seeking approval for an investigation into the Armenian 
genocide by the Ottomans at the beginning of the century.269 Does the latest 
Turkish position therefore indicate the absence of change in Ankara’s stance 
regarding its relations with Armenia? Due to the negative effects of Turkey’s 
siege and the severing of relations with Armenia, the latter has recently (at 
the beginning of 2005) resorted to the Europeans in a clever move to force 
Turkey’s hand in this matter. Because Turkey wants to join the EU, Armenia 
has exploited this opportunity and encouraged Europe to put Turkey under 
pressure to change its policy regarding Armenia. Consequently Oskanian, the 
Armenian Foreign Minister, declared pointedly that he could not understand 
why the European leaders ignored Turkey’s shortcomings and impudence.270   
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As for US pressure on Turkey to re-open its borders to Armenia, if Europe 
agreed with the US it would be much more probable in the future that Turkey 
would change its policy in its relations with Armenia.  In 2008 and 2009 both 
countries with support of the US and the EU took steps to normalize relations. 
The presidents met in July 2008 in Astana. After the Russia-Georgia war 
Ankara lifted restrictions on Armenia to use Turkish air space in August 2008. 
Turkey’s President visited Armenia in September 2008 and during this 
meeting both sides agreed to improve relations. Also in 2008 the Government 
of Turkey authorized 40,000 illegal Armenian workers to continue residence. 
Sarkisian and Gul, the Presidents of Armenia and Turkey, met in Prague in 
May 2009. 
  
Turkey’s Overall Strategy over Azerbaijan, Armenia & NK 
 
Since the independence of the republics, Turkey’s strategy over Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and the NK conflict has been based on the following generalities: 
 Supporting the Republic of Azerbaijan and its territorial integrity in the 
conflict with the Republic of Armenia over NK 
 Enhancing the mutual relations with Azerbaijan under common 
conceptions such as ethnicity, language, religion, culture and history 
 Persisting in the establishing of strategic unity with the Republic of 
Azerbaijan in the political, economic and military fields 
 Exploiting the idea of the Republic of Azerbaijan as a bridge to influence 
the Turkish-speaking states of Central Asia, the autonomous republics, 
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the Muslim-populated republics of the northern Caucasus and the Turkish 
regions on the margins of the Volga river 
 Emphasizing and persisting in holding meetings, especially for the 
Turkish-speaking people in general, and organizing programmes in order 
to fulfil the dream of Pan-Turkism 
 Making an effort to fulfil the plans whereby Azerbaijani oil pipelines and 
generally the energy of the Caspian Sea would pass through Turkish 
territory 
 Defending Azerbaijan against Russian pressure and their excessive 
demands  
 Competing with Iran in a move to influence Azerbaijan and making efforts 
to weaken Iran’s role in that country 
 Condemning Armenian aggression towards Azerbaijan in international and 
regional organizations and communities  
 Magnifying the risk of Pan-Armenianism among the regional states, 
especially Georgia 
 Accusing Armenia of supporting the Kurds and the PKK organization 
 Making efforts to isolate Armenia politically and economically  
 Continuing the siege and economic boycott of Armenia.  
 
During the years following the independence of the republics, the Turks put 
the above-mentioned subjects on the agenda, some of which were their basic 
strategies in the region.  
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Turkey’s Strategy in Opposition to the Interests of other Outsiders and its 
Effect on the Conflict 
 
Turkey’s Pan-Turkish policy in opposition to other regional powers, 
particularly Russia, Iran and China, has had a decisive effect on the 
perpetuation of the NK conflict between the two republics of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia. Such oppositional interests and Turkey’s rivalry with Russia and 
Iran are therefore considered as one of the main obstacles in the process of 
settling the differences between the Azeris and the Armenians. These three 
long-standing rivals have regarded each others’ actions as a ploy to provoke 
their adversaries. Just as Iran’s efforts to establish a ceasefire were 
countered by Russia, similarly Turkey’s measures to settle the conflict were 
met with suspicion from Iran and Russia. In other words, the rivalry between 
Russia, Turkey and Iran is in reality the result of the different interests that 
each government follows in the region. For this reason, the future of the NK 
crisis depends on the outcome of the efforts made by these three states. Of 
course this does not mean that each of them acts independently in its 
regional policies, since during recent years the regional and supra-regional 
outsiders have approached each other and set up some informal coalitions 
and groups in their common interest. Russia, Iran and Armenia, which have 
more or less common policies in the area, stand against the US and 
Azerbaijan. What is clear for the moment is that Russia, Iran and Armenia 
share a common interest, which they are pursuing so as to lessen Turkish 
influence in the region and to prevent the rise of an oil-rich Azerbaijani 
state.271  
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There may be hope of settling the dispute when the oppositional interests and 
goals of one group can be imposed on the others, or the interests of the 
outsiders are somehow harmonized regarding the resolution of the conflict. 
As long as the interests of regional and supra-regional outsiders are in 
opposition to each other, the “no war, no peace” situation will persist in the 
area. In short, without the understanding and cooperation of outsiders, little 
hope can be envisaged for a conclusion of the disagreement and the 
establishment of peace in the region.272  
 
 
 
 
Turkey’s Proposals for the Settlement of the NK Conflict  
 
Turkish proposals to settle the NK hostilities are in complete agreement with 
its regional stance and viewpoint regarding the Caucasus. Ankara has 
proposed that the land connecting the Republic of Azerbaijan and the 
Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan, which was seized by the Armenians, 
should be entrusted to Azerbaijan and in return, Azerbaijan would consign a 
part of NK to the Armenians. Azerbaijan would be linked to Nakhichevan by a 
direct land route, and Armenia would be directly connected to Karabakh 
through this corridor. Turkey not only would face no obstacle to entering 
Central Asia and the Caucasus but also would be directly joined territorially to 
a vast region stretching from the Chinese border to Azerbaijan. This proposal 
was not welcomed by either of the warring factions because Armenia would 
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thereby be deprived of its territorial link and vital border with Iran, and 
Azerbaijan would also lose NK. This proposal was also presented by the 
US.273 
  
The United States of America 
 
The US was among the first states to recognize the independence of the 
republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia but because of the rapidity and 
seriousness of the developments the US, like other outsiders, was taken by 
surprise and was doubtful about the future and real degree of independence 
of these countries. The two months’ deferment by the Americans in sending 
their ambassador to the newly independent republics confirms this point. It is 
evident that the developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus had no 
direct impact on America’s vital interests, so this matter was an important 
reason for the delay in entering the locality. Instead of making efforts to gain 
strategic advantage there, the US prevents other internal actors from 
accessing their benefits, such as oil and natural gas resources. The Caspian 
basin is the third largest source of oil and natural gas reserves in the world. 
This typifies the policy of the US in the region.274 
 
At present there is no threat to US interests in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. The only worrying factor was the presence of nuclear weapons in 
the area, hence one of the most important preferences of the US was to offer 
political, diplomatic, and economic support to some of the republics in return 
for their nuclear disarmament.275 The Soviet Union moved nuclear weapons 
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from Eastern Europe, Baltic republics, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to Russia 
before the end of 1991. But tactical nuclear weapons remained in Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. 
 
In the beginning, the Americans were dependent on the Russians for their 
views on the region; they were not too worried about events there and did not 
have the status to exert a significant influence on this area. But in time the US 
fixed its attention on the area, fearing lest the newly independent republics be 
influenced by Iran and other regional states and fill the power vacuum caused 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union.276 
 
Goble argues that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US 
administration almost immediately formulated three modest policy goals for 
the NIS:  
 The US declared its support for the independence of the NIS and aimed to 
help prevent them from gravitating towards Russia and, in particular, Iran 
 The US aimed to support the establishment of liberal democratic regimes 
in the NIS, and adjusted its policy according to the progress of 
democratization in those states 
 The US supported the export of Caspian energy resources by a route that 
would not exclusively depend upon Russia and that would, most 
importantly, not cross Iranian territory.277  
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The US interest in retaining a presence in the critical area of Karabakh is 
manifest and its concern about the conflict between the Republics of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia has a direct correlation with its own interests. 
 
The US has two separate policies regarding NK. The first originated in the 
Congress in 1992 and the second was arranged by the White House. While 
the policy of the White House and the US Department of State is based upon 
mediation to settle the conflict and the condemnation of the violation of the 
residents’ rights, as well as the forcing of civilians to emigrate by both parties, 
the policy of the Congress originated from domestic developments in the US 
Congress showed its bias towards the Armenians by enacting section 907 
and cutting off aid from Azerbaijan and by rarely condemning the Armenians 
for violations of human rights.278  
Thus we can discern a two-edged policy over the conflict approved by the 
US. As long as the Popular Front party was in charge, the US called for a 
rapid settlement of the dispute and the establishment of peace and stability in 
the region, but because of the existence of large Armenian communities in 
the US and the need to maintain friendly links with both parties, they never 
openly supported the Azeris. But the fall of the Popular Front and the concern 
about Heydar Aliev’s bias towards Russia and Iran caused a considerable 
change in the US position to the benefit of the Armenians. With Aliev’s 
entrenched power and his independent adoption of policies from Moscow, the 
US favoured Azerbaijan once again, though not with the idea of giving aid to 
Azerbaijan to gain victory in the NK conflict. Nonetheless Aliev’s position drew 
US attention once more towards settling the dispute. Particularly after the 
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setting up of an oil consortium in Azerbaijan and the granting of 45 per cent of 
the international company shares to American firms, Washington was 
tempted to engage in the Caspian area and especially in Azerbaijan to seek a 
resolution of the dispute. The continuation of hostilities in NK caused 
problems for the oil pipelines and was a destabilizing factor preventing 
western companies from investing. It also put Turkey, the most important US 
ally in the region and a member of NATO, under pressure, none of which was 
to the benefit of the US.279  
 
On the one hand, it seems that the US position over Karabakh was affected 
by considerations regarding its regional friends. On the other, the US was 
trying to harmonize its policy with the Russian position in the Caucasus, 
because it believed that the adoption of offensive tactics there would facilitate 
the restoration of Russia’s dominance, as in the past. So the US had to avoid 
provoking Russia, but at the same time encourage it to continue its reforms. 
Furthermore the US was attempting to introduce Turkey, its old regional ally, 
as an economic and political model for Central Asian and the Caucasian 
states in order to obstruct Iran’s influence and Islamic fundamentalism in the 
area and, in addition, to achieve its own economic goals. It is clear that these 
policies are essentially contradictory, because Russia and Turkey are rivals 
with opposing interests in the region. 
 
Although it seemed that after signing the “Century Compact”, in 1994, the US 
position was inclined towards Azerbaijan and Turkey, the influence of the 
Armenian lobbies on the US decision-making authorities not only obstructed 
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the adoption of pro-Azeri policies but also led to a ban on sending economic 
aid to Azerbaijan, which lasted for the following few years. 280  The US 
Congress passed the Freedom Support under section 907 of the Freedom 
Support Act in 1992 for humanitarian aid to 15 republics except Azerbaijan. 
Those included were: Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Section 907 was enacted mainly because of the 
strong lobbying efforts of the Armenian community in the US, whose 
influential position in US politics is well-known.281  In the words of Robert 
Cutler:  
 
“United States policy on Karabakh through much of the 1990s until the 
present  was dominated by the extremely well-organized and politically 
well-connected  Armenian diaspora. Legislation was passed which 
penalized both Azerbaijan and Turkey for their bans on trade with 
Armenia”.282. 
 
Briefly, the Americans adopted two-edged and ambiguous policies over the 
NK conflict, thereby enhancing mutual relations with the republics of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, and gradually took a firm stand in the Caspian 
region.283   
 
During this period, then, the US was very successful in respect of its regional 
objectives, i.e. dominance over the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and 
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finding a replacement for the Persian Gulf. It also prevented the restoration of 
Russian hegemony in the area through the adoption of peaceful policies. 
 
The European Union 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the 
Central Asian and Caucasian states, the EU endeavoured to increase its 
influence in the region and, taking into account its better understanding of the 
historical, cultural and political issues, tried to avoid taking risks. The great 
interest of Europe in developing its standing as far as the Pacific coast, and 
with the members of the Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union in the 
OSCE, as well as its efforts to play a decisive role in conflicts such as NK, all 
confirm the European interest to increase its influence in that locality.284  
 
The strategic advantages and location of the Caucasus, along with its mines 
and energy resources as well as virgin markets for European products proved 
to be sufficient reason for arousing European interest in this area. It is evident 
that European goals and plans for the region would only be achievable if 
there were political stability there, thus one of the main goals of the OSCE is 
to establish stability and peace along the borders of the republics. This 
proves the presence of this organization as an interested outsider in the NK 
problem. While the CSCE envisages numerous benefits for itself in the 
Caucasus, the new republics are more inclined to seek cooperation and 
relationships because of their historical background and the conduct of the 
Europeans. For this reason Armenia and Azerbaijan are very interested in 
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joining European institutions. Insofar as the EU, is able to have access to the 
the natural resources of the region, and because of its strategic importance, it 
tends to strengthen its relations with the Caucasian states. Moreover, it never 
likes to see instability on its borders because at present, the probability of the 
recommencement of hostilities is one of the most important obstacles to 
drawing nearer to Europe. European efforts can be summarized by EU 
cooperation with the Minsk Group.285 The regional states became members 
of the CSCE in 1992 and consequently their mutual political and diplomatic 
relations developed. As for the importance of the Caucasian borders for the 
Europeans, the establishing of stability along the republics’ frontiers is 
considered the first aim of the OSCE agenda.286 The OSCE adopted this 
name to reflect its more permanent structure. 
 
In February 1992, one year after the independence of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, the CSCE dispatched a delegation to the locality to discuss the 
status of NK plus the possibility of a ceasefire and the deployment of 
observers. In the middle of the same month two delegations visited the place 
and as a result, the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE-administered Minsk 
Conference, called on the “Minsk Group” on 24th March to settle the NK 
issue.287 This group was responsible for holding a peace conference in Minsk, 
the capital of Belarus.  
 
Mediating efforts to carry out their decisions were unsuccessful for a number 
of reasons: first, the organization lacked the necessary mechanism to 
pressurize the hostile parties; the second reason was the existing challenge 
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from Russia, especially because it investigated the national interests of those 
members which were inconsistent.288  
 
Some observers believe that although the CSCE is in charge, one should not 
lay all the blame at its feet, since NK was the first major quarrel in which the 
CSCE was involved. Lacking any firm guidelines or any practice in 
peacemaking, the CSCE did whatever was in its power to stop the war.289  
 
The CSCE nevertheless played a vital role in settling regional conflicts, 
especially the NK dispute, and some agreement was achieved among the 
CIS, Russia and the CSCE, despite the challenges. It is worthy of note that 
the OSCE and the parties in dispute could not agree on the organization of 
the peacekeeping forces being entirely Russian because they feared that the 
policies of the Russian empire would once again be restored. Thus, while 
Russia consistently made it clear that it preferred a Russian-only 
peacekeeping force to be approved by the world community, the UN, NATO 
and the CSCE did not intend that Russia should control the territories 
belonging to the former Soviet Union.290  Furthermore, with 70 years of bitter 
experience of Russia’s hegemony, the regional states believe that they must 
resort to a powerful ally, but not a neighbour, to guarantee their security. The 
experience of the wars in NK and Chechnya has strengthened this idea.  
 
As already mentioned, from the beginning the first priority of the OSCE was to 
remove security worries from the zone. In order to guarantee security they 
tried to arrange political, economic and military cooperation with the newly 
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independent states to prevent Russia from having an absolutely free hand. 
Russia was the country with the most influence in Armenia, and Moscow’s 
strategy was to keep the resolution of the Karabakh dispute under its 
absolute control. The effective presence of Europe in Armenia would allow 
Yerevan to understand that alternatives to Russian domination did exist.291  
 
Russia never agreed to the presence of new partners in the sphere of its 
security. Russia has always played a dual role in the OSCE and the Minsk 
Group. This contradiction is manifest in Russia’s competing mediation efforts. 
 
Briefly, the efforts made by the OSCE to have a hand in the settlement of the 
NK crisis and increase its influence in the Caucasus resulted in rivalry 
between Russia and that organization. Despite this contest, the parties 
involved, especially Azerbaijan, were very interested in the implementation of 
a role by the OSCE in the NK crisis, and considered its presence as an 
important factor in lessening Russia’s pressure on themselves, but Russia 
never agreed to accept new outsiders in its traditional sphere of influence. 
Such rivalry not only accounts for the lack of success of the OSCE in the 
resolving of the NK confrontation, but also causes the trouble to be 
perpetuated. Although in general a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities 
have been maintained in the region, the opposing interests and rivalry among 
the outsiders have prevented the attaining of peace because, as one might 
expect, the highest incidence of contradictory argumentation by the co-chairs 
was in the peace plans proposed to the conflicting parties. For that reason, 
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the Minsk Group has been unable to adopt an impartial position in the 
proposed solutions.292   
 
It is clear that the greater the increase in the number of effective outsiders, 
the more complicated the crisis becomes. Supposing that contradictory 
interests exist, it is clear that we can in no way be optimistic about settling the 
dispute. Thus the interference of Russia obstructed the peace process 
because of its rivalry with the OSCE, and finally prolonged the disagreement. 
 
Russia’s actions were so uncooperative that John Maresca, the American 
ambassador to the OSCE, and the US special representative for Karabakh, 
later denounced it:  
 
“At first, Russia fully supported the Minsk Group. But in 1993 Russia 
reactivated its earlier independent mediation effort …. Russia wished to re- 
establish its dominance in the region and to exclude outsiders, namely the US 
and Turkey… Moscow would like to re-establish control of the former 
[Azerbaijan] Soviet frontier with Turkey and Iran, and to share in Azerbaijan’s 
oil riches. To accomplish these aims, Russia has been pressuring Azerbaijan 
to accept the re-entry of Russian troops as …border guards…. For leverage, 
 the Russians have used an implicit but dramatic threat: if Azerbaijan 
does not comply, Russia will step up its backing for Armenia… with 
disastrous military results for the Azeris.”293  
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Despite the passing of several years following the ceasefire between the 
conflicting parties and because of the opposing interests of outsiders - 
especially Russia, which played a prominent role in the process related to the 
NK conflict - the present state of this dispute is unfortunately more 
complicated than in the past and there remain many problems and 
unanswered questions.294  
 
As a result most Azerbaijani parties are pessimistic about the intervention of 
the OSCE mediators and consider that the visits of the Minsk group 
representatives are fruitless and futile. Some also believe that this 
organization acts in the same way towards the aggressor and the victim, and 
lacks the necessary mechanisms to carry out the UN Security Council 
resolutions to force the Armenians to withdraw from Azerbaijani-occupied 
territories. In other words, it is not able to settle the NK question. Some even 
believe that the Minsk group has no intention of resolving the conflict. Among 
these are the party of “National Independence”, under Etebar Mamadev, the 
“Azerbaijan Popular Front” led by Ali Karmiev, and the leaders of the 
“Karabakh Liberation Organization.”295  
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the main factors in the perpetuation of the NK conflict is the opposition 
of the interests of regional and supra-regional outside powers in the 
Caucasus. The policy of each external power in trying to achieve its goals 
and interests in the region is at variance with those of other outsides. It is 
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clear that the consequence of such opposing interests in the area is the 
formation of informal coalitions, eventually leading to the establishing of a 
balance of power between the protagonists. Thus the settlement of the crisis 
by defeating one another is highly problematical. The outcome of such a 
balance is nothing more than a perpetuation of the strife. 
 
It is noteworthy that the opposition of outsiders’ interests in the Caucasus and 
the balance resulting from this is somewhat ambiguous and the exact 
demarcation between both sides of the equation is unclear. In such a 
situation the established counterpoises are usually fluid, and the coalitions 
are varied based on the interests that have attracted them into the region. 
Iran’s desire to establish equilibrium in the region is in accordance with 
Russian interests, and as a result, coordination and harmony is observable in 
the positions of both states. In contrast, it is in opposition to Russia’s interests 
in some cases. The positions of both states can be incompatible and may 
even cancel each other out. For instance, Iran and Russia are not particularly 
interested in Western influence over the region. They consider the Pan-Turkic 
power of Turkey as an aggravation of the instability in the area and as a 
danger to their territorial integrity. In the meantime Iran has no intention of 
allowing Russian military dominance in the region once again. On the other 
hand, Russia is anxious about the increase of Iran’s cultural influence.296 
 
Besides, they have differences regarding the routes of the oil pipelines. 
Russia is convinced that the Economic Cooperation Council (ECO) restricts 
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its influence in the area, but Iran regards it as a mechanism through which it 
expands its influence there.297 
 
Iranian regional policy also faces a variety of reactions from Turkey. Many 
examples can be found in regional developments that confirm the rivalry of 
Iran and Turkey in establishing a sphere of influence in the region. This is 
why Russia and the US prefer Turkey to play a prominent role, because the 
policies proposed by that country for the Caucasian Republics are a good risk 
for the interests of the EU and the US and Russia in comparison with Iran’s. 
In particular, the US believes that Turkey’s policy in the area can forestall 
Pan-Islamism and pro-Iranian aspirations. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran 
enjoy cooperation in economic affairs, which has resulted from the propensity 
of both states to develop the ECO and to reach an understanding about 
important projects.  
 
Tehran is generally not interested in a unilateral expansion of Turkish cultural-
political influence in the region, or in Russian military control over the borders 
of the Commonwealth Republics. Besides, Iran does not conceal its 
dissatisfaction with the powerful impact of the West in the region, especially 
the US. It is clear that the mutually opposed opinions of the outsiders to each 
others’ interests could eventually result in a renewal of hostilities. 
 
In the end the contrasting and opposing interests of the outside powers 
involved in the NK conflict will not bring about convergence and cooperation  
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Chaper 5: Early Mediations and Solutions 
 
Introduction 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided an opportunity for a third 
party to transform the conflict from an internal Soviet dispute to one among 
several sovereign states. This structural change gave other members of the 
international community the chance to contribute to the resolution of the NK 
conflict. According to Rubin et al, where disputants are unable or unwilling to 
move towards an agreement on their own, third parties often become 
involved either at the request of the disputants or on their own initiative.298 
 
In the absence of any negotiation attempts by the parties in conflict, at the 
beginning of the disagreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted Russia, the 
OSCE and Iran as mediators in the dispute.  
 
On the other hand, the efforts of the Turkish government to play such a 
mediatory role were rejected by both the Armenian government and the 
Armenians inhabitants of NK. This rejection was primarily a result of the 
historical antagonism between Armenians and Turks from 1894-1923. At the 
time and even today, the Armenians view the Karabakh conflict as a 
continuation of past quarrels and are hugely suspicious of the role of the 
Turkish government in the 1915 genocide. 
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The Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati defined Iran's mediating role 
as an obvious response to the "natural" demand of the hostile parties from 
one of the neighbouring states. 299  In addition, the close historical and 
geographical relationship between Iran and other countries in dispute as well 
as the presence of a large population of Azeris living in Iran, gave legitimacy 
to the mediation efforts carried out by the Iranian government.  
 
The Iranian effort for mediation was initiated by the visit of Iran’s Foreign 
Minister, Dr Ali Akbar Velayati, to Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK in February 
1992. This endeavour was followed by meetings between the Presidents of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia hosted by the Iranian President, Mr. Ali Akbar 
Rafsanjani, in Tehran in May 1992 which led to the signing of the Tehran 
agreement, containing eight articles. Although several ceasefires were 
agreed as a result of Iranian intervention they were all very short-lived due to 
a lack of collaboration between the opposing parties and other countries and 
international organizations. 
 
The Russian Government played a leading role in the altercation either 
directly or through the Minsk Group. Russia’s mediation efforts began in 1991 
after the visit of Boris Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, the Presidents of Russia and 
Kazakhstan, to Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert. This intervention continued 
until May 1992 when Valdmir Kazimirov was appointed as the Russian 
President’s envoy to the negotiations. Kazimirov and Grachev, the Russian 
Defence Minister, travelled many times to the region and held many meetings 
regarding the NK conflict. In September 1992, they proposed a 60-day cease-
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fire which was rejected by the Azerbaijan authorities. The negotiations 
continued and finally led to a cease-fire which was to take effect in May 1994. 
Russia's involvement in mediation was primarily motivated by its desire to re-
establish a presence in Armenia and Azerbaijan and increase its influence in 
the region. Russia intended to maintain a military presence in the Caucasus 
as it feared a ‘security vacuum’ being filled by Turkey, Iran or other non-
regional powers, such as the US and NATO.300 After the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, Armenia continued to rely on Russia for its security protection 
and therefore agreed for Russian troops to be stationed in Armenia. 
Azerbaijan, however, resisted Russian attempts to exert influence within its 
borders and deemed such a presence a threat to its national sovereignty. The 
disagreement in NK provided an opportunity for the CSCE/OSCE to establish 
itself as a regional conflict-settlement organization.  
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the OSCE has been struggling with 
the problem of how best to intervene in the problems of disputed territories. A 
key development in the mediation to resolve the NK conflict was the United 
Nations accord in late 1992 to enable the OSCE to become the leading 
international body in the management and resolution of the NK 
disagreement.301 
In 1992 at the Helsinki conference, the OSCE called for the convening of a 
“Conference on NK” to be held in Minsk, the capital of Belarus and arranged 
for a group of member states to organize the Minsk Conference. Organising 
and holding the conference was however more difficult than expected and in 
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the end, it was not held but the participating member states endorsed speedy 
negotiations for a formal cease-fire to be reached. 
This group of OSCE members later renamed themselves the “Minsk Group” 
and managed to meet separately in 1992 to agree on a methodology for 
negotiations. The countries involved were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Belarus, Turkey and 
the United States.  
 
After the Helsinki conference the peace process entered a new phase on 24th 
March 1992, when Co-chairs were appointed to lead the Minsk Group. The 
current (July 2009) Co-chairs are from Russia, France and the United States 
 
During the Budapest Summit of December 1994, the OSCE members 
strongly supported the mediation efforts of the Minsk Group and encouraged 
the countries in conflict to undertake negotiations with the final aim of 
arranging a ceasefire.  
 
The United States of America also supported the negotiation process. This 
was the first example of the US participating directly in an effort to resolve a 
conflict on the territory of the former Soviet Union.   
 
Following Russia’s cooperation with the OSCE, a ceasefire agreement was 
reached in May 1994 and is still in operation. According to a report by the 
latter, harmonizing its own efforts with those of the Russian Federation was 
one of the key prerequisites for this ceasefire.  
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Another international organization that attempted to contribute to the 
resolution of the conflict argument was the United Nations Security Council 
which passed four resolutions regarding this dispute. The recognition of NK 
as a legitimate part of Azerbaijan and addressing Armenia as a party to the 
conflict. 
In 1992, the US diplomat, Goble indicated that Azerbaijan and Armenia are 
not able to solve their problems and suggested that peace would be 
established if Meghri was exchanged for Lachine and NK. This swap would 
enable Azerbaijan to have a border with Nakhchivan but would mean 
Armenia would be deprived of one with Iran. 
In this chapter I will discuss the proposals made by Goble in detail and 
explore the contributions made by Iran, Turkey, the OSCE and Russia in 
solving the NK conflict.  
 
Mediation by the Russian Federation and CIS 
 
Russia: The First Mediator and the Most Important Player  
 
The Minsk Group of the OSCE was the only international organization 
involved from the beginning in the NK conflict and officially assumed the role 
of mediator, with the Russian Federation, along with the US and France, as 
one of three co-chairmen of the Minsk Group. However, the Russians, either 
individually or within the Minsk Group, operated in a unique way. Russia 
always has played a leading part in this dispute and in a way, can be 
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considered as the most influential player in the NK crisis. Russia should take 
credit for its exertions which resulted in the May 1994 ceasefire. Thus, in a 
sense, the success or failure of the mediating efforts, either prior to or after 
the ceasefire, can be related to a lack of interest by Russia. The Russians 
sometimes actively undermined OSCE peace efforts as they made parallel 
and unilateral mediation attempts without informing the CSCE. The final 
cease-fire of 16th May, in fact, occurred at a time when Jan Eliasson, the 
chairman of the Minsk Group, was in the region to promote the CSCE peace 
plan. Despite his presence, and in spite of Azerbaijani requests that he 
should be a party to the talks, Eliasson was not invited to take part in the 
cease-fire negotiations. Such a humiliation naturally lowered the standing of 
the CSCE.302 
 
Therefore, bearing in mind the importance and influence of Russia's role in 
the settlement process, we consider its mediating function within the 
framework of the CIS and the Caucasus and the role of its other members. 
 
Russian mediation began in 1991, after Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, the 
Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan, made a visit to Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and NK. 303  After this, a meeting was arranged on 23rd September in 
Zheleznovodsk with the participation of the leaders of the hostile parties. At 
the end of the negotiations, a joint declaration was signed by these 
countries.304 
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After the September meeting, representatives of the parties concerned sat 
down to negotiate in Bishkek under the supervision of Russian, Finnish, and 
Kyrgyzstani representatives, in which the Russians called for the observing of 
three principles, namely: 
 The establishment of a ceasefire  
 The acknowledgment the Karabakh representatives as the main force 
in the peace talks 
 The deployment of 1,800 soldiers of the CIS.305 
 
Although, these principles were in accordance with the interests of Armenian 
forces, the Azerbaijan Republic, under Russian pressure, signed the final 
declaration, with some modifications in the articles. These laid stress on the 
Azerbaijani occupied territories and the deployment of international observers 
in the buffer zone alongside those from the Commonwealth States. 
 
In May 1992, Russia's mission as a mediator began with Vladimir Kazimirov, 
who was appointed as special envoy by President Yeltsin. From this moment 
onwards, Russia used intense diplomatic efforts under the directorship of 
Kazimirov, aimed at formulating Russia's plans and views concerning the 
settlement of the NK conflict 
 
In June 1992, Russia presented its proposals for resolving the conflict, but 
these were not implemented due to the opposition of the Minsk Group. Later 
on, it was shown that this group’s counter-proposition was not successful 
either. It should be mentioned that Russia presented its programme 
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clandestinely to the opposing parties through a secret mission, and all three 
parties agreed with its general points as though - according to this proposition 
which, was in some ways similar to the Step-by-Step Solution - the war would 
end and the parties would begin negotiations about different issues 
separately. A few days after this proposition, a US delegation entered the 
region and asked Yerevan and Baku to oppose the proposition. Baku acted 
on the delegation's advice, but Yerevan rejected it.306 It appears that the US 
was not pleased with the Russian unilateral action and not using the Minsk 
Group. 
 
After autumn 1992, when the weaknesses in the Minsk Group became 
apparent, Russian mediating efforts aimed at calming the region were 
intensified. This time, many Russian politicians and military figures became 
engaged in establishing peace in the region. On 19th September 1992, 
ceasefire negotiations between the warring parties were brokered in Sochi by 
Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defence Minister. During this period of fierce 
fighting, the Russians pressed hard for a ceasefire. Grachev, was actively 
involved in the negotiations and his role was indicative of the extent to which 
the Defence Ministry was actively caught up in this dispute.307 As mentioned 
earlier, Russia's main reason for presenting its proposal to settle the conflict 
at that time was, in fact, to be able to deploy its peacekeeping forces in the 
buffer zone and to exclude the Minsk Group from the mediation process. The 
Russian Defence Minister and Kazimirov took part in periodic and 
uninterrupted shuttle diplomacy between Stepanakert and Baku (from 1992-
1996).308 
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In September 1992, Kazimirov, the Russian President’s special envoy, 
proposed a 60-day ceasefire to Elchibey, the Azerbaijani President. But the 
Baku authorities did not respond to this proposal and it remained 
unanswered. In October, Russia once again made several proposals to Baku, 
and these too went ignored. In spring 1993, Kozyrev and Cetin, the Foreign 
Ministers of Russia and Turkey, chose to visit the region, with the aim of 
establishing a ceasefire. But the Turkish authorities wanted to carry out a 
deeper analysis of the basis of the conflict along with the inauguration of the 
ceasefire; consequently, their visit was cancelled  
 
At this point, another difference arose between Turkey and Russia, 
concerning arrangements for peacekeeping forces. Although Cetin stressed 
in a statement that the ceasefire must be achieved with Russia's aid309 he 
declared his opposition to the deployment of Russian troops as peacekeepers 
in the Transcaucasus except as part of a multinational force.310 
 
The Russians introduced numerous measures in 1993, each of which was, 
for one reason or another, abandoned. For instance, in September, it 
brokered negotiations in Moscow with the participation of Azerbaijani and 
Karabakhi representatives.311 Finally, in May 1994, as a result of Russia's 
leading role e in the tough negotiations, a ceasefire treaty was concluded 
between the hostile parties. Thus, on 15th April 1994, through a Russian 
initiative during the CIS Summit, a document relating to the NK conflict was 
approved, in which the implementation of a ceasefire was determined as a 
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prerequisite for establishing peace. Then, on the 4th and 5th of May, this time 
through the instigation of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a meeting made up of 
the representatives of the commonwealth states was held, in which all of 
them prioritized the cease-fire except the Azeri delegate, who finally signed it 
after much pondering. It is worth mentioning that Kazimirov was present at 
this meeting and played a vital role in convincing Aliev to agree to the 
ceasefire treaty. Finally, on 12th May 1994, the ceasefire treaty was signed by 
the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Karabakhi parliamentary speakers in 
Bishkek.312 It was the first time that Karabakh had officially been recognized 
as a separate political and regional entity. This was while Azerbaijan had 
been trying for a long time to characterise Armenia as an aggressor to the 
international community.313 
 
Russia did not stop its mediation after the ceasefire and continued its efforts 
to achieve a final political solution. Russia's special negotiator for NK, 
Vladimir Kazimirov, travelled to Baku and spent several weeks with the 
Azerbaijani authorities there, and in Yerevan and Stepanakert. 314  But the 
Baku authorities had no confidence in Kazimirov and they were not terribly 
impressed by his conduct in the region up to that point. 
 
After this, Boris Yeltsin met with Aliev in early 1996 to issue a declaration on 
the settlement of the NK crisis, in which he proposed a high degree of 
autonomy to the Armenians of Karabakh. He also promised to continue his 
efforts and follow up the resolution of the conflict by adopting an active shuttle 
policy. The Armenian officials showed indifference towards it and the 
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Karabakhis construed it as an imposed autonomy and refused to agree with 
it. 
 
On 8th May 1996, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister visited the 
region, as the first step of Yeltsin’s shuttle diplomacy. The result of this visit 
was the exchange of prisoners of war. But no other visits were made and this 
was interpreted as meaning he was involved on other fronts. This time, the 
Azeris expressed their discontent with Kazimirov, the Russian President’s 
special envoy, who was still active in the region. This finally led to his 
resignation. Of course, both the Armenian and Karabakhi authorities praised 
him for his efforts. 
 
After the December 1996 Lisbon OSCE summit, which led to the issuing of a 
Azerbaijani-favoured resolution, a new stage in Russo-Azeri relations was 
started, as Russia made a clear stand in defending Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity at the conference.315 
 
The following year, after negotiations with the Armenian Foreign Minister 
Primakov announced that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity must be observed 
when settling the NK crisis. He also emphasized that if there were any 
deviation from this principle, there would be no hope of settling the crisis. 
 
Generally, in the past few years, Russia has been firm in this commitment to 
defend Azerbaijani territorial integrity. At the same time, it has not only 
foregone its military cooperation with Armenia, but also reinforced its military 
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bases, particularly in Gurmy, about 75 miles from the capital Yereven with 
advanced armaments. It has also enhanced its relations with Armenia as its 
only strategic ally in the Caucasus. According to an Azeri claim, during 1996-
1998, Russia unconditionally provided Armenia with heavy armaments, 
valued at approximately one billion dollars.316 
 
Evaluating Russia’s Mediating Conduct 
 
A different characteristic can be seen in Russia's mediating behaviour. Russia 
has sometimes supported Armenia openly and on others has approached 
Azerbaijan. This assistance has even expanded to the point of military 
intervention and supplying arms and munitions. 
 
Russia's has adapted it mediating conduct to correspond to its regional goals, 
and this has been influenced by a number of different factors. For example, 
one influential element concerned the efforts made by other players, 
particularly the United States. Russia's involvement in other diplomatic 
spheres has also affected its interference in the conflict.  
 
When analysing Russia's conduct over the settlement of the NK conflict, it 
should be mentioned that Russian diplomacy towards regional developments 
generally and its views about the NK crisis specifically, were shaped in two 
completely different periods. In the first period, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia adopted a non-interference policy. Hence, it did not take any 
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independent action over the settlement of the NK conflict. Such a Russian 
viewpoint was affected by several factors, including: 
 Lack of coordination among the members in the realm of  foreign 
policy  
 Unclear strategic interests of the Russian federation in the region, 
which resulted from the absence of a single consistent policy there  
 Domestic political polarization 
 Western orientation among the officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry 
and their conviction of refraining from interference in the settlement of 
different regional problems after the collapse of the Soviet Union.317 
 
After September 1991, Russian diplomacy regarding the development of the 
region changed to such an extent that they actively entered the region from 
that time up until June 1992 and began purposeful attempts in the second 
half of 1992. Two local and external factors underpinned this new diplomacy. 
A local factor made its appearance following the coordination and integration 
of the elements round a single policy, and the external factor was the failure 
of the Minsk Group in stabilizing the temporary ceasefire in NK. 
 
In this period, we witnessed Russia's gradual engagement and persistence 
regarding the conflict either independently or as part of the Commonwealth of 
States. An example of these activities was in Sochi on 19th September 1992 
where, through the mediating efforts of Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defence 
Minister, a ceasefire was agreed between the opposing parties. In this regard, 
we can also see the joint declaration signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan in 
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Alma-Ata in August of the same year, mediated by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 
President of Kazakhstan. The two conciliation missions dissatisfied the 
western rivals because, during the meeting brokered by Grachev, he 
postponed NK’s legal identity to the final stage, and also the parties 
discussed unofficially the possibility of deployment of peacekeeping forces. 
 
The Russian independent and unofficial mediation in 1993-1994 was openly 
inconsistent with the approved principles of the OSCE and the UN. In 
particular, the recognition of NK as the party in dispute, and the participation 
of its representatives in the process of negotiations became one of the main 
components of Russia's proposal to settle the conflict. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Russia emphasised several points about its 
activities regarding the peace process; first, the term “Conflict over NK” 
should be replaced in all official documents by “Armeno-Azeri Conflict”; 
second, it laid stress on a ceasefire as the basic prerequisite for the 
settlement of the dispute; and finally, it urged the need for a strengthening of 
the ceasefire.  
 
Nonetheless, Russian policy regarding the NK conflict was based on it 
playing the part of supreme mediator so as to prevent the other players from 
interfering in the region, since, if the disagreement were to be settled by 
another country, it would mean more influence for that country and less for 
Russia. Furthermore, the propositions of other players did not coincide with 
Russian interests. Regarding the Caucasus, Russian policy was twofold. 
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There were those within the Russian national security bureaucracy who 
believed that it was in Russia's interests as a great power to reassert its 
control over the former Soviet borders and prevent or limit the extent of 
western penetration in the Caucasus and central Asia.318 
 
The idea that Russia was against the establishment of peace in the region, 
was not right. Rather, Russia was against a peace plan which increased the 
influence of other players and limited its own power in the region. But, on the 
other hand, if the solution were to increase Russia's authority, it would 
certainly agree with it. Of course, Russia possesses the levers needed to 
exert pressure on each of the belligerents in order to settle the conflict. The 
best proof for this claim is the fact that they have handled this difference for 
70 years and have not let it turn into violence.319  
 
Some commentators doubt that the Russia can be as influential as the Soviet 
Union and believe that the only reason that the Soviet Union was successful 
at preventing the conflict was that it deemed it an internal conflict and thus 
could control all aspects and difficulties in relation to it. After the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia struggled to regain its position in the 
Caucasus and the conflict defined the strengthening of this role in the region 
and her supremacy in the conflict. It should be indicated that Russia is still the 
dominant power in the Caucasus and is interested in maintaining its grip. 
Maintaining the Caucasus as a part of the former USSR is in Russia's 
interests. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has attempted to 
manipulate her power through the conflicts. 
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All in all, by its very presence and by playing the chief role in the mediating 
process, Russia has proved that it will not allow other countries, or 
international organizations from being deployed in the region and obstructing 
Russia's influence and interests in the Caucasus. Accordingly, Russia was 
even opposed to solving the dispute through Iran's mediation, and sometimes 
neutralized Iran's peace-making efforts. This was when Iran assumed 
responsibility for human suffering in the region, after being asked to act as 
mediator by the warring parties in 1992.320 
 
Mediation by the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
After the collapse of the USSR, Iran's strategy was based on developing 
relations with both states, since both Armenia and Azerbaijan are within the 
orbit of Iranian-Islamic culture and civilization.  Taking into account the 
dispute between the two countries over NK, Iranian diplomacy was predicated 
on the creation of a balance between their relations. Accordingly, Iran was not 
in favour of any solution whereby only the interests of Armenia would be 
respected as this would dissatisfy the Moslems of Azerbaijan. Similarly, it had 
no intention of unreservedly supporting that country to settle the conflict. 
Perhaps, by the returning of NK to Azerbaijan, the Baku statesmen had other 
reasons for causing problems for Iran. 321  However, the adoption of a 
balanced policy by Iran indicates that it believed in this policy as the best one 
for regional stability and also the most influential in settling the conflict 
because the Turkish programme, based on unconditional support from Baku, 
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had made the peace process more complicated after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991.322 
 
When Iran became engaged in a mediating role in the NK conflict, Iranian 
diplomats defined their country’s mediating role as an obvious response to a 
"natural" demand from the disputing parties of one of their neighbouring 
states.323 
 
Besides, Iran’s other motives for mediation are as follows: 
 Iran spares no effort in preventing the conflict from spilling over its borders 
because it is a potential threat to Iran's security in its northern provinces. 
Thus, Iran hoped for a rapid solution to the conflict, for obvious security 
reasons. The military operations along its borders represent an immediate 
danger to Iran's security.324 
 Iran's role as a regional power functions to prove its ability to adopt and 
persist in an appropriate foreign policy towards these new threats and 
challenges. 
 In the light of western hostility, Iran’s mediation and its efforts to prove its 
good intentions can have a positive effect on the improvement of its 
international and regional image and even on its relations with the 
West.325 
 A prolongation of the conflict will lead to a strengthening of Russia’s role, 
which may be tempted to settle the conflict on its own terms and 
conditions. These are contrary to Iran's security interests, as Russia's new 
military doctrine states unequivocally that it considers its strategic borders 
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in Central Asia to be contiguous to Iran and Afghanistan,326 and in the 
Caucasus to Iran and Turkey.327 Hence, Iran's concern is not founded on 
irrationality.    
 As mentioned above, Iran has sought to create a balance of power 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has also followed a plan, aiming at 
the settlement of the NK conflict. To the Iranian authorities, the power of 
either side is not to the benefit of the peace and stability of the region and, 
considering the local conditions, it is a threat to Iran's national security and 
interests. 
 Iran needs to contain Turkish influence in the region. The rivalry between 
Iran and Turkey dates back to ancient times and these differences have 
never been reconciled. Turkey is considered a "model" democratic 
government by the US administration, with a "leading role in the region's 
politics" which all the newly-independent states of the region were 
encouraged to follow.328 With the dissention in NK, the Iranian leadership 
had the chance to take advantage of Turkey's "Achilles’ heel". The enmity 
between the Armenians and the Turks may indeed give Iran an 
opportunity to oppose Turkish and US policies in the region. In making 
good use of this enmity and of the inconsistencies in Russian policies, Iran 
is the only regional player which has both the incentive and interest to play 
a mediating role by taking a visibly impartial stand in the conflict.329 
 
As we are already aware, through the failures of the co-chairmen of the Minsk 
Group, (as the only mediator in the conflict) and also the reaching of a 
deadlock in the peace process, we are now witness to the development of 
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warlike views among the Azeris. Also, it is natural that through a prolonged 
peace process and the reaching of a deadlock, such opinions will be 
increasingly supported by the admirers of a military solution in Azerbaijan.  
 
For this reason, Iran is concerned with the resurgence of military operations 
in the region. In this case, the spilling of the war over its borders will be 
unavoidable and its consequences will endanger Iran's national interests and 
security. Hence, the NK conflict and its settlement are directly related to Iran's 
interests.330 
 
As mentioned earlier, Iran recognized the independence of the Republics of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan from the first few weeks of its declaration, and 
expressed its concern about the continuing of the NK conflict and Iran's 
efforts to establish peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia were among the 
first made by a regional third party. 
 
Following the requests of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran, 
started its mediation initiatives in the area very actively through the offices of 
Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister. Following the intervention of 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Iranian President, the Presidents’ of both states met 
each other in Tehran on 7th May 1992 and signed the “Tehran Agreement”. 
This contained eight articles, in which both parties emphasized the need to 
continue their meetings to achieve a basic result according to the principles of 
international law and the UN Charter. They also agreed to ratify the stipulated 
ceasefire within one week after the arrival of Iranian official representatives in 
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the region. Then observers from Iran and the CSCE were to be deployed in 
the region and finally a stable peace would be established.331 
 
Iran's mediation lasted from March to September 1992, coinciding with the 
partial capture of Karabakh and the occupation of Shusha and Lachin. As a 
result of this serious military development, Karabakhi and Armenian forces 
were able to capture the entire province of Karabakh and some other areas of 
Azerbaijani territory.  
 
In early 1992, the Karabakhis recommenced their attacks against Azeri 
positions. Azerbaijan still dominated Shusha, Karabakh’s second important 
city, and was thereby able to bombard and control Stepanakert, the capital 
city of Karabakh. One of the strategic goals of the Karabakhis was to capture 
Shusha so as to rescue Stepanakert from Azeri attacks. Another strategic 
objective was to occupy Lachin situated outside the autonomous province of 
Karabakh in order to open a corridor between Armenia and NK. Up until this 
time, the Karabakhis were supported and fed by the Armenian aircraft as it 
sought to open its land corridor to Armenia. Thus, Iran's mediation lasted six 
months, which was the severest period in Karabakh’s affairs.  
 
In general, the measures taken by Iran in its role as mediator were based on 
the following principles: 
 The mediation delegation making  periodic visits to the region  
 The mediation delegation making propositions to the feuding parties 
 The establishment of two intervals of ceasefire 
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 The holding of summits in Tehran 
 
Periodic Shuttling of the Mediating Delegation to the Region 
 
Following the Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to Azerbaijan and Armenia and 
the recognition of the two republics, the Iranian consulate in Baku was 
upgraded into an embassy and an Iranian embassy was opened in Yerevan. 
 
After the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s negotiations with the Presidents of the two 
states, and the visit of the high-ranking delegations of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia to Tehran in 1992 a declaration was drafted; this was to be 
confirmed by the statesmen of both sides. In their negotiations with the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, the leaders of both countries expressed their interest 
in Iran's mediating efforts in the NK conflict. This request, which was the most 
important factor in the mediating attempts, paved the way for Iran to start its 
task. Considering Iran's standing, both parties expected its initiative to bring 
about an effective peace in the region. 
 
After the official appointment of Iran as mediator, the Iranian Foreign Minister 
described the main measures and objectives on which Iran would focus in its 
mediating role (shown above). Then the deputy Iranian Foreign Minister and 
the Supreme Representative heading a high-ranking political delegation, 
shuttled between Baku, Yerevan, Stepanakert, Tiflis, Nakhichevan, and 
Moscow, making three visits during which he negotiated with the top officials 
of both parties332 and took the necessary steps to balance their status and 
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pave the way for the preliminary negotiations. Moreover, the status, 
viewpoints, and degree of flexibility among the parties were studied closely. 
The mediating delegation visited Moscow and Tiflis in order to achieve its 
aims and through consultation and possible cooperation to advance future 
measures. In Moscow and Tiflis, Iran was praised on account of its unilateral 
action to conclude the conflict. The Russian reaction, although it was with the 
best of intentions, did not support it.333  
 
The important point about this shuttle process was that it continued even after 
the occupation of Shusha and Lachin. Following the occupation of these two 
strategic and sensitive provinces, involving contact by the Azerbaijani 
leadership with the Iranian President in Eshgh Abad, the mediating 
delegation, in May 1992, started its third visit to the region. Although the 
political status became more complicated after the capture of these areas, the 
parties were still ready to resume political negotiations. 
 
Another important point regarding these visits was the deployment of a 
number of Iranian representatives in Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert to 
observe and coordinate with the local officials. They were responsible for 
reporting deviations, actions and violations of the ceasefire treaty by the 
disputing parties to the mediating delegation. 
 
Aspects of Iran's Proposals to the Conflict Parties 
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After preliminary negotiations with the leaders of the three warring parties and 
after being informed of their standpoints, in February 1992, the mediators 
presented their proposals to both sides in order to achieve an agreement. 
Iran’s suggestions had been designed after careful consideration of each 
side’s flexibility and limitations and also because they were generally in 
agreement with them. But Iran did realise that due to the fluidity of events, it 
was not expected that all points would be achieved in the short term. The 
most important steps in Iran's proposition to achieve a compromise or break 
the initial deadlock were as follows: 
 Temporary and then permanent ceasefire 
 Exchanging of prisoners of war and bodies of dead soldiers 
 Simultaneous lifting of the blockade and return of refugees  
 Deployment of observer forces to monitor the ceasefire 
 Resumption of negotiations over Karabakh’s future for the determination 
of Karabakh’s legal status and the opening of transportation and 
communications to Karabakh 
 
Temporary Ceasefire  
 
One of the outcomes in Iran's mediation was to extract an agreement from all 
three sides to establish a temporary ceasefire and operate it. The first round 
of the ceasefire was realised on 20th March 1992. The mediator focused on 
executing the temporary ceasefire since it was vital for building mutual 
confidence and providing the opportunity to cool the conflict. The second 
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round began two months later in May and was founded on the same 
understanding. 
 
Tehran Summit 
 
After the second round visit by the mediators, it was decided that Iran's efforts 
to achieve basic results to settle the dispute should be dependent on the 
decisions and conclusions of the leaders of both states. In fact, by this 
approach, Iran wanted to avoid making unilateral decisions and the leaders of 
both countries confirmed its resolutions. In this period, the Karabakhi leaders 
were not invited to the conference, as the Azerbaijani authorities would not 
agree to sit at the negotiating table with the separatists. At that time, the 
Armenian authorities were agents of the Karabakhi leaders whose job it was 
to express their viewpoints.  
 
Through the efforts made by the mediators during the second visit to the 
capitals of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the leaders agreed to attend the trilateral 
conference in Tehran, in the presence of the Iranian President. After two days 
of intense negotiations - attended by Mamadov, the acting Azerbaijani 
President and Ter Petrossian, the Armenian President, and brokered by the 
Iranian President Rafsanjani - a political declaration, known as the "Tehran 
Declaration" was published in May 1992. This contained the previous points 
announced by the mediating delegation and the declaration was signed by 
the leaders of the two states. It should be added that the high political 
authority of the mediator heightened its esteem and validity. 
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The main points of the declaration were as follows: 
 
 Supporting the efforts made by Iran and other states and international 
organizations 
 Stressing to the parties the need for stability and peace on their borders 
and in NK 
 Requesting Iran to send its envoy to the region to negotiate with the 
interested parties and operate the temporary ceasefire with the support of 
both Presidents.  
 Expressing the desire by the parties for a continuation of Iran's mediation 
until the final result was achieved. 
 
The Tehran Summit can be considered as the the climax of Iran's efforts to 
end the conflict. In spite of effective arrangements, these attempts did not 
bring about positive results due to the unilateral measures taken by the 
Karabakh Armenians in occupying Shusha. But despite unexpected 
developments on the battlefields, the endeavours of the Iranian delegation 
continued. However, the complexity of the conflict was increased by fresh 
military developments, such as the changing military disposition of both sides, 
the plundering of occupied regions, the increase in the number of the 
P.O.Ws, refugees, and bodies and also the non-stop flow of armaments to 
the region. Thus, the future course became blurred. 
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Iran's Mediation and Other Players’ Reactions  
 
When Iran entered this mediation process it faced close scrutiny from Russia 
and the western powers. In fact, any movement which had a political and 
economic effect in such an important region became the core of attention for 
Russia and the West. Iran's independent diplomatic measures in the NK 
conflict drew Moscow's immediate attention. This was while Iran was 
successful in its initial steps. Before that, the first attempt to settle the conflict 
politically had been made by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev in September 1991. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Iranian mediating delegation proceeded to Moscow 
to negotiate with the Russian authorities after preliminary discussions. But the 
Russian Foreign Minister answered with a few diplomatic formalities such as 
"being ready to support any efforts, expressing hope that Iran's efforts would 
be fruitful.” Thus, Iran’s initial mediation encountered a lack of cooperation 
from Russia and a reluctance to exchange ideas, even though Iran showed 
interest in encouraging Russia to plan joint measures. But Iran's serious and 
active attempts were confronted by suspicion, since it did not want the power 
vacuum following the collapse of the USSR to be filled by other states Thus, 
Iran's and other countries’ attempts to settle the tensions ran into Russian 
mistrust. Russia never wanted Iran to go beyond normal diplomatic behaviour 
in the Caucasus and this view is also true in relation to Turkey and the EU.334 
During this process, the progress of Russo-Iranian consultation which had 
little political relevance continued and after the occupation of Shusha and 
Lachin by the Armenian forces and the presence of the CSCE, Russia tried to 
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get closer to Iran in order to take limited advantage of Tehran's influence in 
the dispute. 
 
Following changes in Azerbaijan's ruling system that resulted in new 
developments in the conflict, in March 1992, the Azeris tried to vary the 
effective parameters and to develop their power to manoeuvre. Hiring Afghan 
mercenaries and taking advantage of the oil issue were the most important 
levers used to exert pressure on the Armenians. In these circumstances, the 
Russians believed that Tehran would be a guarantee to convince the Afghan 
authorities to recall their mercenaries, so again Russia became interested in 
Iran. Such an approach can not be interpreted except as a marginal abuse. 
As in the past, such a view has been maintained by the Russian authorities 
towards Iran's role in the NK conflict. 
 
The CSCE`s attitude towards Iran's mediation can be seen in two ways: 
firstly, as an international organization; and secondly, as the representative of 
the western countries and their strategies. In 1992, after the members all the 
Republics of the former USSR joined the CSCE, this council set up the Minsk 
Group to present different solutions for the settlement of the NK conflict. The 
CSCE (now OSCE), ignored Iranian mediation as Iran was not a member of 
that organization. US views towards Iran's political behaviour also affected 
the CSCE’s bias. In fact, the US’s negative and suspicious attitude mainly 
affected CSCE behaviour towards Iran. From the US viewpoint, Iran's 
developing influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia could not be defined 
in the context of US interests. By entrusting the CSCE with the NK conflict, 
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Iran was automatically and very tactfully excluded from mediation in the 
conflict.335 Therefore, ignoring the advantages enjoyed by Iran in the region 
and even its critical role in controlling and limiting Russian influence (as was 
shown during the Cold War), the CSCE created a containment policy towards 
Iran.  
 
Naturally, such a course of action made the situation more complex, since 
one of the obstacles to achieving any agreement in the peace process, even 
today, is the lack of even temporary unity among the different parties in the 
conflict. Briefly, Russia and the CSCE did not recognize Iran's important 
strategic role at first, as they were at this time seeking to take advantage of 
some aspects of its influential position.336 
 
Analyzing Iran's Mediation 
 
Regarding Iranian diplomacy in NK and the obstacles that destroyed Iran's 
mediation, it should be said that a variety of factors caused it to fail to bring 
about a settlement. These are as follows: 
 One was the instability in the Armenian and Azerbaijani domestic situation 
and the effect of the NK problem on their domestic status which prevented 
reconciliation between the belligerents.  
 A second was the lack of effective leverage to provide a political 
guarantee for the process and, at the same time, for the progress of the 
peace negotiations. Mere political trust was not enough to provide 
effective assurances. 
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Regarding the effects of domestic factors on the mediating process, 
Mahmud Vaezi, the deputy for Europe and the United States in the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry and also the Presidents envoy in this mediation stated: 
 
"The case of Karabakh had transformed into a pretext, in the hands of 
Azerbaijani political parties, to sweep to power. Karabakh, itself, was not 
so important, so that some groups were ready to sacrifice some territories 
only in order to eliminate their rivals and to win in the upcoming election. 
This competition was more apparent in Azerbaijan compared with 
Armenia, because in Armenia, the Karabakh ideal was regarded as a 
national issue and in the event of any difference arising among the group, 
they settled those disputes immediately for the sake of Karabakh interests 
Therefore, the rivalry among different political groups and parties was the 
main reason for the failure of mediation to settle the conflict. In the 
meantime, the statesmen of both belligerents made the Karabakh issue 
very complicated, to such an extent that no one was found on either side 
showing flexibility and compromise regarding Karabakh. In other words, 
the flexibility of both sides was reduced to a minimum and, in such 
conditions, either to mediate or to find a solution seems impossible."337  
 A third factor was the contrariety originating from Russia's security 
interests in the Caucasus, along with the political challenges that 
threatened its security. In other words, the Russians felt apprehensive 
about foreign influence in the region. Thus, they sought to exclude their 
main rivals from the mediation scene. In this respect, they were seeking to 
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destroy the intervention of third parties. In the meantime, because of 
various limitations, Russia intended to exploit several regional and 
international factors to strengthen its policy with regards to the NK conflict. 
 
With respect to this, Vaezi stated:  
"Direct or indirect reactions of the Russians towards our mediation efforts 
convinced us that they opposed our measures. They wished to settle the 
conflict merely through their mediation and based on their proposed 
solution. Of course they thereafter followed the same policy at different 
stages of the mediation. Russian diplomacy was founded on the exclusion 
of other states in this regard. As we observed, the existing ceasefire was 
due to their initiatives. However, Russia's power and influence as a foreign 
factor had a negative impact on our role as mediator. Another negative 
point was Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan, especially during the tenure of 
the Popular Front government. This time, they created direct obstacles. 
 
The Popular Front merely sought power. Being informed of the evacuation 
of Shusha, the Karabakhis made the most of their opportunity and 
captured the city. Of course, some believe that this action was 
encouraged by Russia in order to further complicate the situation and 
create obstacles for Iran's mediation."338 
 Fourthly, by ignoring Iran’s success in establishing the first ceasefire, the 
CSCE had no desire either to consult Tehran or support its efforts. This 
approach was probably rooted in the idea that the greater the support for 
Iranian mediation, the smaller Turkey’s influence in the region would be. 
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 Another factor which added to Iran's difficulties in mediating was the logic 
of the progress of the war. Naturally, in an armed conflict, the belligerents 
pay great attention to military dominance and the exploitation of 
opportunities. The weakness of the Azeri front and the impact of the local 
political climate on the battle were the main factors in changing the 
geography of the war during the capture of Shusha and Lachin. Perhaps 
some ill-timed developments acted as a catalyst for Iranian failure in the 
mediation process. Maybe if the summit had not been held in Tehran or if 
it had been postponed most probably the sequence of events would have 
changed. When the Popular Front sought to take Azerbaijan in May 1992, 
and withdrew its forces from Shusha, it was only natural that the enemy 
would take advantage of this opportunity. The Karabakhis claimed that 
Shusha was voluntarily handed to them on "a silver platter" by 
Azerbaijan.339 
 
 In addition, a lack of basic trust between the Armenians and Azeris, not to 
mention the fact that there were also those who believed that they could 
satisfy all their hopes without granting any concession to the opposite side 
was another reason for failure. By relying on their military might, the 
Armenians did not vote for any conciliation, except independence or 
unification, while Azerbaijan never accepted such requests. But the 
polarity in objectives and politics covers a particular period of the war. As 
for the Karabakh conflict, it was terminated by occupying Shusha and 
Lachin and realism was replaced by idealism thereafter.  
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Despite Iran’s efforts to build trust between the parties, in the period of its 
mediation, their fear of each other, was backed by intense political and 
psychological propaganda, did not allow the parties to reach a mutual 
understanding. 
 
 A further problem was ignoring the Karabakhian role even though it was 
always evident and important from the beginning of the crisis. Moreover, 
as a review of the conflict shows, the Karabakhis always enjoyed vast 
room for maneouvre which sometimes enabled them to behave in a 
manner contrary to the wishes of Yerevan and Moscow. One of the major 
axes of Iran's mediation diplomacy was its consultation with the 
Karabakhis while at the same time referring the results to Yerevan. During 
that period, and for obvious reasons (such as its relations with Azerbaijan 
and the requirements of those relations), Iran was obliged to view the 
Karabakh factor from Yerevan’s viewpoint. This fact inevitably weakened 
the mediation process. As an independent entity associated with 
Karabakh, the absence of a third-party broker might have had an impact 
on Iran's standing in the dispute. It was under such circumstances that the 
Karabakhis, showing no respect for the foreign policy aims of the 
Armenian President and the standing of his signature on the political 
document, attacked Shusha a few hours after signing the Tehran 
declaration. 
 Finally, there was the negative impact of local developments in Iran on the 
mediation. Gradually a political pro-Azeri polarization was formed in Iran 
which did not conform to the official policy and the impartial behaviour of 
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the government. Before the fall of Shusha and Lachin, Iran's position was 
based on neutrality. A pro-Azeri bias was detectable in Iran's political 
behaviour; from that time, its diplomacy apparently shifted towards Baku, 
and this occasioned interruptions in the progress of mediation.  
  
 In spite of Iran's reputation for mediation, unlike Russia, it lacked the 
necessary means or leverage to pressure the belligerents; and unlike 
Turkey, Iran declared its impartiality, but it is interesting that the Azeris 
and others tried to take advantage of the common religion and Islamic 
nature of the Iranian government to gain its support. In the same way, 
they were successful in obtaining Turkey's help, using the ethnic card. But 
Iran defined its policy as being based on the national interest and the 
stability and security of the region. If Iran had viewed the dispute as a 
sectarian disagreement, probably this Armeno-Azeri clash would have 
turned into a religious struggle which not only would have endangered the 
whole region but also, undoubtedly, would have made its settlement more 
complex for the regional and international states. Thus, Iran's stance 
compared to that of Turkey was more discerning.340 
 Another important reason for the failure of Iran's mediation was the 
content of the document signed during the Tehran Summit. The aim of the 
document was not just to establish a ceasefire, but to define its future 
course and continuity 
 But the most important factor responsible for the failure of Iran's mediation 
was the capture of Shusha on exactly the same day as the document was 
signed. It is true the Armenian side had made such a decision before 
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hand, as the Azerbaijani forces were using Shusha`s heights to bombard 
Stepanakert. When considering why the Karabakhis occupied Shusha on 
this particular day, there are certainly many arguments and possibilities 
but the most noteworthy reason that the Baku and the Iranian authorities 
relied on was that it was Russia’s doing. Probably, the Russians 
convinced Karabakh and the Armenian forces that they should postpone 
occupying Shusha until the very day of the signing of the ceasefire treaty 
and this would discredit Tehran.  
 
Another possibility is that the Karabakhis had intentionally delayed their 
attack to make it coincide with Ter-Petrossian, the Armenian President’s 
visit to Tehran, in order to advise him that no document should be signed 
without their agreement. The third possibility is Dashnak`s interference to 
discredit Ter-Petrossian. It is also possible that a combination of these 
reasons may have been used by the Armenians to justify the attack on 
Shusha. It is fair to say that going on past events, this bears the traces of 
a Russian plan, since neither the Armenian nor the Karabakhi authorities 
are prepared to speak about this event.341 
 
According to Abdullah Ramezanzade, an Iranian author and academic, two 
factors obstructed Iran's mediation, firstly, the Armenians’ frequent victories 
on Azerbaijani territory, and secondly, the Popular Front government taking 
office in Baku. The first factor caused Iranian extremists to condemn the 
Armenians for squandering the opportunities for rearmament prepared for 
them by Iranian diplomacy. This was indeed a rejection by President Elchibey 
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of any mediation by Iran and it made Iranian intervention impossible.342 He 
accused Iran of preparing a transit route for weapons to Armenia and of 
encouraging the Azeris in Iran to revolt and unite with Azerbaijan.343 Elchibey 
was President from June 1992 to June 1993. After a series of defeats in the 
NK conflict, he fled Baku in June 1993.  
 
UN Measures 
 
With the escalation of military activity in Karabakh, the UN Security Council 
adopted four resolutions regarding the 1993 conflict. The Charter prohibited 
any encroachments on the territorial inviolability of states by military and non-
military means, i.e. the threat of military or non-military forcible action.344  
 
The first UN Security Council Resolution (number 822) on the conflict was 
adopted on 30th April 1993.345 It called for "an immediate cessation of all 
hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable ceasefire as 
well as immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from Kelbajar and other 
occupied areas of Azerbaijan". It also asked the CSCE to "assess the 
situation in the region."346  
 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 853 on 30th July 1993. In this text it 
welcomed, among other things, the adoption of a timetable of urgent steps in 
compliance with Resolution 822, condemning the taking of Aghdam and the 
bombing of settlements, and urged the Armenian government to continue to 
exert its influence on the Armenians of NK.347  
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At that time, the Minsk Group held an extraordinary meeting in Paris and 
presented a plan to resolve the crisis, a plan which was recognized by the 
Security Council as being in accordance with its Resolution and it issued 
Resolution 874 supporting it. This was adopted on 14th October 1993, after 
Azerbaijan's military attack. This ruling asked the parties to execute 
resolutions 822 and 853.348 It also asked the belligerents to withdraw from 
newly-occupied territories immediately and to open the transit routes and 
telecommunications lines. 
 
The last UN measure relating to the conflict was Security Council Resolution 
884 adopted on 12th November 1993. This condemned both the violation of 
the established ceasefire and the excessive use of force in response thereto. 
Reference was made to violations of the ceasefire by Azerbaijan and the 
reaction of the Karabakh forces in occupying Zangilan district and the city of 
Horadiz. The omission of Shusha and Lachin from these resolutions attests to 
their special status in the Karabakh negotiations.349 
 
The Security Council resolutions emphasized its views regarding the need for 
the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal from the occupied 
areas, to allow international humanitarian aid to be delivered and to 
cooperate with OSCE mediating attempts.  
 
Although the Security Council remained "actively apprised of the matter" and 
the Secretary-General was requested, in consultation with the chairman-in-
211 
office of the OSCE and the chairs of the Minsk Group to continue to report to 
the Security Council concerning the situation in NK, the Security Council did 
not act further on the conflict, opting instead to permit the OSCE through the 
Minsk Group to pursue a settlement among the parties to the conflict. These 
can be considered as the only measures taken by the UN in relation to the 
NK conflict.350 
 
In assessing the steps taken by the UN, it is suggested that the Security 
Council was biased towards Armenian interests, since it did not explicitly refer 
to Armenia as an aggressor in any of the adopted resolutions. And more 
importantly, all the resolutions lacked an executive guarantee. Consequently, 
the West supported the Armenians.351 
 
In 2004, Azerbaijan embarked on a campaign to put the issue on the agendas 
of international organizations such as the European Union, the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the United Nations. In the UN General 
Assembly, the investigation of the NK conflict issue was postponed to an 
undisclosed date by the intervention of the US ambassador.352 It seems that 
the United States and Armenia were not pleased about the UN resurrecting 
the discussions. But according to some observers, entrusting the 
responsibility of the settlement to the OSCE would overtake the UN`s 
responsibility regarding this dispute and it would have to fulfil its international 
commitments according to the constitution and international law. Thus, it was 
probable that the UN would enter the NK peace process again.353  
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The “Goble Plan” of Territorial Exchange 
 
As far back as 1988, a group of lawyers headed by Andrei Sakharov, 
proposed a model for the solution of the Karabakh conflict. It was based on 
"moving apart" the Armenians and Azeris, but at that time this alternative 
failed to become a matter of discussion. Then Paul Goble, an American 
proposed something similar in his article "Coping with the NK Crisis" 354 . 
Goble`s solution did not seem very important at the time because he wrote 
his article after he had left the post of US Secretary of State. The parties did 
not make any immediate comment about Goble`s solution until 1999-2001 
when this plan was seriously considered during talks between the two 
Presidents and it was put forward again by different organizations. 
  
He believed that the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia were 
unable to solve the conflict themselves. He argues that a solution was not 
possible, if the sides tried to return to the situation existing before the start of 
the current struggle in 1988, and therefore no solution was fully envisaged. 
Goble argues the status quo ante was maintained thanks to the USSR. Now 
the situation has changed, it means finding a new approach to the conflict. 
 
According to Goble, the following approaches are conceivable as alternatives 
to settlement: 
 
 To immediately oust or kill Armenians living in Karabakh, who oppose 
Azerbaijan with boycotts and tough restrictions and risk bringing about a 
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deplorable future. In such a situation, Azerbaijan would suffer long-lasting 
economic and political seclusion. Besides, this would be impossible due to 
the Armenians’ military superiority and even for the Azeris, it would also 
be out of the question for moral reasons. 
 The restoration of Russia's sovereignty, which would be even more 
regrettable. 
 To mobilize a great number of international peacekeeping forces to keep 
these sides apart. But would be unworkable for a considerable length of 
time. 
 The handing over the NK Autonomous Oblast to the Armenians  
 A territorial swap.355 
 
Goble sees the key to providing a stable peace in the region in exchanging 
territories. However, he has modified his idea several times and presented 
different versions of his plan of territorial exchange. 
 
In his first proposition, in 1992, Goble suggested handing over Meghri in 
exchange for the Lachin corridor plus NK, that is, in lieu of Meghri, Azerbaijan 
would hand over NK to Armenia and the Lachin corridor for its access to 
Karabakh. This would enable Azerbaijan to have an immediate border with 
Nakhichevan and a friendly state, Turkey, but Armenia would be deprived of 
having a direct border with Iran, which in the past, has proved a vital link for 
the Armenians. 
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Map 1 shows the exchanges of territory that could have taken place as part of 
this plan 
 
 
Map 1: Goble’s Peace Plan: The map shows how the changes in territory, 
particularly relating to Meghri would work – notice in particular how Armenia 
would be deprived of its border with Iran. 
 
In 1996, Goble removed the weak points from his plan and brought in some 
amendments. In particular, he proposed to hand over part of the NK 
Autonomous Oblast to Armenia and in return, the southern region of Armenia, 
Meghri, plus another part of NK would be given to Azerbaijan. The latter 
would thereby have a land bridge with Nakhichevan and Armenia's 
connection with Iran would be through a corridor from Meghri, where some 
international forces would be deployed.356 
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After the failure of his first proposal, Goble added other amendments, to what 
was known as "Goble Plan 2". Through this he would make some changes in 
the Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s borders. 
 
Based on this approach, the southern region of Armenia and the western 
region of the Azerbaijani Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic would be 
exchanged. In this plan, the nine kilometre border between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey would be cut off, consequently Azerbaijan would be deprived of direct 
access to Turkey and would only have access to the Nakhichevan 
borderland, namely, Sadrak would be handed over to Armenia and then this 
state would have a direct border with Iran. Armenia's new common border 
with Iran would be about 100 km closer to Yerevan, but its length would be 
shortened by 25-30 km. Of course, because it overlooks the Lachin and 
Sadark corridors and is several km wide, the journey would only take one or 
two hours. But, the lack of a common border with Turkey did not appeal to 
Azerbaijan either. This issue became the subject of a controversy which was 
quashed by granting a corridor instead of a region, namely Meghri, which was 
to be controlled by international and Armenian peacekeeping forces.357 
 
The Armenians argued that in both cases, Meghri (which form part of 
Armenia and enjoys strategic importance) would be sacrificed on account of 
the conflict. Based on the first plan, Meghri would be exchanged for the 
Lachin corridor and on the second plan for Sadrak. 
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In Goble’s plan 2, the status of Karabakh is ambiguous. Two views were put 
forward in this regard: first, Karabakh and Lachin would be recognized as part 
of Armenia's territory and, second, Karabakh would be accepted as an 
independent state by the international community. It was also stated that the 
siege of the Armenian-Turkish border would have to be lifted.358 
 
In general, none of Goble’s Plans for an exchange of territories was officially 
supported by either side. In particular, the people and the political parties both 
pro and anti government. Armenia and NK reacted against these two plans 
and consequently the government rejected them.  
 
However, according to media information and opposition figures in Armenia, 
some variants of the territorial exchange, similar to the Goble plan were 
seriously considered during the talks between the presidents of the 
Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia in 2000-2001, but to little 
avail. However, it seems that the solution to the exchange of corridors was 
still on the agenda of both sides.359 
 
Position of the Republic of Armenia regarding the“Goble Plan” 
 
The Armenian authorities have repeatedly stated that the idea of a territorial 
swap is not acceptable to them. During his face-to-face meetings with his 
Azeri counterpart, in 2001, Robert Kocharian openly declared that Armenia 
would not agree to hand over Meghri to Azerbaijan. He also specified that the 
plan he had discussed with Aliev was totally different from the Goble plan. He 
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explained that they had only discussed granting some transit facilities to 
Azerbaijan through the Meghri corridor as opposed to gaining complete 
control of the Lachin corridor. Meanwhile, the Meghri corridor would be 
completely dominated by Armenia as before. According to Kocharian, this 
plan followed its own logic and was expected to bring long-lasting peace to 
the region.360 
 
On the other hand, during his talks with the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, 
in 2001, the Armenian Prime Minister, Markarian - even considered talking 
about the exchange of territories as unacceptable. He also stated that 
Armenia would not agree to negotiate the exchange of territories which 
enjoyed strategic importance. Moreover, Serge Sarkisian, the Armenian 
Secretary of the Security Council and the Defence Minister, expressed his 
opposition to the idea of a territorial swap several times.361 But apart from the 
Armenian authorities, we are certain that all political movements, parties and 
figures expressed unanimous opposition to handing over Meghri to 
Azerbaijan considering it a risk to the security of Armenia. In particular, an 
organization known as the Militia, which had great influence in the army, and 
other militants, strongly opposed this plan. This group openly threatened the 
authorities when the opposing party made a pronouncement in the media, 
denouncing the Kocharian agreement and accusing it of handing over Meghri 
to Azerbaijan.362 It is noteworthy that the rumour about handing over Meghri 
was exaggerated to some extent in that its details even suggested that 
everyone who lived in Zangezour province would receive five to ten thousand 
dollars assistance because of their displacement. Thus, the Zangezour 
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representatives protested against this plan in the National Parliament of 
Armenia.363 
 
Armenia would certainly appreciate the annexation of NK and the Lachin 
corridor, however, the price they would have to pay for this would be their 
border with Iran, which in the past had proved to be a life-line for the country. 
Without this border, Armenia would be landlocked between its historical 
adversaries. Thus, Armenia was even less likely than Azerbaijan to accept 
this solution.364 
 
Since the Lachin corridor is under the control of Armenia, the Armenian 
people did not approve of exchanging this corridor with a similar one or 
granting a region to Azerbaijan through Meghri, as it is the only land passage 
between Iran and Armenia and is surrounded by Turkey. Clearly most parties 
in Armenia agreed that the price of settlement of the NK conflict should be 
paid for by Armenian land.365 
 
In general, the idea of a “territorial swap” would have several effects on 
Armenian national security and interests, namely: 
 Armenia would not benefit very much from a “territorial swap.” Only taking 
control of the Lachin corridor would provide the permanent connection 
between Armenia and Karabakh and this would guarantee partial security 
for Karabakh.  
Armenia would lose its direct access to Iran, which is strategically 
important as it would be surrounded by historical enemies.  
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In the event of Meghri being taken over, though it can be argued that 
Armenia's southern gate be closed and Turkey would take control of the 
Russia-Armenia-Iran axis and would not allow Russia or Armenia to connect 
to India via the ocean through Iran.366  
 
Although some Armenian authorities do not appreciate Iran's role, the vital 
importance of their border with Iran has been proved many times. In the event 
of any threats from other areas, it is the only escape route for Armenia. 
 The Republic of Armenia and NK together would lose their strategic 
importance and be turned into normal geographical entities. In particular, 
NK would lose its geopolitical value in the region, as militarily, taking over 
this region from outside is impossible. History shows that other powers 
could conquer Karabakh if they began internal operations. Naturally, the 
separation of Karabakh aims at destroying its geopolitical value. Since far 
back in history, distinguished military figures have been quoted as saying 
that he who takes over Shusha, will be in possession of Karabakh and he 
who is in possession of Karabakh will take possession of the whole of the 
Transcaucasus. This outcome is not now realistic but shows the 
importance of Karabakh in the Caucasus. The military importance of 
Karabakh is revealed through these quotations.  
 The loss of Meghri would diminish Armenia's security and the ground 
would be prepared for the eclipse of Armenian domination. 
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 The handing over of Meghri to Azerbaijan, would in turn have negative 
effects in Armenia which would bring about distrust in society and 
consequently lead to local instability and civil war.  
 It would have negative effects on Armenia's economy and especially trade 
because the implementation of this idea would make Armenia's trade 
more complicated.  
 By building a land bridge to Nakhichevan, Azerbaijan would directly be 
able to transport Caspian oil to Turkey and then to western markets 
without it being moved through any third country - but Armenia would 
sustain a loss. Although the probability of routing the pipeline through 
Armenia is very small, it would be possible under certain conditions at the 
present time. But after handing over Meghri or any other corridor, this 
chance would vanish.  
 
The American diplomat, John J. Maresca, in his famous article “A Peace 
Pipeline to End the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict” argues that: “Despite its 
traditional hostility towards Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia would be a 
reliable partner if an agreement could be reached. The possibility that a 
pipeline could be built across Armenia could encourage rational Armenians to 
join in an honest effort to find a solution to the Karabakh conflict.”367 
 
Azerbaijan's Position regarding the “Goble Plan” 
 
The Azerbaijani authorities up until now have officially rejected the plan for 
the exchange of territories. We have witnessed the appearance of 
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contradictory viewpoints over this solution by the Azeri officials, as they are 
very reluctant to renounce sovereignty over NK. Even more, they 
categorically refuse to even discuss yielding sovereignty over the Lachin 
corridor, as it was mainly Azeri-populated before 1988 and was part of the 
Azerbaijan Republic itself, not of the NKAO. Hence, there is reason to believe 
that even given the land gain of Zangezour, the Azeri side would be unlikely 
to accept such a solution.368 
 
However, some authorities speak about the necessity of having a land 
connection with Nakhichevan. Ghuliev, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, 
considered the gaining of the Meghri corridor in exchange for the Lachin 
corridor, in 1999, as a good move for his country, through which it will make 
possible for Azerbaijan to guarantee security for Nakhichevan.369 
 
One of the reasons for the ambiguities and differences in Azerbaijan 
regarding this idea has to do with Turkey's politics and leanings. Turkey is 
greatly interested in the Meghri corridor to Nakhichevan and it is for this 
reason that the Azeri authorities lack enough power to resist Turkey, and 
hence it is more probable that they would implement the wishes of Ankara in 
the end.  
 
Turkey's views in supporting the exchange of Meghri have reached such a 
point that it would assent to the annexation of NK by Armenia, only if the 
Armenians agreed with the exchange. Heydar Aliev, the Azerbaijani ex-
President, in 2000 had announced that if Armenia offers the exchange of 
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Meghri with Lachin, then he would be ready to examine it. It is perceived from 
his expression that this kind of exchange had not been discussed by either 
president and if the Armenians so desired, Azerbaijan would agree with it.370 
 
Simultaneously, in an opposite position, Aliev declared that he had reached 
an agreement over a territorial swap with his Armenian counterpart in Paris in 
2001. Consequently, Serge Sarkisian, the Armenian Secretary for National 
Security Council and the Defence Minister, declared decisively on July 17th 
that in the Paris talks, the Meghri corridor was not referred to.371 
 
The plan for a “territorial swap” produced had the following effects in 
Azerbaijan, some of which are as follows: 
 Geopolitically, Meghri is more valuable than Lachin, as it cannot be 
replaced by Kalbajar to provide the connecting line between Armenia and 
Karabakh, but there is no other line to take the place of Meghri. Moreover, 
in case the plan is agreed upon (unlike Armenia) there would not be any 
reduction in Azerbaijan's neighbours.  
 By implementing the plan, Azerbaijan would gain a land bridge with 
Nakhichevan and its ally, Turkey. 
 Turkey would not face any problem in fulfilling the Pan-Turkism idea, 
thereafter, since it would gain direct access to all Turkish-populated 
regions from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. 
 It would be allocated the building of the Baku-Nakhichevan-Igdir railroad. 
This would mean that Turkey would be able to send Azerbaijan military 
assistance if necessary.  
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 It would be possible to construct a variant of the Baku-Nakhichevan-Jihan 
pipeline, which would be shorter and more controllable than the Baku-
Tiflis-Jihan pipeline. 
 Economic and trade relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan would be 
developed and transportation of cargoes would be cheaper and easier.  
 Turkey`s goal of dominating the Central Asian states was created by the 
collapse of the USSR. This policy has been supported by Western powers 
and United States’, which intended to introduce Turkey as a "model" to the 
newly independent states,  
 
NK’s position regarding the “Goble Plan” 
 
Like their Armenian counterparts, the NK authorities have expressed their 
negative and opposing views over the plan for the exchange of territories and 
rejected them as a solution for the settlement of the NK conflict. Ashot 
Sarkisian, the Chief of the Legal and Governmental Commission of the NK 
parliament believes that this scenario will lead to an unjust territorial swap 
among Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK. He also suggested that all Armenians 
are aware of the consequences this plan will bring for them if it is carried out. 
Despite gaining territories, Armenia and NK will be deprived of their common 
border to Iran, a gateway to the Middle East and the wider world. Besides, 
should this plan be executed, the direct and strategic relations of Russia-
Armenia-Iran and also the trilateral cooperation of Iran-Armenia-Greece, 
which crucially ensures Armenia's national interests and security, will be 
damaged. He concluded that any retreat from the basic positions would mean 
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suicide for Armenia and NK. In this interview, in 1999, he warned that those in 
favour of this plan should know that they will face a strong reaction when 
making decisions either in Armenia or NK.372 
 
External positions regarding the “Goble Plan” 
 
The United States supported the idea of exchanging territories as the solution 
to the NK conflict. Madeleine Albright, The former US Secretary of State, and 
Talbot, the Under-Secretary of State, had participated in negotiations with the 
Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territorial swap. Turkey is one 
example of a state that is in favour of this option, as it will benefit the most 
from this plan. Thus, it is making every endeavor to convince Armenia to 
agree to hand over Meghri. Turkey has also laid this down as a condition to 
opening its border to Armenia and raising its blockade and economic 
sanctions. It seems that Turkey had no problem in convincing Azerbaijan in 
this matter. The main obstacle to this solution - which has actually been 
advanced, among others, by Turkey's former Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit - 
is that it is unlikely to be accepted by either side.373 
 
But, other neighbouring states like Russia and Iran are opposed to this plan 
as the solution to the conflict and have expressed their dissatisfaction. Iran 
has declared that it is against the changing of the borders in the region. 
Russia rejects this plan too.374 The reasons for the disapproval are clear, as 
both states will be detached from the region via this plan. The north-south line 
will be weakened and Russia will not be able to gain access to other regions 
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through Iran. On the other hand, Turkey will have a chance to influence a 
large area.375 France is another opponent of this plan as it is averse to de 
facto US dominance over this region.  
 
The March 1992 CSCE / OSCE Resolution  
 
The peace process entered a new stage on 24th March 1992, when the CSCE 
held its conference in Helsinki. The CSCE commenced its mediating attempts 
and peace talks by issuing a declaration. It was here that the European 
Foreign Ministers expressed their deep concern about the continuing 
escalation of the armed aggression in and around NK and the increased 
suffering and loss of life of the inhabitants. They called upon all parties to 
exercise restraint and held an extensive discussion of ways and means to 
end the hostilities, bearing in mind the implications for regional and 
international security which could result from its continuation and further 
extension. The ministers agreed that the CSCE must play a major role in 
promoting a peace process relating to the conflict. They agreed that the 
situation in and around NK required further CSCE action.  
 
In the same conference, the Foreign Ministers mandated the chairman-in-
office of the CSCE Council of Ministers, Jiri Dienstbier, to visit the region in 
order to contribute, in particular, to the establishment and maintenance of an 
effective ceasefire as well as to the creation of a framework for an overall 
peaceful settlement. The ministers expressed their firm conviction that a 
conference on NK under the auspices of the CSCE would provide an ongoing 
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forum for negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis on the basis 
of the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE.  Thus, they 
requested the chairman-in-office of the CSCE Council of Ministers to convene 
such a conference as soon as possible.  
 
They agreed that this conference, which was to take place in Minsk, would 
have include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech Federal Republic, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the 
United States of America. Elected and other representatives of NK would be 
invited to the conference as interested parties.376 
 
It should be mentioned that the main reason or deciding factor that caused 
the UN to entrust the responsibility for leading the negotiations in the conflict 
to the CSCE is not clear, but it can be inferred that political interests were a 
factor in this decision. It is interesting to speculate that by entrusting the 
CSCE with the NK dispute, it would make possible the exclusion of Iran as 
western powers wanted to keep out of the Caucasus. Iran being a member of 
the UN, but for understandable reasons not of the CSCE, was automatically 
and very tactfully excluded from the mediation.377 
 
It can be argued that this is one reason why the mediation of the CSCE – 
later on the OSCE - has not brought about a settlement of the conflict.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that Russia, Iran, Turkey and the OSCE all have 
conflicting motives and interests in the Caucasus and these form the bases of 
their different approaches to the resolution of the NK conflict. Touval and 
Zartman who believe that mediators in any conflict are “players in the plot of 
relations around the conflict, with some interest in its outcome; otherwise they 
would not mediate.”378 
 
As Boris Yeltsin stated: "Russia continues to have a vital interest in the 
cessation of all armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR.”379 .  
Russia has been pursuing its own interest in the Caucasus to bring all three 
countries under control. This policy has been realised by the action of the 
Russian Government in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NK. The main goal of 
Russia in the mediation of the resolution of the N-K conflict has been to 
counter NATO, the OSCE and Iran. 
 
Russia as a regional actor has always followed it national interest, as has 
been discussed and it should be remembered that it was Russia and not the 
OSCE that brokered the ceasefire. 
 
Russia’s major aim was to return the Southern Caucasus to its direct political 
authority as it was before the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Russia wanted to 
broker a ceasefire and play a leading role in the N-K negotiations to keep its 
leverage in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.380 
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Throughout the NK conflict one can see the objectives of the Russian 
government reflected in its shifting attitudes towards the disputing parties. For 
example, under the USSR, government policy was to support the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan. After the break-up of the Soviet Union however, 
Russia began backing Armenia, arguably because it allowed the stationing of 
Russian troops on its territory from 1996. When Azerbaijan joined the CIS 
and accepted Russian troop deployments, Russia switched allegiance and 
began training the Azerbaijani military.381 
 
The Russian policy of acting as mediator in this conflict has prevented other 
players from acting in the region. It therefore comes as no surprise that all the 
mediation attempts carried out by other countries in the area have not led to 
any substantial change. 
 
The Iranian government has recognized the importance of including the 
Karabakh Armenians in the negotiations and therefore recommends holding 
direct meetings between them and Azerbaijan. The Karabakh Armenians 
reportedly stated that “Iranian mediation looks far preferable to Russian 
mediation, simply because Tehran is proposing significantly better starting 
conditions for the initiation of talks than Moscow.”382  
 
Russian policies have resulted in Iranian efforts proving unsuccessful, as the 
Iranian deputy Foreign Minister and special envoy of Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mr 
Vaezi stated: Direct or indirect reactions of Russians towards our mediation 
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efforts convinced us that they opposed our measures. They wished to settle 
the conflict merely through their mediation and based on their proposed 
solutions. Of course they followed the same policy at different stages of the 
mediation thereafter. Russian diplomacy was founded on expelling all other 
states in this regard. As we observed, the existing ceasefire was due to their 
initiatives. Anyhow, Russia's power and influence as a foreign factor had a 
negative impact on our mediating role.383  
 
The main task of the Minsk Group from 1992 has been to attain a sustainable 
ceasefire and convince the parties to get involved in negotiations in order to 
settle the conflict. Unfortunately, this second aim has been hampered by 
disagreements with the Russian government 
Until December 1996, all the OSCE draft peace proposals avoided discussing 
the problem of the status of NK although it was the most contentious issue. 
Furthermore, the problems related to the NK mediation process could be 
divided into two categories: first, “military technical” difficulties or “the removal 
of the consequences of the war” which include the occupied territories, the 
blockades, the refugees and human issues. Secondly, the issue of the status 
of NK 
As discussed, Russia has pursued unilateral initiatives that could be the key 
in the resolution of this struggle. In addition, the OSCE failed to honour its 
commitments in regard to the deployment of peacekeeping troops in NK 
mainly because of disagreements with Russia over the nature and 
composition of the intended international peacekeeping force. Also, the lack 
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of cooperation among members of the Minsk Group has hampered the peace 
process even further.  
It can be said that this conflict will remain unresolved as long as the Russians 
are co-chairing the Minsk Group. There are also other regional actors, sich as 
Iran and Turkey who consider their national interests to lie in a continuation of 
this stalemate. In addition, the impasse allows Russian to have authority to 
influence the entire region.   
Nevertheless, the major political events that renewed the Minsk Group’s 
dynamism as the exclusive mediator in the NK conflict were the 1994 and 
1996 OSCE summits, in Budapest and Lisbon, respectively. Despite the fact 
that the OSCE was unable to deploy an international peacekeeping force in 
NK, it submitted a proposal at the Lisbon summit as a framework for the 
settlement of the NK conflict based on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and, at 
the same time, provided a high degree of autonomy for the Karabakh 
Armenians in Azerbaijan. 
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Chapter 6: The Minsk Group Process 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will look at the formation of the Minsk Group, its objectives and 
its various attempts, at providing a resolution to the NK conflict. After 
providing a background to the formation of the OCSE, and the Minsk Group 
and how their structure has changed in respect to the NK crisis, this chapter 
will then analyse the proposed solutions. Proposals such as the Package, 
Step-by-Step and Common State approaches will be discussed together with 
the reasons why they have all failed to date. This chapter then concludes by 
providing reasons which account for these failures from 1992 to the present 
day. 
 
The Formation and Evolution of the Minsk Group 
 
The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the 
world’s largest security organization and covers a geographical area from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE’s secretariat is in Vienna and it 
currently has over 4000 employees. 
 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in 
Helsinki in July 1973 during the period of the dispute between east and west; 
the market-oriented capitalist western system versus the communist, planned 
system of the east. This convention was attended by 35 countries including 
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all the European states (except Albania, but including the Soviet Union). It 
was followed by the Geneva meeting in September and resulted in the final 
act in Helsinki, which was signed by all the member countries. This meeting 
took place from 30th July to 1st August 1975.  
 
The OSCE was established under Chapter VIII of the United Nations charter. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War required 
changes in the role of the CSCE as it sought to define its role. The beginning 
of these changes can be traced through two important meetings held in 1990 
- one in Denmark and one in France. The first meeting, held from the 5th to 
the 29th June led to the adoption of a document for Pan-European public 
order. In the second meeting, held in November 1990, the document charter 
of Paris for a new Europe was adopted.  
 
Under this charter, several new offices were established including the Council 
of Foreign Ministers; the Administrative Secretariat; the Conflict Prevention 
Centre; the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the 
Office for Free Elections. The approving of this charter made the organization 
far-reaching and helped to develop new historical changes. 
 
Two years later, at the Budapest Summit in 1994, the tendencies expressed 
in the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Summit were developed further. This 
summit focused on the task of implementing change in the CSCE. It decided 
to alter the name of the organization from the CSCE to the OSCE, which 
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gave it more political impetus, and several practical decisions regarding 
previous agreements on Europe’s security system were taken.  
 
In the Lisbon Summit in 1996, a declaration on a common and 
comprehensive model for the 21st century was adopted. One of the major 
outcomes of this summit was that the CSCE, which was assigned to become 
a forum for dialogue and negotiation for a European security system, was to 
be created.384 
 
In the first 15 years of its existence, the OSCE served primarily as a 
mechanism to guarantee the stability of the European post-war order against 
the background of the two confrontational systems of east and west.The end 
of the Cold War liberated the organization from the stalemate between the 
east and west.  
 
The OSCE deals with conflicts through both diplomatic and peace-keeping 
operations. Its diplomatic offices play a soft role in conflict resolution, whereas 
peace-keeping operations play a harder role in the organization of security 
and cooperation in Europe.  
 
The organization has the task of setting standards for intra-state and also 
inter-state behaviour. In security management, the OSCE is an instrument for 
conflict prevention, political crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. 
In Europe, the future conventional arms-control forum will be the OSCE.  
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All decisions in the OSCE are taken on the basis of consensus. In the case of 
high-tension areas where a potentially overt conflict looms, it is desirable that 
the OSCE should have the ability to take decisions promptly and undertake 
actions rapidly. This ability to make swift and rapid decisions is thought to 
have diminished due to the great need to reach consensus for any decisions 
made. 
 
The OSCE is the only organization in Europe with a mandate to operate 
throughout the CIS. The office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is 
in Warsaw. The documentation office is located in Prague. The 
Commissioner on National Minorities is in The Hague.  
 
The decision-making body of the organization is the Council of Ministers, 
which meets once a year. The political direction of the organization is given 
by the Heads of States who hold meetings when needed. The last such 
meeting was, in fact, held in Istanbul in 1999. The OSCE currently has 65 
members.385 
 
A key development in the mediation of the NK conflict resolution was the 
United Nation’s agreement in late 1992 to let the OSCE become the leading 
international body in the management and resolution of the NK dispute.386 
 
In 1992, the OSCE called for a peace conference to be held in Minsk, the 
capital of Belarus, and formed the organization called the Minsk Group, 
consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, the United States, France, Italy, 
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Turkey, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and a representative from NK. 
The OSCE became officially involved  in the NK disagreement on 24th March 
1992, when its Ministerial Council adopted a decision to convene in Minsk 
(Belarus) under the auspices of the OSCE to provide an ongoing forum for 
the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the NK conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan.387 
  
The ceasefire arranged by the OSCE and Russia has been in place since 
May 1994. There have been meetings and negotiations attempted by the 
Minsk Group which have been chaired jointly by France, Russia and the 
United States. Unfortunately, such meetings have not led to any 
developments in the resolution of the conflict, and negotiations still remain 
deadlocked. 
 
Formation of the Minsk Group: Goals & Tasks 
 
In February 1992, Jiri Dienstbier, the chairman of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) commissioned 12 reporters to visit the 
Caucasus and present their evaluation of the NK conflict.388 They reported in 
their conclusion that the belligerents agreed to cooperation in the plans of the 
CSCE, and declared themselves prepared to welcome the involvement of the 
CSCE in the settlement of their conflict.389 
 
The Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE on 24th March 1992 requested 
the chairman-in-office to convene a conference on NK as soon as possible 
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under the auspices of the CSCE to provide an ongoing forum for negotiations 
towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of the principles, 
commitments and provisions of the CSCE.390 Since the mediation of the NK 
conflict was not really practical with such a large group, a smaller group was 
formed comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Sweden, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, Turkey and the United States. 
This committee was named the Minsk Group. This conference was scheduled 
to be held in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, but the time was not ripe for 
holding it. Thus, the Minsk Group was charged by the CSCE with finding a 
political solution to the dispute, therefore, all work related to its mediation was 
termed the Minsk Conference. The main aim of this body was to play a 
mediating role to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table to hold talks 
and reach an agreement over the political status of NK.391 
 
On 6th December 1994, at the conclusion of the Budapest Summit, it was 
agreed to appoint a co-chairmanship for the Minsk Group. Furthermore, the 
heads of states and their respected governments expressed a willingness to 
deploy a multinational peacekeeping force in the region, as an essential part 
of the overall settlement of the disagreement.    
 
On implementing the Budapest decision, the chairman-in-office issued a 
mandate to the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group on the 23rd March 1995.  
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Objectives of the Minsk Group 
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned documents, the main objectives of the 
Minsk Group may be summarized as follows: 
 To provide an appropriate framework for conflict resolution by way of 
ensuring the negotiation process supported by the Minsk Group  
 To obtain an agreement from the parties for the cessation of the armed 
strife so as to sanction the convening of the Minsk Conference  
 To promote the peace process by deploying CSCE multinational 
peacekeeping forces 
 To visit the Minsk Group co-chairs, to talk to the warring groups, and to 
hold meetings with the chairman-in-office and the members of the 
Minsk Group to brief them on the process 
 
The Minsk Group was to be considered successfully concluded if the 
objectives referred to above were fully met. 
 
From 1997 onwards, it was decided that France, Russia and the United 
States would jointly chair the Minsk Group. At them time, the representatives 
of the co-chairs were ambassadors Henri Jacolin of France, Yuri Merzlyakov 
of the Federation of Russia and Steve Mann of the United States of 
America.392 These positions are now held by Ambassadors Bernard Fassier 
of France, Yuri Merzlyakov of Russia and Mathew Bryza of USA, the US 
Deputy Secretary of State. 
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Analyzing the Evolution of the Minsk Group: Organisational 
Developments 
 
The Minsk Group of the OSCE has been the subject of basic and structural 
developments since it was established.  
 
It was formed in the short term because of Russia's weakness. On the one 
hand, the OSCE’s orders and demands were not enforceable on the parties 
in dispute. In particular, this organization had no experience in the settlement 
of conflicts and neither side was interested in negotiation. This issue was 
especially important for the Karabakh Armenians who were well aware of 
their military superiority. At that time, the OSCE members were not yet ready 
to send peacekeeping forces to the region. As the Bosnia crisis had ignited at 
the same time, the international peacekeeping forces were facing many 
problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they had no incentive to send these 
troops to the outlying region of Karabakh.  
 
The US proposed a greater role for Iran in Karabakh mediations at the April 
2001 talks between Armenian and Azeri Presidents in Key West.393 
 
The Minsk Group was originally dominated by smaller parties who had limited 
influence. The mediation process was thought by all parties to be impartial 
since countries such as Sweden, Italy or Finland had little or no interest in the 
South Caucasus. However, these countries could only act as mediators in the 
true sense of the word since they possessed no incentives, no carrots or 
sticks to convince the belligerents to adopt a more compromising attitude. 
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The group was "too large and too low level" for serious negotiation and this 
caused changes in the structural organization of the Minsk group.394 
 
So, only one chairman was foreseen for the Minsk Group in the first year. 
Italy was elected as the first chair and then followed by Sweden and Finland. 
In 1997, when Finland was chairman, the single chair became a co-chair or 
rather a board of directors. This time, Finland and Russia jointly chaired the 
Minsk Group.395  
 
The Italians who chaired the first two years did not play an active role as chair 
and was largely ineffective. These factors forced them to desist from the 
obligation after only two years. Sweden was the second state elected in 
December 1993 to take the chair after Italy. Despite the pressures resulting 
from the escalation of the war, these states actively continued their 
endeavours, but in practice rivalry over the mediating efforts prevented the 
Minsk Group from carrying out the task effectively. One of the most active 
states, to engage in mediation, was Russia. After joining the Minsk Group, 
Russia energetically continued its parallel mediation. This made the Minsk 
process more complex and created some problems in its relations with other 
members. 
 
Since Finland was Russia’s neighbour  and had a better understanding of its 
viewpoint, it offered to accept the chair of the group in April 1995, but then, in 
order to stop Russia's individual efforts, it was decided that Russia and 
Finland should jointly chair the Minsk Group. This situation continued until 
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Finland stepped down. Germany volunteered to succeed Finland and this 
move was welcomed by the three parties and other states, but as Frank 
Lambach was appointed as their representative in the Minsk Group, a person 
whom Baku, Karabakh and the United States disagreed with, the Germans 
left the group. This time France showed an interest in taking on the 
responsibility and was supported by Baku, Karabakh and Yerevan. Since the 
United States decided to enter the frame of co-chairs, the problems were 
accentuated and France was asked to leave but it would not stand down. 
Such a disagreement resulted in three countries holding the position of Co-
chair instead of the previous two. On the first of January 1997 France 
succeeded Finland as co-chair and because of Azeri displeasure the US 
became a third co-chair on the 14th February. On 6th December  1994 in the 
Budapest summit, a co-chairmanship was set up for the peace process. First 
Russia and Sweden were co-chairs. Finland replaced Sweden in 1995 and 
announced its termination at the end of 1996. Then the US asked the three 
parties to disqualify the French chairmanship and Baku responded. The 
Armenian society in France and their influential and powerful lobby in Paris 
were a pretext for the Baku authorities to veto the chair of France. But 
Armenia objected and recommended Russia, France and the United States 
as triple co-chairs of the Minsk group on 14 February 1997.396   
 
However, during this period, political games played a decisive role in the 
appointment of the chair. As mentioned earlier, during the first few years the 
chair was independent, but later the position was made up of two people and 
finally it became a triumvirate. Of course, either of the former chairs - Italy or 
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Sweden - could have been a co-chair member, but since this task involved a 
heavy responsibility, they declined. Naturally, this office was very important to 
the Russians and they remained in their post. Baku’s disapproval and their 
pretext for objecting were completely illogical, as they claimed that enormous 
numbers of influential and powerful Armenians lived in France, though 
Armenian society in the US was larger and more powerful.  
 
By making changes in the arrangement of the Minsk Group chairmanship, the 
Minsk process was altered as well. Formerly, the decisions were made by the 
eleven members and the chair was unable to come to a decision on its own, 
but in 1997 when it was decided that three members should jointly chair the 
group, the decision-making process was totally transformed. Turkey and 
some other members were not satisfied (and despite not being among the co-
chairs, they remained a part of the Minsk Group structure as before. But since 
they were ignored by the co-chairs when it came to decision-making, they 
were offended and some of them refrained from collaborating with the Minsk 
process thereafter. For instance, Belarus had decided to co-operate by 
holding the Minsk conference there. Hungary and Germany, who were 
ignored in the decision-making, were upset by this and gradually withdrew 
their cooperation from the Minsk Group.  
 
Lastly, through the direct negotiations of the presidents of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, the co-chairs were somewhat marginalized, although direct 
negotiations were not new and Aliev and Ter-Petrossian had met several 
times before.397 
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Coinciding with Ilham Aliev’s (the president of Azerbaijan) coming to power, 
several different figures published articles about re-activating the Minsk 
Group mediators, resuming their visits to the region and especially re-
accepting their new solutions. But no solution was implemented up to July 
2009. 
 
An Evaluation of the Minsk Group’s Attempts at Bringing Peace 
 
One of the problems faced by the OSCE at the beginning of its mediation was 
a lack of experience on conflict resolution as it was the first time the OSCE 
had acted as a mediator in an armed conflict. It is noteworthy that the OSCE 
specialized in what is called preventive diplomacy. The peacekeeping 
operations in NK were the first in OSCE history, 398  and could thus be 
considered a test of competence in mediation for them. The OSCE did not 
know which policy should be adopted towards the issue of the collapse of the 
USSR and its aftermath. 
 
Thus, the organizational interests of the OSCE damaged the settlement 
process of the conflict. It should be explained that the OSCE was organized 
as a political structure, aiming at confidence-building between NATO and the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) or, in other words, the West and the 
East. They had a positive function until the collapse of the USSR, but after 
that, following the abolition of the WTO, they sought to justify their existence 
by taking on the mediating role in the NK conflict, so simply having 
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responsibility was important to them, even though their action was ill thought 
out. Hence, the raft of proposals and plans were counterproductive. In fact, in 
the early years, the Minsk Group members believed there was no difference 
between the essence of problem-solving and its formalities.  
 
For that reason, the Minsk Group wasted important resources on 
preliminaries and marginal issues. For example, for a few months, all 
negotiations centred on how the Karabakh Armenian representatives should 
participate in the peace negotiations, where the OSCE forces should be 
deployed in the region and where they should be stationed, either along the 
Armenia-Azerbaijan borders or the NK–Azerbaijan frontiers. It is interesting to 
note that some of these preliminaries were never resolved during the 
negotiations, including the question of peacekeeping, which was further 
complicated as Russia had consistently made it clear that it preferred a 
Russian-only peacekeeping force, and the other OSCE members rejected it. 
 
Even though there were no peacekeepers, the ceasefire had not been broken 
in the past years.399 An eleven-member international conference was to be 
held to settle the Karabakh problem, as mentioned in the resolution delivered 
at the ministerial summit, dated 24 March 1992. In fact, the NK situation was 
on the agenda of the Minsk Group.400 They even designated July 1992 as the 
date for holding the conference, but the prolongation of military operations 
and the fall of Shusha and then Lachin scotched the idea. The Lachin corridor 
connects NK to Armenia and has wider geopolitical and security importance 
for both sides.401 
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This had an adverse impact on the programme as the Azeris specified the 
withdrawal of Armenia from Shusha and Lachin, as a pre-condition for 
participating in the conference.402 This caused the meeting to be cancelled 
because one party was absent. After a lengthy debate, it was decided to hold 
a pre-conference session to solve the problem of Shusha and Lachin. The 
OSCE sought to solve this dificulty in a few days, and a few months later to 
hold the peace conference itself. But in hindsight it is fair to say that this 
problem could not be solved while Armenia refused to withdraw from Shusha 
and Lachin. 
 
Thus, this early period was characterized by the OSCE’s unrealistic views 
and their false expectations, as evidenced by this first conference. 
Interestingly, it was held in Rome. As time passed, the continuation of military 
operations not only prevented the question of Shusha and Lachin from being 
solved, but the capturing of a new region at that moment by the Armenians 
led to further postponements. Thus, each time the OSCE arranged a 
timetable to fix a date for the conference it was obliged to settle the problem 
of the new occupied region beforehand. After preparing many timetables and 
having others in the pipeline, they reached the conclusion that holding the 
meeting was impossible, as they believed the time was not right for a peace 
conference. The members who chaired the peace process were known as the 
Minsk Group, and after the suspension of these sessions, it was renamed the 
Minsk process.  
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This process had another impact. The OSCE`s goal was to meet in order to 
resolve the NK situation and after the failure to hold the conference, the “step-
by-step approach” was automatically accepted.403 
 
Another important factor in the evolving function of the Minsk Group was 
related to Russia's role regarding this group. The Russian stance towards the 
CSCE-OSCE and its relations with it influenced the Minsk Group's functions. 
As mentioned earlier, the quality of the CSCE mediation in comparison with 
other states dates back to 1992, when the Russians had no intention of 
interfering in the region. But before the CSCE could take effective steps to 
settle the conflict (in the second half of 1992), the Russians changed their 
foreign policy and decided to revive their interests in the region. As a result, 
the Kremlin took an active part in the NK conflict and this diminished the 
CSCE influence during this period. 
 
In January 1997, France and then the United States became permanent co-
chairs of the Minsk Group, together with Russia. This period can be said to 
have lasted until the end of 1997, when Ter-Petrossian the Armenian 
president was deposed. This signalled the victory of the hardliners over the 
pragmatists in Armenia, and the rejection by Armenia of the OSCE`s step-by-
step plan.404  
 
The Minsk Group has continued its efforts to resume negotiations and 
present new peace plans. The “Common State” in November 1998 was one 
such proposed solution, among others but it was not successful. 
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An assessment of the Minsk Group’s attempts indicates that it was not 
successful in the settlement of the NK conflict and all attempts at a resolution 
from 1994 until now have reached a deadlock. Some of the effective factors 
and reasons for the failure of the Minsk process have been pointed out 
above. However, some individuals and scholars believe that the Minsk Group 
of the OSCE could become a good mediator and be successful.  
 
Regarding the failure of the OSCE, Mr. J. Libaridian, senior advisor to the ex-
president of Armenia and also the head of Armenian negotiators with 
Azerbaijan, believes that the framework and policies adopted by the OSCE so 
as to become involved in the problem were irregular from the beginning. 
Moreover, those persons who were commissioned by this organization had 
no background knowledge of this region or the factors causing conflict 
between the parties and only a few members had general experience in 
mediation. According to him, Russia was the only state that had a direct 
appreciation of the differences and had spent time in acquiring a deep 
understanding of the issue.405 
 
We can draw a conclusion from his assertions that the arrangements of the 
Minsk Group members in general, and the co-chairs, were not suitable for this 
purpose. 
 
On the one hand, the complex and contrary interests of the three states, 
namely Russia, France and the United States made it very difficult to reach 
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an agreement and consensus regarding a solution to the conflict. In fact, this 
subject convinced the Minsk Group to forgo presenting solutions and entrust 
the problem to the parties themselves and ask the Presidents to solve their 
own disputes.406 The first meeting with the support of the US administration 
was held in April 1999 in Washington DC. 
 
Minsk Group Solutions 
 
Since it was formed, the OSCE Minsk Group has drafted and presented three 
solutions to the conflict. Furthermore the proposal that was presented in 
Madrid in 2007 was very close to one of the three solutions known as the 
Step–by-Step plan. However, each solution was rejected by at least one or all 
three parties in the dispute. We now discuss the Minsk Group proposals and 
review the positions of each party towards each of the proposals. 
 
The Package solution 
 
The “Package Approach” was proposed to the parties in May 1997. This time, 
after considering different aspects of the conflict, the Minsk Group co-chairs 
simultaneously submitted complete peace plans because while some issues 
were totally independent of each other, others were enmeshed. This peace 
plan included: 
 Complete autonomy for Karabakh within the framework of the 
Azerbaijan Republic. 
 Withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied regions 
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 Returning of the homeless and refugees to their own homes 
 Deployment of the OSCE peacekeeping forces in the buffer zone  
 Renting Lachin by Karabakh from Azerbaijan 
 Lifting the economic blockade.407 
 
This package covered all the issues including the final status of NK. 
 
The most important aspect of this peace plan was that Karabakh had been 
presumed to be within the framework of Azerbaijani territorial integrity. 
Naturally, the Karabakhis would have some representatives in the Azerbaijani 
parliament and they would participate in the presidential elections.408 This 
solution, which had insisted on the position of NK within Azerbaijani territory 
above all else, was rejected by Armenia and Karabakh and it was not 
resolved because no agreement was struck over Karabakh’s status.  
 
According to some authorities like Vladimir Kazimirov (the first Russian 
President’s special envoy in the NK conflict), the Package Approach variant 
seemed to be more effective for the settlement of such a complicated issue 
when compared with other options. This is why Armenia expected all the 
disputed problems to be resolved in one meeting in which the subject of 
Karabakhi independence or annexation to Armenia would be finalized. But 
since Azerbaijan would not accept autonomy, the Package Approach would 
simply hold up the negotiations and bring the peace process to a standstill.  
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According to Kazimirov, the agreements must necessarily start from the less 
pertinent issues which pave the way to a breakthrough in the negotiations.409 
 
Regardless of the truth or otherwise of this viewpoint, what seemed to be the 
basic problem was defining the political and legal status of NK and it is clear 
that if the parties were ready to compromise, the Package Approach would 
certainly be negotiable. The main obstacle that prevented the proposed 
solutions from being effective were the parties n the conflict themselves. 
Naturally, if they were ready to reach a mutual compromise, the settlement of 
the conflict would be possible through this plan too. 
 
For a short time from 1998 onwards, Armenia insisted on the Package 
Approach and Azerbaijan in contrast, on the Step-by-Step approach, detailed 
below. Acceptance of the latter proposal, as the principle of the peace talks 
led in the end to the abdication of Ter-Petrossian. There was a similar body of 
opinion in Azerbaijan concerning the Package Approach. Ilham Aliev declared 
many times that under no circumstances would he agree to accept such a 
compromise, certainly not in advance of the 2008 elections.410 
 
In June 2004, after a number of meetings between both Foreign Ministers 
and Minsk Group co-chairs, Yuri Merzlyakov, the Russian chair, declared that 
the Minsk Group mediators were trying to connect all the complex problems 
and unsolved differences between the parties. The American former 
representative also suggested that the package approach was the basis for a 
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probable proposal of the Minsk Group in the future, which would be drawn up 
in accordance with the Paris and Key West principles.411 
 
In this respect, in his interview with “Radio Liberty”, in June 2004 Elmar 
Mammadyarov, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, described his negotiations 
with his Armenian counterpart, which were based on Armenia’s insistence on 
the Package Approach whilst Azerbaijan declared itself in favour of the Step-
by-Step solution.  
 
“Thus, in the new process, we will select the most acceptable options from 
these two approaches and then arrange them in a separate plan so as to 
achieve a new solution by mutual consent in the future.”412 
 
The Step-by-Step solution 
 
The Step-by-Step peace plan was proposed to the two parties by the Minsk 
Group co-chairs in December 1997. This plan was based on achieving a 
solution through agreement on details and moving gradually towards an 
understanding of the general issues. Ambassador, V. Kazimirov, as a 
committed supporter of the Step-by-Step solution, thought that the way to 
resolve the quarrel was through multiple small steps. “Of course, by ‘stages’ 
we do not mean to begin with meeting the demands of only one of the sides 
(even if this is quite lawful), and only then considering the problems 
concerning the other side.  
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At each stage, small packages must be made up so that all sides are 
satisfied. To begin with, let these not be the main issues. Surely, over the 
course of a few years, a number of problems can be settled, creating a 
positive dynamic and a more favourable atmosphere, rather than being stuck 
in deadlock, with people being driven to despair and forced to abandon the 
country.”413 
 
The issues related to Karabakh were divided into two categories. The first 
was grouped under "military-technical" issues or "the removal of the 
consequences of the war", and included the end of the blockades, the return 
of occupied territories on both sides, the repatriation of displaced people and 
refugees from both sides, measures to strengthen the ceasefire and other 
humanitarian issues, such as hostages and prisoners of war. The second 
category referred to the question of the future status of NK. The Step-by-Step 
Approach related to a methodology of first negotiating one set of problems 
and implementing its solutions, and then tackling the second category of 
issues.414 
  
It was proposed that the Armenian forces should withdraw from the 
Azerbaijani territories around NK (except the Lachin corridor), then in the next 
step, the grounds would be prepared for the refugees to return to their 
homes. But the legal and political identity of NK would be deferred to the 
future. 
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This approach had some shortcomings, because the outlook for answering 
some problems would remain ambiguous and unresolved; for instance, how 
could the subject of the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azeri Lachin 
corridor be resolved? Hence, this plan didn’t make it beyond the paper it was 
written on. 
 
It should be mentioned that this approach was rejected at the first stage by 
the NK Proclaimed Government.415 Ter-Petrossian resigned under pressure 
from powerful forces in his own cabinet who opposed his acceptance of the 
Minsk Group co-chairmen's September 1997 draft proposal for the resolution 
of the conflict.416 Robert Kocharian, the Karabakhi successor to Levon Ter-
Petrossian declared that he supported the Package Approach. He believed 
that “any process breaking the status quo that does not guarantee the final 
settlement of the conflict and poses the risk of re-igniting military operations 
because these processes destroy the temporary balance formed since the 
ceasefire was established.”417 
 
However, the remarks of Kocharian and other Armenian authorities, in April 
2005, indicated that the mediators’ could have drawn the Armenians’ 
attention to this solution by presenting some international guarantees.418 
 
Of course, the mere agreement of the Armenian President with this solution 
should not be considered as the end of the conflict. As mentioned before, as 
soon as ex-President Ter-Petrossian agreed with this plan, the power triangle 
(the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and the Defence Minister) put him 
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under pressure and he was forced to resign. In 2005 when Kocharian 
adopted a fresh position, the opposition seriously talked about starting a 
revolution and ousting him in the near future.419 
 
The Common State solution 
 
OSCE efforts were not active from the end of 1997 to the first few months of 
1998 because of a number of internal developments in Armenia which led to 
his opposition to the Step-by-Step Approach and other matters. Ter-
Petrossian resigned as Armenia’s president on 3rd February 1998 and 
Kochurian, who contributed to his resignation, replaced him on 3rd March 
1998. He was president of NK from 1994 to 1997 and Prime Minister of 
Armenia from 1997 to 1998. In 1998, after the Minsk Group co-chairs 
proposed a new plan named the Common State, approach, they resumed 
their mediating efforts. 
 
It was, in fact, an attempt to find an "unconventional" solution, which would, 
as far as possible, formally combine the main demands: Azerbaijan's 
territorial integrity and NK`s self-determination. The most important items of 
this alternative approach were as follows: 
 NK is a state and a territorial formation. Together with the Azerbaijan 
Republic, it constitutes a single state within its internationally-
recognized borders.  
254 
 The NK Constitution and laws are effective on NK territory. The laws of 
the Azerbaijan Republic are effective on NK territory only if they do not 
run counter to the Constitution and the laws of the latter.  
 NK will be entitled to have direct external relations with foreign states 
in the spheres of economics, trade, science, education and culture.  
 NK will have a National Guard and police force but they can not act 
outside of NK borders.  
 The army, security forces and the police of the Azerbaijan Republic will 
have no right to enter NK territory without the consent of the NK 
authorities.420 
 
Based on these items, this plan proposes that Karabakh would be an 
independent de facto state and there would be no hierarchical relation 
between Azerbaijan and Karabakh. Furthermore, none of the authorities of 
the “Common State” would unilaterally be allowed to deny any mutually-
accepted provisions.421  According to the first item of the “Common State 
Plan”, a common commission consists of Karabakhi and Azeri 
representatives who will mutually administer it.422 It can be seen from these 
items that this plan proposes horizontal relations between Azerbaijan and NK. 
This was rejected by the Azeri side, but Yerevan and Stepanakert accepted it. 
 
It is necessary to mention that the “Common State Approach” raised many 
ambiguities and questions for Yerevan, Stepanakert and Baku. The concept 
and meaning of the "Common State" was not clear to them and issues such 
as which state would it be in, who the President would be and what the state 
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would be called, were left unclear. But it was predicted that the NK 
Proclaimed Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan would enjoy equal rights 
and Stepanakert would not be under the direct jurisdiction of Baku and a 
horizontal relationship would be established between them. 
 
By “the state”, a unitarian form of nation is meant. But, apart from the above-
mentioned ambiguity, what seems most interesting was the lack of unity 
among the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group concerning the exact name of 
this approach. So, they called it the “allied state”, “common government”. It is 
obvious that there is an essential difference in the meaning of "common" and 
"allied" when, within the framework of which there might be either a limited or 
a "broad" autonomy. And if this was all that was offered to the conflicting 
sides by the co-chairmen of the OSCE`s Minsk Group, then it should be 
admitted, that their offer was in no way novel. But when it comes to the 
second - the "joint state"- two forms of state configuration are being described 
at once: a federation and a confederation. If it was intended that the 
Karabakh Armenians would become a member of the federation, the co-
chairmen should have defined which function would be offered to NK as a 
member of this imaginary federation. 
 
A study of the text of the proposals of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group 
from November to December 1997, gives us grounds for think that the main 
intention was to expand ordinary notions about interrelations between a 
"federal centre" and a "subject of the federation". For instance, it was 
presumed that NK, while returning to the legal sovereignty of Azerbaijan, 
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would nonetheless retain all the external attributes of independent statehood: 
the institutions of the presidency, parliament, government, constitution, court 
system, army (in the form of a national guard), the police, a state emblem, 
national anthem, flag, and so on. But, as to NK maintaining its communication 
links with the outside world, the following was offered: the Azerbaijan 
Republic "rents out" to the OSCE the zone of the Lachin humanitarian 
corridor and the OSCE establishes its control over it "in collaboration and 
interaction" with the leadership of NK by using manpower officially provided 
by Stepanakert, working jointly with observers from the OSCE. NK would be 
deprived of the possibility of carrying out an independent foreign policy and 
having independent banking and financial operations. But at the same time, 
this territory was declared to be a free economic zone with unlimited use of 
any foreign currency. 
 
The peace proposals of the Minsk Group co-chairmen enable us to conclude 
that, though the terminology speaks of preserving Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity as a single state, the thrust of the international intermediaries' 
proposals was to set a course towards the formation of a union of states 
between Azerbaijan and NKR, that is to say, a confederation and an 
asymmetric one at that.  
According to a commentary by Oskaniyan, the then Armenian foreign 
minister, the term "Common State" means "more than autonomy and less 
than independence". In April 1998, when Kocharian had just become 
President, he declared in Moscow that Armenia accepted a compromise 
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concerning the NK conflict and that it was forgoing the independence of the 
NKR.423 
 
Briefly, the Republic of Armenia and the NKR stated that they were ready to 
accept this plan, as the basic principle for the resumption of the peace 
negotiations. But the Azerbaijan Republic rejected it with respect to its 
national interests, based on the standards of international law, because, as 
Vafa Guluzade, the State Advisor of the Azerbaijani President, commented 
(in the autumn of 1996), “a confederation means independent states.”424 
Besides, the Baku authorities rejected outright the possibility of establishing 
horizontal relations with NK. On 24th June 1998, during a meeting with the 
European Parliamentary Committee, Heydar Aliev addressed the deputy, 
Karin Jones, and insisted that under no circumstances was there any 
possibility of establishing confederal relations between Azerbaijan and NK 
and this was not negotiable.425 
 
Moreover, after the meetings between both Presidents in Paris and Key West 
which put forward proposals that were known as the "Paris principles", the 
"common state" approach was nullified in practice. As already mentioned, 
according to the Paris principles, NK would nominally remain within the 
framework of Azerbaijan without having vertical relations or hierarchy and, in 
the meantime, it would establish direct links with Armenia through the Lachin 
corridor. In a word, according to the Paris principles, NK would achieve 
independence through a de facto not a de jure government.426 
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As can be seen the proposed solutions were each fundamentally different to 
each other – but for a variety of reasons they were all rejected by one of the 
parties. What remains clear is that talks need a fresh impetus and further 
work to settle the differences between the two sides. 
 
Important OSCE Summits & Resolutions  
 
As mentioned earlier, the CSCE`s Ministerial Council undertook the mediation 
of the conflict in March 1992 and decided to prepare the ground for the 
settlement of the dispute by holding a conference in Minsk, the capital of 
Belarus. Thereafter, in December of the same year, the members of the 
CSCE elected Han Mario Raffaelli, as the chairman of the CSCE in NK affairs 
and called for the exerting of ceaseless efforts by the Minsk Group to 
advance the peace process.427 
 
In September 1993, the Minsk Group developed an “adjusted timetable of 
urgent steps to render inoperative Security Council Resolution 822”. But the 
ousting of the Azeri president, Elchibey, in June and the seizure of the Azeri 
town of Aghdam by the Armenian forces of NK in July of that year created an 
entirely new situation, leading to the loss of the leadership in crisis 
management for the CSCE. 428  It should be said that this new adjusted 
timetable for the parties to the conflict (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and NK) 
anticipated, among other things, the withdrawal of Karabakh forces from all 
recently-occupied areas of Azerbaijan.429 
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In September 1994, the end of the armed conflict paved the way for Minsk 
Group members to test the waters for the organizing of peacekeeping forces 
under the Third Act approved in the 1992 Helsinki summit. This act contained 
a general order regarding the operation of the CSCE peacekeeping forces.430 
 
In the Budapest summit of 1994, it was decided to intensify the CSCE act 
concerning the NK conflict. Also some decisions were made regarding 
harmonization of the mediating efforts undertaken by Russia, which had been 
appointed as one of two co-chairmen of the Minsk Group and the OSCE. In 
this summit, the co-chairmen of the Minsk conference and the members of 
the Minsk Group were introduced. The members also welcomed the 12th May 
1994 agreement of the ceasefire by the parties in dispute. 
 
One important decision made at the summit was the sending of 
peacekeeping forces to the region as soon as the parties relinquished military 
operations. The members expressed their political will to deploy multinational 
peacekeeping forces, on the condition of the issuing of an appropriate 
resolution by the UN and the ending of the military conflict. A high-level 
planning group was set up in Vienna to make recommendations for arranging 
a possible mission to the area.  
 
In August 1995, the OSCE chairman-in-office introduced his personal 
representative on the conflict to the Minsk conference. In this capacity, he 
was mandated to act regarding the continuation of the ceasefire and to 
prepare the ground for the deployment of the multinational peacekeeping 
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forces in the region, as well as to report all information regarding the issues 
relating to the NK conflict.431 
 
In December 1996, during the Lisbon summit, the OSCE chairman-in-office 
issued a very important statement concerning the principles for settling the 
NK problem. While notifying the members that no progress had been made in 
the past two years in resolving the impasse, he regretted that the efforts of 
the co-chairmen of the Minsk conference to reconcile the parties’ views on 
the principles of a settlement had been unsuccessful. He then added that the 
three principles which should shape a settlement of the NK dispute had been 
recommended to the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, and these ideas were 
supported by all the members of the group. These three principles were as 
follows:  
1. Territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Armenian 
Republic 
2. Conferring the Highest Degree of Autonomous status on NK within 
Azerbaijan 
3. Guaranteed security for NK and its entire population.432 
 
At the end of this statement, all but one (Armenia) of the state-participants 
rejected it, whereas all the others supported the principles. This statement 
was included in the documents of the Lisbon summit and, as a result, caused 
a failure in Armenia's diplomacy regarding Karabakh.433 
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The plan did not receive a favourable response in Stepanakert. Through a 
declaration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NK assessed the OSCE 
communication as “a flouting of law, fairness and common sense in the face 
of gross blackmail on the part of Azerbaijan.”434 
 
In late 1996 and following the end of Finland's commission as chairman of the 
Minsk Group, the OSCE’s chairman-in-office introduced the three states of 
Russia, France and the United States as the triple co-chairmen of the Minsk 
Group. 
 
After making known the comments and decisions taken during the Lisbon 
summit, the peace process reached a temporary deadlock. In particular, in 
April 1997, it was made abundantly clear that the negotiations had ground to 
a halt. 
 
During the month of May 1997, the co-chairmen pooled their ideas and 
developed a unified approach to address the problem. It embraced a 
comprehensive modus operandi with two agendas. The first comprised 
immediate steps to end the armed conflict including, inter alia, troop 
withdrawal, deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force, return of 
displaced persons, establishing measures to guarantee the security of all 
populations, the removal of blockades and embargoes and normalization of 
communications throughout the region. The second agenda was to determine 
the status of NK that was to be approved by the Minsk conference. The co-
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chairmen presented these new proposals on 31st May and 1st June 1997 in 
Yerevan, Stepanakert, and Baku.  
 
The Presidents of France, Russia and the United States, during their meeting 
in Denver on 23rd June 1997, made a joint declaration in which they called 
upon the leaders of the parties in dispute to take a positive approach towards 
the proposals presented to them by the three co-chairmen. They pointed out 
that these suggestions had taken into consideration the legitimate interests 
and concerns of all the parties and presented an appropriate basis for 
achieving a mutually-acceptable agreement. On 10th October 1997, within the 
framework of the Council of Europe summit, a meeting took place between 
the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, after which, a statement was 
issued emphasizing that Azerbaijan and Armenia were as committed as 
before to the peaceful settlement of the NK conflict by political means, in the 
first instance through negotiation.  
 
With the acceptance of the co-chairmen's recommendations by Azerbaijan 
and Armenia as a basis for negotiations, during November and December 
1997, the co-chairmen concentrated on obtaining the same response in NK. 
However, NK continued to adopt a negative position.435 
 
The OSCE chairmen-in-office made a visit from 23rd to 26th November to the 
south Caucasus region, including the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan 
Republic. During the course of his journey, he met with the Presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the leadership of NK, and became 
263 
acquainted with the situation in the area of the conflict. All the parties involved 
agreed that the OSCE Minsk course was the only suitable framework for a 
continuation of the peace process. The parties expressed their firm 
commitment to maintaining the ceasefire. Upon the suggestion of the 
chairman–in-office, everyone agreed to an exchange of prisoners of war and 
referred to this as a positive step towards confidence-building.  The chairman-
in-office welcomed the vigorous activity by the co-chairs during 1998. He 
accordingly urged the antagonists to resume negotiations within the 
framework of the OSCE Minsk Group without delay.436 
 
At the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk 
Group presented a report based on the evolving situation and recent 
developments connected with the NK conflict and commended the efforts of 
both sides. The heads of state supported the dialogue and the negotiations 
within the OSCE. They applauded in particular the intensified dialogue 
between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose regular contacts 
had created opportunities to dynamize the process of finding a lasting and 
comprehensive solution to the problem. He firmly supported this dialogue and 
encouraged its continuation. 437  Furthermore, a decision was made 
concerning the opening of the OSCE Personal Reprehensive Office in 
Yerevan and Baku. 
 
In general, regarding the effects of the Istanbul declaration, it should be 
mentioned that it would appear that this declaration was to the benefit of 
Armenia, since, on returning from Istanbul; Robert Kocharian stated 
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cheerfully in Yerevan airport that the Istanbul meeting removed entirely the 
negative consequences of the Lisbon meeting of 1996.438 
 
Following the afore-mentioned provisions in the declaration of the OSCE 
Istanbul meeting in November 1999, the co-chairmen continued convening 
high-level direct negotiations between Baku and Yerevan and took a step 
forward, aiming at the creation of a basis to resume the negotiations within 
the framework of the Minsk Group. In other words, the mediators suggested 
that Armenia and Azerbaijan should resolve their differences by themselves 
(under the Minsk Group). This time, the peace process was followed at 
Presidential / Foreign Minister level through direct and secret meetings within 
the framework of the Minsk Group.439 
 
In 2000, the co-chairmen based their activities on establishing relations with 
international organizations and communities. In particular, they cooperated 
with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and as a result, some delegations were 
dispatched to the region and some issues were resolved like the exchange of 
prisoners of war. In that year, the co-chairmen submitted their report, stating 
the conditions and the outlook for the settlement of the conflict to the Political 
Deputy of the UN Secretary General. They also intensified their activities to 
facilitate the peace process after holding the OSCE Ministerial Council in 
November 2000. During the months of December, May, June and November 
they visited the region four times. They also held many meetings, inter alia a 
consultative committee attended by regional experts in June and October. 
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These finally led to the meeting of the presidents in Paris, in July 2001 and 
the submitting of a solution in accordance with the Paris principles.  
 
Several factors provoked a deadlock in the peace talks including, on the one 
hand, Azerbaijan's disregard for the execution of the Paris and Key West 
agreements, and the remarks of its Defence Minister and different non-
governmental organizations concerning the military liberation of Karabakh 
and, on the other, the declaration of Velayat Guliev, the Azerbaijani Foreign 
Minister who on 7th March 2002 deemed that the OSCE efforts had been 
unsuccessful.440 Since a stalemate in the peace process could impact on the 
ceasefire, the mutual confidence and the mediating process of the Minsk 
Group, their representatives paid a visit to the region in March 2002 and 
presented their new proposals to the political leaders of both sides, the 
content of which were not made public.441 
 
The Group also offered a new structure for the negotiations, which would be 
complementary to the presidents’ sessions. In the new set-up, the Azerbaijani 
and Armenian presidents’ special envoys were to be commissioned to 
continue the peace talks in the Minsk process. Both presidents appointed the 
deputies of their Foreign Ministers to perform the new role.442 
 
During recent years the co-chairs have been very active in dispatching high-
ranking delegations to the region, inter alia the leaders and foreign ministers 
of their countries and in convening conferences with the participation of the 
leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
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From 1998 to November 2004, the Presidents and high-ranking officials of the 
opposing parties were directly entrusted to resolve the dispute and they 
conducted backstage negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group. 
The Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia have had 21 direct discussions 
during the past few years. After the death of Heydar Aliev in December 2003, 
his son Ilham Aliev met with his Armenian counterpart three times from 1999 
to 2002. The Presidents had met on more than 20 occasions with no results 
achieved. As far as the content and results are concerned, maybe the most 
important presidential meetings were those in Paris and Key West. During the 
four-day peace negotiations dated 3rd -7th April 2001 in Florida, through the 
participation of Heydar Aliev and Kocharian and under the supervision of the 
three representatives of the Minsk Group, the co-chairs were witnesses to 
substantial progress in the peace negotiations. It is noteworthy that following 
the Key West talks, each of the Presidents had a meeting with President 
Bush in the White House, during which, Bush promised to provide extensive 
economic assistance if the conflict was resolved.443 In Florida, approval was 
also given to invite Iran to take part in the mediating process, but Iran gave a 
cold response, as it was concerned that no serious role had been given to 
Iran before.444 
 
The published contents of the negotiations, called the Paris and Key West 
Principles (the last negotiations between Kocharian and Aliev in April 2001) 
are as follows: 
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 Withdrawal of Armenian forces from six out of seven occupied 
Azerbaijani territories; the seventh region is the Lachin corridor, 
connecting Armenia to Karabakh. 
 Karabakh and Lachin will achieve autonomy de facto, while they will 
remain within the Azerbaijani territory, de jure. 
 An international corridor guarded by international forces will link 
Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan across Armenian soil.445 
 
Briefly, in recent years and through the OSCE summits and Ministerial 
councils, including the Oslo, Vienna, Bucharest, Porto and Maastricht 
meetings, the Minsk group co-chairmen have presented reports stating their 
measures and efforts in the period between each meeting. Some of these 
gatherings have ended by expressing some generalities about the peace 
process. For example, by stressing “the direct negotiations between the 
Presidents within the Minsk Group”, the OSCE state-participants supported 
the co-chairs’ efforts and also encouraged the conflicting parties to find a 
peaceful resolution. Meanwhile, developments in the international sphere had 
also influenced attitudes towards discussing the NK conflict in European 
meetings, as it had lost its importance and priority or on occasions had been 
dropped as an agenda item from meetings, after the events of September 
11th 2001.  
 
In early 2004, international mediators, operating under the auspices of the 
OSCE Minsk Group, took action to reinvigorate the peace process by 
facilitating several top-level meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani 
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officials. In late April 2004, for instance, the Armenian president Robert 
Kocharian met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliev, in Warsaw, and 
on 12th-13th May, the Foreign Minister’s of the two countries were scheduled 
to meet on the sidelines of the European Council.446 
 
Ilham Aliev and his Armenian counterpart met three times in Prague, Warsaw 
and Astana but the details and results of their talks have not been published. 
However, according to some sources, it seems they reached an agreement in 
the Astana meeting regarding a framework for the settlement of the conflict. 
This framework, which had been designed by the Minsk Group, summed up 
the results of the four meetings between the Foreign Ministers of both sides 
during the so-called Prague process. The Minsk Group presented this 
framework to the Presidents in Astana.  
 
It is worth mentioning that during the December 2004 meeting of the OSCE 
Ministerial Council in Sofia, 55 OSCE state-participants reached a consensus 
on this framework for the NK conflict and urged Presidents Aliev and 
Kocharian to take the "framework reached in Astana" into account and to 
move forward by basing their decisions on it.447 Following this meeting, the 
OSCE issued a statement and commended the progress achieved in the 
settlement of NK conflict in 2004 and welcomed the creation of the so-called 
“Prague Process.”448   
 
But in Yerevan, some officials involved in the process said that they saw no 
sign of an immediate breakthrough. One Armenian diplomat commented "The 
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framework of the agreements elaborated in Astana is very vague and there is 
still a lot of work to do." Even if the two reached an agreement on the final 
outline for a settlement deal, Kocharian and Aliev would then face the task of 
persuading their countries to agree to the plan. Given the problems with 
political stability that both leaders faced, the task was unlikely to be quickly 
accomplished.449 
 
In 2006, the meetings of the two Presidents, Robert Kocharian of Armenia 
and Elham Aliev of Azerbaijan (held in Ramboolet in February, Bucharest in 
June and Minsk in November) failed to result in any substantial agreement.    
 
On November 29th 2007 a set of proposals which were developed in 2005 
and 2006 by the OSCE following meetings between senior Azerbaijani and 
Armenian officials were presented by US Under Secretary of State Nicholas 
Burns, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and French Foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner to the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 
Madrid. 
 
Following the meetings that took place in Madrid, the OSCE released a 
statement that said: "It was noted that over the last three years of talks the 
two sides have significantly narrowed their differences through the mediation 
of the Co-Chair countries and that only a few differences remain to be settled. 
As noted by the representatives of the three Co-Chair countries, the joint 
proposal that was transmitted today to the party’s offered just and 
constructive solutions to these last remaining differences. The parties to the 
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conflict were strongly urged to bring to a close the current stage of 
negotiations by endorsing the proposed Basic Principles and commencing as 
soon as possible to draft a comprehensive Peace Agreement."450 
The basic proposals were as follows: 
1.The withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani regions 
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; 
2.The resettlement of these regions with Azerbaijani refugees; 
3.The return of Azerbaijani refugees to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh 
itself; 
4.The provision of an overland link connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia 
through the Lachin corridor; 
5.The deployment of peace-keeping forces across the borders of Nagorno-
Karabakh; 
6.The demilitarization of the territories that had been returned to Azerbaijan; 
7.The lifting of the blockade of Armenia’s and Karabakh’s external 
communications, and reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border; 
8.The definition of an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh Republic; 
9.The conduct of a referendum on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh at 
some undefined, future date; 
10. Provision of international financial aid for the restoration of the conflict 
zone.451 
Azerbaijan reaction to this proposal was: “If an agreement is reached on any 
principle of the NK conflict settlement, it must be made public,” Azerbaijani 
Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said. The minister underlined that 
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public diplomacy may have a positive influence on the process only after 
peace is achieved. “During a meeting in Madrid, the sides were handed a 
new package of proposals on conflict resolution. We are working on the 
document. Though there are no new proposals, it offers some new features. 
We think the document admissible but have some observations,” he said.452. 
In Prague on 8th May 2009, after the meeting of the Presidents of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan with the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Azerbaijani 
Foreign Minister (Memmedov) said: "I can not say that we have achieved any 
significant progress. Complex issues were discussed at the meeting in 
Prague. Unfortunately, the Armenian side once again did not show a 
constructive attitude. Azerbaijan wants Armenian troops to withdraw from the 
occupied territories as soon as possible.”453 
Furthermore, in a news conference in June 2009, Memmedov indicated that 
the NK conflict must be resolved on terms of the restoration of Azerbaijan's 
territorial integrity and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied 
territories: “We are moving, albeit slowly, and we must move forward step by 
step, Let the Armenian side be confident that Baku will not allow preserving 
the current situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh in future” Mammadyarov 
said..454 
Events in Georgia showed that any challenge should be faced on the basis of 
talks, but the President of Azerbaijan Aliyev, in a televised nationwide 
address on May 27th, 2009 said "there is and there can be no mechanism for 
Nagorno-Karabakh's secession from Azerbaijan at the negotiating table."455 
The Armenian reaction to this proposal was made by President Sarkysyan: 
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“The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is conducted within the framework of 
the OSCE Minsk Group, based on the ‘Madrid principles’. A resolution of the 
longstanding conflict is possible if Azerbaijan recognizes the right of the 
people of Nagorno-Karabakh for self-determination, if Nagorno-Karabakh has 
a land border with the Republic of Armenia, and if international organizations 
and the leading powers of the world guarantee the security of the Nagorno-
Karabakh people.”456 Sarkisian in October 2008 said at the meeting that he 
was ready for talks with Azerbaijan on the basis of principles worked out at 
negotiations in Madrid in 2007, meaning that the people of NK had gained the 
right to self-determination.457 
Ter Petrosian reacted to this proposal; he was forced to resign in February 
1988 because of accepting the Step-by-Step proposal which was proposed in 
September 1997. The basis of of the Madrid proposal is similar to that of 
1997 except for the referendum and the question of Kalbejar. Ter Petrosian 
had said that only the Armenian side should be clarified when the proposed 
referendum by the OSCE took place and he asked who would be responsible 
for the administration of this referendum. Ter-Petrosian also indicated that the 
principles were acceptable and were similar to a peace plan that he had 
strongly advocated while in power.458 
The position of the USA in the conflict remains unchanged as they believe in 
a peaceful settlement of the conflict and respect for the "Madrid principles", 
developed by the OSCE Minsk Group. On 10 June 2009, The US 
Ambassador to Azerbaijan Anne Derse and Gordon Philip, US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, told journalists in 
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Yerevan that “any mechanism of people's will must be included in the 
settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Any mechanism of voting, in which 
people express their will, should be included in the settlement process."459 
Dmitry Medevedev the Russian President visited Armenia on 22nd October  
2008 and in a press conference with Serge Sargsyan the Armenian President, 
said Russia would assist in the search of mutually acceptable solutions of the 
NK issue. Medevedev also said in August that the events in South Ossetia 
were the example. “We are ready to search for a decision. I will not comment 
on nuances of the talks, but we hope that a meeting of the three Presidents 
will be held soon and I hope it will be done in Russia.”460 This is another 
indication that Russia is dealing with the subject separately and not under the 
auspices of the OSCE. The three Presidents met in Moscow in November 
2008 and in St Petersburg in January 2009. 
The OSCE organized a meeting in December 2008, in Helsinki with the 
participation of the Foreign Ministers of Russia and France, the US Deputy 
Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 
outcome of this meeting was a joint statement that "the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict had no military solution and it encouraged the parties of the conflict to 
reaffirm their commitments to a peaceful settlement.461 In addition, OSCE 
organized a meeting between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia on 
the sidelines of the EU Eastern Partnership summit in Prague on 7th May 
2009. At the residence of the US Ambassador in Prague the co-chair of the 
OSCE indicated progress.462 However, the Azerbaijani presidential adviser on 
11th May denied any progress and criticised the Minsk Group co-chairs.463 
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The French were also not hugely optimistic regarding the outcome of the 
meeting. In line with the Azeris dissatisfaction, the French Foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner said. “There is a lot of misunderstanding between the 
sides, each insists on going his own way, but we shouldn’t lose heart. 
Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan still have much to do.”464 
The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met on the sidelines of the EU 
Eastern Partnership summit in Prague on the 7th of May. Following the 
meetings, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair, Bryza reported,that there had 
been a “most substantive exchange of views between the presidents and so 
far differences on basic principles had been reduced.”465  
The co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bryza 
of the United States, Ambassador Fassier of France and Ambassador 
Merzlyakov of Russia, visited Yerevan and Baku on May 28th and 29th 2009 
and negotiated with the officials of both countries. They also took part in the 
meeting of the President of Armenia Serge Sarkysyan and President Ilham 
Aliyev of Azerbaijan in Saint Petersburg on 4th June 2009. The meeting of 
both Presidents was constructive and they agreed to continue with the 
negotiation process. The Foreign Ministers were tasked to continue working 
towards making the positions closer. This was the fifth meeting of both 
presidents.466 
In joint statements released on 10th July 2009 on the sideline of the G8 
summit in Italy, the Presidents of the US, France and Russia expressed their 
commitment to resolving the NK conflict on the basis of the Madrid agreement 
of 2007: “We, the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group’s Co-Chair 
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countries… affirm our commitment to support the leaders of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as they finalize the Basic Principles for a settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, We urge the Presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to resolve the few differences remaining between them and 
finalize their agreement on these Basic Principles, which will outline a 
comprehensive settlement.”467 
The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, 
met in Moscow on Friday 18th July 2009 to discuss the conflict based on the 
Madrid Principles. The presidents were accompanied by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of both countries, Edward Nalbandian and Elmar Mamedyarov, 
the Co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group Yuri Merzlyakov, Bernard Fassier, 
Matthew Bryza and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-
in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk. The US Co-Chair Matthew Bryza expressed a 
level of frustration with the meeting by stating “I am disappointed. No 
document was signed, no new decision was taken.”468 
As can be seen from the discussion above, there was no shortage of effort in 
trying to find a solution to the NK conflict. There are many reasons for this. 
 
Reasons for the Failure of the Minsk Group 
 
In a general sense, numerous factors have led to the Minsk group mediators 
being unsuccessful. These are detailed below. All of these have conspired to 
make the peace process fail. Over the years they have had different levels of 
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importance according to the geo-political reality at the time. These factors are 
detailed below: 
 
1. Improper techniques being applied: The settlement of the NK conflict like 
any other prolonged, frozen, and complicated conflict requires two pre-
conditions; first, the intention and will of both sides to somehow reach an 
agreement and compromise; and second, the ability and power of the 
mediators to use an appropriate policy of using incentives and 
punishments – a combination of "carrot and stick" methods to force the 
conflicting parties to compromise. The mediator should have power and 
should use his position outside the negotiations to persuade the parties to 
obey.  
 
If the first pre-condition exists in a conflict, then the only problem will be 
suspicion and distrust between the parties. In this regard the role of “Track 
Two” diplomacy, which has not yet been applied, is crucial. It has been 
proved that traditional methods of negotiations are not appropriate for 
identity-based conflicts. In fact, the end of the Cold War opened up 
opportunities for a re-examination of international relations. Fortunately, 
this led to substantial research in conflict resolution and it is clear that 
without a properly designed process, the negotiation will never have a 
sustainable outcome. Thus, by building trust between the conflicting 
parties, the mediators can establish peace through direct negotiations 
and/or by presenting their own solution. Of course, in either case, no 
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positive result will be achieved unless political pressure is exerted to some 
degree and political guarantees are granted to both parties.  
 
A third party should be able to engage the trust of both sides and interpret 
the motives of both parties towards each other. In this intense conflict, a 
trust-building mechanism has not been put in place. Good mediators 
should possess problem-solving skills so as to enable the different parties 
to diagnose their key problems. Developing appropriate proposals for the 
resolution of this type of conflict is only possible with a combination of both 
official and unofficial intervention. But, none of the above-mentioned pre-
conditions exist in the NK conflict. In other words, neither party shows any 
serious inclination for compromise and peace, nor do the mediators have 
the ability to exert the “carrot and stick” policy. 
 
During the years immediately following the formation of the Minsk group, 
some small states became members who had neither the recognition of 
the Caucasus region nor interests therein, so they had no serious 
motivation or interest in solving the conflict, The CSCE has an 
organizational structure where all member states are equal, and where no 
great-power vetoes exist.469 It is ‘too large and too low level for serious 
negotiation, [having] no way of guaranteeing that the much larger CSCE 
itself would either agree or actually produce a peacekeeping force’.470 
 
2. A lack of capacity and interest amongst the Minsk Group: Therefore, in the 
early stages, when solving the conflict would have been very simple, 
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these states lost the opportunity to do so. This caused the peace process 
to be prolonged and it seems that the traditional approach has made the 
conflict more protracted. 
 
A lack of strong institutions and experience in conflict resolution should 
thus be considered. The CSCE and then the OSCE had no previous 
experience in mediating to settle a conflict and establish peace. In fact, 
the NK conflict was their first such case of mediation. Therefore this 
organization should not be blamed entirely because it was the first dispute 
in which the OSCE had been involved. 
 
3. The Minsk Group mediators had no stable and codified strategy to solve 
the NK conflict. Also, their mediation was based on traditional methods of 
conflict settlement, which on their own were unsuccessful. 
 
4. The Minsk Group mediators had no understanding of the roots, the 
historical causes or the social-psychological aspects of the NK conflict, 
such as the insecurity, hatred and traditional hostility in the minds of the 
Armenian and Azeri nations, the deep historical disagreements and far-
reaching psychological influence over the public and the specific opinions 
of the Azerbaijani and Armenian states. Generally, the most important 
reason for the failure of the mediators was that they were far from the 
battle zone. The most obvious example of their ignorance of the roots of 
the dispute, and the history and culture of the tribes of the region, was 
based on the misconception whereby they thought they could lead the 
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conflicting parties to compromise and peace. They were unaware of the 
fact that this conflict was not rooted in economic interests but was a 
disagreement over shared values and feelings. Even in recent years, the 
Minsk group has been unable to understand such important public 
feelings and tendencies. 
 
5. While mediating, the Minsk Group co-chairmen were in contact and 
negotiated solely with the political leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
They forgot to involve the opposition - influential anti-government 
organizations, figures and movements - and generally public opinion. 
Whereas, no peace accord can guarantee the permanent stability of the 
region without the consent and support of these elements, it is clear that 
convincing the people and gaining their support for the method of settling 
the conflict, is the most important principle for ensuring a stable peace as 
well as internal and regional stability. 
 
In this respect, the Minsk Group had neglected to establish any relations 
with the different influential movements in either of the republics of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is interesting that the offering of proposals to 
the authorities of both states causes nothing but pessimism among the 
different parties and movements. 
 
It should be mentioned that the fall of the government of Terpetrossian 
was in fact brought about by the failure of the mediators to establish 
coordination and relations with the political parties and groups of the 
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republic of Armenia. Without doubt, this issue had the most negative effect 
on the peace process. Problem-solving workshops to bring together the 
representatives of the disputing parties to unofficially explore possible 
uncommitted solutions to the conflict could have been the best approach 
for examining the options. Unfortunately, in spite of this useful technique 
invented by John Burton at University College, London, which in a 1965 
workshop enabled the settlement of a dispute between Indonesia and 
Malaysia, was never applied by the OSCE in this conflict. 
 
6. A lack of coordination and the presence of opposing viewpoints among 
the regional goals and interests of the influential powers in the region, 
particularly between two members of the Minsk Group - Russia, and the 
United States. In such a situation, each of these countries preferred their 
own foreign policy to the settlement of the dispute, and viewed the solving 
of the conflict through the prism of its own interests. It is logical that finding 
a solution that simultaneously provides strategic and geo-political benefits 
to both sides has thus far been an impossible event.  
 
It is quite evident that the rivalry amongst near and distant powers, the 
United States at the head, was aimed at filling the power vacuum in the 
Caucasus region. Because of this rivalry the status of the region and the 
proportion of forces stationed there had not been defined. Thus, the 
settlement of the NK conflict depends on the result of this competition and 
remains in abeyance as before. So too, we can say that the NK conflict 
has been a pretext for stabilizing the area, providing for regional interests 
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and for adjusting the behavior of the conflicting parties in their relations 
with these powers. 
 
It is natural for the co-chairmen to bear in mind the geo-political benefits of 
their respective countries while finding a solution to the conflict, as each 
country tries to fulfil its own regional and geo-political programme in the 
region. Therefore, as long as they have not achieved these interests and 
goals, it is logical that they should have no intention of settling the conflict. 
Thus, it can be said that during the past years, the mediators have tried to 
preserve the status quo instead of making efforts to heal the divisions. 
 
7. The Minsk Group members did not have an impartial view of the NK 
peace process. The mediator must be impartial as it is an important 
principle of mediation. 
 
8. There were some imperfections in the OSCE decision-making process - a 
process which is based on consensus. In this process, a negative vote 
cast by either party causes the decision to become null and void. This is 
certainly a very weak point that hinders the Minsk Group members from 
carrying out their duties. 
 
9. The frequent changes in the OSCE leadership and members of the Minsk 
Group, as well as a short period of service for the latter group’s co-
chairmen. It is interesting that in some cases, the chairman in office and 
the representatives did not have enough time to study and grasp such 
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notions as the origins and historical roots of the conflict, the stances of the 
opposing sides and the process of any developments. In this respect, the 
trips and meetings of these officials were merely ceremonial and symbolic. 
 
Also, in many cases when one of the co-chairmen was ousted from his 
office, his position remained vacant for a long time. It is clear that such 
issues would have disrupted the process of decision-making and would 
have finally led to the failure of the mediators. 
 
10. The Minsk Group mediators followed traditional, diffuse and unstructured 
methods, without any overarching strategy and without paying attention to 
the internal factors of the conflict. Thus, they failed to plan or implement 
any programme to remove these factors and facilitate the psychological 
grounds in the conflicted societies. It is interesting that the mediators were 
not even successful in addressing the external factors of the conflict. 
 
11. Although the principles of territorial integrity and self determination are 
among those approved by the OSCE and are the basic policies of most 
European governments, the mediators - worrying perhaps that this would 
establish a precedent for the freedom-seeking movements of other groups 
and minorities - had no intention of favouring the principle of self-
determination over that of territorial integrity. 
 
Interestingly, neither did they effectively support the principle of territorial 
integrity in the early years, as the OSCE had never explicitly supported 
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Azerbaijan's territorial unity until the Lisbon Summit in 1996. Besides, after 
1996, because of Armenian opposition, members of the OSCE did not 
adopt any particular stance to defend Azerbaijan's territorial cohesion. On 
the contrary, the co-chairmen's other solution - "the common state"- was 
diametrically opposed to the Lisbon declaration. This was while the OSCE 
repeatedly and simultaneously issued formal declarations concerning the 
need to respect and observe other countries’ territorial integrity, especially 
with regard to Georgia.  
 
This contradiction and violation of the accepted principles of the OSCE 
lowered the prestige of this organization in the eyes of the Azerbaijanis. 
This too is another weak point and reason for the failure of the mediators. 
 
Generally, the OSCE principles and rules were arranged through a 
complex process of political bargaining drawn from Cold War realities; 
besides, the legal arrangements as a dynamic phenomenon had always 
been erased from the activities of this organization in most periods after 
the Cold War. This is why both parties arranged and explained their 
situation according to these principles and the legal regime which made 
their position uncompromising. 
 
12. A lack of communication and interaction amongst the different parties. 
This is a necessary condition for any resolution to a conflict, including this 
one. (Saunders 1999) The OSCE has not been able to do this. 471 
Successful mediation entails what Berkovitch et al. call “containing, 
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enticing, and mending” (Berkovitch 1997; Touval and Zartman 2001).472 
The mediator should be able to draw the parties to the dispute away from 
conflicting perceptions and actions and bring them together in a more 
harmonious relationship. Unfortunately the OSCE has not used this 
important insight. Justice and fairness is best regarded not as one of the 
issues in the conflict but as a term of analysis for the entire situation and 
therefore a basic way in which issues and grievances can be analyzed 
and resolved (Zartman et al. 1996).473 
     
13. A poor choice of partners. Peace-keeping could have played an important 
role in bringing trust to this conflict but Moscow’s policy of “denying 
access” was applied in its diplomatic relations with the OSCE. Moscow did 
not hesitate to exploit every opportunity to “make trouble” and prevent 
consensus on important decisions to be made in this Organization. Russia 
had been concerned about the OSCE’s increased involvement in the 
management of the NK conflict because it would undermine and 
marginalize its role in the Caucasus.474 
 
14. Not learning from past mistakes. Since the ineffectiveness and failure of 
the Minsk Group continues unchecked as before, and as it has made no 
evaluation of its past behaviour or how to improve the methods and 
structure of its mediation, it gives the impression that it has no serious 
desire to settle the dispute. An insistence on the fruitless methods of the 
past, without effective evaluation suggests that they have no intention of 
resolving the conflict. For instance, the Minsk Group mediators proposed 
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direct negotiations between the Presidents before 1996, which produced 
no practical results. Then, they entrusted the peace talks to junior 
ministers of foreign affairs and the presidents’ special envoys on both 
sides, which also yielded no results. After a while, the Presidents, advised 
by the mediators, resumed direct negotiations. When these proved 
fruitless, the negotiations reverted to the junior ministers again, whose 
efforts had already proved to be futile. In such a state of affairs, it is only 
natural that the conflicting parties, particularly the Azerbaijanis, would be 
seriously dissatisfied with the conduct of the mediators. 
 
15. International developments have diverted the attention of the mediators 
from the NK dispute at particular moments. The conflict was particularly 
affected by the events of September 11th, followed by the US and its allies’ 
attack on Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
On the other hand, disagreements amongst members of the Minsk Group 
stalled the mediation process for a while. Moreover, the frosty relations 
among the co-chairmen of the respective states sometimes halted their 
meetings and counselling; for instance, the adverse conduct of the Minsk 
Group coincided with the sour relations between Russia and the United 
States during the Bosnia and Kosovo wars. Therefore, it follows that the 
interruption of the mediation process and the reaching of a deadlock in the 
peace process were the main reasons for the prolongation of the war and 
the failure of the mediators.  
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Rivalry between the regional powers, particularly Russia and Turkey, on 
the one hand, and Turkey and Iran, on the other – combined with the 
differences between China and Turkey and Europe and Turkey on the 
regional issues also contributed to the failure of the Minsk Group. In 
particular, Turkey's diplomacy and its pan-Turkic policies and plans for this 
region are in contrast with the direct interests of Iran, Russia, China, and 
Europe. In addition, Turkey’s frosty relations with Armenia and its explicit 
and prejudiced support for Azerbaijan have had a great effect on the 
prolongation of the fighting and the failure of the Minsk group. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the Minsk Group was successful in opening 
negotiations regarding the conflict, but despite these early successes has not 
yet achieved a stable ceasefire. Looking back over the previous 15 years, it 
can be argued that the OSCE has not been effective in conflict resolution and 
has not had the means or necessary instruments at its disposal to achieve 
this.  
 
Although more than 15 years have passed since the OSCE Minsk group 
mediation, the hostile parties are still in the vulnerable position of “no war, no 
peace”. While the opportunities for the OSCE mediators have deteriorated 
and the people are tired and dejected by the prolonging of this situation, the 
Minsk Group co-chairmen insists on persevering with the mediation as before 
with the last proposal presented to the conflicting parties in 2007 in Madrid 
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which was similar to the 1997 Step-by-Step proposal which had been rejected 
by Azeri Karabakhs, who were not participating with negotiations. 
 
According to some experts, including Alexander Alexandrian, the Manager of 
the Caucasus Research Centre in Moscow, such negotiations will not bring 
about any particular political outcome. In particular, given the unreliability of 
Azerbaijan towards Russia's mediation - which has been pointed out several 
times by Vafa Guluzade, the political advisor to three Azerbaijani presidents - 
the Azeri side is generally tired of and depressed about the continuation of 
the mediation process by the co-chairmen. Azerbaijan's mistrust of the Minsk 
Group is not confined to Russia. Leila Aliyev, the Azeri writer, says that 
people here believe that the other two Minsk co-chairs: the United States and 
France, are hostage to powerful domestic Armenian lobbies. Thus, the Azeris 
have their doubts about all three countries.475  
 
The most important reason for the failure of the Minsk Group to resolve the 
NK dispute undoubtedly lies with the troika of co-chairs and their differences. 
Each member of the troika has its own viewpoint over the NK conflict and the 
way to its settlement. With respect to the power vacuum in the Caucasus 
after the break-up of the USSR, it is quite natural that each of the co-chairs - 
Russia, the United States, and France (representing Europe) - intends to fill 
the power vacuum. This has caused a rivalry between the United States and 
Russia, which has had, in its turn, a negative impact on the settlement of the 
conflict. 
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Another reason for the lack of effectiveness of the OSCE-sponsored 
negotiations can be found in the weakness of its conflict-resolution 
framework, which overestimated the attraction of the economic development 
arguments and underestimated the security concerns and the role of history 
in the shaping of a country’s strategic choices. The framework constitutes a 
rational set of objectives and arguments, which do not reflect the lessons of 
the collective memory of the conflict parties.476 As Baird observed, values, as 
part of national identity, are at stake in the conflict of Nagorno Karabakh. 
Value-related conflicts are difficult to negotiate, because values cannot be 
compromised.477 This kind of dispute is not so prone to Western negotiating 
techniques, which are based primarily on a culture of rational self-interest.  
 
Briefly, the cultural differences between the mediators and the parties 
involved in the conflict as well as the lack of recognition of the people, history 
and the background of the conflict, have caused the peace process to be 
persistently weakened. 
 
Apart from the above points, one of the most important factors in the failure of 
the OSCE mediators was the lack of necessary and effective leverage to 
pressurise the belligerents. In such circumstances, it was quite natural that 
even in the case of establishing a coercive peace, it would not last, and we 
must also not be confident about the durability of a Bosnian treaty.478 
 
It is clear that the Russian acceptance of the mission reflects a desire to 
oppose Europe and also to provide a greater weight to counter NATO 
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enlargement. The policy of Russia in the Caucuses is directly against EU and 
NATO expansion. The role given to Russia to co-chair the Minsk Group 
raises serious questions about the viability of this organization concerning the 
resolution to the dispute. As long as Russia holds the position of co-chair in 
the Minsk group, there will not be any settlement achieved by this 
organization 
 
Russia views security and energy as part of its interests. In addition to 
Russia’s, other foreign interests have been developed in the Caucuses. Since 
the interests of Russia, the US, Europe, Iran and Turkey are difficult to 
reconcile, Russia and other countries in the region benefit to a greater extent 
from the instability in NK. A stable peace reduces the political influence of 
these countries, while the continuation of the conflict justifies the continuing 
presence of the Russian military in Armenia.  
 
Although this chapter has shown that traditional diplomacy has achieved little 
success in solving the dispute, what is required is a new approach, which 
uses the diplomatic process in its widest sense, including the use of Track 
Two diplomacy to achieve success. In fact this has been the view of some 
commentators and is the focus of the next few chapters.  
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Chapter 7: Legal Aspects of the NK Conflict 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union following 
the introduction of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policies in 1988, 
was the end of the policy of divide and rule. Under this policy NK separated 
from Armenia and Nakhchivan as well as from the rest of Azerbaijan. In 
addition, the Armenians had to cross through populated Azeri areas, whilst 
the Azeris did the same in Armenia. This change of circumstances caused 
the Armenians living in NK to demand independence or unification, and this in 
turn caused the NK conflict.  
 
Although this dispute was between three different countries, namely Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and the unrecognized Republic of NK - it was regarded by 
international organizations and external powers as an internal or intrastate 
quarrel. The conflict has lasted for more than two decades thus far, making it 
the longest inter-ethnic conflict in history. The NK contest represents a clash 
between territorial integrity on the one hand and self determination on the 
other. 
 
Both the Azeris and the Armenians claim an absolute historic right to NK and 
have battled over it periodically for generations. Both nations also have very 
different ideas of the future status of NK. The right to self-determination is 
against the territorial integrity principle. Armenians justify their right by 
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indicating that as they are the majority population in NK they are the ones 
who should decide its future. The Azeris on the other hand believe that their 
territorial integrity should be respected as NK was internationally recognized 
as part of Azerbaijan before the conflict began. The Karabakhis demand 
independence or unification with Armenia and international recognition, citing 
their right to national self-determination but Azerbaijan is ready to provide 
NK’s population with the highest form of self-government but within the 
country's frontiers and maintain the right to preserve its territorial integrity. It 
should be mentioned that after the dissolution of the USSR, NK was ruled by 
Azerbaijan, according to international law. 
 
The Armenians make up 80 per cent of the population of NK, speak a 
different language, practice a different religion and have a distinct culture to 
the local Azeris. They refer to the approved principles of the UN Charter and 
deem them very important as they are the basis of the development of the 
legal right to self-determination.  
 
The Azerbaijani position regarding the final status is that international law 
recognizes the right to independence of colonial peoples and annexed 
territories but not of national minorities in internationally-recognized states. 
The Azerbaijanis also believe that international law demonstrates that, based 
on the provisions of the Soviet Constitution, the status of NK is defined as an 
autonomous oblast within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and therefore has 
no right to self-determination and secession. They also argue that, in 
international law, there is a difference between the rights of a people and the 
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rights of minorities and they refer to the priority of territorial integrity as being 
manifest not only in the United Nations but also in regional resolutions, as 
well as Article-4 of the Helsinki Act and the Declaration of the Vienna Summit 
in 1993. 
 
Article 55 of the United Nations promotes a number of goals with a view "to 
the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination. In addition, Article 1, 
paragraph 1 of the international covenant on Civil and Political Rights for 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Development, reveals the following: "All 
people have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development." 
 
To be able to find and facilitate a solution to this conflict, one must have an 
understanding of legal appraisal and the development of international law on 
self-determination and territorial integrity. Therefore, in this chapter, I examine 
some legal aspects of the NK conflict and how international law affects 
matters.  
 
These legal features of the NK dispute are important from three points of 
view: the Soviet Constitution,, because both countries were part of the Soviet 
Union, the principles of the Commonwealth of Independent States covenant, 
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and international law. In addition to the above, the chapter explores the 
positions and legal definitions of each contending party.  
 
The USSR Constitution and the Perspectives of the Conflicting 
Parties  
 
On 20th February 1988, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the NK 
Autonomous Region (NKAR) in Stepanakert appealed to the Supreme Soviet 
of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and USSR governments to allow it to be joined 
to Armenia. The Azerbaijani government quickly rejected this request on the 
basis of the USSR constitution of 1977, article 78, which stipulates that "the 
territory of the union of republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the 
republics concerned, subject to ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics." However, on 18th July 1988, a special session of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR discussed the resolution of the Supreme 
Soviet of the NKAR regarding secession from Azerbaijan and incorporation 
into Armenia and adopted a decision confirming that NK should remain an 
autonomous region within Azerbaijan.479 
 
Following the decision of the central government to reject the demand of 
Karabakh and incorporate it into Azerbaijan again and the creation of unrest 
in Karabakh, the administrative board of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
decided to put Karabakh under Moscow's direct control as a racial-territorial-
administration sector. This stand continued from January to November 1989, 
and again the autonomy of Karabakh within Azerbaijan was turned to. On 1st 
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December 1989, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia adopted a resolution on the 
unification of NK with Armenia.480 
 
Finally, contrary to Azerbaijan's decision in 1991 to nullify NK’s autonomy and 
its direct administration by Baku, the Karabakh Armenians held a referendum 
throughout the region on the subject of independence, thereby answering 
Azerbaijan's request. On 10th December 1991, 82 per cent of NK’s population 
attended the balloting, of whom 99.89 per cent voted in favour of secession 
and independence.481  
 
Since that time, the Proclaimed Republic of NK has been effectively 
independent and currently exists as a self-proclaimed entity which has some 
of the attributes of a fully independent state, such as population, power, 
unique culture and so on. However, it lacks a clearly-defined territory and it is 
not internationally recognized by any state. Therefore, as we can see, from 
the very beginning the stage was set for a conflict because of completely 
incompatible ideas on the future status of that enclave. Armenia formally 
annexed Karabakh, whilst Azerbaijan officially abolished its autonomy, and 
Karabakh declared itself an independent republic.482 Thereafter, each of the 
parties in dispute considered itself in the right and believed that its measures 
conformed to international law.  
 
Substantiating the legitimacy of the December referendum which led to the 
declaration of independence in early 1992, the Armenian party drew attention 
to the 3rd December 1990 USSR law regarding “the Procedure for Solving 
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Issues of Secession of a Soviet Republic from the USSR”. Article 3 of this law 
provided the autonomous regions within the Soviet Republics with the right of 
independent self-determination.483  
 
Several days before the official disintegration of the Soviet Union on 10th 
December 1991, a nationwide referendum took place in NK. This was held on 
the basis of the then legislation of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, a 
declaration of independence by the NKR was legally impossible and 
Karabakh was entitled to secession from Azerbaijan. According to Soviet law, 
if a republic seceded from the USSR, any autonomous region and fully active 
national group had the right to determine independently their further legal 
status by means of a referendum.484  
 
Due to the fact that both sections of the divided Armenian nation were part of 
the USSR, they – the Armenians of Karabakh, like the Armenians of Armenia 
- were subject to the constitutional principle of self-determination set down in 
the Soviet constitution.  
 
The NK declaration was implemented by way of a referendum and other 
democratic methods, acknowledged by the world community, in the presence 
of international observers.485 
 
Regarding the circumstances surrounding the holding of the referendum, the 
Armenians believed that the central committee of the Karabakh election 
prepared the ground for it throughout the entire Karabakh region, even in the 
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areas inhabited by the Azeris. But the Azeris boycotted it while the Armenians 
considered it legitimate because 85 per cent of the population of the enclave 
were Armenians and the participation or otherwise of the Azeris had no effect 
on the result.486 
 
Also, since NK became independent on 10th December 1991 while the 
collapse of the USSR happened on 15th December, the former was separated 
from both Azerbaijan and the USSR 487 . Furthermore, the Karabakh 
Armenians argued that there were no legal grounds for the inclusion of NK in 
the structure of Azerbaijan, apart from a resolution of the Caucasian Bureau 
of the Bolshevik Party in 1921. The Azerbaijan Republic claimed that it was 
the successor of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic of 1918-1920. 
Meanwhile, NK was not a part of Azerbaijan at that time. 
 
On the other hand, Azerbaijan maintained that the 70-year sovereignty of the 
Soviet Union and its legal heritage was illicit. This state stressed that handing 
over Karabakh to Azerbaijan during the era of the Soviet Union and forcibly 
keeping it within Azerbaijan was illegal. Therefore, Karabakh’s persistence in 
vindicating its right to self-determination did not violate the Soviet Union’s 
laws.488  
 
But the Azerbaijani authorities saw things differently calling the Karabakhi 
separatists’ measures unlawful and a violation of Azerbaijani territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty. Thus, they believed that by the time the 
referendum was held (10th December 1991) Azerbaijan had already become 
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an independent country (achieved independence on 30th August 1991), 
therefore this law of a troubled empire had no legal power over an 
independent Azerbaijan and its territory.    
 
On the basis of Article 72 of the Soviet Union Constitution, which was ratified 
in 1977, all 15 Soviet Republics had the right of secession from that 
federation, but it was quite evident that this was merely a pro forma law, 
because in Article 75 of the Constitution, the territorial integrity of USSR had 
been defined.489 Furthermore, in the administrative hierarchy of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the autonomous territorial units were defined at three 
distinct levels, and the rights of each level were related to the realm of the 
Republic. In other words, the power to decide on the autonomous regions 
was different to that of the autonomous republics in the USSR constitution. 
Based on this law the autonomous regions had more limited power than the 
autonomous republics, and the regions did not have the right to separate. 
Furthermore, based on Articles 78-88 of the USSR Constitution, any changes 
in the border of the Union by an autonomous republic had to be confirmed by 
the Soviet Republic. 
 
Based on the provisions of the USSR Constitution, to the Azerbaijani 
authorities, the former status of NK was defined as an autonomous oblast 
within the Soviet Social Republic of Azerbaijan, thus, it had no right to 
external self-determination, including secession. The provisions of Soviet law 
explicitly indicated that any kind of modification to the borders required the 
consent of the Azerbaijan SR (later Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan did not agree with 
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any change to its borders, arguing that the principle of granting autonomous 
status (regional or republican) to the national minorities of the former USSR 
did not have any logical basis and their creation was based more on political 
and imperialistic factors than a genuine desire for the protection of minority 
rights. This was because a number of other minorities who had a larger 
population than the Karabakh Armenians had not been granted autonomy. 
For example, the Azeri natives residing in Armenia and Georgia and the 
Armenians living in Georgia were not given independence, unlike the small 
population of Armenians in NK.490 
 
Other Armenian claims as the basis for having the right of secession have 
been deduced from "oppression theory". The Armenians can claim the 
legitimatization of secession under this theory because of the discrimination 
of the Armenian population in NK.  
 
In response to this claim, the Azeris firstly denied discrimination against the 
Armenians, and secondly, they claimed that, even if it had taken place, a 
claim for secession could not be legitimized according to “oppression theory”. 
Besides, it is well-known that decision-making in the former USSR was highly 
centralized and local government was totally dependent on instructions from 
the Kremlin. They argued that the alleged discrimination against the NK 
Armenian population by the Azerbaijan Soviet government was groundless. 
Moreover, the Armenian population in NK shared a common government with 
the Azeri population, with a person of Armenian nationality leading it. There 
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were also schools which taught in the Armenian language and the level of 
welfare was higher than in most parts of Azerbaijan.491 
 
The Azeris also argued that the Armenians violated global peace and 
stability, resorting to the principle of the right of self-determination and 
justifying secessionism because they are planning to achieve it at the 
expense of Azerbaijan. Armenian scholars emphasize that NK is a special 
case and differs from other Armenian communities outside of Armenia as it 
had Autonomous Status which is the starting point for self-determination and 
of secession. To the Azeris, there is no legitimate difference in terms of 
secession between the Armenians of NK and those living in compact 
communities in other countries. There is no doubt that the Armenians living in 
NK (Azerbaijan) or in the territory of other states are national minorities and, 
as such, have the right to determine their status inside the states they inhabit, 
but they should not take measures for its break up.492 Thus, according to the 
USSR constitution, the NK autonomous oblast does not have the right to 
secession. The Armenians in Azerbaijan, as a national minority, therefore 
have the right to self-determination in their own country which enables their 
free participation in the political life of Azerbaijan to pursue their own 
economic, social, and cultural development, establish and maintain, without 
discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with citizens of Armenia to whom 
they are related by national, religious, or linguistic ties. Self-determination 
however, does not necessarily mean secession, particularly by the use of 
force. 
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But the Armenians have another reason for arguing for self determination. 
They see secession as morally permissible given that the state refuses to end 
the serious injustices it is perpetrating against the seceding group. The types 
of state-inflicted injustices justifying secession are its violations of basic 
individual, civil and political rights, as well as its exploitation of one group to 
benefit another. Under certain highly-circumscribed conditions, the need for a 
group to defend itself against the threats to the survival of its members by 
third-party aggressors, when its own state is not protecting it, can justify 
secession.493   
 
The Armenian community of NK has repeatedly alleged that it had little 
decision-making power and that it was discriminated against by the Azeri 
population of Azerbaijan in economic and cultural terms to the extent that its 
survival in a state with an Azeri majority was threatened.494 
 
The proponents of NK independence claim that the policy of aggression, 
massacre, expulsion and national discrimination against the Armenian 
population carried out by Azerbaijan and Turkey, has led to the destruction 
and expulsion of about half a million Armenians from the territory of the so-
called Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan.495 
 
Also, with regard to economic discrimination, Stadelbauer claims that capital 
investments in NK during the last three decades of the Soviet Union were 
significantly lower than those in Azerbaijan. 496  It is, however, not clear 
whether this can serve as a sufficient basis for concluding that NK was 
301 
systematically discriminated against in economic terms. Given the relative 
strength of Azerbaijani industry, it seems logical that most of the investments 
went into the oil-related industries, located along the Caspian Sea. NK was 
traditionally an agrarian and sheep-herding region without major industrial 
units. The Azeris cite authors such as Kurbanov who maintain that the 
Armenians in NK were not discriminated against.  For example, he argues 
that economic differences among the nations of the Soviet Transcaucasus 
were insignificant.497 
 
According to a leading Russian anthropologist, Yamskov, “the population of 
Nagorno Karabakh enjoys a level of social and economic development that is 
somewhat higher than that of the general population of Azerbaijan.” 498 
However, other scholars believe that there was, in fact, a difference in living 
standards in Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the end of the Soviet Union, 
the gross domestic product per inhabitant in Azerbaijan was 75 per cent of 
the Soviet Union’s average, for Armenia it was 94 per cent.499 Therefore, the 
core of Armenian dissatisfaction with their economic standing in Azerbaijan 
may be their perception of the differences between the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani economic situations. 
 
As for the argument that the culture of NK Armenians is at risk, the Azeris 
invoke the views of Allen Buchanan, who believes that “to prepare the 
grounds morally for secessionism, the culture must be really at risk.”500 It is 
difficult to argue that Armenian culture in NK was imperilled, especially given 
that 75 per cent of the Armenian population in the region was employed in the 
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local administration. However, there is a widespread conviction among the 
Armenians that the Armenians from NK were discriminated against regarding 
access to education and employment. Even more importantly, those from NK 
with a university education were not able to find appropriate work in their 
home region. Therefore they tended to migrate elsewhere – usually to 
Armenia or to Russia. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in response to the Armenians’ moral claims, the Azeris 
argued that even if we take the discrimination of the Armenians in NK as fact, 
the claims can be questioned on the grounds that it was not Azerbaijan but 
the Soviet Union that was discriminating against them. There had not been 
time for such discrimination when NK was a functional part of the Azerbaijan 
Democratic Republic. Therefore, it cannot be convincingly argued that NK is 
or will be discriminated against by Azerbaijan. 
 
In sum, it cannot be plausibly concluded that the Armenians in Azerbaijan 
were victimized by Azerbaijan, economically or culturally. The potentially 
seceding culture must meet minimal standards of moral decency. Taking into 
account the atrocities and the violations of human rights committed by both 
sides during the NK conflict, it could be argued that NK does not fulfil this 
criterion and neither does Azerbaijan. It may be concluded therefore that NK 
fails to fulfil any of the moral criteria for secession.   
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The Legal Aspects of the Conflict According to the CIS Treaty & 
Arguments of the Conflicting Parties 
 
After the collapse of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as independent 
entities, entered the CIS. One of the major principles of the Commonwealth 
Treaty is the inviolability of the borders of the constituent sovereign states: 
that is, territorial integrity. 
 
However, the Armenian population in NK held a referendum, and declared 
the establishment of the NK Republic as an independent state and appealed 
to the Commonwealth for membership. This action contradicted the principles 
of the Treaty, which was signed by eleven sovereign republics, and was not 
recognized by the Commonwealth, or by any state in the world, or even the 
Armenian Republic.501 In this respect, the Armenians of NK argue that the 
procedure for its independence was started before Azerbaijan, with the other 
republics and Karabakh left the structure of Soviet Azerbaijan before the 
collapse of the USSR. In those conditions, NK was a unit similar to Azerbaijan 
and they had the right to declare independence, just as the Azeris had earlier 
taken advantage of the opportunity to declare independence.502 
 
The Legal Aspects of the Conflict in the Context of International Law, 
UN Charters, OSCE Principles & arguments of the Parties 
 
Justifying their actions and positions, each of the conflicting parties used the 
articles of USSR law or the provisions of the CIS Treaty, through which they 
argued that their actions fully conformed to international standards and 
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principles. Thus, each side relied on either territorial integrity or the right of 
self-determination to clarify and justify their positions. 
 
In this respect, when discussing and interpreting certain principles of 
international law, the Armenian authorities argue that NK independence 
depends on the Karabakhis’ legitimate right of self-determination and whether 
it conforms to those standards. In particular they invoke Article 55 of the UN 
Charter, which mentions “peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
people”. Based upon the 1970 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (xxv), 
stating that all self-identified groups with a common identity who live in a 
single territory have the right to make a common decision for their political 
future through democratic policies, free from any kind of systematic ruling. 
For these groups, the right of self-determination and, in some special cases, 
even complete independence can be achieved through autonomy within the 
structure of the federal government, confederation or free union.503 
 
For example, during the investigation of the claims relating to East Timor, the 
International Court of Justice specified that the principle of self-determination 
was manifest in international common law and was applicable to all 
communities, and all countries were obliged to observe it.504 
 
The Armenian authorities also invoke international law to substantiate the 
claim that Karabakhi independence is the result of their right to self-
determination: the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights dated 16th 
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December 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, & Cultural 
Rights also dated 16th December 1966, the Declaration of Vienna, the 
executive plan approved by the Global Conference on Human Rights dated 
25th June 1993, and the Declaration of the UN General Assembly on the 
principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
It must be explained that the 16th December 1996 decision of the United 
Nations (Article1, Paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), had the 
following wording: 
"All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. “505 
 
This principle was further developed in the Declaration of the United Nations 
General Assembly on the “Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations” of 24th October 1970: “By virtue of the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in 
accordance with the provisions of the charter. The establishment of a 
sovereign and independent state, the free association or integration with an 
306 
independent state or the emergence into any other political status, freely 
determined by a people, constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.”506 
 
Therefore, the Karabakh Armenians claimed that their independence 
originated from their right to self-determination and it was then legitimized 
according to the above-mentioned principles. For this reason, it demanded to 
be recognized as the NK Proclaimed Republic by the international 
community. NK rejects any attempts to restore the status quo ante and the 
extension of the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan over it. The leadership of the NKR 
believes that they won a military victory and the armed forces of Azerbaijan 
were defeated. And this fact must be taken into account when it comes to a 
solution of the question of its status, because there is no historical precedent 
for a victor accepting the dominance of the defeated country. In this view, the 
relation between NK and the Republic of Azerbaijan can only be of a 
horizontal character with certain modifications.  
 
On the other hand, the Azeri jurists claim that all international legal 
documents concerning the right of self-determination follow the article 
concerned with the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of 
countries. In other words, in international law and in the OSCE and UN 
principles, territorial integrity takes priority over the right of self-determination, 
and minorities are solely allowed an internal right to self-determination. Thus, 
Azerbaijan is ready to grant autonomy, with guarantees of security to the 
Armenian minority inhabiting Karabakh.507 
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According to the interpretation of Azeri jurists, there is a difference between 
the rights of "people" and the rights of "minorities" in international law. 
According to international norms, minorities have the right to determine their 
status inside the states they inhabit, but they should not take measures for its 
dismemberment. They are essentially Armenians of the same region, 
nationality and culture as those in the Republic of Armenia. Hence, they are a 
national minority – an “integral part”- of the society in which they live, and 
should be treated as such with respect to the applicable norms of 
international law. 
 
Thus, the Azeris have a right to self-determination with regard to effective 
participation in political, social, economic, cultural, religious, and public life in 
a manner which is neither threatening to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan 
nor its sovereignty.508 Hence, the Azeris believed the referendum was neither 
legitimate from the perspective of the existing norms of international law nor 
of the USSR Constitution. The referendum was held without the consent of 
the government of the sovereign state of Azerbaijan and was held solely on 
ethnic grounds without Azeri participation, and it was even argued after 
clearing many Azeris from the region.  
 
Therefore, to the international community, the ethnic basis mentioned in the 
principle of self-determination is not an authentic and sufficient principle for a 
declaration of independence. Moreover, this principle is not legitimate without 
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the consent of all sides in dispute, because in such a case the right of self-
determination discriminates against the other side.  
 
Thus, the measures taken by the Karabakh secessionists based on factors 
such as resorting to force, modifying the recognized borders of the Azerbaijan 
Republic and establishing the NK Republic are, in fact, a violation of 
international law, the principles of the OSCE, the CSCE and the UN 
guidelines among others. For example, the Helsinki Final Act of 1st August 
1975 constitutes a framework for self-determination concerning territorial limit. 
Principle VIII states: “The participating states will respect the equal rights of 
peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with 
the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the 
territorial integrity of states.”  
 
The commitments taken in this Document were fully reaffirmed later in the 
Charter of Paris (1990), the Lisbon Summit (1996) and in the Charter for 
European Security, adopted in the OSCE Istanbul Summit (1999). All of them 
argued that territorial integrity always prevails over self-determination. For 
instance, the Charter of Paris states that: "In accordance with our obligations 
under the Charter of the United Nations and commitments under the Helsinki 
Final Act, we renew our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or from 
acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles or purposes of 
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those documents. We recall that non-compliance with obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international law ". 
 
The Azeris point to some UN resolutions and international procedures that 
verify their own views. For example the General Assembly (GA) Resolution 
1514 (xv) and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, was the most important GA Resolution to associate 
the concepts of self-determination and decolonization, clearly stated in 
paragraph 6: “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations.”509 
 
Moreover, some believe that GA Resolution 1514 merely refers to the colonial 
countries,510 as in 1960 the General Assembly declared that: 
 
“Self-determination” applies to territories that are ethnically distinct and 
geographically separate form the country administrating them - that is 
colonies.511 Thus, national self-determination became a synonym for Western 
European decolonization in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.512 
 
Such logic also allows for the assertion that since there are virtually no more 
colonies, the importance of self-determination to people is gone. However, 
such an interpretation was rejected, as it would endanger the universality of 
the principle, as stated in paragraph 1 of the GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), self-
determination constitutes the fundamental right of all peoples. Nevertheless, 
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self-determination is dictated by territorial integrity, even in this document. 
Paragraph 7 of this resolution states:  
 
“Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as an authorizing or 
encouraging any action, which would dismember or impair, totally or in part 
the territorial integrity or political union of sovereign.”513 
 
In addition to the provisions mentioned above regarding territorial integrity 
and imposing limits on self-determination, it should also be noted that not 
every group of people has the right to self-determination. In absolutely all the 
legal documents mentioned above, this right is granted only to minorities who 
have been under colonies - not for internal minorities as such, the nature and 
character of the right to self-determination is at the core of tensions. 
Minorities based on common national, ethnic, linguistic rights have no right to 
determine their political status. 
 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates: 
“In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be deigned the right, in community with 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”514 
 
No right to self-determination is granted to minorities under the provisions of 
the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by GA Resolution 47/135 (Dec 
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18th 1992) either.515  Article 2 (1) of this declaration gives a slightly more 
precise definition of the rights of minorities: “Persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities (hereinafter minorities), have the right 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use 
their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or 
any form of discrimination.”  
 
There is no mention of self-determination in this document. Moreover, Article 
8, paragraph 4, of this declaration stresses: “Nothing in the present 
Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity and political independence of States.”  
 
The Azerbaijanis believe that the importance given to territorial integrity is 
evident not only in UN documents but also in regional resolutions and 
documents. Article 4 of the Helsinki Final Act stressed that this principle was 
very important. Also, in the Declaration of Vienna summit, 1993, the 
authorities of the members of Council of Europe committed themselves to 
supporting the rights of national minorities, within the structure of laws and 
respecting the right of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 516  The 
1991 Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities also 
declared that national minorities form “an integral part of the society of the 
State in which they live.”517 
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Such an approach to minorities has been reaffirmed in the practice of 
international institutions (UN, ICJ, OSCE etc.). for example in 1921, when 
solving the dispute over the territorial integrity of the Finns and the claim to 
self-determination by the Aland Islanders who were overwhelmingly Swedish, 
the Commission of Reporters appointed by the League of Nations concluded 
that the Aland Islanders, unlike the Finns, were not a “people”, but simply a 
‘minority’. Minorities, the Commission declared, could not be treated “in the 
same manner or on the same footing as people as a whole”, and in particular 
were not entitled to the right to self-determination.518 
 
The principle of territorial integrity clearly prevailed over the separatist desires 
of the Aland islanders. Hence, the Azerbaijan Republic declared its readiness 
to negotiate with the Armenians on using the Aland model to settle the NK 
conflict.519  Similarly, in accordance with the arguments of the Azerbaijani 
authorities, the Serbian attempt to choose self-determination is another 
example of procedures of international law being used to vindicate their 
opinions. This recently happened in 1991 with the formation of the Yugoslav 
conference. 
 
The Arbitration Commission of the assembly rejected the Serbian claim 
despite the fact that they comprised about one third of the population of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. However, the Commission held that “the 
Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia must be afforded 
every right accorded to minorities under international conventions as well as 
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national and international guarantees consistent with the principles of 
international law.520 
 
It should be mentioned that such a distinction between peoples and national 
minorities raises new problems. Since only peoples are entitled to self-
determination in contemporary international law, many ethnic groups, who are 
also minorities, also identify themselves as peoples and claim a right to self-
determination.521 Moreover if a people can be defined as a “nation”, then 
ethnic groups may be able to claim to be a people.522 
 
Such a definition would endanger the principle of territorial integrity and 
therefore, it is argued, peace and stability. That is why a number of limitations 
have been imposed on the degree of self-determination. First of all, the 
methods of obtaining independence via self-determination have been 
seriously restricted. International law establishes the following modes of 
implementation of self-determination: free association or integration with an 
independent state; or the development into other political status freely 
determined by a people. However international institutions and states refuse 
to recognize secession from an independent state as a means to achieving 
self-determination. The Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 
chose Opinion two i.e. self determination, over opinion one i.e the dissolution 
of SFRY when solving a complicated dispute with regard to self-determination 
claimed that the Serbian population in Bosnia and Croatia explicitly opted for 
the pre-eminence of territorial integrity over self-determination. Paragraph 1 
of the opinion clearly expressed this:       
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“It is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-
determination must not involve changes of existing frontiers at the time of 
independence except where the states concerned agree otherwise.”523 
 
Such treatment of self-determination describes the position of the majority of 
states willing to preserve their territorial integrity. Thus, as a rule, in the case 
of a dispute between the territorial integrity of independent states and the 
self-determination of people living in its territory, only the internal aspect of 
self-determination is applicable under the provisions of international law. 
Claims that the legal principle of self-determination supports the secession of 
parts of an existing state have also generally been rejected in international 
law.524 
 
With the single exception of Bangladesh, whose independence was due more 
to the Indian army than to the precepts of international law, no secessionist 
claim has been accepted by the international community since 1945.525 It was 
because of oppression, rather than the fact that the Bengalis were 
linguistically or culturally different and geographically distant from other 
Pakistanis, which ultimately justified the creation of Bangladesh under 
‘oppression theory.’526 
 
The clear parameters of oppression allowing secession from an independent 
state have yet to be clarified. It is plain, however, that those parameters 
extend far beyond the strict confines of paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
which emphasized the internal aspect of self-determination and disallowed 
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the infringement of territorial integrity. Therefore, the claims of ethnic groups 
to self-determination have generally been rejected. 
 
Azeri jurists are of the opinion that the limitations of both fundamental 
principles and particularly those of self-determination are viewed as the 
primary means to preserve peace and stability in the world. It can be said that 
they are essential to prevent it from splitting into numerous entities and at the 
same time to ensure basic rights and freedoms for every individual and 
group.527 
 
In brief, the Azeris believe that the Armenian’s insistence on achieving 
independence and  the right to self-determination, as well as their expression 
of baseless claims, have led to the perpetuation of a fragile situation and 
produced a deadlock. 
 
Yashar Aliyev, a Azerbaijani diplomat, argued in 1998 that with regard to 
Armenia's interpretation of the principle of “self-determination”, it should be 
noted that it only became outspoken about this issue after expelling 200,000 
Azerbaijanis from Armenia between 1988 and 1990, even though Armenia 
had been their home for centuries. Today, there are no Azerbaijanis in 
Armenia according to Aliev. As a result, Armenia has become essentially a 
mono-ethnic state with practically no ethnic minorities. Therefore, Armenia 
has no right whatsoever to press for the right of self-determination within 
another country, especially when it is pursuing unfounded territorial claims in 
that country - claims which have been endorsed “de jure” by the Armenian 
316 
parliament. Incidentally, for generations, it is argued that thousands of 
Azerbaijanis had lived in Armenia without enjoying any form of autonomy. 
The Armenian population of the NK region of Azerbaijan, on the other hand, 
enjoyed autonomy in the political, social and cultural spheres. It was a Soviet-
styled autonomy (although incomplete and imperfect), but nevertheless, an 
autonomy with freedom to use the Armenian language in the public sphere 
(for example, the region’s legislature), the educational sphere (Stepanakert 
Pedagogical Institute), and the cultural sphere (Stepanakert Drama Theatre) 
as well as in the media. Nevertheless, a legitimate desire of NK’s Armenians 
to improve all aspects of their lives and to strengthen their ties with Armenia 
is understandable and has been met with no resistance. However, according 
to Aliev, these aspirations do not entitle them to an independence justified by 
the right of external “self-determination”. In principle, the Armenian people 
have already exercised their right to self-determination. There is an 
independent state – the Republic of Armenia - which is a member of the UN 
and other international institutions - but has there ever been a single nation 
made up of two separate states? Secondly, is the Azerbaijani population of 
NK supposed to desist or are they to proceed with the same “logic” of self-
determination and create another Azerbaijani sector within an “independent 
NK”? Such an absurdity leads only to deadlock. Or is the right to self-
determination only available to the Armenians of NK?528       
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Conclusion 
 
After deliberating on the legal aspects of the NK conflict, we have reached the 
conclusion that international approaches to this problem do not meet the 
needs of the conflicting parties or satisfy them. In this respect, a number of 
factors have brought about such an understanding, some of which are rooted 
in international law and others in the special situation of the NK conflict. 
 
The most important element in the former is the existence of a certain 
ambivalence in the provisions of international law, especially regarding the 
right to self-determination for NK, which contains many ambiguities with 
respect to its principles and standards. For example, “Do Karabakh 
Armenians enjoy the visible aspect of the right to self-determination, what 
about the Azeris living in NK and can NK be counted as a colonial country?  
 
Although it is assumed that international law is a neutral source to guide and 
lead the settling of disputes between conflicting parties, most of the time there 
is an element of vagueness in the details of the provisions, the understanding 
of which requires arbitrators. In fact, this problem has a purpose: the basic 
logic of which necessitates that the removal of the ambiguities may not be 
desirable, because the final result should be in accordance with the wishes of 
the international community, or to be more precise, the superpowers. So the 
international community has always matched its legal views and political 
intentions with the concerns of its members. 
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As a result, the international-legal aspects should, one might think, make their 
own decisive contribution to the solution of the conflict. However, they, in their 
turn, come to form part of the conflict between two major principles: the right 
of nations to self-determination as against the principle of territorial integrity 
and the inviolability of the state’s borders. 
 
While Azerbaijan insists that the status of Karabakh should be 
accommodated within the framework of its own territorial integrity, the 
Armenians, addressing the principle of the right to self-determination, argue 
that the latter’s status should be defined from a clean sheet.529 
 
Highlighting the legal and legitimate structures of state, arranged through 
referenda and elections, and also addressing the discrimination during the 
Soviet rule, the Karabakh Armenians invoke the principle of the right to self-
determination and call for their legitimate and moral right to put it into effect. 
On the other hand, the Azeris declare their readiness to grant a high level of 
autonomy to the secessionists while insisting on preserving their territorial 
integrity. 
 
The Karabakh Armenians consider that secession from Azerbaijan is their 
legitimate right according to USSR law, while Azerbaijan relies on the idea 
that the United Nations, the OSCE and many other states have recognized 
the independence of the Azerbaijan Republic within the borders of the former 
Soviet Azerbaijan. Thus, the measures taken by Karabakh are in open 
violation of the principle of the inviolability of Azerbaijan’s internationally-
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recognized borders and its territorial integrity. Therefore, we are here witness 
to the clash of two views, and it is quite obvious that seasoned jurists must 
decide which of these has priority. Do the laws of a country which has 
disintegrated – the Soviet Union - prevail over international recognition or, 
given its collapse, should the international community replace all Soviet 
laws?530 
 
As a result, as long as this challenge and opposition exist between the two 
principles, the settlement of the conflict is doubtful. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, not only the ambiguity of the provisions of international law itself but 
also some ambiguities that are rooted in the dispute have caused its solutions 
to be ineffective. Thus, in the NK conflict, both sides challenge each other’s 
values. 
 
Many scholars believe that in the question of values, negotiation on the basis 
of compromise is an improbable event. 531  Thus, the resolution of the 
confrontation is highly unlikely because of failing to rely on the suggestions 
proposed by international law or on compromise, and it seems that the only 
answer is on the basis of a political programme of policy decisions. 
 
In a speech at the conference held in Yerevan on 25 April 2002, focusing on 
preparing the ground to establish peace in the Caucasus, Vladimir Kazimirov, 
the Russian former representative in the Minsk group stated: “I have always 
notified the parties in dispute that God has forbidden you from examining the 
legalities. This route will lead to a deadlock. The solution must be discovered 
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only in the political sphere. Whether you like it or not, the NK struggle is 
political rather than simply legal.”532 
 
It should be mentioned that in the new world order, some scholars do not 
believe in the purity and inviolability of borders as they did in the Cold War 
era, something that was necessary for global peace. But in today’s new 
international order, "unalterable borders" are considered a questionable 
issue, and it is advisable that a more flexible policy should be taken according 
to the needs of the times.533  
 
On the contrary, other jurists consider the principle of territorial integrity and 
the inviolability of borders as the most important means of preserving peace 
and stability in the world and stress their priority, which has been specified in 
the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United 
Nations.534 
 
Undoubtedly, such differences and contradictory interpretations over the two 
concepts of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, on the one 
hand, and the insistence on either of the principles by the opposing parties, 
finally drew certain scholars, particularly Vladimir Kazimirov, to advocate 
merely political solutions. 
 
It seems that the working out of the NK conflict depends more on the 
influence of the principal powers in the region, particularly the United States 
and Russia, as opposed to the antagonists. In this regard, the viewpoints of 
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other regional powers like Iran and Turkey are important too. Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, until the power struggle is finally resolved and the rivalry 
and sphere of influence of the leading powers has been clarified, there can be 
little expectation of a settlement of the quarrel.   
 
Also, by relying on the existing principles of international law, a settlement of 
the NK struggle is very doubtful, and considering the ambiguities of the legal 
articles, the jurists have not been able to come up with a legal formula to 
settle the dispute. This is why the principle of territorial integrity seems to 
prevail over that of the right of self-determination and why statesmen, fearing 
the disintegration of their country, give it great support.  
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Chapter 8: Prospects of the Last Socio-Political Atmosphere 
in Azerbaijan and Armenia 
 
Introduction 
 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989, Azerbaijan gained 
independence in December 1991. President Mutalebov was forced to resign 
after Khojaley city in NK territory was occupied by the Armenians in 
March1992. The new presidential election was held in Azerbaijan in June of 
the same year and brought to power the Azerbaijani popular front and its 
leader Abulfaz Elcibey, whose policy was to oppose Russia and Iran and 
strengthen relations with Turkey. In his campaign he promised that he would 
protect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and resolve the conflict. His period 
of office was pro-Turkish and pan-Turkish as well as anti-Iranian and anti-
Russian. Defeat in combat resulted in the termination of his rule in June 
1993.His government was unseated through a coup which was organized by 
an army colonel, Surat Huseinov. The latter surrendered his position to 
Heidar Aliev, who was a communist party chief in the 1970s and a Politburo 
member who became President in October 1993. In March 1994 he 
concluded a ceasefire with Armenia. Currently, Azerbaijan has mainly two 
political groups; the first is the government consisting of the New Azerbaijani 
party and a number of small formations. Secondly, there is the opposition 
which is made up mainly of four parties: the Democrats, the Popular front, the 
Musavat and the ANIP. 
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The Armenians are nationalistic people and the Armenian diaspora, who live 
in different parts of the world, particularly in the US, Russia, France, Greece, 
Iran and Canada, have large lobbies in these countries. Leon Ter Petrosian 
was an important figure on the Karabakh committee and in the Armenian 
National Movement. In the first parliamentary election held in May 1990, he 
was elected speaker and in 1991, with his pro-market vision, realistic view of 
foreign relations, the Armenian genocide (by Ottoman Turks during the First 
World War) and his aim of resolving the NK conflict. He was then elected the 
first Armenian President, a position which allows him to wield unlimited power 
where he is able to dismiss the Prime Minister, dissolve parliament and 
appoint the head of the constitutional court.  
 
With regard to his domestic policies, Ter Petrosian banned the Dashnaksiun 
party in December 1994 and ordered the arrest of Hovanesian and many 
other members. He also expelled Markarian as the leader of the party. He 
also ordered the banning of Yergir the largest daily newspaper in Armenia 
which was owned by the Dashnaksiun party and was founded in 1890. Its 
ideology was heavily nationalist as it wished for a united Armenia. It became 
the most active political party in Armenia after independence and opened an 
office in NK which advocated its independence, and as they were already well 
represented among the Armenian diaspora, they played a significant role in 
aiding NK.  
 
Robert Kocharian replaced Ter Petrosian, after he resigned over opposition to 
his efforts to find a compromise over the conflict Robert Kocharian replaced 
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him after he was elected President in 1998 with the support of the 
Dashnakhsiun party. In addition, this party won many seats in parliament and 
a few of its members were allocated ministerial positions in the cabinet. With 
regard to his international policy, Kocharian signed a military agreement with 
Russia in 1992. 
 
In the first part of this chapter I consider the sociopolitical atmosphere in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia I also discuss the way in which the conflict 
influenced the internal and domestic politics in both nations. Understanding 
public opinion and the domestic politics of the opposing parties as one the 
key factors in this conflict would make any proposal more realistic, hence 
their inclusion in this chapter. 
 
In the second part, the preferred solutions of the warring parties are 
discussed, based on the latest developments of the official authorities in 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and NK. The aim is to gather all the solutions and 
explore the views of each party regarding them, as all those involved in the 
conflict have their own solution to the dispute. Furthermore in this chapter, I 
review the solutions suggested by international mediators and organisations, 
including the “more than autonomy not a state” concept, the exchange of 
territories idea, the Associated State recommendation, the Cyprus model, the 
Chechen variant, the Common State and Tatarestan models as well as the 
proposal of the Trans-Caucasian Confederation.  
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The Conflict & the Sociopolitical Atmosphere in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan & NK  
 
In this part, brief information about the positions of influential political forces 
and movements towards the NK conflict in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and NK are 
presented. Thus, we will become familiar with the sociopolitical atmosphere of 
the three societies: Azerbaijan, Armenia and Karabakh. 
 
The conflict and the positions of the political forces in the Republic of 
Armenia  
 
Generally, three kinds of stance are observed among influential political 
forces in Armenia regarding the settlement of NK:  
 
 Supporters of the independence or the integration of NK into Armenia 
 
These are the overwhelming majority of the right and left-centrist forces of 
Armenia. The ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), (Which is in power 
currently, August 2009) the ARF (Dashnaktsutyun), the People's Party of 
Armenia, the National Democratic Party, Ajam, the "Constitutional Rights" 
Union, the "Law-Based State” party and others, the members of which make 
up the overwhelming majority of deputies in the Armenian parliament. These 
groups enjoy the support of between 75 to 80 per cent of Armenian 
citizens.535 
 
326 
The supporters of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict by Armenia and 
NK joining the Belarus-Russian Union.  
 
Members of this group included the CPA, APIRBA, the majority of parties and 
organizations forming the broad coalition of socialist powers in Armenia. In 
spite of collecting about one million signatures in 1995, and because of the 
opposition of the right-centrist parties which have always been the ruling 
party, the organization gradually lost its position and its advocates, so that 
they have less than ten per cent of the advocators at the present time.536 
 
The supporters of concessions to Azerbaijan 
 
The Armenian National Movement (ANM) - the ruling party in the reign of 
Leon Ter Petrosian, the ex-President of Armenia, is a member of this group. 
In fact, the opponents of Ter Petrosian accused him of compromise on the 
"Karabakh aim" Leading to him and his colleagues being forced to abdicate 
power. It should be mentioned that the Armenian National Movement (ANM) 
only agreed with the proposed Step-by-Step peace plan to commence the 
peace talks (handing over of the occupied territories, returning the refugees in 
the first phase, and determining the political status of the NK in the second 
phase). But the opponents of the ex-President believed that if the occupied 
territories, which guarantee the security of Karabakh, were surrendered, 
Azerbaijan would certainly not agree with Karabakh independence. Hence, 
they considered accepting the Step-by-Step approach of the ANM, that is, a 
compromise with Azerbaijan over the “Karabakh Ideal.”537 
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In Armenia, the Nor Oghi (New Way) party also agrees with handing over NK 
to Azerbaijan, despite having a limited number of members.) The "New Way" 
party, even in 1993 emphasized the need to surrender NK to Azerbaijan.538 
 
Generally, the final assessment of the sociopolitical attitude towards 
Karabakh indicates that during the past few years, people’s support for the 
pro-Karabakh policies of the Armenian authorities have diminished for a 
variety of reasons. The most important of which is related a negative effect on 
the local and foreign economies of Armenia, and on the people.  
 
It seems that the Armenian people have become less concerned about the 
future of Karabakh compared to earlier years. The majority of Armenian 
political forces and people are in favour of either Karabakh independence or 
integration into Armenia, because in spite of the opposition of some political 
forces and the Armenian President, it is unlikely that they would support any 
plan whereby NK would be integrated into Azerbaijan. In fact, this claim was 
confirmed in April 2001 through the opposition of parliamentary factions 
against solutions that predicted Karabakh’s abrupt following of Azerbaijan. 
 
Taking into account the fact that 2002 – 2003 were the years of preparation 
for the next Presidential elections in Armenia and NK, many political forces 
adopted radical stands in the question of the settlement of the conflict. An 
obvious example of this tendency was the emergence of a prominent 
movement that opposed the return of the Azeri occupied territories around NK 
even after the reaching of a political settlement. Their slogan suggested that 
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these territories should not be called "occupied" but rather "liberated” 
territories. As one of the leaders of this movement stated recently, "Our 
concession to Azerbaijan is the fact that at its request in 1994 we stopped our 
advance, otherwise that state would have collapsed. No concession must be 
made to Azerbaijan."539  
 
The expression of such views in Azerbaijan, especially in situations where 
militarism is sometimes advocated as a means of settling the conflict, means 
it has a direct influence in intensifying the sociopolitical climate of Armenia to 
the benefit of Karabakh.  
 
The conflict & the positions of NK political forces 
 
All the political forces in this non-recognised state (including the pro-power 
coalition, the CP and ARF (D)) are in favour of the independence of NK or its 
reunification with Armenia 
 
Despite the many varying viewpoints regarding the conflict, all the political 
forces and movements are in full agreement with their statesmen. Their real 
goal is nothing short of independence and integration with Armenia, as can 
be deduced from their opposition to any proposal that put Karabakh under the 
control of Azerbaijan or any policy based on having horizontal relations with 
that state. Of course the Karabakhi political forces are more radical than the 
statesmen and they openly express their political goals.540   
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The conflict & the positions of the political forces in the Republic of 
Azerbaijan 
 
In 2001, the various factions in Azerbaijan created a document for the 
settlement of the NK conflict, called the "Charter of the Four", which was 
signed by the leaders of the main political parties, religious leaders and 
representatives of the intelligentsia.541 This was delivered to the co-chairmen 
of the Minsk Group and sent to international organizations by the President of 
Azerbaijan. It embodies Azerbaijan's opinions and positions regarding the 
resolution of the conflict. The charter assumes that the disagreement 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia can only be settled stage-by-stage and with 
the consistent observance of the following four principles: 
 
1. All occupied lands must be cleared and the territorial integrity of the state 
restored. 
2. Refugees and those forced to resettle elsewhere, including Shusha and 
other settlements in NK, must return to their homes, and the security of 
their lives must be guaranteed. 
3. NK can be granted the right of self-government, but the powers 
implementing the sovereignty of the state must be left to the supreme 
organs of power in Azerbaijan. 
4. If the settlement of the conflict by peaceful methods turns out to be 
impossible, Azerbaijan, in accordance with the UN Charter and certain 
resolutions of the Security Council, must banish the aggressors, using 
force.542  
 
330 
Although some groups like the Social-Democratic Party and the Institution of 
Peace and Democracy under the leadership of Leyla Yunosov presented a 
strategy opposed to the Charter,543 on the whole the positions of the majority 
of Azerbaijan's political movements were favourable to it. 
 
Mechanism for the Settlement of the Conflict According to the 
Desired Solutions of the Conflicting Parties 
 
It is quite reasonable that each of the contending parties should have their 
own solution to the final determination of the NK quarrel. Because being 
informed of the desired outcomes and solutions will make us familiar with the 
crux of the problem and enable us to analyze the proposed solutions up to 
the present, in this part we briefly review the methods of conflict resolution 
based on the final positions of the rival parties. 
 
As the views of NK Azeris have a great influence on the policies and positions 
of the Azerbaijani authorities, their ideas will be separately reviewed in a 
section dedicated to that purpose. 
 
 
The Position of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Azerbaijan insists on the fact that the conflict stemmed from the military 
offensive initiated by the Armenians against Azerbaijan with the aim of seizing 
and uniting part of its territory to Armenia. As a result of this aggression, 
Armenia appropriated territories outside the borders of NK and hundreds of 
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thousands of inhabitants from six regions of Azerbaijan became refugees. 
Azerbaijan demands, as initial measures, the withdrawal of Armenian military 
formations from the occupied territories as well as a return of refugees to their 
homes. It is also ready to grant NK the highest status of self-government 
within the structure of the Azeri state, the form and the degree of which are 
not specified and must be worked out in the course of negotiations. Of 
course, Azerbaijan’s position is that NK would enjoy self-rule but play no role 
in foreign affairs, defence or nation-level taxation.544  
 
The main point, according to this position, is the maintenance of the 
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and its recognition within the borders of the 
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The Azerbaijan Republic believes such 
a position (i.e. the existence of the unrecognized NK Republic) to be entirely 
the result of aggression on the part of Armenia. 
 
The Position of the Azeris of NK 
 
The position of the Azeris of NK is rarely voiced but its official version on the 
whole coincides with that of the leaders of Azerbaijan. The Organization for 
the Freedom of Karabakh (OFK)’s viewpoint on the solution to the conflict 
consists of a demand for the military forces to quit the occupied lands as soon 
as possible and also the return of refugees to the places of their former 
habitation After leaving the occupied territories, discussions must start for the 
achieving of a stable peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, concerning the 
possibility of the formation of structures of self-government on the territory of 
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Azerbaijan for the Armenian population of that Republic and in the territory of 
Armenia for the Azeri population, driven out by the former. This would require 
bringing to the table the resources of international organizations including the 
UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as forums of civic diplomacy 
and human rights organizations.  
 
The OFK presumes that the main principle of the structures - securing the 
peaceful co-existence of Azeri and Armenian populations in the territories of 
the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia - must include the 
following: a complete correspondence of the statuses of administrative rights 
and powers of the structures formed in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The OFK 
believes that a stable peace in the region is possible only if the conflict finds a 
just solution. The two communities will be able to live in a stable, just and 
flourishing world only if there is neither victor nor vanquished, if nobody is 
able to profit from the results of ethnic purges and aggression.545  
 
The Position of the Authorities of NK 
 
There is an acknowledgement of NK's right to self-determination, going as far 
as the formation of an independent state. The leadership of NK gives priority 
to the question of status in its approach to finding a solution. In short, it 
believes that according to all the clauses of international law, the Republic of 
NK must be recognized as a lawfully-formed independent state. NK rejects 
any attempts to restore the status quo ante and an extension of the 
jurisdiction of Azerbaijan over it. The leadership of the NKR believes that they 
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won a military victory and the armed forces of Azerbaijan were defeated. And 
this fact must be taken into account when it comes to a solution to the 
question of status, because there is no historical precedent for a victor 
accepting the dominance of the defeated. The relations between NK and the 
Azerbaijan Republic can only be of a horizontal character with certain 
modifications. Therefore the minimal solution that the Karabakh Armenians 
are ready to accept is a form of union, confederation or federation which 
would guarantee Armenia and NK unrestricted contact opportunities.546 
 
Also, the authorities of Stepanakert believe that the army is responsible for 
securing the independence of NK and guaranteeing the security of Karabakh 
Armenians. They therefore lay stress on maintaining it. 
 
The declaration of the NKR as an independent republic means that its 
integration into Armenia is not on the agenda. It is said that the NKR does not 
hide the fact that its eventual goal is integration with Armenia. The matter of 
the return of territory occupied by the Army of Karabakh must be tied to the 
question of status, that is, according to the formula, "land in exchange for 
status."547 
 
The Position of the Republic of Armenia  
 
During the sovereignty of the USSR, the Armenian authorities petitioned 
several times for the integration of Karabakh with Armenia and it is quite 
reasonable that such an approach as a solution does not need to be 
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interpreted further. However, after the USSR’s collapse, the Armenian 
authorities declined to present their preferred solution for a variety of reasons. 
Yerevan has officially announced that the present stance of the Republic of 
Armenia is as follows: it consents to any kind of settlement of the Karabakh 
problem, which is acceptable to the Armenians of NK, and the same goes for 
the question of status. Proceeding from this, the leadership of the Republic of 
Armenia does not demand or insist on uniting NK with the Republic of 
Armenia. Therefore, the December 1989 resolutions of the Republic of 
Armenia and the NK parliaments regarding the integration of NK and Armenia 
remain on paper only. This, together with the fact that Armenia does not 
officially recognize the independence of NKR is intended to ease the 
situation, to provide room for manoeuvre and to leave them a loop-hole for 
political negotiation.548 
 
Proposed Solutions & Plans up the Present 
 
In this part, our aim is to collect all the solutions that have been proposed 
regarding the NK conflict and become familiar with the political solutions 
envisaged for the NK dispute and the position of the conflicting parties 
towards each solution. 
 
More Than Autonomy But Not a State 
 
Amongst the attempts to find an acceptable solution to the NK conflict were 
schemes which may be provisionally described as: "more than autonomy but 
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not a state" – a solution used in Aland. Thus, it can probably be used as a 
model for Karabakh. The Azerbaijani authorities consider it as the most 
acceptable solution to the NK conflict.549  
 
The Alands is an archipelago of 8,000 islets, situated in the Baltic Sea. The 
population have spoken Swedish from time immemorial and up until 1808 
existed within the structure of the Swedish Kingdom. At that time both Norway 
and Finland were parts of Sweden. As an outcome of the 1808-1809 war 
Sweden had to surrender Finland and hand over the Alands to Russia. After 
its defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, Russia had to recognize the Alands as 
a de-militarized zone. At the beginning of the 20th century a national 
referendum was held and Norway peacefully seceded from Sweden. 
 
In 1917, Russia recognized the independence of Finland. At that time the 
Swedish population of the Alands expressed their desire to re-unite with their 
ancient motherland and sent the king of Sweden a petition signed by the 
entire adult population of the archipelago. In December 1917 Finland 
opposed the wishes of the Aland population and suggested that the terms of 
self-determination should be coordinated with it. The islanders rejected these 
suggestions. A conflict was brewing but neither side resorted to arms.  In 
1921 the League of Nations passed a resolution: the Aland Islands were 
declared a neutral and de-militarized territory of Finland. According to this 
ruling Finland was given the responsibility for ensuring the maintenance of 
the Swedish language, customs and traditions and the development of 
Swedish culture for the population of the islands.  
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Sweden and Finland concluded a Treaty in which the population of the 
Alands received the right to maintain their language, culture and institutions. 
As a result, the threat of assimilation vanished. Sweden obtained guarantees 
regarding the security of the Swedish population of the islands and the right 
to unhindered association. According to the Law of 1922 on self-government, 
the local parliament (Lagting) was entitled to adopt laws on the internal affairs 
of the islands and on the budget. In accordance with the Constitution, the 
laws on self-government can be amended by the Parliament of Finland only 
with the consent of the Lagting of the Alands.  
 
The law-making powers of the Lagting are defined in the following spheres: 
education and culture; the health service; economy; transport; communal 
economy; police; post-office; and radio and television. In these domains the 
Alands have the powers of a sovereign state. All the remaining legal powers 
are the prerogative of Finland such as foreign policy; the majority of the civil 
code; court and criminal law; customs and money circulation. To defend the 
interests of the Aland population one deputy from the archipelago is elected 
to the Parliament of Finland. With the consent of the Lagting the President of 
Finland may appoint the governor of the islands. 
 
The powers of the governor are to head the Council of the representatives of 
the islands (which is organized on an equal footing) and to open and close 
sessions of the Lagting. Economic relations are set out in the following way: 
the government of Finland levies taxes collects customs and other imposts on 
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the islands in the same way as it does throughout the country. The expenses 
on the archipelago are covered from the state budget. The archipelago 
receives a proportion of state income after the deduction of a part of it to pay 
off state debt. It is left to the Lagting to decide how to distribute the rest 
according to its budget. The laws adopted by the Lagting are sent to the 
President of Finland who has the right of veto. This veto can be exercised in 
two instances: if the Parliament of the islands should exceed its powers or the 
adopted law represents a threat to the internal and external security of 
Finland.  
 
The right to live on the islands is equivalent to the right to citizenship. Every 
child born on the islands has that right on condition that one of its parents is a 
citizen of the Alands. Alanders are also citizens of Finland. The right of Aland 
citizenship is granted to any citizen of Finland who has moved to the 
archipelago and has lived there for five years on condition that they have 
knowledge of the Swedish language. Restrictions on the ownership of real 
estate are accounted for by a wish to secure the lands for Alanders. A citizen 
of the Alands is exempted from serving in the Finnish Army. It is forbidden to 
garrison troops and build fortifications on the islands. The Alanders may 
directly cooperate with Scandinavian countries. The government of the 
Alands also takes part in the work of the Council of Ministers of the 
Scandinavian countries. Foreign policy is the prerogative of the government 
of Finland and the Finnish Parliament. But if Finland signs an international 
treaty that affects the internal affairs of the Alands then the implementation of 
the treaty should be coordinated with the Lagting.550 
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International intermediaries proposed the Aland model as a possible solution 
to the conflict. On 21st to 22nd December 1993, on the initiative of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the RF and Finland and the CIS Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly, a symposium of Azeri, Armenian and NK 
parliamentarians was held on the Aland Islands at which the details of the 
model were presented. While some Azerbaijani official authorities showed 
partiality towards the Aland model,551 it was rejected by the authorities of NK 
as one "which does not take into account the historical foundations and 
psychological consequences of the Karabakh-Azeri conflict and of the war 
fought de facto for independence from the Azerbaijan Republic". Besides, 
according to the firm conviction of the Armenian side, the Aland model was 
not applicable to the conditions of the South Caucasus, because the question 
of the status of the archipelago in the 1920s did not constitute a single 
problem. It was solved in the framework of a general issue, the so-called 
"Sweden problem" in Finland. The Swedes were able to balance their rights 
not only in the Alands, but also throughout Finland as a whole, where the 
Swedish language is the second state language.552  
 
It is noteworthy that in late 2004, the National Committee of the Azerbaijani 
Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, together with the Finnish ambassador to the 
South Caucasus, prepared a plan called the "Aland model" to settle the NK 
conflict. Also, on the initiative of this committee and under the supervision of 
the Finnish government and the Alands Peace Institution, a delegation 
consisting of the members of the committee, the representatives of the 
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government and the parliament, the Organization for the Freedom of 
Karabakh, journalists and Karabakh Azeris and Armenian communities, paid 
a visit to Finland.553  
 
It should be mentioned that in reaction to this proposal, the Karabakhi 
authorities declared that they and Yerevan disagreed with the Alands model 
for the settlement of the conflict. Simultaneously, the Russian representative 
of the Minsk Group disliked the idea of using the Alands model..In the middle 
of the 1990s the Finland-Sweden model for the resolution of the dispute was 
debated but it came to nothing. Thus, at the present time the mediators face 
serious problems, as they should not resume talks about a solution which had 
been rejected by two out of the three parties in the conflict.554 According to 
the Eco newspaper, this proposal was discussed and analyzed by the Azeri 
and Armenian representatives as well as the envoys of Alfred Motzar-
Fredrikh Ebert, at a meeting in Brussels on 25th September 2001.555 
 
This is not the only example of a proposal based on the principle of "more 
autonomy but not a state." Many statesmen and experts suggested such a 
way out as an opportunity for both sides to withdraw from the conflict with 
dignity and minimal losses to their security and self-respect (which is also 
important). Another such example was presented by the American 
researchers D. Laitin and R.Suny.556 They argue: 
 Karabakh de jure must remain within the structure of Azerbaijan to 
conform with the principle of the territorial integrity of a state and the 
inadmissibility of unilaterally-forced changes to borders. The symbolic 
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sovereignty of Azerbaijan over Karabakh could be represented by the 
Azeri flag waving over the Government building in Karabakh and by the 
appointment of an Azeri representative there, who would have to be 
approved by the Karabakh government. The formal aspect of sovereignty 
implies the fact that Azerbaijan would represent Karabakh in the United 
Nations and other international organisations.  
 The citizens of Karabakh must have proportional representation in the 
Azerbaijani Parliament in Baku. The Karabakh representatives in the 
Azerbaijani Parliament must have the power to stop any proposed law, 
which directly concerns Karabakh.  
 The establishment of full self-government for the Republic of Karabakh, 
within the borders of the Azerbaijan Republic, presupposes the formation 
of their own Parliament with proportional representation, the right of veto 
on the resolutions of Azerbaijan concerning this republic, sovereign rights 
of its government in the matters of security, education, culture and 
investments in infrastructure.  
 The absence of units of the armed forces and police on each other's 
territory without mutual consent.  
 The Armenians and Azeris living in Karabakh would have the right to dual 
citizenship or full citizenship in either republic with the right to permanent 
domicile in Karabakh.  
Summing up the above, it should be noted that the options of the type "more 
than autonomy but not a state", "associated state" and "common state” often 
have interrelated characteristics that are difficult to clearly differentiate. 
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Exchange of Territories 
 
As far back as 1988 a group of lawyers, headed by Andrei Sakharov, 
proposed a variant of "separating Armenians and Azeris” as the basis of a 
solution, but at the time, this variation failed to generate much discussion. 
The first developed plan for such an alternative was proposed by American 
academic Paul Goble, who believed that Azerbaijan and Armenia are unable 
to solve this problem themselves. He also added that no single solution is 
possible, if the sides try to return to the status quo ante, i.e. to the situation 
existing before the start of the current struggle in 1988.557  
 
Now the situation has changed and it dictates the need to find a new 
approach to the NK conflict. Goble thinks that "in principle there are three 
ways ‘to solve’ the NK problem: (i) to oust or kill all Armenians living there 
now; (ii) to mobilize a great number of foreign forces to move these sides 
apart or (iii) to keep the NKAR Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan, which was 
the status of NK during the Soviet Rule. It can be said that its realization is 
impossible for several reasons: the first option because of moral 
considerations, the second because it is not physically possible, and the "third 
is impossible because in that case Azerbaijan would become the side unfairly 
treated both by losing its territory and in the question of a water supply for 
Baku". Therefore, he sees the key to the solution of the problem in the 
exchange of territories, including the following terms: Firstly, handing over 
part of NK to Armenia together with the areas where rivers flowing in the 
direction of Azerbaijan rise. Secondly, handing over the Armenian territory, 
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located between the Azerbaijan Republic and Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan’s 
control.  
 
Evidently, Goble understood that if this choice was implemented, Armenia 
would find itself in a difficult situation because it would lose its connection with 
Iran, something which is vitally important for Armenia. This is why in 1996 he 
brought in some amendments to his plan. In particular, he proposed to form a 
corridor through the southern Meghri region of Armenia to Iran, where some 
international forces would be stationed. Goble later suggested handing over a 
part of the NKAR to Armenia in exchange for a piece of Armenian territory, 
namely the Meghri region, to Azerbaijan. This would enable Azerbaijan to 
have an immediate border with Nakhchivan.558 
 
For a variety of reasons, Goble's plan did not enjoy the support of Armenia or 
NK. It is important, however, to note that, according to information from media 
and opposition figures in Armenia, some variant of the territorial exchange 
like the one proposed by Goble was seriously considered during talks 
between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2000-2001. During 
direct meetings in Paris, and Key West in the United States, both Presidents 
had discussed territorial exchange and handing over the corridor under 
international observation and security.559 
 
As mentioned before, because of the firm opposition of Azerbaijani political 
forces, after returning to his country, Aliev abandoned the negotiations and 
reached a final agreement on the Paris and Key West principles. In Armenia 
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too, the pressure of the opposition and their objection to handing over Meghri 
to Azerbaijan finally led to the breaking off of negotiations in this regard.560 
 
 Associated State 
 
Statesmen and political scientists often pay great attention to the concept of 
the associated state, as an alternative solution for ethno-political conflicts, 
including the NK dispute. They usually refer to the resolutions and 
pronouncements of the UN, in particular to resolution 2625, adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1970: the "Declaration on the Principles of International 
Law Pertaining to Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States". This 
declaration admits three forms of realisation for the right of self-determination: 
formation of a new state; association with an already existing independent 
state or the status of a different level provided it is approved by the free will of 
a given people. In the present case the variant of free association with an 
independent state is of some interest. This version is not only a political 
concept but is already realised in practice. The islands of Cook and Near at 
present enjoy associated statehood with New Zealand, while Puerto Rico, the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia have associated 
statehood with the USA. The last two - the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
and the Federated States of Micronesia - even became members of the UN in 
1990. Oskanyan, the Armenian Foreign Minister, has doubtlessly mentioned 
these solutions and announced the readiness of Armenia to examine 
solutions like common state, free dependence, and integrated states.561. 
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John Maresca, the former special representative of US negotiations on NK, 
worked out and presented a plan for a political solution on 1st July 1994. His 
proposition consists of eight chapters, the first of which is "The Status of NK”. 
It should be noted that Nagorno Karabkh was to be called the Nagorno 
Karabakh Republic and be a completely self-governed legal formation within 
the sovereign state of Azerbaijan and associated with it." 562  Maresca 
proposed to adopt a Main Law regarding the status of the NKR, where its 
clauses would bring about the associated integration of the NKR with 
Azerbaijan. It was suggested that representative offices should be set up in 
Stepanakert and Baku and that the NKR could have permanent 
representatives in the capitals of countries considered to be of special 
importance such as Yerevan and Moscow, and receive corresponding 
representatives from those countries. But the "NKR must not be recognised 
as a sovereign independent state" According to Maresca's plan, "The armed 
forces of the NKR must be gradually scaled down.563 
 
The NKR must be entitled to local security forces, including self-defence 
forces, but must not have weapons of an offensive character. Azerbaijan 
would also gain the right to station local security forces in the NKR but it could 
not locate weapons of an offensive character in or near the NKR. There are 
some clauses in Maresca's proposal about Armenia’s right to maintain transit 
links with the NKR through the Lachin corridor, and Azerbaijan’s right to do 
the same with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. There are also articles 
about the return of refugees to the places of their former residence, about 
making the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic, including NK 
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and Nakhchivan, a free trade zone, about the convening of a conference of 
donors for financial support of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of 
Armenia, including NK and Nakhchivan, etc. And finally, Maresca proposes 
that the OSCE and UN Security Council should become guarantors for 
implementing the terms of this document.564  
 
The option of an associated state, though it stops short of unconditional 
integration to the laws and jurisdiction of Azerbaijan, is nevertheless based on 
the principle of non-recognition of the independence of the NKR and regards 
it as part of the Azerbaijan Republic, retaining the NKR’s vertical 
subordination to Azerbaijan. For the Armenian side, this absolutely fails to 
correspond to the internationally-acknowledged idea of an "associated state". 
In the NK leadership's opinion, relations with the Azerbaijan Republic must be 
founded on the principle of complete equality, ruling out any vertical 
connections. Among the alternatives to this option can be included the so-
called "synthetic variant", put forward in the mid 1990s by the director of the 
USA’s National Institute of Democracy, ambassador Nelson Ledski.565 In his 
opinion, NK must become a virtual part of Armenia, although possibly, it 
should be connected in some form with the Azerbaijan Republic. "There's no 
doubt,” Ledski says, “that the Armenians were a success in this war. And the 
Azeri side must acknowledge that it lost something”. It would be pertinent 
here to recall, that, according to the Azeris, the constant reference of western 
analysts to the "military successes" and "results of war" represent a 
concealed hint that a "military solution" to the Karabakh problem is the only 
possible one. 
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It is easy to see that this permutation is close enough to the notion of the 
Common State Solution which was proposed by the co-chairman of the Minsk 
Group in December 1998. This chapter will now assess this variant by looking 
at the so-called "psychology of apprehension" of the opponents. 
 
There is no doubt that NK has a de facto chance to exist as an independent 
state, with the retention of some political symbols, while formally remaining 
within the structure of Azerbaijan. But the Armenians are afraid of such a 
prospect, firstly, because if Azerbaijan’s military-economic strength increases 
and its international position stabilises, it could take advantage of its legal 
right of sovereignty and cancel the de facto independence of NK. The 
absence of an absolute guarantee makes NK afraid of even the symbolic 
attribute of NK belonging to Azerbaijan. The other reason is the dynamics of 
the demographic and migration processes in Azerbaijan, capable, in the 
opinion of the Armenians, of leading to a repetition of the Nakhichevan 
scenario, where the Azeris, by weight of numbers, allegedly ousted the 
Armenian population.” 
 
Since the Armenian authorities insist on the stipulation of the “results of war” 
in future conflict resolution, the proposed subordination of NK to the 
jurisdiction of Azerbaijan will inevitably face the resistance of the Armenians 
of NK and Armenia. Officials state that “after those victories, the people 
themselves will never allow it". The stance of the Azeri side is conditional, 
firstly by the firm conviction that upper and lower Karabakh constitute an 
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inseparable entity with other parts of the republic. Secondly, the belief that the 
systems and principles of international law (inviolability of borders, recognition 
of the Azerbaijan Republic by the UN and other international organisations 
within its factual borders etc.) support Azerbaijan and giving up these 
advantages would be preposterous. Thirdly, the Azeri side holds that the 
prospect for strengthening state power and, as a consequence, the possibility 
of revenge cannot be ruled out. Fourth, international law is inclined, especially 
of late, to accept precedents, which subsequently become the norm and take 
on a permanent character. Thus a “domino” effect will come into play: if 
Azerbaijan makes one concession, it will set a dangerous precedent perhaps 
leading to the secession of NK. One example of this cited by the Azeri side is 
the allowing of the NK Armenians as a party to the negotiations, which, 
according to the “domino” principle, is a step on the way to recognition of 
NK's independence.566 
 
The Cyprus Model 
 
The so-called Cyprus variant often emerges in discussions of ways to settle 
the Karabakh conflict and the status of NK. The basic idea of the Cyprus 
Model consists in the fact that this one, namely the Turkish republic of 
Northern Cyprus is not officially recognised by anybody, but exists and 
functions de facto.567 The Cyprus model as applicable to NK will mean: not 
recognising it de jure, but consent to its existence de facto. It means that NK 
will not be part and parcel of Azerbaijan or Armenia, it will not be officially 
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recognised as an independent state or a member of the international 
community, but will exist and function as an independent state. 
 
The Cyprus Model, in the opinion of the Armenians, is a compromise solution. 
It may allow the sides to reconcile themselves to the existing state of affairs 
without hurting the national dignity of any group involved in the dispute. It will 
relax the situation, create breathing space and in future will encourage a 
broader approach to the solution of the problem. On the other hand, it will 
promote the normalisation of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
However, this suggestion fails to recognise the territorial character of the 
struggle.568 It is noteworthy that such a model, in the opinion of the Azeri side, 
has already been working for the past decade but has not lived up to 
anybody's expectations.569 
 
The Chechen Variant 
 
Right after the conclusion of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 between the 
leadership of the Russian Federation and Chechnya there appeared one 
more option for a resolution of the NK conflict, called the Chechen Variant. 
After a long and bloody war the Russian Federation and Chechnya came to 
an agreement on ceasing the war, establishing peace and freezing 
discussions on the status of Chechnya for five years. This is the sum and 
substance of the Chechen model, a particular "mechanism for a delayed 
political status."570 The final status of NK would be deferred for a number of 
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years pending a normalization of the relations between peoples and the 
return of refugees.571 
 
After the Russian-Chechen agreement, some factions in the Russian 
Federation, Armenia and the NK leadership started talking about the 
applicability of this model in relation to the Karabakh problem. It is necessary 
to consider this transition period during which the stances of the parties are 
determined. It is thought that if the question of status is delayed, say, for five 
years, during this interval a new generation of politicians may take the stage, 
and the geo-political situation in the South Caucasus as well as the economy 
will become more clearly defined by being more definitively outlined. Possibly, 
the sides of the conflict will cease to have an overly-categorical approach to 
negotiations. Thus, the problem may be freed from the deadlock. To sum up, 
the Chechen variant as applied to the problem of NK rests on three principles: 
1. Ensuring maximum security for Karabakh and for the residents of the 
neighbouring territories of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
2. The establishment of a transitional period of a minimum of five years 
during which the question of the political status of NK will be frozen. This 
will give some time and create more favourable political, geopolitical and 
economic conditions for the settlement of the Karabakh problem. 
3. The emergence during this period of a new generation of politicians, free 
of the baggage and the mutual enmity of the preceding period, who will 
act in a new atmosphere and in new conditions.  
350 
It is not too difficult to see the following obvious obstacle: the Chechen 
Variant presumes that broad negotiations will enlist "the opposing sides to the 
conflict", but this has proved impossible even within the framework of the 
negotiations already going on between Armenia and Azerbaijan. One 
variation of the Chechen Variant is the Dayton peace treaty (1996) according 
to which the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be granted "a 
delayed right of self-determination” after nine years. The then leader of NK, 
Kocharian stated on 27th February 1997 in Stepanakert that the "variant of the 
solution of the Karabakh issue when compared with the Chechen problem is 
quite acceptable to Karabakh. This proposal is not acceptable to Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan, believes that the Chechen Variant is incompatible with the 
situation in NK. It argues that there is nowhere for Chechnya to integrate into, 
while NK has already widely integrated with the Republic of Armenia, and in 
five years will complete this process.572 Moreover, Azerbaijan fears that such 
a solution, whatever the case in Chechnya, would lead to the perception of 
Azerbaijan as having de facto recognised the independence of NK.573 
 
Common State 
 
In 1998, the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group proposed a new approach to the 
disputing parties, called the Common State. It was, in fact, an attempt on the 
part of the Russians to find an "unconventional" solution, which would as far 
as possible formally combine the main demands: those of Azerbaijan for 
territorial integrity and those of NK for self-determination. In this solution, the 
establishment of "horizontal relations" between the Azerbaijani government 
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and the leadership of NK was proposed. This was in fact the consequence of 
a rejection of the Lisbon proposition by Armenia, which was prepared to 
satisfy the Armenian side by supporting Russia, but it was unacceptable to 
Azerbaijan. In the opinion of the Azerbaijani authorities, this proposition was 
against the Lisbon principles and violated their territorial integrity, so they 
refused to accept it.574  
 
The Azerbaijani authorities declared that it was impossible to establish a 
government according to confederative principles between the Armenian 
racial minority with a population of less than 150,000 in Karabakh and the 
Azeris with eight million people (according to the Azeris, the Armenian 
population was less than two per cent of the whole, and even less than that of 
Russian nationals). In the Azeri view, this would mean the embedding of one 
government inside another, with a formal dependency on Azerbaijan. 
Moreover, based on this solution, the Azerbaijani government would not be 
able to sign any covenant or join any political block without the consent of the 
NK Proclaimed Government. This meant that the independence of eight 
million Azeris would be in the hands of the NK government. This is, at best, 
indicative of the political leanings of a Karabakh Armenian society with a 
population of 150,000. Thus, to the Azeris, handing over this part to the 
Armenian side would be better than this solution. But this does not mean that 
the Armenians agree with this answer to the problem.  
 
The Baku authorities believe the reason is that Armenian military superiority 
ensures that they have greater demands.575 Of course, according to other 
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sources, the Armenian side, including Armenians from Armenia and 
Karabakh, has agreed with the Common State solution to settle the conflict 
peacefully.576 However, this alternative was proposed in a politically chaotic 
period resulting from terrorist action in parliament and the assassination of 
the Armenian Prime Minister in 1999, which was subsequently removed from 
the table Some politicians believe this tragedy was of no relevance to 
Karabakh.577 The most important items of this variant published in the media 
are the following (not in the order presented in the official Minsk Group 
document): 
 NK is a state and a territorial formation and together with the Azerbaijan 
Republic makes up a single nation with internationally recognised borders. 
 The NK constitution and laws are effective in the territory of NK. The laws 
of the Azerbaijan Republic are also effective in the territory of NK if they 
do not run counter to the constitution and the laws of the latter. 
 NK will be entitled to have direct external relations with foreign states in 
the spheres of economics, trade, science, education and culture.  
 NK will have a National Guard and police force. These cannot act outside 
NK borders. 
 The army, security forces and Azerbaijani police will not have a right to 
enter NK territory without the consent of the NK authorities.578 
However, it seems that overall this idea was not fully defined. This is evident 
from the fact that there was no consensus about a name for the concept. It is 
clear that there are differences between the terms "single", "common" and 
"allied" states. In the first case – the “single state” - a unitarian form of state is 
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meant, an entity within the framework of which there may or may not be a 
limited or a "broad" autonomy. But in a “joint state” - two forms of state 
configuration are being described at once: a federation and a confederation. 
And the “allied state” necessitates the forming of a symmetric or asymmetric 
federation, and its subjects may exist on an equal or unequal legal footing. 
The Armenians of the NKR were in fact invited to become members of some 
kind of federation, though it is not certain what sort of amorphous status the 
Minsk Group co-chairman offered NK as part of this hypothetical federation.  
 
As to the sum and substance of the proposals about a "common state", it 
should be noted that the matter concerns the notion of federalism in the 
countries of the South Caucasus, which Russia adhered to in its intermediary 
mission up until 1995 and only then abandoned it because of Azerbaijan’s 
and Georgia's opposition. Besides, at the regulation stage of the NK dispute, 
this idea had already been put forward in a vague way by the USA. A study of 
the text of the proposals of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group from the 
period November-December 1997 gives us grounds to believe that the main 
idea of the Russian Federation, the USA and France which allied Russia in 
this question - was the intention to expand the ordinary notions about 
interrelations between a "federal centre” and a “subject of the federation". 
 
For instance, it was presumed that NK, while returning to the legal 
sovereignty of Azerbaijan, would nonetheless maintain all the external 
attributes of independent statehood, namely, the institutions of the 
presidency, parliament, government, constitution, court system, army (in the 
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form of a National Guard), the police, a state emblem, national anthem, flag 
and so on. But as to NK maintaining its communication links with the outside 
world, the following was offered:  
 
In effect, Azerbaijan ’rents out’ to the OSCE the zone of the Lachin corridor, 
whilst the OSCE establishes control over it "in collaboration and interaction" 
with the leadership of NK, using manpower provided by Stepanakert, working 
jointly with OSCE observers. NK was deprived of the possibility of carrying 
out an independent foreign policy and having an independent banking and 
finance sector. At the same time, this territory was declared to be a free 
economic zone with unlimited use of any foreign currency. However, NK 
participation in Azerbaijani foreign policy was not clarified within the context of 
the “common state” approach. So Karabakh diplomats and consuls may be 
present in all Azerbaijani embassies and representative offices located in 
other states and international organisations and they may also conclude 
agreements to promote foreign cooperation, with the consent of Azerbaijan, 
of course.579      
 
These and other Minsk Group peace proposals enable us to conclude that, 
though their terminology speaks of preserving Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity 
as a single state, the thrust of the proposals was to set a course towards the 
formation of a union of states between Azerbaijan and the NKR, that is to say 
a confederation, and an asymmetric one at that.  
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At the present moment, both NK and Armenia state that they are ready to 
accept these proposals as a basis for negotiations. Meanwhile Azerbaijan, 
referring to the norms of international law and their national interests, reject 
this suggestion. 
 
The Tatarestan  Model 
 
The Tatarestan model implies the creation of an associated state, that is, a 
state within and associated with, a larger state. Other examples of such 
solutions include the Niue Island and New Zealand. 580  The Republic of 
Tatarestan (enjoys a substantial degree of self-determination verging on 
independence in the economic sphere, pursues its international relations in a 
relatively independent manner, having opened ‘representation offices’ in over 
15 countries). However it acknowledges being associated with the Russian 
Federation, hence whilst remaining a sovereign state, it forms part of the 
Russian Federation but is subordinate to its institutions and delegates 
significant powers to the federal authorities. It is noteworthy that the 
Azerbaijani authorities have declared their support for the Tatarestan model 
for settling the NK conflict.581 
 
This model complies with the Azerbaijani position of offering NK the “highest” 
degree of autonomy, and also has the advantage of avoiding the use of the 
term ‘autonomy’ which, from the Armenian perspective, is tainted by past 
experiences. Whereas, the main controversy lies in the definition of future 
relations as ’horizontal’ or ’vertical’, the associated state model may be 
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helpful in providing a ’diagonal’ type of relationship. Whatever the terms used, 
it is likely that a future solution will bear some resemblance to the Tatarestan 
model, while accounting for the specific conditions and circumstances of NK. 
So, the most probable status for Karabakh includes enjoying the highest 
degree of autonomy, as implied by the Tatarestan model. 
 
As mentioned before, under an autonomous government and by establishing 
international relations, the enclosed territory of NK would enjoy real 
advantages just like other independent states.582 However, describing it as 
ambiguous and unacceptable, one of the authorities of Yerevan declared that 
none of the world’s existing autonomy models can today satisfy NK’s 
requirements, particularly regarding the problem of security.583 
  
Trans-Caucasian Confederation 
 
The idea that the future of the South Caucasus countries lies in their political 
integration, is not new. But a group of researchers from the Centre for 
Research of European Politics in Brussels headed by Michael Emerson 
proposed a very radical version of such an idea, presupposing that integration 
in itself may turn out to be the key to the solution of both the Karabakh and 
the other conflicts in this region. This proposal assumes the following 
elements: 
 Readiness of the leaders of the three recognized states of the South 
Caucasus to immediately take steps towards regional integration and the 
creation of the so-called South Caucasus Community. 
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 Consent of the EC, Russia and the USA to sponsor such integration. 
 Readiness to realise a plan / agenda of six items, three of which pertain 
immediately to the South Caucasus, and the rest to collaboration in a 
wider region, including the Black Sea zone and the south of Russia. The 
first three items include: 
 
I. Constitutional resolutions for international conflicts, in particular, with the 
use of modern European models of shared sovereignty as well as the inter-
dependence of different levels. 
II.  It is proposed for the most important conflicts - NK and Abkhazia - to make 
provision for a high degree of self-government, exclusive competence, 
separate constitutions, horizontal and asymmetric relations with state 
powers, and joint competence in such spheres as security, foreign relations 
and economy. 
III.  Special articles must be drafted on peace-making and guarantees of 
security for refugees. 
 
The project also stipulated the possibility of the federalisation of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan proceeding from their cultural and ethnic characteristics so as to 
avert conflicts in the regions where national minorities reside. All this was to 
be followed by concrete measures on the formation of the South Caucasus 
community, presuming compact political and economic integration of all the 
states of the region. It also presupposed the active participation of other 
bodies such as the OSCE, the Russian Federation, the E.U and the USA.584  
 
358 
As expected, the plan failed to produce any significant results because of the 
lack of any real interest among the leaders of the states in the region. 
 
Here we can mention the analogous model of Emil Agayev, called the ’Trans-
Caucasian Confederation’ or the ‘South-Caucasian Union’ (SU). According to 
this notion, his union could include not only first two and then three 
independent states, but after entering confederate relations they would retain 
their sovereignty. Under specific terms (stipulated in each separate case), 
autonomous entities could also be included as associate members. Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Ajaria, NK (plus Nakhchivan), would in this case remain 
subjects of the sovereign republics but would be granted the right to 
participate on an equal basis in confederate life as a whole. Each of them 
would receive the right to live as it wished but within certain limits without 
interfering with the others. All this would be determined by a treaty related to 
the formation of the Confederation. This treaty should also stipulate that all 
territorial and other claims must be consigned to the past once and for all, 
thus making it easier to settle disputes. It would also be easier to return 
refugees to their origins. 
 
According to Agayev, the formation and functioning of the South Caucasus 
Union, could be realised with the help and mediation of the world community, 
otherwise it would be difficult to achieve.585 
 
The possibility of the formation of such a confederation could be considered 
in the context of global tendencies towards integration. The question is: 
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whether the time for the creation of an integrated (common) political space 
has come and how to organize the process of controlled, ’predictable’ 
globalization, leaving space for the development of peoples and their 
cultures. 
 
It can be said that the forming of a new type of confederation of countries, 
encompassing one region, is a subject worthy of consideration. The South 
Caucasus and the territories that border it - Russia, Turkey, Iran, the Caspian 
countries of central Asia and some Black sea countries - are geographically 
and economically predisposed to integration.586  
 
In essence, one more sub-variant of a solution through integration is the 
model proposed in 1996-98 by the leftist forces of Armenia and NK, 
supported by the communists of the RF. In this variant, settlement of the 
conflict could be achieved by joining the internationally recognized and un-
recognized states of the South Caucasus to the Belarus-Russian Union (now 
- the Union state) as a single formation. In 1997, more than one million 
Armenian signatures were collected in favour of this decision, as the leaders 
of the Armenian Communist Party and the Armenian People's Initiative 
Russia-Belarus-Armenia (APIRBA) who held this campaign, claimed. 
According to some data, the leadership of NK was also predisposed to this 
idea. However the official rulers of Azerbaijan and Armenia (and Georgia 
likewise) showed a negative attitude towards it.587 
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The Principle of Condominium (or the Andorra Variant) 
 
After the Key West meeting, publications appeared in the Azerbaijani and 
Armenian media about another alternative known as the ‘Andorra status’. 
This foresaw having “plenipotentiary representatives” of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia participating in the NK power structures. It also spoke of other 
’attributes’ including the establishment of some kind of international control 
over the ’corridors’. 
 
The basic premise of the idea was that there would be dual rule by Azerbaijan 
and Armenia over NK. It is possible that this was just a trial balloon  to gauge 
the prevailing opinions in Azerbaijan, Armenia and NK. In reality the co-
chairmen of the Minsk Group could hardly have intended to propose such a 
plan to the sides in dispute or to consider the plan themselves because there 
are many obstacles to this solution, such as how can the two currencies of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan – the dram, and the manat - be circulated 
together?588  
 
The difficulty is that, logically, any ‘Andorrised’ variant of the settlement must 
be based on a denial of the right of ’new Andorrans’ to maintain their own 
armed forces. And in the case of the ’Andorrisation’ of NK or a similar 
agreement, the USA, the RF and France would have faced the difficult task of 
fully and unconditionally disarming the army of NK and demilitarising the 
territories not only of NK, but also of the regions it borders within Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
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It is unlikely that the Minsk Group is seeking to implement this plan in the 
region; moreover, it is likely that Azerbaijan and Karabakh will disagree with 
it.  
 
NK has turned into the ‘big independent factor’ ofTranscaucasian  politics. 
Such a position is indebted to the idea of having a powerful army and thus, it 
is doubtful whether NK would agree to demilitarise the army.589  
 
However, the Andorra solution was explicitly welcomed through the official 
stance taken by the Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman in 1998.590  
 
Conclusion 
 
The lack of progress during the past two decades in resolving the NK conflict 
and its negative effect on Armenia's internal economy and foreign business 
has caused public opinion to be somewhat pessimistic and indifferent towards 
the dispute. Some Armenian parties and political movements blame their 
economic plight on the NK hostilities. However, the majority of Armenia's 
political forces are in favour of independence for NK or its unification with 
Armenia. The Azeris believe that the conflict is firstly the result of Armenian 
aggression and secondly, that the Armenians are responsible for the creation 
of hundreds of thousands of Azeri refugees. Thus, it is quite natural that they 
will maintain their positions if the current conditions are not changed.  
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Throughout these years, most of the Azerbaijani parties and groups have 
changed stances and agreed to grant substantial autonomy to NK. In contrast 
to the Armenians, Azerbaijan's public opinion has not become indifferent. 
Quite the contrary, it has become increasingly radical and dogmatic towards 
the NK problem and any impeding solution.  
 
The Armenians of Karabakh consider the right of self-determination as their 
own unquestionable prerogative and insist on it. Thus, they call for a definition 
of the political status of NK. Armenia's political, economic, military and even 
social conditions hold no potential for another war. It is for this reason that the 
Armenians of Karabakh accept the creation of a confederation as a solution. 
Due to the political culture, the confederation model is somehow interpreted 
as independence, but this status is anything but full-blown independence and 
particularly weaker than their main demand which is unification with Armenia.  
 
On the whole, an analysis of the political and social climate in Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and NK together with the final stances of the different parties and 
movements, particularly in NK, suggest that the time is ripe for compromise. 
Public opinion in Armenia is against another war. The general atmosphere in 
Azerbaijan, however, allows the rulers to make decisive decisions for it even 
if this means another war in the region.      
 
As already stated, none of the proposed models for settlement have yet been 
agreed by the different parties. For instance the ’more than autonomy but not 
a state’ model based on the Aland islands was the most favoured and 
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practicable solution to Azerbaijani officials, but  the Karabakhis did not accept 
such a proposal at that time as few efforts were made to convince them. The 
‘Exchange of territories’ was the second solution proposed and according to 
this plan, Armenia would be given a part of NK in return for handing over the 
territory of Meghri. By this plan Armenia would lose its border with Iran and 
for this reason the Armenian authorities rejected it. 
 
The ‘associated state’ variant was another proposal based on which NK 
would become a legitimate autonomous entity but remain within the structure 
of an independent Azerbaijan. For this reason, this suggestion was not 
accepted by the Armenians. 
 
The ’Cyprus model’ having at its core the idea that NK would not form part of 
Azerbaijan or Armenia, nor would it be recognized as an independent state or 
a member of the international community but would exist and function as an 
independent state. The Azerbaijani authorities believed that this plan was 
impracticable. 
  
Delaying the political status or the ’Chechen variant’ is another model 
proposed to solve the NK conflict. According to this model, defining the 
political status of NK would be delayed for a few years until relations were 
normalized and the refugees returned to their homes; but according to the 
Azeris, this model was not suitable for the NK problem.  
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The ’common state’ variant was initiated by the Russian co-chairman of the 
Minsk Group and suggested the creation of a horizontal relationship between 
Azerbaijan and NK, but this time too, finding it against their national interests, 
the Azeris rejected this plan. 
 
The ’Tarestan model’ was another proposed solution which implied the 
setting up of a horizontal relationship between Azerbaijan and NK and of 
being independent in the sphere of international economic relations. This 
model was too similar to Azerbaijan's offering NK the highest degree of 
autonomy, and Karabakhi officials believed that their security problems had 
not been included and therefore it was not acceptable to them. 
 
According to Michael Emerson the NK conflict was solvable through the 
forming of a "Trans-Caucasian confederation" which required regional 
integration of the three Caucasian republics, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia; but this plan too failed to bring any significant results due to the 
failure to find any interest among the leaders of the regional states. 
 
Emil Agayev proposed a similar model called the "Trans-Caucasian 
confederation" which included the three independent states. After entering 
into confederate relations, they would retain their sovereignty and NK, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia would in that case remain subjects of the 
sovereign republics but with the right to participate on an equal basis in 
confederate life as a whole. 
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After the meeting in Key West, Florida, another variant named the ‘Andorra 
model was debated. This required the presence and cooperation of the 
plenipotentiary representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia participating in the 
power structures of NK and controlling the corridors. Disarming the Karabakh 
army was the essential proviso for implementing this model and this was not 
agreed by NK or Armenia. Also, the dual governments of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan had their reservations too. Briefly, none of the proposed models 
have lived up to anybody's expectations and hence, the outlook for the 
settlement of the NK conflict is still uncertain. 
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Chapter 9: The Outlook for a Settlement of the Conflict  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter comprises two parts. In the first, an outline for solving the NK 
conflict is presented and in the second, specific solutions by various 
individuals are suggested for the NK conflict in the context of the observations 
and findings of some outstanding scholars in resolving international conflicts. 
In the end, proposals are presented which are founded on past experience 
and up-to-date knowledge of conflict resolution.   
 
This work thus far has presented the background to the NK conflict and put 
forward many reasons – legal, historic, geo-political and institutional which 
have contrived to prolong the conflict. My own solution is one where Track 
Two diplomacy is used to solve the conflict from the ‘bottom up.’ This solution 
is unlike any solution which has been put forward before and will be 
elaborated later in this chapter. 
 
In spite of the efforts made by the Minsk Group mediators, and after 15 years 
of various ceasefires by the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the NK 
conflict has remained unsolved. This has halted the economic development of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and the region of the Caucasus. Moreover, because 
of the prolongation of the peace process and the reaching of a deadlock, the 
NK conflict has become more complicated than ever.  
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A number of factors have affected the peace process, which have over time 
become more complex: reasons such as the deepening rancor and hostility 
between the opposing sides (resulting from the subversive propaganda 
directed against the politico-social circumstances of both states), a new 
generation of leadership in both states, the plight of refugees particularly the 
Azeris who have suffered harsh conditions, the loss of hope for peace, 
particularly among the Azeris, who were disappointed with the Minsk Group 
mediators. 
 
Today, there is little hope that direct negotiations between the Presidents of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia will yield peace. At the present time (September 
2009) , the settlement process has reached total deadlock. It can be said that 
the opposing factions have no inclination to compromise. On the one hand, it 
is clear that the methods of mediation and the mediators are not going to 
change and, on the other, if this state of affairs is maintained, the NK conflict 
will remain shelved and frozen in the coming years. This is not to the benefit 
of the warring parties and it poses a risk for the general stability of the region. 
 
Moreover, in "no war no peace" conditions, it is not expected that basic 
problems in the sphere of policy, economy, trade and so on will be resolved, 
because such issues fall in the shadow of these conditions and remain 
ambiguous and suspended. Obviously, economic problems and obstacles to 
development will consequentially produce their effects and threats. 
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The geo-political and geo-economic importance of the region is indispensable 
and prompts the great powers to be ready for military confrontation in order to 
dominate the region. Consequentially, there is a probability that the war will 
spread both regionally and globally. Thus, the NK conflict presents a risk for 
the whole Caucasus area. 
 
Since the outbreak of the war, Armenia has received armaments from Russia 
worth over one billion dollars. If Azerbaijan too receives the same - which is 
likely because of its oil revenues - a dreadful scenario involving the 
resumption of the military confrontation between the strengthened rivals is 
possible. This will certainly have a great effect on other influential regional 
and wider regional powers, particularly Iran and Turkey, as it had from 1992 
to 1994. In other words, the NK conflict has such a potential for disaster that if 
such a situation should develop, it would return the Caucasus to its 17th and 
18th century situation, with more destruction of property and loss of human 
life.  
 
Moreover, during recent years, the exertion of influence by outsiders on the 
bilateral relations between the two countries and also their rivalry in the area 
has gradually paved the way for increased regional polarization. Armenia's 
alignment with the power axis of Iran, Russia and Greece, against 
Azerbaijan's association with Turkey and the US (with Israeli tactical support), 
represent a regional polarization that obstructs the settlement of the dispute. 
Such a development risks increasing the regional consequences resulting 
from any change in the present status of the Caucasus area, since increasing 
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the strategic and geo-economic importance of the region through exploitation 
and extraction of Caspian oil and gas may have a negative effect on the 
peace process. 
 
Possible Settlements to the Conflict 
 
Prospects for peace have been bleak but historical experience tells us that no 
war can remain unsolved forever. This is true especially for the NK conflict 
situated in an important and sensitive region. If neither side can compromise 
through direct negotiations or accept the proposals of the mediators, then 
there may be three possible methods of resolving the situation:  
 
Military Solution  
 
It is evident that the methods used so far, including the mediating attempts 
made by international organizations and the direct negotiations of the 
Presidents, have proved fruitless. Therefore, the longer the deadlock, the 
greater the probability that military operations will resume, because if the 
settlement of the dispute is postponed, the number of Azerbaijanis who 
believe such a solution as the only way to resolve this situation, will increase. 
This is because the Armenians control Karabakh and up to 20 per cent of 
Azerbaijan, and therefore they have little motivation to start a war. 
 
While the conflicting parties have stressed that they will abide by a peaceful 
settlement, during recent years several influential political and military figures, 
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particularly the Azerbaijani President, threatened, in 2004 to resort to military 
force to restore territorial integrity if the stalemate persisted.591 Until now, the 
balance between the military forces of both sides has been the most 
important obstacle to the resumption of war. Thus, without doubt, hostilities 
would be inevitable if the balance were to be lost even for a short period 
during the cease-fire conditions. On 25th May 2005, during the inauguration of 
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, an Azeri official clearly indicated that a percentage 
of the proceeds from this project would be invested in the army. The Azeri 
side, in particular, possesses a necessary and serious motive to trigger the 
war because, apart from material and spiritual damage, the Armenians insist 
on benefiting from the outcome of the fighting as they already have the upper 
hand in the status quo; therefore they want to have more control over the 
negotiation process, and this has in fact increased their determination. 
 
In justifying their war-like attitude, the Azeris ask to what extent would the 
Armenians abide by the peaceful settlement of the conflict if Azerbaijan 
attacked Armenia, occupied its territory and asked for the independence of 
the Azeris residing in that country? Such beliefs have led to an increase in 
those who believe in a militarily liberation of the occupied territories. It is 
noteworthy that according to sociological research carried out in 2002 by the 
European Commission, 32 per cent of Azeris believed that the resumption of 
military operations was probable in the NK situation; while in Armenia, the 
figure stood at just 16.6 per cent. Thus, it is quite clear that a re-ignition of the 
military conflict largely depends on the Azeris.592 
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Today, the military solution is not the only one considered as a final though 
probable solution. This has, unfortunately, become more likely because of a 
neglect of the peace process and an increasing sense of hopelessness 
among the Azeris. Similar examples in the region amount to between 14 and 
20 cases, such as Chechnia, Abkhazia, Karabakh and also clashes in other 
areas such as Kosovo, Spain (in the Basque country) China (in the west 
regarding the Moslems), the Philippines, Indonesia, France, Northern Ireland, 
Moldavia, Cyprus, Turkey with Kurdistan, Algeria with Morocco, and it can be 
said that all these conflicts have involved military intervention.593 Thus, the 
world has not witnessed any disagreement like the one in NK which has been 
settled peacefully. 
 
However, the enormous investments in the region, especially in the oil 
industry projects in Azerbaijan and the construction of the Caspian oil and 
gas pipelines (in Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Nurusisk) are the main obstacles 
mitigating against the resumption of military operations. 
 
Foreign Compulsion to Impose a Solution  
 
A coercive peace imposed by global powers may be another possible solution 
to the conflict. Examples of this idea are found in the war between the Serbs 
and Croatians and the Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Presidents 
of the three sides were forced to sign a peace treaty under pressure from the 
United States. Another example of coercive peace carried out in similar 
circumstances was the Aland Islands conflict between Swedish nationals and 
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Finland. At that time, the peace solution was in fact imposed on the opposing 
sides by the international community. Because neither Finland nor Sweden 
was satisfied with the peace plan they were forced into agreeing with it and 
the conflict was duly settled. 
 
Since the NK conflict is taking place in a highly strategic geo-political area, it 
is highly probable that if Armenia and Azerbaijan fail to find an acceptable 
solution, the global powers will present them with this answer. Of course, in 
the NK conflict, the coercive solution will turn out to be the same as previous 
ones or a combination of them. Most observers believe that the settlement of 
the NK dispute depends more on external actors rather than the parties at 
odds with each other. However, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten 
that the belligerents had this solution imposed on them by the USSR in the 
early years of the last century, and even Moscow was unable to stifle 
hostilities using this solution over a period of 70 years.  
 
In the Balkan conflict too, the Dayton coercive peace process proved 
authentic and indispensable to the warring parties. Since the coercive 
solution was to the detriment of the Armenians, they regarded themselves as 
the victims of a conspiracy orchestrated by the Russians and Turks, so they 
are more worried about this solution than the Azerbaijanis. In his noted article 
“War and Peace,” Ter-Petrossian, the ousted Armenian President, 
approvingly pointed this factor out.594 
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Therefore, coercive peace imposed by neutral mediators may be a possible 
solution for the settlement of the NK conflict. But, the vital question is which 
power will be able to enforce this coercive peace on the combatants? This 
question is related to the future rivalry of the powers in the Caucasus 
region.595 
 
Political and peaceful solution  
 
The third option is a political solution to the conflict, achieved through 
negotiation. It is evident that this solution requires both sides to be ready for 
huge concessions. Under present conditions and with regard to the positions 
of both sides, reaching such compromises seems a distant dream 
(particularly in Azerbaijan and NK), but it is not an altogether improbable or 
impossible event.  
 
The political and peaceful solution to the NK problem can be achieved in two 
ways: first, a settlement proposed by international mediators like the OSCE or 
the UN; and secondly, a solution to be achieved through direct meetings of 
the Presidents. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of hostilities, in both the 
Azeri and Armenian communities, there were some factions who agreed to 
relinquish NK for the benefit of the opposite side and this solution was 
regarded as a peaceful one, but today it can be seen that these forces have 
seriously lost ground in both states, so this option seems improbable (For 
example, Nor Oghi was an Armenian party which was in favour of the 
restoration of NK to Azerbaijan). Nor Oghi means the "right path."596 
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Proposals for the Settlement of the NK conflict 
 
It is necessary to consider the past, present and future events in order to 
discover a solution to this frozen conflict. Being informed of the historical 
roots of the conflict and trying to mitigate them is the most basic but difficult 
step in solving the problem, which is only possible through a gradual and 
peaceful process. Another important measure is to examine the reasons for 
the failure of the mediators, and for the ineffectiveness of the proposed peace 
plans, as well as having a precise understanding of the present position of the 
relevant parties, regionally and further afield. It is quite clear that it is 
impossible to find a formula to solve such a prolonged dispute without being 
aware of and putting into practice up-to-date scientific findings in mediation, 
conflict solving and conflict resolution.  
 
Thus before presenting a proposal for resolving the crisis, it is appropriate to 
examine a variety of specific peace plans expounded by senior figures. The 
suggested peace proposal presented later in this chapter is critically informed 
by these previous events. It is also necessary to be aware of the theoretical 
comments and empirical experiences of academics in the field of security 
studies and conflict resolution. Even though none of the scholars discussed 
have directly touched on the NK conflict in their writings, their work in the field 
is generally of great value. 
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Proposals for Peace: Historic Peace Plans   
 
It is noteworthy that one of the first peace plans proposed was by John 
Maersca, the former US former ambassador to the OSCE and a former 
special negotiator in the NK crisis. He presented his plan in July 1994 and the 
key points are as follows:597 
 
 NK to be reconstituted as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (RNK), a 
self-governing legal entity within and freely associated with the sovereign 
Republic of Azerbaijan. Nagorno Karabakh would exchange missions with 
Baku and they would have the right to establish their own missions there 
and in Stepanakert. In addition, the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh would 
have the right to limited permanent missions in capitals such as Yerevan 
and Moscow and in return these states would be allowed to have 
permanent missions in Stepanakert. 
 The Azeris residing in NK would have the right to elect their own 
representatives in the NK parliament according to the size of their 
population. The Armenians living in Azerbaijan and outside of NK would 
enjoy the rights of minorities according to law. NK would gradually reduce 
its army and would only be permitted to have a local security guard but not 
assault forces in NK. Azerbaijan would only deploy local security forces in 
NK but not offensive armaments in its vicinity. 
 Armenia and Azerbaijan would sign an agreement according to which both 
would have the right to land as well as air transit and access to the 
defined territories. Armenia would enjoy land transit through the Lachin 
Corridor in Azerbaijan and, in return, the latter would have access to 
376 
Nakhichevan through Armenian territory along the Arax River. All kinds of 
transport and the right to transfer energy and build pipelines would be 
subject to this agreement. All these transit regions would be under 
international supervision. 
 Refugees and displaced persons created as a result of the crisis would 
return to their homes. Some villages in NK which belonged to the Azeris in 
1988 and those in Azerbaijan belonging to Armenians, along with Shusha 
where the population was mixed, would be internationally supervised. 
 The whole of Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK would be a free trade area. 
 After the articles of the peace treaty were signed, they would have to be 
approved by the parliaments of NK and Azerbaijan. The articles which 
included transit through the special zones would be signed by 
representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan. And finally the agreement 
would be signed by the Minsk group and submitted to the UN Secretary 
General to be distributed to the governments 
 The US would appoint a high-ranking mission in order to support the items 
of the proposal and take a leading role in the financial affairs and 
establishment of the lines of communication between Armenia and NK as 
well as Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. 
 The UN and OSCE would hold a conference with the cooperation of 
international financial organizations, and support from the donor countries 
would attract economic resources to restore Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK. 
They would be committed to investments and the carrying out of these 
programmes.  
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The following year, John Maersca pointing to the Azerbaijan oil pipeline, 
called it the "peace pipeline" and stressed that if Azerbaijan ignored its 
passage through Armenia and Nakhichevan to Turkey, it would lose the sole 
opportunity to end the conflict.598  
 
To sum up Maersca’s proposals, it is fair to say that they are dependant on 
mutual trust, which currently does not exist among the conflict parties. It is 
unrealistic to expect Armenians and Azeris to coexist in harmony in the 
present circumstances and because of this unrealistic assumption this 
proposal has failed to gain popularity.  
 
The most famous peace plan after John Maersca’s proposal was tabled by 
Michael Emerson, former EU Ambassador to the Soviet Union and 
subsequently to the Russian Federation. In 2000, he presented his solution, 
entitled the "Caucasus Stability Pact.”599 
 
To compare Maersca’s and Emerson’s proposals, it can be said that 
Emerson’s plan suggests that the Balkans and the South Caucasus are both 
beset by the difficulties associated with post-communist transition and the 
associated problems surrounding ethnicity. However, the Balkans are in 
Europe, whereas the South Caucasus is on the edge of the continent. Even if 
Europe becomes more involved in the South Caucasus, it will remain only 
one of a number of interested parties, including large regional states such as 
Russia and Turkey, pointing out the need for a Caucasus Stability Pact. 
Emerson uses the term ”stability pact” as a loose, generic shorthand for a 
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comprehensive, regional and multilateral initiative to bring peace to a region 
beset by ethnic conflict. Emerson’s proposal is based on regional co-
operation while Maersca’s is more of a personal plan for a political settlement 
of the conflict. 
 
This recommendation was presented with a similar formula used for Balkan 
statehood, namely, a regional, multilateral, multi-sect initiative to bring peace 
and cooperation to the region. The measure had been proposed at political 
level by Suleiman Demirel, the president of Turkey, around the time of the 
OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999 - the first instance of an OSCE 
meeting in the Turkish capital. It was supported by the presidents of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. They spoke about the need for the formation of a 
regional security system for the Caucasus. 
 
In this respect, many formulae were presented and finally the formula 3+3+2 
(The three Caucasian states, plus the three neighbouring states of Turkey, 
Russia, and Iran, plus the two great external powers: the European Union 
and the United States) prevailed and was accepted. The next year, Michael 
Emerson proposed a formula of 3+3+3+2 and added the three separatist 
units in the Caucasus: NK, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The main features of 
his plan were: 
 
 It included six phases in two separate sections. The first section was 
directly related to the Caucasus and the second was based on the 
cooperation among other territories of the region, including that between 
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the areas of the Black and Caspian Seas and the Caucasus. Considering 
the numerous existing tribes and the ethnic diversity and demarcations in 
the Caucasus and its potential for new misunderstandings, Emerson 
aimed at solving the present disputes and, at the same time, preventing 
any conflict emerging in the future, through a coalition of the three 
Caucasian states and the cooperation of the European Union.  
 In order to solve the problem of NK and Abkhazia, he proposed the 
formation of a confederation between these two and Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, whereby the power structure would be horizontal and the 
relations between NK and Armenia would be asymmetrical. Thus, the 
refugees and displaced persons would be able to return to the Azeri-
occupied provinces and also to southern Abkhazia.  
 Another plan of his was the formation of new order of regional security, 
through which responsibility for the supervision and implementation of the 
peace plan would be entrusted for a limited period to the military units of 
the OSCE members. In this last phase of his plan, Emerson proposed the 
setting up of an organization called the Trans-Caucasus Society. The 
responsibilities of this organization would be to eliminate the existing 
demarcations, to establish a free-trading zone, to facilitate public 
businesses, cooperation in transportation and the creation of energy 
networks. Along with the three Caucasian states, this organization would 
play a decisive role regarding the competence of the autonomous units 
(NK, Abkhazia, and Ossetia).600 The USA, the EU and Turkey did not 
object to this approach, even taking a number of measures for the 
initiation of corresponding discussions.However, the Russian Federation 
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and Iran were against this formula, and favoured the “3+2.” The 
approaches to integration were intensively discussed at international 
conferences in Bohum and Berlin (Germany) in 2001, with the 
participation of the representatives of all sides of the South Caucasus. In 
this conference Emerson presented his idea. These authors did not 
receive the support of politicians in any country or any international 
organisations. 
 
Another relatively important peace plan was proposed in 1998 by Professor 
Armen Aivazian, an Armenian historian and political scientist which included 
three inter-related political, military and legal agreements. The most important 
points of the three agreements were as follows601: 
 
 Through signing a trilateral military agreement, Armenia, Russia and the 
United States will guarantee the strategic security of Armenia for a long 
time. It is implicitly mentioned in the agreement that any kind of attack 
against Armenia is considered an attack on the United States and Russia 
and according to the UN Charter, Article 51, these states have the right to 
punish the aggressor. He specifies that any other text except this will be a 
null and misleading promise and that this agreement must be permanent. 
 Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan will sign a trilateral agreement 
concerning the recognition of territorial integrity. 
 NK will be called the Armenian Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and be 
recognized by Armenia as an Azerbaijani confederacy. The relations 
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between the Armenian Republic of NK and Azerbaijan will be horizontal 
and according to the confederative principles. 
 Through a quadrilateral agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia 
and the United States, Armenia will be entrusted with the guaranteeing of 
the security of the Armenian Republic of NK. 
 The Armenian republic of NK will keep separate military forces, to be 
called the national guard of NK. In times of peace, the number of soldiers 
will be 25,000 - the same number as the present army. 
 NK military forces will withdraw from six Azerbaijani regions and the Azeri 
army too will evacuate some parts of Karabakh and its neighbouring areas 
and withdraw to a distance of 20 to 30 kilometres. These regions will be 
supervised by the OSCE or UN forces for an unlimited time.  
 Nagorno Karabakh will have the right to have a government, flag, emblem 
and army. 
 Azeri citizens, or at least the Azeris who will reside in NK, will enjoy 
double citizenship. 
 NK itself will define its level of economic and trade relations with 
Azerbaijan, and will cooperate with the Azerbaijan central bank. 
 Stepanakert-Baku cooperation and coordination in foreign, defence, 
security and legal policies will be defined through negotiations. 
 The return of the refugees will be postponed to the time when the entire 
agreement on all articles has been achieved. 
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Another solution was put forward in 2005 by Tabib Husseinov, a researcher 
and expert on ethno-territorial conflicts. He believes that this conflict should 
be solved through "power-sharing and regional integration."602 
 
He has analyzed and studied the position taken by the Armenian parliament, 
which can be summarized according to three principles:  
 NK shall not be under the control of the Azeri government.  
 A permanent land communication between NK and Armenia will be set up 
and Armenia shall have the right to military interference if necessary; and  
 International guarantees for the security of the Karabakhis603.  
 
A study of Azerbaijan’s position, called the "Nagorno Karabakh Charter", or 
the "Charter of Four" proposed four important principles to solve the conflict: 
((i) Armenian withdrawal from the occupied regions; (ii) the keeping of 
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity; (iii) the safe return of the refugees and 
homeless to their homes; and (iv) the granting of autonomy to both Armenian 
and Azeri societies. Should this solution be rejected, Azerbaijan would have 
the right to use military force to solve the problem (according to international 
rights and the UN Charter).604 He came to the conclusion that there were 
common grounds for both positions and that the conflict could be solved 
through "power-sharing". So, he suggested granting autonomy to the 
Karabakhis with each part or province administered jointly by Armenians and 
Azeris. 
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It is important to point out that none of the plans described above were legally 
binding. They were simply proposed solutions. 
 
But this solution will definitely face problems, since if the Azeris return to their 
homes, mainly in the two strategic cities of Shush and Lachin which were 
formerly populated mainly by Azeris, how could they allow these regions to be 
administered jointly with the Armenians? This is true in places where the 
Armenians constitute the majority of the population. Besides, in the first 
phase of this peace plan they have no intention of living among the peoples 
of the other side Thus, from the point of view of NK’s geographical features, 
this solution will cause acute security problems in these regions. 
 
Such a defeat of the "power-sharing" solution leads us to an important truth, 
that the NK problem cannot be solved at the intergovernmental level alone 
when the specifics of the peace plans, the nature of the NK conflict and the 
basic demands of the parties in dispute are taken into account. Thus, a 
combination of some intra-state (decentralization and power-sharing), inter-
state and super-state measures are necessary to achieve a stable and just 
peace in the region. 
 
Therefore, he proposed regional integration and then integration of the region 
with Europe. He believed that regional integration would pave the way for 
establishing peace in the region and at the next stage the European political 
and social structures would be responsible for developing it. 
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Briefly, the above-mentioned peace plans, along with the proposals 
presented by the Minsk group mediators, have been the most important ones 
to date for solving the NK conflict. They have not, of course, been effective. It 
is only natural that a rejection of the solutions proposed by John Maresca, 
Michael Emerson and Armen Eivazian should have their own particular 
reasons, in a similar way to those for the failure of the proposals presented by 
the Minsk Group mediators, discussed earlier 
 
This chapter will now briefly but critically discuss the afore-mentioned 
settlements. One of the main reasons for the failure of peace plans in general 
and the proposals of Maresca and Emerson in particular, is that they paid no 
attention to the interests and concerns of the neighbouring powers in the 
warring region. It is reasonable to suggest that if the NK conflict is solved 
according to a formula which puts the interests or the national security of an 
influential power at risk, the plan will not provide peace and stability in the 
region in the long term. For instance, John Maresca presents the United 
States as the only guarantor of the peace treaty and no role has been 
entrusted to other states in the region or the world. Russia too has been 
eliminated from the plan. 
 
The best example, to show the neglect of the interests and security 
considerations of the neighbouring powers is to be found in the proposal for 
the "exchange of territories" presented as a settlement for the NK conflict. It is 
clear that in this plan, Russia and Iran would be separated from the region, 
and the north-south corridor would be completely removed. Moreover, the 
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buffer zone between Europe and central Asia would face difficulties. In other 
words, the political, economic and security interests of Russia and Iran as 
well as those of Europe and central Asia would be put at risk. Even China 
would encounter security problems. The introduction of this proposal would 
only provide for the interests of Turkey and its pan-Turkic and pan-Turanian 
policies. Turkey would gain direct access not only to central Asia but even to 
China. Moreover, this plan would be to the detriment of the opposing parties, 
especially Armenia, because it would be surrounded by Turkish extremists 
and its own historical enemies. 
 
Unfortunately, in Mareskas proposal too, the fulfilment of his country’s 
interests and strategic goals is clearly the main motivator. In his peace plan; 
he has not envisaged the slightest involvement of other powerful regional 
outsiders like Russia and Iran. Thus, it is simple-minded to suggest that no 
role would be contemplated for these nations in a region which has formed 
part of their territories for a very long time. To show how simplistic Maerskas’s 
idea is, it is sufficient to point out that the conflicting parties did not pay any 
attention to his suggestions, because it is impossible to establish peace in the 
region without bearing in mind the interests of these other powerful nations. 
 
The same criticism can also be levelled at Michael Emerson's plan. He too 
has not considered any role for a regional actor like Iran and has ignored the 
decisive part played by the regional powers in the affairs of the Caucasus. 
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It is of some significance that the positive reaction of the Armenian 
government and its President to this proposal was because they shared the 
same view. Kocharian explicitly stated that Russia and Iran should not be 
sidelined in the peace process and that heir cooperation and participation 
were necessary for any peace plan.605 
 
It should be explained that Emerson considers that the first and most 
necessary element for creating stability in the Caucasus is the settlement of 
the various ongoing conflicts in the region. He proposes the creation of a 
Trans-Caucasus Pact and considers that it would be possible to solve the NK, 
Abkhazia and south Ossetia problem within the framework of such an 
organization; but this requires that the governments of the three Caucasus 
states should be ready to unite and form a coalition. On the one hand, the 
authorities are not able to make such a decision without the support of public 
opinion. Thus, as a first step, the governments should prepare the mood 
within the country. This would appear to be extremely difficult, because the 
numerous communities living in the Caucasus have been subjected to 
intense propaganda for a long time and Russian security agencies have 
stamped on any escalation of opposition and difference. Thus, to unify the 
Caucasian groups necessitates laying foundations and developing the culture 
by introducing at least a short or middle-term programme, which is 
complicated. 
 
In commenting on Aivazian’s plan, one should note that an elementary 
knowledge of Caucasian history is sufficient to understand that integration in 
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the Caucasus area and the agreeing on a treaty among the three states of 
the region is not a plan that can be easily implemented. Despite the fact that 
influential powers have been in some way involved in his peace plan, he 
made a mistake in his evaluation of their degree of influence by presuming 
that the US and Russia were the only important and effective powers in the 
settlement of the dispute. Fearing and feeling abhorrence towards the old 
enemy caused Aivazian to avoid involving Turkey in the peace process and 
limiting that country’s participation. Moreover, the role of Europe and Iran is 
ambiguous, in spite of their standing. His proposal favours and strengthens 
Armenia. 
 
Hosseinov’s suggestion has positive features but the main point is that the 
Caucasus should join the EU, which does not seem practical for a variety of 
reasons. 
 
As understood from the content of the proposals, none of the peace initiators 
have paid any attention to the internal factors of the conflict in Azerbaijan and 
Armenia and have had no policy ideas to eliminate these important 
considerations. This has limited the political leaders to compromise.  
 
As an Armenian, Aivazian has ignored the Azeris’ historical mind-set and 
deep feelings towards the Armenians and Karabakhis. He has put forward a 
unilateral plan, which is to the benefit of the Armenians and he expects to be 
able to stabilize the peace treaty with the support and guarantees of 
outsiders. But a stable peace will be achieved when it is organized according 
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to a mutual and fair compromise. In such a case there would be no need for 
foreign guarantees and for distant powers to interfere in the region. On the 
contrary, if the said principles are not observed and even if the world 
community is united to support and guarantee the plan, it cannot be 
considered permanent. Either way the situation will become more fraught if 
no resolution is found. 
 
Reviewing the Opinions of Conflict Resolution Scholars 
  
In the past two decades or so, the emergence of many international conflicts 
and the greater complexity and duration of peace processes, occasioned by 
an increase in powerful internal and external factors, have gradually 
convinced theorists in conflict resolution and security studies that traditional 
methods of mediation are no longer viable. They believe that new methods, 
appropriate to this change need be implemented. Fortunately, in recent times, 
new approaches to conflict resolution have been developed. A combination of 
traditional diplomatic techniques and unofficial methods are effective when 
used together 
 
Since 1960, scholars have introduced various initiatives and methods for 
increasing mutual understanding between adversaries to gain a better insight 
into conflict resolution. In this respect, the most influential figures to propose 
new ideas and contributions include John Burton (controlled communication 
for analytical problem solving); Leonard Doob (human relations workshops 
applied to conflict resolution); Herbert Kelman (interactive problem-solving); 
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and Edward Azar (protracted social conflict); not to mention the problem-
solving forums of all these figures. Because of the limited success in 
resolving violent conflicts, these scholar-practitioners have developed new 
ideas such as problem-solving workshops as a non-official third-party 
strategy. These study groups aim to bring together representatives of the 
warring factions and to facilitate creative problem-solving through “direct 
communication” and in-depth conflict analysis. Burton defines “direct 
communication” as “an attempt to raise the level of communication to 
transform competitive and conflicting relationships into ones in which 
common values are being sought.”606 
 
Using this method, attempts are made to address the identity and security 
needs of the parties in dispute, on the assumption that conflicts arise out of 
unsatisfied human demands. This approach is an academically-based, 
unofficial third-party intervention to resolve conflicts, which brings together 
political and influential representatives of the adversaries to engage in direct 
dialogue under the supervision of a social scientist. Their proposals and 
solutions are briefly analysed. 
 
Burton was one of the first figures to examine this idea. With the co-operation 
of his assistants, he started important research into the settlement of several 
conflicts in the 1960s.607 Together with his colleagues, Burton created a new 
concept known as "interactive conflict resolution" and successfully tested it in 
the Malaysia-Indonesia conflict. He achieved success in resolving the 
dispute, and also an affirmation of his belief in this new paradigm. In contrast 
390 
to the realist and traditional approach to international relations whereby a 
conflict could be resolved by resorting to force, suppression or compromise, 
Burton developed his thinking about a new “pluralist” paradigm which 
emphasized the values and relations of multiple actors in the global system. 
 
With the acquiescence of the then British prime minister, Harold Wilson, who 
had tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict, Burton sent letters of 
invitation to the governments concerned, asking them to send delegates for 
discussions in London. In December 1965, a five-day meeting was held with 
the representatives of the opposing parties and a panel of ten social scientists 
from different universities, to test the interactive conflict resolution in a 
peaceful atmosphere. Relevant subjects such as the roots and historical 
causes, and the viewpoints of each party were analyzed, together with an 
academic board, known as the "facilitators", who played a considerable role 
in the meetings. Finally, a solution close to the viewpoints of both sides was 
accepted and the peace treaty was prepared according to the results and 
resumés of the London meeting. Thinking about this new approach to conflict 
analysis and resolution, Burton described it as a decisive paradigm shift 
 
Leonard Doob, a professor of psychology and a close colleague of Burton 
recommended a different approach to solving international conflicts. As part 
of the “Yale group” he used psychological principles to help people learn how 
to promote peace in conflicts. The Yale group launched its attempts to solve 
the dispute among Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia in circumstances when the 
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mediating attempts of the Organization for African Unity and the UN were 
unsuccessful and produced no results. 
 
In their theory, Doob and his colleagues believed in using social science as a 
tool to solve disputes and were convinced that for real progress to be made 
during a period of intensive hostility between the two sides, it would be 
necessary for some outside figures to intervene in their conflict resolution 
workshops. The Yale group also believed that a human relations training 
workshop would be an appropriate form for interposing in conflicts. It can be 
said that Dobb’s workshops were totally different from Burton's both 
methodologically and structurally. The workshops Burton proposed were 
based on open and unstructured seminar discussion to analyze the sources 
and the process of the conflict.608 
 
Generally speaking, the Yale group was not successful in the settlement of 
disputes because they faced numerous practical difficulties in organizing their 
workshops. They even faced budget problems for their research and for 
holding meetings, which is shown for example by their attempts at resolving 
the Ethiopian, Kenyan and Somalian conflicts and the Northern Ireland strife. 
 
As mentioned before, Doob fully considered social science and training in 
human relations as the most effective tools for intervention in the disputes. 
However, his workshops were not very successful in comparison with 
Burton's. Although one of the problems in organizing them was a lack of 
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powerful and influential sponsors, it seems that the main reasons for their 
failure was the nature of the workshops themselves and their proposals. 
 
Herbert Kelman from America, the founder of the programme on International 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard held over thirty workshops to 
address the Israeli-Palestinian strife. He was another of Burton's colleagues 
and an activist in the CAC who has spent more than thirty years articulating 
and elaborating the conceptual rationale of the problem-solving workshop. 
The work of Kelman on interactive problem-solving encompasses a 
comprehensive blend of theory, research and practice in applied social 
science. In collaboration with Stephen Cohen, Kelman created the integrated 
conceptual rationale rooted in approved principles of social behaviour.609 
 
In his comparison of Burton and Doob, Kelman noted several commonalities 
between the two, including the prestigious yet unofficial participants, such as 
writers, journalists, academics, and former officials – all influential figures 
within their communities. He also pointed out commonalities such as the 
facilitative role of the third party, the informal atmosphere, the relatively 
unstructured agenda and the use of isolated settings. The typical workshop 
brings together unofficial representatives of conflicting parties in a relatively 
secluded and preferably academic setting to engage in face-to-face 
communication with the guidance of social scientists that are knowledgeable 
about conflict theory, group processes and the region in question. All these 
elements were considered by Kelman and Cohen in designing the basis of 
the workshop to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a seminar held to 
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seek solutions to hostilities, Kelman operated with and argued for an 
ethnically balanced and neutral team as the third party. Thus, he sought Arab 
collaborators to balance his own Jewish identity on the third party panel. 
 
Generally, Kelman`s problem-solving workshop had the dual purpose of 
being both "educational"- producing changes in the perceptions, attitudes, 
and ideas held by the individual participants - and "political": transferring 
these changes to the political dialogue and decision-making in each 
community. 
 
Kelman saw the problem-solving workshop as a uniquely social-psychological 
approach to conflict resolution in that social interaction, which is at the heart 
of the evolution and resolution of conflict, is the central focus and unique level 
of analysis of social psychology. He believed that international conflict is not 
seen as mere disagreement between states, but as conflict between 
societies, thus underscoring the importance of psychological and cultural 
factors in the analysis, along with military and strategic ones. Unique 
assumptions in the processes and structure of the conflict-solving workshop 
are set out in the basic principles of the social-psychological approach. 
Finally, the substantive content of workshops is informed by assumptions 
about the importance of human needs and perceptual constraints, and 
influences processes in situations of conflict.  
 
From 1971, Kelman and his associates held numerous workshops on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with increasingly influential participants. Within the 
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context of their action research programme on the Middle East, Kelman and 
his colleagues have engaged in many visits, meetings and conversations with 
opinion leaders, decision-makers and policy advisers. Throughout his 
involvement, Kelman increasingly came to see the Israeli-Palestinian issue as 
lying at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
According to Kelman, the core element of the dissention between the 
nationalist movements was the mutual denial of the adversary's national 
identity. In the late 1970s, there were no indications of either Israeli or 
Palestinian readiness to offer acceptance to the other side, thus the peace 
process reached a deadlock. The way out, according to Kelman, was to work 
towards the psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance, which 
required complementary and reciprocal actions by the two parties. Kelman 
carried his analysis further by proposing that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
were possible in a framework of mutual recognition in which 
acknowledgement of the other's rights represents the assertion rather than 
the abandonment of one's own rights.610 
 
According to Kelman and his colleagues, a lasting settlement of the conflict 
would be possible when it is responsive to the needs and fears of the two 
conflicting parties. Meeting human basic needs is the main criterion of a 
satisfactory solution, according to Kelman and his colleagues, and it was 
therefore essential to understand the two perspectives and to confront the 
differences between them. 
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In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman et al showed that although the 
workshops cannot become a substitute for official diplomacy, the results of 
such workshops can be beneficial in all the processes of the negotiations. 
Also the workshops and the relative measures can gradually help to build up 
trust once again in the negotiations As in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Kelman focused on the process of  renegotiation to help create an 
appropriate climate for negotiations and to set principles as bases for it.611 
 
Edward Azar is another expert in conflict settlement. During the 1980s, he 
held workshops to address the dispute between Argentina and the U.K. over 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the Lebanese civil war, and the fighting in Sri 
Lanka. In his approach, Azar was able to assess the degree of hostility 
versus friendliness in interactions and to track the frequency and nature of 
violent conflict in the world, over time. Azar`s analyses of international conflict 
indicated that since World War Two, almost all conflicts have occurred in the 
Third World, and many were ethnic rather than strategic. In the Cold War era, 
the interference of the US and the USSR aggravated the situation. These 
results convinced Azar that a shift in focus in international relations was 
necessary, from a "superpower bias” towards these countries. 
 
This realization, clearly ahead of its time, led Azar to coin the term "protracted 
social conflict" (PSC), and to develop a model that captured the reality of the 
most violent and apparently intractable conflicts in the world. He defined 
protracted social conflicts as "hostile interactions which extend over long 
periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in 
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frequency and intensity".612 Proposing that security and stability are linked to 
human dignity, quality of life, and true peace, rather than to military power 
and the threat of force, Azar thus sought to change the approach of 
international relations from strategic to humanistic. 
 
In those conditions where social scientists analyze conflicts and discover the 
power dynamics in the area of international interactive relations, they present 
solutions which are generally favourable to the superpower nations. Azar and 
his colleagues believed that the internal and social characteristics of the 
conflict must be considered in their internal aspect. In his studies of 
international conflicts, he deduced that ninety per cent of the conflicts had 
occurred in the Third World and that the mediation of the superpowers in 
most cases had been unsuccessful up until 1970. He concluded that 
mediations exerted on the basis of superpower solutions were largely 
ineffective. 
 
Azar noted that the role of the facilitators is the main asset in problem-solving 
workshops. He believed that such workshops allowed the parties to assess 
their immediate complaints and goals and make a distinction between their 
needs and interests. Recognition of needs paves the way for future 
negotiations and the reaching of an effective agreement. Azar placed the 
problem-solving approach firmly in the domain of "Track Two diplomacy", 
which involves unofficial efforts in the promotion of peaceful relations 
between warring parties. He acknowledgesd the seminal contributions of 
Burton, Doob, and Kelman, and adopted the term "third party consultation". 
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He then placed the use of workshops within a four-step process for the 
management of protracted social conflicts which included:  
 
1) Tracking the conflict 
2) Facilitating breakthroughs through workshops,  
3) Promoting structural development within the society, and  
4) Adopting development diplomacy to alleviate external barriers to 
resolution. 
 
Azar coined the term “problem-solving forum” to denote his model of the 
workshop approach. He emphasized the importance of creating the proper 
environment in which representatives of the parties can analyze their identity-
related needs through effective communication leading to the mutual 
discovery of breakthroughs. Thus, each party must come to recognize the 
legitimate needs and aspirations of the other, the third party providing 
impartial facilitation. Azar considers the panel of facilitators as an integral 
element of the forum model.613 
 
Azar outlined the steps of structural development and development diplomacy 
that must flow from and complement the forum process to resolve PSCS. 
Although problem-solving forums are necessary to achieve short-term 
breakthroughs, fundamental goals can be achieved only through long-term 
economic growth and sociopolitical reforms that include consensus building 
within and between communities. He believed that PSCS can not be 
managed or resolved without addressing the issues of economic 
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development and communal pluralism. Thus studying protracted social 
conflict led Azar to conclude that "peace is development in the broadest 
sense of the term."614 
 
A Proposed Solution to the NK Conflict 
 
The proposed solution stems partly from the author’s experience as a 
diplomat in the Caucasus region. What follows is a proposal which if carefully 
put into effect may enable lasting progress to be made. 
 
It can be concluded from the comments and lessons learnt from scholars that 
potentially workshops can affect the process of conflict-solving in two ways: 
firstly, by organizing and passing on the new ideas and results from the 
negotiations of the participants to the officials and those in senior positions on 
both sides of the conflict; and to important circles of society; and secondly, by 
introducing a third party to the issues surrounding the conflict in order to 
influence both parties and bring them closer together. Moreover, the 
initiatives of all four scholars discussed: Burton's interactive conflict 
resolution, Doob`s human relations training workshop, Kelman`s social-
psychological unofficial interactions and Azar`s problem-solving forum, are 
basically indirect social-psychological interventions in which changes are 
transferred from the individual to the community, thereby affecting political 
trends on a broader scale.  
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Since these scholars have achieved some positive results in testing their 
theories in their case studies, it can be said that unofficial social-
psychological interaction can have a relatively important impact on 
negotiations, mutual recognition and the process of conflict settlement in 
general. Thus, Burton, Kelman, Doob and Azar deduced relatively important 
principles and concepts, all of which are necessary for solving complicated 
and protracted disputes. 
 
As mentioned before, the NK question is a complex, drawn-out struggle 
taking place in a sensitive geo-political and geo-economic region. On the one 
hand, the political and military importance of the Caucasus cannot be 
abandoned by the regional and global powers, and on the other, this conflict 
is happening in close proximity to important energy projects and has the 
potential to impact significantly on the global economy.  
 
Also, the differences between the Azeri and Armenian nations and culture are 
significant and the collective consciousness of people on both sides are 
littered with bad experiences and failed efforts to achieve a lasting peace. 
The NK dispute is not about territory but about the cultural values of the two 
nations. Thus, because of these problems, if the authorities of either side 
compromise on these issues it will, as a consequence, result in an internal 
crisis and the loss of power. 
 
Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the Minsk Group lies 
here. In the 15 years of negotiations, the mediators - the US, Russia and 
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France - were only in contact with the leaders of the conflicting factions. In 
particular, all of these activities and proposals were confidential, meaning that 
these secret negotiations without transparency were unlikely to produce 
peace because there was no public input and feedback. Although members 
of the Minsk Group have not used any psychological strategy in spite of its 
great strength, it can be said that peace-making policies which are based on 
unofficial social-psychological interaction can be effective in the solving of the 
NK conflict because the people of both sides have the opportunity to be 
engaged in peace-building.  
 
Also, despite the theories of the above-mentioned researchers, the 
cooperation of unofficial movements must be counted not only as part of the 
official and diplomatic processes but should also be accorded greater priority 
and attention, and if they are replaced by official diplomacy from the 
beginning, they can play a role as initiators of the negotiations. Problem-
solving workshops do not offer a total solution. They are inputs into the 
settlement. Also, these workshops are not alternatives to a political approach 
and negotiations but merely a supplement to them. As has been indicated, 
the workshops should be sponsored by academic bodies independent of 
governmental organizations. 
 
It can be said that during the past 15 years when only official authorities and 
diplomatic organizations have been involved in the NK peace process, there 
has been little noticeable progress or convergence between the two sides. 
Because of the psychological warfare of both governments, the younger 
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generations in particular, feel even greater animosity towards the other side 
than their parents. This is patently obvious among the new Azeri generation. 
Thus, the beliefs of the afore-mentioned scholars regarding the need to follow 
the problem-solving workshop solutions of official diplomats have never been 
effective in the NK dispute and the efforts which have been described earlier 
for conflict settlement have not resulted in any progress.  
 
In addition to the points which have been discussed above, neither side 
possesses the political resources to impose a solution by themselves. There 
is no national consensus for compromise among the parties to the conflict. 
There are no trump cards the leaders can play or any plan for a peace 
agreement. Secret negotiations have been one of the main obstacles to a 
resolution because transparency and the support of the people are necessary 
for any concessions by the leaders. Moreover, the people have not been 
engaged in the peace process and they are considered strangers to the 
negotiations. Thus, at the present time, it has been shown that the Track One 
approach will not resolve the conflict on its own.  
 
By using the experience of scholars - which is the key response to the 
obstacles in this conflict - and discussions by representatives of both parties 
at unofficial meetings with skilled facilitators and scholar-practitioners in 
interactive conflict resolution, this problem has a greater chance of being 
settled. 
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Burton was one such diplomat who became dissatisfied with traditional 
diplomacy. His novel approach in the field of international relations from the 
creation of controlled communication to interactive conflict resolution, was 
successful because, as a diplomat, he understood the difficulties of dealing 
with official negotiations and that is why when he became an academic he 
was able to propose new and successful ideas for conflict resolution. He was 
able to aid the settlement of the conflicts in Malaysia and Indonesia after the 
failure of official mediation because he used his previous contacts as an 
Australian diplomat to send letters to the parties concerned asking them to 
nominate representatives for an academic analysis of the dispute. 
 
It is clear that their unofficial solutions, especially the “problem-solving 
workshops” and the presence of a third party - in other words, the art of Track 
Two diplomacy - would be the best way of tackling the obstacles to the 
Karabakh problem and helping settle the predicament. 
 
The enhancement of the role of popular communities in solving the dispute is 
another reason proving that indirect social-psychological solutions are useful. 
As was seen, in the Paris and Key West talks, both the Armenian and Azeri 
authorities came close to an agreement on a particular formula for solving the 
differences, but internal opposition, especially from Azerbaijan caused the 
negotiations to fail. 
 
Since a lack of mutual trust is one of the main obstacles in the NK peace 
process, problem-solving workshops, especially third party workshops would 
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be useful in renewing confidence in the negotiations. Such workshops are 
needed in order to solve the NK crisis. 
 
Another factor for advocating the usage of Track Two diplomacy is that the 
belligerents are able to negotiate different solutions to the conflict merely 
through discussion without being worried about political reactions, and also 
enjoy the benefit of political interaction without any risk. In practice, none of 
the decision-making participants can arrange greater flexibility in the 
workshops than the officials and decision-makers. They can even deny their 
participation in case of failure. 
 
As presented and discussed, each of the four researchers offer different 
proposals for the arrangement of the members participating in the problem-
solving and third-party workshops. Because of the deep animosity and 
differences of opinion between the protagonists as well as numerous other 
influential factors, the NK dispute is different from the conflicts which have 
been studied by these scholars, so it is suggested that the ideas of all four 
should be used in the arrangement of the participants in the different 
workshops. Of course it should be emphasised that a careful analysis of the 
parties and issues are a priority in this approach. 
 
With regard to Burton's positive experience, the setting up of workshops and 
related measures, such as the holding of seminars should be directly 
supported by universities and academics. It should be stated that seminars 
must not have a fixed agenda but discussions should be open-ended to 
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explore any new ideas which may come up. Considering the special 
characteristics of the NK problem, it might be sensible for two authoritative 
British or American universities to take responsibility for the organizing of 
such workshops and the measures, ceremonies and meetings to be held 
therein. The scholar-practitioners who oversee the various sessions and who 
play a facilitative and diagnostic role have a crucial task. It is reasonable that 
the sponsoring universities should assume such responsibility by notifying 
and obtaining the consent and support of their respective governments and 
the OSCE. The establishing of university-based centres for conflict resolution 
in Armenia and Azerbaijan are also recommended. These centres for 
research and training, with special attention to culture and cultural analysis, 
would be supplementary. 
 
The aim of setting up the problem-solving workshops must be to create an 
atmosphere in which the participants will be able to express their basic needs 
through the forming of effective relationships and to recognize and remove 
obstacles through a peaceful process in order to pave the way for 
compromise and agreement. On such grounds, the third party must facilitate 
the peace process in a fair way through a convergence of viewpoints and the 
removing of anxieties and a recognition of the needs of both sides. 
 
Without doubt, Burton's emphasis on the role of the organizer in the NK 
conflict has another importance. Naturally, holding and running the problem-
solving workshops is critical in relation to the conditions and complexities of 
the NK conflict. Therefore, one must be careful with selection. The organizer 
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must be able to begin the negotiations from a proper starting point and lead 
the discussions to creative and new results through measured planning as 
well as a controlled and balanced agenda. Otherwise, the business of the 
meetings will be preceded by accusations, complaints, demands and the 
claims of belligerents. Moreover, the taking of fixed positions will lead to a 
disturbance of the peace and a tense atmosphere, in which no progress will 
be made in bringing the viewpoints of the two sides together. Thus, the 
organizer must expertly guide the peace process towards common ground 
and interests, in order to achieve positive results.    
 
Taking into account the characteristics of the NK conflict, the following 
attributes are the most important ones for the organizer to have: competence, 
ability, reliability and acceptability by both sides but, particularly, the sharing 
of a common culture and values with the disputants’ culture and beliefs. 
 
Apart from the organisers’ role, members of the third-party workshops must 
be selected according to appropriate criteria. As Azar has emphasized, it is 
necessary that the facilitator board be impartial, well-informed, expert and 
reliable in the eyes of the adversaries in order to establish an open mind 
towards consultation with the third party (the third-party workshop). This will 
help it establish a mutual understanding between the two sides. Thus, it is 
proposed that selection of members of the third party (or the facilitator 
boards) be entrusted to the sponsoring university or universities, who will 
choose the members after widespread and comprehensive research. They 
should include political actors, leaders and activists from political parties and 
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movements, military personnel, the political elite, students and so on. The 
workshops should be coordinated with the relevant decision-makers of the 
parties and similarly the participants should be aware of the position of the 
decision-makers. 
 
Another point is that in the organization of the workshops, the participants’ 
selection must be balanced ethnically, by class and gender, so that they can 
arrange their activities and consultations effectively in a harmonious team. It 
is evident that any mistake in the selection of the participants will severely 
damage the running of the workshop. 
 
In general, when arranging the members of the problem-solving workshops 
and the participants in the third-party workshop for this conflict, it is advisable 
to include:  
 
 University professors in relevant fields, such as social psychology, political 
scence, sociology, law, human relations, history and international relations 
from the sponsoring university or universities, along with professors from 
the opposing factions. It is also recommended to add professors from 
neighbouring countries to this group. As for Burton's positive experience, 
the participation of students from the sponsoring universities and other 
universities including those of Armenia and Azerbaijan can be effective in 
creating a lively and more scientific atmosphere in the workshops.  
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 Influential figures among the groups and movements of the disputing 
parties, outstanding party figures and generally reliable and influential 
political and social figures. 
 Former statesmen and officials along with parliamentary representatives 
of past periods (particularly the members of foreign relations committees), 
former diplomats and politically-involved academicians 
 Journalists and press editors, writers, poets and outstanding artists. 
 
Regarding Azar`s positive practical experience, it is desirable to develop and 
improve the agenda by progress in the workshop. In other words, by creating 
an atmosphere of mutual trust and bringing together the viewpoints of the two 
sides in the preliminary sessions. The official authorities and their 
representatives must also be invited to take part in subsequent workshops. In 
this respect, it is recommended to start this process with the parliaments of 
both sides and then invite other influential figures. With regard to the 
importance, sensitivity and influence of the meetings in which the official and 
governmental representatives participate, it is better to invite to the 
preliminary workshops younger and more flexible representatives as well as 
impartial statesmen and diplomats who have had an academic education.  
 
If extremist elements like combatant volunteers, militiamen and well-known 
opponents of peace are invited to the social-psychological workshops, it can 
be fairly claimed that by being exposed to indirect popular negotiations, their 
mentalities will be gradually modified in the company of the scholars and 
flexible-minded young people taking part in the workshops. In a peaceful and 
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creative atmosphere, their views will be guided towards moderation and 
finally they will become advocates of peace. This is important especially 
considering the fact that similar extremist militants in Azerbaijan are 
becoming increasingly radical at the present time, to the despair of the 
mediators.   
 
There are several examples of situations where hardline views have been 
moderated as a result. For example, Presidents Kocharian and Sarkisian, 
who were previously hardliners, became more amenable as they became 
involved in the negotiations after they became President. Also if the case of 
the Tajikestan conflict is reviewed, there is evidence of a shift from an  
extreme to a more moderate view after extremists were involved in the 
negotiation process. 
 
As a final step in the peace process, the leaders and authorities of the 
conflicting states, neighbouring countries, and international figures should be 
invited by the OSCE to these conferences. The precise number of 
conferences will be decided by judging public opinion and feelings. The first 
conference that will take place depends on the agenda, and participant 
support will determine how it will be followed up in terms of other meetings 
and further conferences. The presence of Security Council members will 
certainly facilitate agreement and also guarantee implementation at a higher 
level. Of course, the sponsoring body must be explicitly designated as an 
executive guarantee for the peace treaty. In the matter of regional conditions 
and rivalry among the numerous actors in the area, the UN Security Council, 
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as the supreme international organization possessing the necessary tools to 
take on this responsibility, should attend. Also, if observers and peacekeeping 
forces are to be deployed, they should be invited from a state, whose 
impartiality is evident. If either party so wishes, the forces of the neighbouring 
states may be asked to cooperate. The timescale for these conferences 
should be flexible but they should take place as soon as possible. 
 
As has already been indicated, the main emphasis of the Azeris and their 
associates was on the internal social structures of the conflict. Thus, their 
solutions were based on the goal of analyzing the social and internal 
obstacles for settling disputes psychologically through problem-solving and 
third-party workshops. Using this approach they tried to resolve the internal 
aspects of the conflict (which they believe are the main roots of the 
disagreement). But, in the NK situation, along with internal factors, there are 
external ones which are important and influential items in the process of 
conflict development. It is plain that rivalry among the powers has become 
greater compared with the Cold war era in sensitive and geo-political 
locations like the Caucasus. Thus, in the event of a war breaking out in such 
an area, it is understandable that the regional and global powers would try to 
manage and control it. Therefore, one needs to consider the use of third 
parties as a serious determinant in solving the NK dispute. It is clear that this 
important external aspect of conflict resolution has been ignored by the 
above-mentioned scholars, as they have only concentrated on the removal of 
relevant internal causes. 
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It should also be mentioned that Azar does not believe in the use of force by 
the superpowers to impose a settlement and he thinks that the final solution 
to the struggle is closely related to its internal features and to the social 
structures. But, in the case of the NK conflict, merely taking the internal 
aspects into account is impossible, for obvious reasons. In other words, any 
solution that disregards the national security and interests of the regional 
powers would not have any chance of being accepted and executed because 
the two sides are not prepared to study any such suggestion. Also any 
proposal that puts the national security and interests of Russia and Iran (like 
Goble`s plan of territorial exchanges) at risk will be immediately rejected by 
both sides as,  not surprisingly, they will avoid opening a debate on it. 
Besides, it is simplistic to imagine that the regional powers will overlook any 
peace plan or allow one that damages their national security and interests to 
be carried out. Thus, the national interests and security of the neighbouring 
states is a key point that must be considered in the peace plan of the NK 
conflict. 
 
As Azar has emphasized, political and economic development is needed as a 
supplement in the practice of the workshops and problem-solving forums. In 
fact, this is a necessary condition for the final and stable solution of conflicts, 
because, problem-solving workshops can only achieve short-term success. 
Achieving fundamental goals will only be possible through long-term 
economic development and social and political reforms (including public 
harmony, intra- and inter- communities, and the removal of the conditions and 
grounds that have led to ethnic discrimination and warfare). It can be claimed 
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that these supplementary requirements for the problem-solving workshops 
constitute the most important conditions for establishing a stable peace in the 
region. It is quite clear that economic development and political and social 
reforms are absolutely necessary in the peace process of the NK dispute. 
Economic development perceived or otherwise is also a great ‘leveller’ and 
will hopefully bring people a shared enthusiasm for the future. Since the 
antagonists have been in a ‘no war no peace’ situation for many years, their 
economic status is extremely critical. On the other hand, the war broke out 
just after independence and the prolongation of the ‘no war no peace’ 
equation prevented these states from being able to progress with democratic 
development and political reforms. Thus, both sides are seriously in need of 
these improvements and undoubtedly the establishment of peace and 
stability in the region cannot be envisaged unless this vital factor is 
considered. If the Armenians or Azeris are unsuccessful with these reforms 
and developments, and if these problems are not addressed, there is little 
expectation of any stable peace in the region. 
 
Therefore, the programmes related to the diplomacy of political and economic 
development must be carried out, while the peace process must bring about a 
convergence of the views of both sides, based on contemporary strategies for 
solving conflicts. In this respect, the OSCE should invite the G8 members, 
together with other European countries and international financial agencies, 
to seriously help the political and economic development and reform of the 
opposing factions by offering software and hardware aids together with 
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incentives to attract inward investors. Undoubtedly this will have positive 
effects on the peace process. 
.  
It is necessary to state that the western powers should be careful in offering 
economic assistance and following their political goals, which may be 
opposed to the interests of the regional states, as they require a proper 
understanding of the realities of the region. The west should know that the 
three great states of the region - Iran, Russia, and Turkey - have serious 
interests in the Caucasus. Thus, western politicians must consider the 
Caucasus as a whole and avoid arranging separate and particular policies for 
each part of this region, otherwise their political and economic assistance will 
not only have no effect in solving the NK problem, but will also cause the 
peace process to be prolonged. 
 
It is clear that weak governments will never have the ability to compromise 
and on the other hand, the development of democracy will result in the 
greater participation of the people and more power to the government. 
Therefore, the assistance of countries and international agencies must be 
considered as a basic principle to put Azerbaijan and Armenia on the way to 
democratic reforms. In this respect, the role of the European Union, the UN 
and the three states of France, the United States and Russia is very 
important. 
 
In addition to the need to use unofficial social and psychological methods as 
suggested above, it is also necessary to make use of other types of unofficial 
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diplomacy. Certainly, in ethnic conflicts, which are characterised by deep-
rooted fear and animosity between two nations, it takes time to prepare the 
ground for compromise; because solving such disputes will not be achieved 
merely through an agreement, but it is important to achieve conditions in 
which the peace accord is permanently maintained. The experience of the 
Sudan conflict (1972), and the peace which lasted for a mere decade, 
teaches us that one must look for a plan in which the roots and grounds of the 
conflict have been totally removed. To succeed with such a peace plan, other 
types of unofficial diplomacy need to be used apart from the afore-mentioned 
solutions. Generally, one needs to adopt several measures simultaneously, 
such as holding problem-solving workshops and taking other relevant steps.  
Examples of these include: 
 
 The introduction, by an agreement between the two governments, of 
social-psychological solutions and problem-solving workshops. As soon 
as their nominees have been sent to the workshops, the governments of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK must be encouraged to remove any direct or 
indirect propaganda from the agendas of the various organizations that 
would increase hostility between the two nations. For instance, a revision 
of the textbooks and the crossing out of historical references which were 
in some way indicative of the strained relations of both nations in the past. 
Similar topics must be eliminated from other texts, stories, poems, 
documents, movies and so on. 
 In the next step, all propaganda needs to be centralized to generate fresh 
ideas and reform ethnic dreams so that a spirit of tolerance and 
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cooperation can be nurtured between the two nations. For instance the 
hostile subjects in the textbooks need to be progressively replaced by 
materials that help the peace process. 
 Producing and broadcasting films and television serials aimed at 
advancing the spirit of compromise and conciliation in the opposing states. 
Although there have been numerous antagonistic indications in the history 
of both the Azeri and Armenian nations, signs of peaceful coexistence 
between the Armenians and Azeris in Azerbaijan and Armenia can also be 
found either in the era when this region was part of Iran's territory or 
during the 70-year communist government. The writer remembers well the 
story of an old Armenian woman who was forced to move to Yerevan from 
Baku. She used to call her Moslem neighbours and with tears in her eyes 
she chatted with them and reminisced about their tranquil life together. 
Therefore, producing movies and television serials which artistically show 
some fond memories and recollections of Armenian and Azeri coexistence 
will effectively prepare public opinion for reconciliation and the restoration 
of peace and stability in the region. 
 Publishing essays in both languages which report economic problems and 
reveal the cost of the “no-war-no-peace” situation and in return the 
benefits of peace and reconciliation for the two opposing parties and the 
region. Similarly, NGOs and international peacemaking organizations are 
important for implementing the relevant plans for peace building. 
 
Today, taking into account the positive experience in many conflicts, the 
success of such plans lies in not keeping anything secret since the 
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advantages and success of "Track Two Diplomacy" in solving international 
conflicts have been proven. It is obvious that demilitarization and the 
promotion of a civil society in Armenia and Azerbaijan are the most important 
duties of these organizations.  
 
Generally, peace-building activities must follow this aim so as to control 
ethnic hostilities and fear through political symbols, and to reform and 
moderate the dreams and ideals of the conflicting parties so as to replace 
antagonism with mutual understanding. These organizations will assume the 
direction of all peace-building processes like making films and television 
serials, publishing essays as well as poems and books about peace. 
 
 Trust-building measures are some of the most basic steps in the peace 
process and undoubtedly these would be extremely practical and effective 
in the NK context. Thus, these measures must be on the agenda in some 
form or other together with the social-psychological solutions. The 
mediators and international NGOs involved in humanitarian measures and 
peace must always encourage both factions to adopt such initiatives. 
Actions such as granting unilateral and symbolic concessions, like the 
withdrawal from less important regions to show their good intentions to 
bring about reconciliation and stop the conflict will definitely be effective 
and have psychological consequences by preparing an atmosphere for 
peace and reconciliation. 
 At the present time, most scholars and experts in conflict resolution 
believe that the cooperation and participation of different levels of society 
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as well as that of the administration of the country are vital for solving any 
disagreement. This is because in the end they must consent to a peace 
treaty. It is clear that no peace accord will ever be finalized without the will 
and assistance of public opinion. The NK conflict is about issues which 
can never be resolved except by political leaders and authorities, as the 
mediators and influential powers are not able to settle it because they do 
not have the tools to change the values of the belligerents. Thus, the only 
way of resolving the NK conflict is by gradual planning to prepare public 
opinion and the agreement of the entire population. Such a solution is a 
combination of official (governmental) measures at all levels and unofficial 
(popular) efforts with the assistance of all strata and movements of 
society, along with the support of global powers and international finance 
organizations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the NK problem is the most obvious example 
proving the inefficiency of using solely traditional diplomatic solutions. 
Although some of those theorists mentioned have been effective in a few 
conflicts, such as Hossennov`s power-sharing proposal in the Balkan crisis, 
they have been applied to the NK context and have failed abysmally. Also, a 
mere reliance on contemporary problem-solving recommendations will not be 
responsive in the NK case. Thus, taking into consideration the peculiar 
character of the NK conflict, it is necessary to apply a combination of 
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procedures and test and use any formula that is recognized as being most 
appropriate and efficient for the NK situation.  
 
In other words, what is needed is to combine a collection of intra-state 
measures along with inter-state efforts and super-state activities; because in 
such ethno-territorial fighting the only efficient answer is a comprehensive 
one consisting of past experience and the findings of present-day 
researchers. For instance, using an economic stimulus will never be effective 
on its own, but this recipe can be applied along with other solutions as a 
positive factor for solving the impasse. Thus, the granting of economic 
concessions and incentives to encourage both sides to start cooperation 
aiming at gaining common benefits will be much more likely to be effective. 
Among contemporary solutions, the social-psychological one seems to be the 
most suitable for the NK crisis because no psychological mechanism has so 
far been applied to prepare the conditions in which the two parties listen to 
one another seriously. From this point of view it may be said that the NK 
peace process has not really started. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
Chronology of key events 
 
1988 
 
January 
 The first forced population movements of the emerging conflict take place 
as Azerbaijanis flee Kapan  
February 
 The local soviet of the NKAO appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet to 
transfer its centre from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. Mass 
Armenia support for the proposal.  
 An unofficial Karabakh Manukian.  
 Soviet media reports on the death of an Azerbaijani citizen in Armenian 
hands. Mass reprisals. Committee is formed comprising Ter-Petrossian 
and Vazgen Armenians in Sumqayit, north of Baku. Official reports put the 
death toll at about 30, but Armenians claim it was far higher 
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 Karabakh party leader Boris Kevorkov is removed from his post. 
March 
 
 CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev explicitly 
rules out any changes to the borders between union republics. Moscow 
announces an economic aid and investment package for the NKAO. 
 Public-political organization ‘Krunk’ founded in the NKAO capital, headed 
by Arkady Manucharov, with the aim of leading the national-liberation 
movement of Karabakh Armenians.. 
 
May 
 
 Resignation of first secretaries of the Communist Parties of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, Karen Demirchian and Kyamran Bagirov. 
 
June  
 
 NK District Television Station established 
 
June-July 
 
 The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet calls on the USSR Supreme Soviet to 
approve the local NKAO soviet's appeal for the region's transfer to 
Armenia. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet condemns that appeal as 
interference into Azerbaijan's internal affairs. The USSR Supreme Soviet 
Presidium formally rejects the NKAO soviet's request.  
 
September 
 
 Russia declares martial law in NKAO. 
 
September-October 
 
 Following scattered inter-ethnic clashes, Azerbaijanis begin to flee from 
the NKAO and Armenia - to Azerbaijan. 
 
December 
 
 Karabakh Committee members arrested and taken to Moscow, where 
they are held in prison until May 1989. 
 Armenia is struck by a powerful earthquake killing 25,000 people and 
leaving 500,000 homeless. 
 
1989 
 
January 
 
 Moscow imposes direct rule in NK 
 Volsky establishes a Special Administration Committee for Karabakh. 
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June-July 
 
 Popular anger in Azerbaijan over the Karabakh Armenian demands. Mass 
demonstrations in Baku which serve as catalyst for the emergence of the 
Azerbaijan Popular Front. 
 
August 
 
 Azerbaijan imposes railway blockade on Armenia and NKAO. Armenians 
retaliate by staging labour strikes. 
 
November 
 
 The Armenian National Movement convenes its first congress in Yerevan 
and elects Ter Petrossian as Chairman. 
 Moscow lifts direct rule on NK 
 
December  
 
 The Karabakh National Council passes a joint resolution with the Supreme 
Soviet of Armenia declaring NK’s unification with the Armenian SSR. 
 
1990 
 
January  
 
 Seizure of Azerbaijani hostages by Armenians in the region of Shaumian 
of Azerbaijan SSR. 
 An illegal supply of approximately 100 tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft 
weapons by the Soviet military to Armenia. 
 The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet condemns the decision of the Armenian 
Supreme Soviet to include NKAR in its economic sphere declaring it a 
grave violation of the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Republic. 
 Armed attacks by Armenians who occupy the village of Karki in 
Nakhchivan  
 ‘Black January’ - anti-Armenian pogroms take place killing about 90 and 
forcing virtually all Armenians to flee  Baku 
 Armed Armenian infantry show up in the village of Gushchu of Khanlar, 
NK 
 Armenians assault the settlement of Sadarak in Nakhchivan Aron. 
 Soviet troops enter Baku. 124 people killed and 737 wounded. A State of 
emergency is declared in Baku and in other Azerbaijani cities 
 The Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR demands the immediate 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Baku. 
 The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR passes a resolution declaring 
illegal the July 1921 decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Russian Communist Party which left NKAR as part of 
the Azerbaijani SSR. 
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February 
 
 Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov replaced as First Secretary of Communist Party 
of Azerbaijan by Mutalibov, who is elected Azerbaijan's first President in 
September. 
 
March 
  
 The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR passes a 
resolution on inadmissibility of territorial claims by the Armenian SSR.  
Armed thugs of the Armenian SSR attack villages of the Gazakh region of 
the Azerbaijani SSR. All civilians in these villages are killed. 
 Attempts to organize elections of the Armenian SSR people's deputies in 
the territory of the NKAR fail. 
 
May 
 
 The resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR on the anti-
constitutional decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and its 
Presidium concerning NK. 
 
June 
  
 USSR President decrees on prohibition to form armed forces, which are 
not envisaged in the legislation of the USSR, and confiscation of illegally-
kept weapons 
 The Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijani SSR pass a resolution on 
resumption of sovereign rights of the Azerbaijani SSR in NKAR and 
measures for socio-economic development of the region. 
 
September 
 
 The People's deputies of the USSR from Azerbaijan appeal to the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the forcible deportation of the Azerbaijani 
Armenians. 
 Fighting along border between Nakhichevan and Iran as rioters destroy 
border installations. Tension eases after Soviet and Iranian authorities 
agree to ease restrictions on crossings between the two countries.  
 Dozens die in inter-ethnic violence in Baku. Popular Front demonstrators 
demand resignation of communist authorities. Soviet troops use force to 
end unrest, killing at least 100 people.  
 Ayaz Mutallibov becomes Azeri Communist Party leader.  
 Communist Party retains power in multi-party elections but parliament has 
an official opposition for the first time. 
 
1990 
 
January 
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 Ayaz Mutallibov becomes Azeri Communist Party leader. 
 Seizure of Azerbaijani hostages by Armenians in the region of Shaumian 
of Azerbaijan SSR. 
 The Soviet army illegally supplies approximately 100 tanks, artillery and 
anti-aircraft weapons to Armenia. 
 The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet condemns the decision by the Armenian 
Supreme Soviet to include NKAR in its economic sphere and considers it 
as a grave violation of the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Republic. 
 The village of Karki in Nakhchivan is occupied by Armenian-Russian 
troops 
 In Azerbaijan’s ‘Black January’, anti-Armenian pogroms take place killing 
about 90 and forcing virtually all Armenians to flee the city.  
 Armed Armenian infantry enter the village of Gushchu in the Khanlar 
region of Azerbaijan 
 Armenian assault on the settlement of Sadarak in Nakhchivan . 
 Soviet troops enter Baku. As a result, 124 people are killed and 737 
people are wounded. A State of emergency is declared in Baku and in 
other Azerbaijani cities. 
 The Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR demands the immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Baku. 
 
February 
  
 Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov is replaced as First Secretary of Communist 
Party of Azerbaijan by Mutalibov, who was elected Azerbaijan's first 
President in September. 
 
March 
  
 Mikhail Gorbachev elected president of the Soviet Union 
 The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR passes a 
resolution on inadmissibility of territorial claims by the Armenian SSR. 
 The Supreme Soviet of the USSR passes a resolution on the situation in 
the Azerbaijani SSR and Armenian SSR and on the measures for 
normalising the situation in that region 
 Armed Armenian SSR thugs attack villages of the Gazakh region of the 
Azerbaijani SSR. All civilians in these villages killed.  
 
May 
 
 Supreme Council of Azerbaijan SSR elects Mutallibov as the first 
President of Azerbaijan’s SSR. 
 Attempt to organise elections of the people's deputies of the Armenian 
SSR in NKAR territory fail. 
 
June 
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 Decree by USSR President on prohibition to form armed forces which are 
not envisaged in the legislation of the USSR and confiscation of illegally 
kept weapons. 
 The Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijani SSR passes a resolution on 
resumption of sovereign rights of the Azerbaijani SSR in NKAR and 
measures for socio-economic development in the region. 
 
September 
   
 The People's deputies of the USSR from Azerbaijan appeal to the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, concerning forcible deportation of 
Azerbaijanis living in Armenia. 
 Fighting flares along border between Nakhichevan exclave and Iran as 
rioters destroy border installations. Tension decreases after Soviet and 
Iranian authorities agree to ease restrictions on crossing between the two 
countries.  
 Dozens die in inter-ethnic violence in Baku. Popular Front demonstrators 
demand resignation of communist authorities. Soviet troops use force to 
end unrest. 
 
December 
 
 The Supreme Council of Azerbaijan SSR officially renames the country 
the Republic of Azerbaijan and adopts the Declaration of Sovereignty. 
 
1991 
 
January  
 
 The Armenians of Karabakh declare independence from Azerbaijan.  
 The Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR passes a resolution unifying 
the Armenian populated Shaumian region with the Kasum-Ismailov region 
of Azerbaijan, creating a new region called Geranboy 
 
May-June 
 
 The Soviet army and Azerbaijani special police troops round up thousands 
of Armenians from villages in the north of the NKAO and in neighboring 
districts of Azerbaijan and deport them to Armenia. Sporadic fighting 
intensifies. 
 
July 
 
 Heydar Aliyev elected a member of Azerbaijan's parliament.  
 
September 
 
 Mütallibov elected President of Azerbaijan in a single-candidate 
nationwide election. 
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 Nagorno-Karabakh’s parliament proclaims establishment of independent 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. 
 Levon Ter-Petrossian elected Armenian President. Armenia holds 
referendum and formally secedes from the USSR.  
 Heydar Aliyev is elected chairman of the Nakhichevan Supreme Soviet. 
 Meeting of Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Zheleznovodsk 
(Russia) mediated by the Russian and Kazakhstan Presidents.  
 
November 
 
 Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet annuls the autonomous status of the NKAO. 
The region's parliament responds by holding a referendum in which 
Karabakh Armenians vote overwhelmingly in favour of secession from 
Azerbaijan. 
 
December 
 
 Gorbachev resigns as president of the Soviet Union 
 Azerbaijan approves the Declaration of Independence in a nationwide 
referendum 
 The leaders of CIS countries call on Azerbaijan and Armenia to resume 
the negotiation process.  
 
1992 
 
January 
 
 The Republic of Azerbaijan joins the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE). 
 Armenia joins the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) 
 NK parliament declares the region's independence. Conflict escalates into 
full-fledged war 
 
February 
 
 Karabakhi Armenian forces attack the Azerbaijani-populated village of 
Khojaly in NK and take control of the city 
 Iran seeks unsuccessfully to mediate a cease-fire 
 
March 
 
 The Azerbaijani parliament blames President Mutalibov for the Khojaly 
massacre and forces him to resign 
 The CSCE creates the 11-country Minsk Group with the aim of mediating 
a solution to the conflict 
 
May 
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 Karabakhi Armenian forces take the town of Shusha and extend control 
over the Lachin corridor linking Karabakh and Armenia. Former Azerbaijan 
President Ayaz Mutalibov is forced to flee to Russia after an abortive 
comeback attempt. The Azerbaijan Popular Front takes power in 
Azerbaijan. 
 Ghambar is elected as the new Chairman of the National Assembly of 
Azerbaijan and takes on the temporary duties of President of Azerbaijan 
until the national elections. 
 
June 
  
 The first Minsk Group emergency meeting held in Rome. 
 Azerbaijan launches offensive against Armenians in Mardakert, in 
northern Karabakh, and the neighboring Geranboi/Shaumian district of 
Azerbaijan, displacing some 40,000 Armenians. 
August  
 Robert Kocharian becomes head of a new State Defence Committee, 
established as Nagorno Karabakh’s executive body. 
October 
 The United States Congress passes Section 907 of the Freedom Support 
Act prohibiting US government aid to Azerbaijan. 
December 
 The OSCE Stockholm meeting fails to agree ceasefire agreement as 
Azerbaijan backs down. 
1993 
 
February-June 
 
 Armenian forces launch a counter-attack and retake Mardakert. They go 
on to take Kelbajar in April 1993, a defeat that paves the way for an 
uprising in June by rebel Azerbaijani Colonel Suret Huseinov.  
 Azerbaijan's President Abulfaz Elchibey forced into exile 
 June: The return to power of Heydar Aliyev 
 
March 
  
 Meeting of personal representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, USA, 
Turkey and chairman of the CSCE Minsk group 
 
July-August 
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 Karabakh Armenian forces take Agdam, and then push south towards the 
Iranian border, occupying the Qubatli, Jebrayli, and Fizuli districts. 
 
August-September 
 
 Russian envoy Vladimir Kazimirov mediates a temporary cease-fire, which 
is subsequently prolonged until early November.  
 Aliyev meets Russian President Boris Yeltsin and renounces a military 
solution to the conflict.  
 Direct talks between Azerbaijani and Karabakh representatives take place 
in Moscow.  
 Aliyev elected Azerbaijani president in October 1993. 
October 
  
 Azerbaijan violates cease-fire by launching a new offensive.  
 Karabakh Armenian forces repel the attack and then advance westward to 
take Zangelan district in southwest Azerbaijan.  
 The UN Security Council adopts four resolutions calling for a halt to the 
fighting. 
 Aliyev is elected President of Azerbaijan. 
 UN Resolution 874 (14th October) stipulates a timetable for the withdrawal 
of Armenian forces from the occupied territories. 
 Minsk Group Chairman, Mr. Mario Raffaelli, presents a peace plan for the 
settlement of the NK conflict. 
 
November 
  
 UN Resolution 884 condemns the occupation of Goradiz and Zengelan. 
The year ends with a renewed Azerbaijani offensive 
 
December 
 
 Azerbaijan launches a new offensive to the south of Karabakh and initially 
wins back some territory in fierce fighting, but is then forced to retreat. 
 The Republic of Azerbaijan joins the CSCE Charter of Paris on 20th 
December 1993 
 
October 
 
 Azerbaijan violates cease-fire by launching a new offensive. Karabakh 
Armenian forces repel the attack and then advance westward to take 
Zangelan district in southwest Azerbaijan.  
 The UN Security Council adopts four resolutions calling for a halt to the 
fighting. 
 
1994 
January-March 
427 
 Azerbaijani and Armenian forces suffer heavy losses in fierce fighting from 
late January to mid-February. 
 Series of negotiations and consultations to reach an agreement on cease-
fire through the mediation of Russia and CSCE. 
March 
 Visit of the peacemaker group of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of CIS 
headed by Speaker of Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council, together with 
Russian President’s representative to Baku, Yerevan, and NK. 
May 
 
 The Bishkek Protocol is signed and a cease-fire begins on 12th May. 
 
July 
 
 The Defence Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the head of the 
Karabakh armed forces sign a further cease-fire agreement legalising the 
Bishkek Protocol. 
 
August 
 
 Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Karabakh representatives meet in Moscow to 
discuss a so-called Major Political Agreement to resolve the conflict. 
September 
 September: Azerbaijan signs a contract to develop its offshore Azeri-
Shirag-Gunashli oilfields with foreign companies. 
 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at their Washington meeting discuss the 
NK conflict. 
October  
 Huseynov flees Azerbaijan as the suspected organiser of an alleged failed 
coup. 
November  
 In the third round of talks since the ceasefire, Azerbaijan makes new 
demands for the inclusion of Karabakhi Azeris in the process and insists 
on a CSCE-mediated peace process. 
December 
  
 At the CSCE Budapest Summit it is decided to establish co-chairmanship 
of the Minsk Conference. 
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 At this summit the CSCE becomes the OSCE and Russia and Sweden 
become co-chairs of the Minsk Group. The High Level Planning Group of 
the OSCE is formed. 
 Robert Kocharian is voted de facto President of NK by parliament on. 
 
1995 
 
January 
 
 Newly elected NK Prime Minister, Leonard Petrossian, meets with 
representatives from the European Union. 
 
February 
  
 Negotiations between Azerbaijan, NK and Armenia, under the auspices of 
the OSCE Minsk Conference Co-Chairs in Moscow.  
 The Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference and Minsk Group visit 
NKR. 
March 
  
 A coup attempt led by Deputy Minister of the Interior Colonel, Rovshan 
Javadov fails in Baku. He and dozens of other rebels are killed.  
 A meeting of the NKR officials with the OSCE Minsk Group US 
representative, Joseph Pressel, in NK. 
 
April 
 
 Finland replaces Sweden as co-chair of the Minsk Group. 
 NK, now acting as an independent republic, holds legislative elections. 
 
May 
 
 A new round of negotiations in Moscow in mid-May fail, with Azerbaijan 
insisting that representatives of both Armenian and Azerbaijani 
communities from NK be included as armed but not political actors. 
 The OSCE Minsk Conference Co-Chairmen visit NK. 
 
June 
 
 Negotiations between the conflicting parties convene in Helsinki under the 
auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairmen 
July 
 
 OSCE delegation headed by the newly appointed Co-Chairman of the 
Minsk Group from Finland and Russia visited NK 
August  
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 US representative of Minsk Group, Joseph Pressel meets with 
Karabakhian officials. 
September 
  
 Personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Deputy 
State Secretary of Hungary, visit Karabakh. 
October 
  
 Negotiations between the conflicting parties are held in Finland under the 
auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen. 
September  
 Personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Deputy 
State Secretary of Hungary visit Karabakh.  
 
November 
   
 Azerbaijan's first members of parliament are elected. 
 
May-December  
 Series of negotiations within the framework of OSCE Minsk Group on the 
elaboration of agreement for cession of the military conflict. 
 
1996 
 
January-March 
 
 Talks in Moscow on security issues fail to make substantial progress as 
the sides reject new OSCE proposals. 
 
September 
  
 Ter Petrosian wins the disputed Armenian presidential elections. 
 
November 
 
 Kocharian is elected de facto President of NK by popular vote 
 Armenia breaks off direct consultations between the Presidential Advisers 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan 
 
December 
 The OSCE Lisbon summit addresses the security challenges facing 
member states  
 Three main principles of the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict 
are formulated in the Statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. 
Principles of resolution that support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity are 
prevented by Armenia from being part of the final communiqué. These 
430 
principles are supported by 53 OSCE participating states. They are 
instead included as an annex, with Armenia’s response recorded in a 
second annex. 
 The OSCE issues a statement attempting to codify the legal status of the 
Republic of NK through high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan 
 
1997 
January 
 France succeeds Finland as co-chair of the Minsk Group.  
February 
 The United States is admitted as a third co-chair of Minsk Group 
March  
 The first joint meeting of the three OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen 
convenes in Paris.  
 President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, appoints NKR President 
Robert Kocharian Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. NKR Prime 
Minister Leonard Petrossian becomes acting President of NKR.  
April 
 Negotiations between the conflicting parties take place in Moscow  
May 
 The Minsk Group presents a new peace proposal. 
 ‘Package’ peace plan presented 
 
June 
 
 The Minsk Group co-chairs discuss the latest proposals with leaders in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, who eventually accept the proposal in principle 
as a basis for peace. Armenia accepts with “serious reservations”. 
 
July 
 A modified "package" proposal is worked on by Minsk Group co-chairs 
after meetings with President Aliyev in Baku. 
 Aliyev visits the United States, signing agreements on investment with US 
President Bill Clinton. Revealing the confidential peace proposals, Aliyev 
announces that Azerbaijan would agree to a staged withdrawal from the 
occupied territories, leaving Lacin under NK’s control at the first stage.  
 
August 
 NK rejects the ’package’ peace plan submitted in late May. 
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September 
 Arkady Ghukasian Foreign Minister wins NK’s presidential elections to 
replace Kocharian 
 ‘step-by-step’ peace proposal presented by the Minsk Group 
October  
 The NKR Representation Office opens in Washington DC, USA 
October-November 
 Armenia and Azerbaijan accept the latest OSCE peace plans as a basis 
for further negotiations, with some reservations. NK rejects them citing 
security concerns with the step-by-step proposal and demands a package 
approach. Ghukasian says a “confederative relationship” with Azerbaijan 
could be discussed, but not proposals that subordinate the region to Baku. 
 
November 
 Ter-Petrossian endorses the new approach and comments publicly on 
need for compromise. His move opens divisions within his own 
government and sparks a number of opposition demonstrations. 
 The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen visit the conflict region  
December 
 At OSCE meeting in Copenhagen, no breakthrough is announced and 
requests by NK to be incorporated as a third party are rejected. A ‘step-
by-step’ proposal is discussed and rejected. No new OSCE documents 
are produced as Armenia blocks a re-iteration of the 1996 Lisbon 
principles. 
1998 
January 
 At a meeting of Armenia’s National Security Council, powerful figures 
including Kocharian, Vazgen Sargsian and Serzh Sarkisian side against 
President Levon Ter Petrossian in rejecting the Minsk Group proposal.  
February  
 Ter- Petrossian resigns 
March: 
 In Armenian presidential elections, Kocharian wins in the second round in 
a poll criticised by international observers.  
 
May  
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 During a visit by the Co-Chair's of Minsk Group to the region, Armenia, 
under new President Robert Kocharian officially recalled the early consent 
of former President of Armenia to stage-by-stage proposals.  
August 
 An opposition rally in Baku demands the resignation of Azerbaijan's 
leadership because of its inability to liberate Nagornyo Karabakh  
 
October 
 President Aliyev is re-elected President of Azerbaijan. 
November  
 The Minsk Group ’common state’ proposal is rejected by Azerbaijan. From 
the very beginning, Azerbaijan refuses to accept this proposal, and 
officially informs the mediators. Azerbaijan confirms its readiness to 
resume negotiations within the OSCE Minsk Group on the basis of the Co-
Chairs' proposals of September 19, 1997. 
 
December 
 Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Araz Azimov accuses Russia of 
delivering military aircrafts to Armenia. 
 At the OSCE ministerial meeting in Oslo, the Chairman-in-Office appeals 
to parties to the conflict to resume negotiations in the framework of the 
Minsk Group.  
 
1999 
February  
 The Secretary-General of the Interchurch Peace Council of Calvinist 
Churches, the President of the Helsinki Civil Assembly (HCA), participate 
in an international seminar in NK 
 Additional delivery of 5 MiG-29 fighter aircrafts and surface-to-air missile 
systems S-300 by Russia to Armenia. 
 
April  
 Meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia during the CIS 
Summit in Moscow  
 Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian attend the 50th anniversary summit of 
NATO in Washington. 
 
May 
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 The Unity bloc, comprising Sargsian’s Republican Party and Demirchian’s 
People’s Party of Armenia, wins parliamentary elections in Armenia 
 
June 
 Sargisian is appointed Prime Minister of Armenia  
 
July  
 A delegation from the US Jewish Committee visits NK and meets 
Ghoukassian. 
 
August  
 Meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Geneva. 
 
October 
 Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian meet on the Nakhichevan-Armenia 
border. A revival of the so-called Goble Plan for territorial exchange is 
discussed, provoking resignations among Aliyev’s senior officials. The 
plan proves highly controversial in Armenia as well. 
 Gunmen storm a session of the Armenian National Assembly and kill eight 
high officials comprising the core of the new political elite, including Prime 
Minister Vazgen Sargsian and Speaker Karen Demirchian. 
 
November  
 OSCE Summit is held in Istanbul. The Final Document and the final report 
of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office underline the Minsk Group’s importance 
for the settlement of the conflict. 
 
December 
 Prominent wartime commander Babayan is sacked as chief of NK armed 
forces. 
 
2000 
January 
 The presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia meet during the Summit of the 
CIS member-states in Moscow  
 At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Azerbaijan and Armenian 
Presidents meet to search for ways of peaceful settlement in the conflict  
 
March 
 President of NK, Ghukasian is seriously wounded in an assassination 
attempt in Stepanakert, and former Karabakh Defense Minister Babayan 
is arrested in its aftermath.  
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 Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian admits Armenia’s internal troubles 
following the October massacre and admits the event  almost “closed 
down” talks on NK. 
 Armenian President Robert Kocharyan suggests a 3+3+2 collective 
security structure for the Caucusus, which would include the three South 
Caucasus countries: Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan; their neighbours, 
Iran, Turkey and Russia; and the European Union and the USA. All three 
South Caucasus countries had agreed on the need to establish a 
collective security system. 
 
April  
 Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan says his country is ready for 
talks with Azerbaijan. Oskanyan denies that Armenia is preparing for a 
new war with Azerbaijan stressing that Yerevan’s top priorities are the 
promotion of regional cooperation and a European orientation in the 
country's development. 
 US increases aid to NK. This aid programme is also designed to help 
people in Azerbaijan and Armenia who have suffered from armed conflict. 
 
May  
 It is reported that representatives from the Minsk Group would meet to 
discuss new peace proposals for the enclave. Washington's 
representative to the Group, Carey Cavanaugh, says that international 
organisations would also meet to discuss allocations of resources in the 
war-torn region  
 
June  
 Armenian President Robert Kocharyan says that the ’common state’ idea 
underlying the latest proposals by the OSCE Minsk Group make it 
possible to optimise the interests of both sides and provided realistic 
possibilities to move forward in negotiations. Kocharyan notes that the 
proposal had been accepted by Armenia and the NK republic, but not 
Azerbaijan. 
 NK holds unrecognised parliamentary elections. 
 
July  
 Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group visit  the region. 
 
September 
 Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev meet at the UN Millennium Summit in 
New York, reaffirming the importance of the dialogue begun in 1999. 
 
November 
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 In Minsk during the summit of the heads of CIS countries, representatives 
meet Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
 A conference for the heads of Foreign Offices of the Republic of Abkhazia, 
the NK Republic, the Moldavian Republic, and the Republic of South 
Ossetia, is organised in Tiraspol. 
2001 
January 
 Azerbaijan and Armenia become full members of the Council of Europe. 
 Meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Aliyev and Armenia, Kocharyan 
takes place in Paris. 
 
March 
 
 The two Presidents meet with President Chirac in Paris. 
 
April 
 Peace talks involving Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian are held in Key 
West, Florida. 
 
May 
 At the CIS Summit in Minsk a trilateral meeting between President of 
Azerbaijan, Aliyev, President of Armenia, Kocharyan and President of 
Russia, Putin is held. 
 The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen, comprising Carey Cavanaugh of 
the USA, Nikolai Gribkov of Russia and Philippe de Suremain of France 
visit NKR. 
 
July  
 A meeting between Abkhazia, NK, the Cisdniestrian Moldavian, and the 
South Ossetia held in NK. 
 
August  
 At the Summit of the CIS countries in Sochi, President of Azerbaijan, 
Aliyev and President of Armenia, Kocharyan hold a bilateral meeting.  
September 
 
 The Minsk Group co-chairs visit Yerevan and Baku. 
 
2002 
January 
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 US President George W. Bush lifts Amendment 907 of the Freedom 
Support Act, which restricted American aid to Azerbaijan, as a reward for 
Azerbaijan’s cooperation in the war on terror. 
 The Minsk Group co-chairs visit Baku and Yerevan to discuss “new ideas 
to reinvigorate and energise the peace process. 
 
February 
 In New York, Armenia's Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian meets with the 
co-chairs of the Minsk Group. 
March  
 Ghoukassian meets with Co-chairmen of the Minsk Group and First 
Deputy of Russia’s Foreign Minister in NK 
 Ghoukassian meets Shane Pritchard, manager of the programme on 
mine-clearance and unexploded shells in the NK. The programme is 
supported by the HALO Trust, a British humanitarian NGO.  
 
May  
 Pope John Paul II makes his first visit to Azerbaijan and appeals for an 
end to religious wars. 
 Armenian and Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Ministers meet in Prague for 
Minsk Group-mediated discussions.  
 
July   
 In the final document of the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Committee, the 
EU reaffirms its support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as the 
basis for the peaceful solution of the conflict. 
 
August  
 Arkady Ghukasian is re-elected de facto President of NK. 
 The EU condemns holding of the so-called "presidential elections" in NK. 
 
September 
 
 Construction work starts on multi-billion-dollar pipeline to carry Caspian oil 
from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. 
 Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat Quliyev criticizes the UN Security 
Council for failing to seek Armenian compliance with its 1993 resolution.  
 
October 
 
 Forty-six US Congressmen send a letter to Ghukasian congratulating him 
on his election victory. 
 
2003 
January 
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 Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer criticizes 
Kocharian for a speech apparently suggesting that Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis are “ethnically incompatible” and cannot live in the same 
state. 
 
February 
 
 In the first round of voting in the Armenian Presidential election, more than 
250 opposition activists, supporters and observers are detained. 
 Baroness Caroline Cox, the Vice-Speaker of the House of Lords of the 
British Parliament, and Robert Wareing, member of the House of 
Commons send a letter congratulation NK officials on the 15th anniversary 
of the Karabakh movement. 
 
March 
 
 Kocharian is re-elected Armenian president with 60 per cent of the vote  
 Ghoukassian meets with the Personal Representative of the OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office, in NK. 
 Presidential and parliamentary elections are condemned by international 
election observers for failing to meet democratic standards. 
 
April 
  
 The Armenian Constitutional Court rules that the Presidential election 
result should stand, but that government should hold referendum of 
confidence in Kocharian within one year. Kocharian rejects this. 
 Aliyev collapses twice during an official ceremony being broadcast live on 
television. 
 
May  
 
 In the parliamentary election, the governing Republican Party of Armenia 
(HHK) led by Prime Minister Andranik Markarian and Defence Minister, 
Serge Sarkisian is declared victorious. 
July  
 Armenian Defence Minister, Serzh Sarkisian and Azerbaijani Defence 
Minister, Colonel General Safar Abiyev agree to ease tensions between 
the two countries’ armed forces after meeting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
border. 
 Heydar Aliyev is taken to hospital in Turkey. In August, he is transferred to 
Cleveland, in the United States. 
 Azerbaijani parliamentarians participate in the 10th OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly Annual Session in Rotterdam. 
August 
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 Ailing President Heidar Aliyev appoints his son Prime Minister, putting him 
in line to succeed his father. 
.  
October 
 
 Ilham Aliyev is elected President of Azerbaijan. The election is 
condemned by international observers for failing to meet democratic 
standards. 
 
December 
 
 Death of Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev’s is announced. 
 
2004 
January 
 President Aliyev declares in Paris that Azerbaijan will never accept 
Karabakh’s independence or integration with Armenia. 
 Armenian Foreign Minister dismisses an Azerbaijani offer to lift Armenia’s 
economic blockade in exchange for the return of Armenian-controlled 
Azerbaijani territories around NK. 
 Parliament of Azerbaijan adopts a new anti-corruption law that defines 
corruption and outlines public officials' responsibility to fight it. It does not 
require them to disclose their assets or income. 
 
February 
  
 The European Parliament refuses to back calls by its chief South 
Caucasus rapporteur, Per Gahrton, for the return of Armenian-controlled 
territories adjacent to NK in exchange for the lifting of Azerbaijan’s 
economic blockade of Armenia. 
.  
March 
 
 The OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon 
Passy, visit Baku and Yerevan calling upon Armenian  and Azerbaijani 
leaders to continue dialogue on the conflict. 
 
April 
    
 The Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia meet in Warsaw. 
 
 Newly appointed Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov meets his 
Armenian counterpart, Oskanian in Prague, beginning a regular cycle of 
meetings known as the Prague Process. 
 
May 
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 12th – 13th: Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet with OSCE 
Minsk Group Co-chairmen in Strasbourg. 
 
June  
 
 The Foreign Minister of Armenia meets OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairmen 
with Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Abdullah Gul in Prague: Meeting of 
Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers in Istanbul. 
 
July 
 
 At a press conference in Yerevan, Minsk Group mediators announce they 
will not bring any new proposals for the conflicting sides, saying that 
Armenia and Azerbaijan bear the responsibility for reaching agreements 
and a settlement. 
 
August 
 
 In unrecognised local elections in NK the opposition Movement-88 party 
scores a major success by winning the Stepanakert mayoralty. 
 Meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers with Minsk 
Group Cochairmen in Prague. 
 
September 
  
 The 11th anniversary of the cease-fire is met with a worsening situation 
along the Line of Contact, as each side accuses the other of violations. 
 Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian meet in Astana, Kazakhstan, with 
Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
 NATO cancels the exercise in Azerbaijan when Armenian military 
personnel are refused visas. 
 
October 
 
 The Council of Europe’s PACE adopts a resolution critical of Armenia’s 
democratic record. 
 
November 
 
 Azerbaijan urges the UN on the 59th session of UN General Assembly to 
acknowledge Armenian settlement of the occupied territories. 
 Meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers in Berlin. 
 
December 
  
 Meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers in Brussels in the 
framework of NATO EAPC.  
 
2005 
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January 
 
 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopts resolution 
1416 criticizing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory and 
containing references to ethnic cleansing. 
 Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers meet Minsk Group Co-
Chairmen in Prague. 
 
February 
 
 OSCE officials make their first inspection of Armenian-controlled 
Azerbaijani territories Aghdam, Jabrayil, Fizuli, Zangilan, Gubadly, 
Kalbajar and Lachin. They conclude that there is no significant 
involvement of the Armenian government in ongoing settlement processes 
in the occupied territories, while they observe some direct involvement of 
the NK authorities, above all in Lachin and a limited area east of 
Mardakert. 
 
March 
 
 Elmar Huseynov, an outspoken critic of the authorities, is shot dead in 
Baku. 
 
April 
 
 Oskanian and Mammadyarov meet separately with the Minsk Group co-
chairs in London.  
 Cease-fire violations along the Line of Contact escalate. 
 
May 
 
 Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian meet at the Council of Europe summit in 
Warsaw, reportedly discussing Armenian withdrawal from the occupied 
territories and approving further meetings between the Foreign Ministers. 
 
June 
 
 Political parties loyal to President Arkady Ghukasian win a surprise 
landslide victory in NK’s parliamentary elections, winning nearly two-thirds 
of the vote. 
 Oskanian and Mammadyarov meet in Paris. Oskanian tells the media that 
“common ground is in sight.” Azerbaijan supports international calls for 
inter-communal contacts between Karabakh Armenians and Karabakh 
Azeris. 
 
July 
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 The OSCE Group Co-Chairs, Ambassador Mann of the US, Merzlyakov of 
Russia and Fassier of France visit Baku and Yerevan. 
 Anonymous Armenian sources suggest that an agreement on the use of a 
referendum to determine Karabakh’s future status is close. The 
Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry quickly denies this. 
 The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly considers a report on the Armenia-
Azerbaijan conflict at its session held in Washington. 
 
August 
 
 Azerbaijan’s military prosecutor reopens a criminal investigation into the 
killings at Xocali in 1992. 
 Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev meet in Kazan. The meeting is 
characterised as positive, but no details are divulged. Speculation 
surrounds reports of new approaches being discussed by Oskanian and 
Mammadyarov, allegedly comprising a combined ‘package’ and ‘step-by-
step’ approach to the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied 
territories and the future use of a referendum to determine Karabakh’s 
status. 
 Meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents at the CIS Summit in 
Kazan. 
 Meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers with participation 
of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs in Moscow. 
 
October 
  
 The International Crisis Group releases a report entitled "Nagorno-
Karabakh: A Plan For Peace.” 
 
November 
 
 The ruling New Azerbaijan Party emphatically wins parliamentary 
elections. International observers say vote failed to meet democratic 
standards. 
 
December 
 
 Foreign ministers Oskanian and Mammadyarov meet informally with the 
co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group in Ljubljana, on the sidelines of 
the annual OSCE Foreign Ministers' meeting. 
2006 
January 
 Meeting between Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian and 
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov in London. 
 The reconnaissance trip of the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) of the 
OSCE to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. 
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.  
February 
 
 Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham 
Aliyev meet in Rambouillet, France 
 OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs visit Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
March  
 
 The Azerbaijani-Armenian Peace Forum, held in Vienna is the latest in a 
series of such meetings sponsored by London-based NGO, International 
Alert, describing itself as "an international peace-building" organisation. 
 
May  
 
 The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group meet in Moscow. 
 
June 
  
 Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham 
Aliyev meet in Bucharest. 
 Armenian Foreign Minister, Oskanian and Azeri Foreign Minister, Elmar 
Mammedyarov meet in Paris. 
 
July 
  
 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline formally opened in Turkey. 
 Survey conducted by the World Bank says corruption in Azerbaijan has 
not improved. 
 The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopts a resolution calling on both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to intensify their efforts to resolve the conflict. 
October  
 President Robert Kocharyan meets with the Prime Minister of Russia 
Mikhail Fradkov in Moscow. 
 Eleven members of the Subcommittee on Future Security and Defence 
Capabilities visit Azerbaijan on 16-17 October. 
November 
 Ambassadors Fassier of France, Merzlyakov of Russia and Bryza of the 
United States, the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group, present a joint 
statement on NK to the OSCE Permanent Council. 
 The meeting of leaders of CIS countries is held in Minsk. Both Presidents 
meet on the sidelines of the summit. 
December 
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 NK authorities hold a referendum on a draft constitution. 83 per cent of 
voters approve the entity's first constitution .The Co-Chairs issue a 
statement saying they do not believe such a referendum will contribute to 
a negotiated settlement of the conflict. 
2007 
 
January 
 
 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hosts Armenian Foreign Minister 
Vartan Oskanian and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov. 
 Azerbaijani state oil company stops pumping oil to Russia in dispute over 
energy prices.  
 
March 
 
 Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian and his Azerbaijani 
counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov conclude a round of talks in Geneva on 
the conflict 
June 
  
 After US-Azerbaijani meeting in Washington D.C. In a joint press 
conference, it is  announced: "In the circles of international law there is no 
universal formula for the supremacy of territorial integrity over the right of 
self-determination of people.” 
 Russian President Vladimir Putin offers United States use of Russian-
leased Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan as alternative to US plans to 
build missile defence system in Europe.  
 
July 
  
 NK elects former head of security service Bako Sahakian to replace 
Arkadiy Gukasian as President who is steps down after holding the post 
for two five-year terms. He wins 85 per cent of the vote. 
 
October 
 
 Serzh Sargsyan called Pentagon to give equal military aid to Yerevan and 
Baku. 
November 
 
 US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov, and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner meet with 
Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers,, Vardan Oskanian and Elmar 
Mammadyarov to demonstrate political-level support for the Minsk Group 
Co-Chair countries' effort to forge a just and lasting settlement of the 
conflict. 
 Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministers meet in Madrid. 
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December 
  
 At the OSCE Madrid summit, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group present a 
new document on resolving the Mountainous Karabakh conflict. 
 Azerbaijan's deputy Foreign Minister says that Azerbaijan is prepared to 
conduct anti-terror operations in NK against alleged bases of the 
Kurdistan Workers Party. 
2008 
 
February 
 
 President of Azerbaijan, Aliev, in a meeting with Slovenian Foreign 
Minister, Dmitrij Rupel, indicates Baku was contemplating waging war for 
control of the disputed territory. 
 Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sarksyan, an ally of Kocharyan, wins the 
Presidential elections, beating former President Ter Petrosian.  
March 
 
 Thousands protest over election results in Armenia, which the opposition 
says was rigged.  
 The government declares state of emergency and arrests opposition 
activists. 
 The UN General Assembly passes an Azerbaijan-sponsored resolution, 
which expresses support for the Minsk Group, but reaffirms Azerbaijan's 
territorial integrity. 
 The worst fighting in recent years breaks out in NK. Azerbaijan and 
Armenia accuse each other of starting the clashes, which leave several 
dead on each side. 
April 
 
 Azerbaijan allows Russian cargo of nuclear heat-isolating equipment to 
cross into Iran after holding it up for a month. The equipment was 
intended for the Bushehr nuclear plant. 
July 
 
 Minsk Group co-chairs meet in Krakow to update proposals for a solution 
to the conflict. 
September  
 Armenian Defence Minister, Seyran Ohanyan says during his meeting 
with Co-Chair of OSCE Minsk Group that negotiations within OSCE are 
the most efficient format for settling the conflict. 
445 
October 
 
 Ilham Aliyev wins second term as President of Azerbaijan after disputed 
electoral victory which was boycotted by the main opposition parties. 
 Russian President Dmitry Medevedev visits Armenia. 
 The right for self-determination of the Artsakh (Karabakh) people is stated 
in Madrid agreements between Armenian and Azerbaijani parts, claims 
ex-Foreign Minister of Republic of Armenia, Vardan Oskanyan. 
November 
   
 Sarksyan and Aliyev sign a joint agreement in Russia to intensify efforts to 
resolve the NK dispute. 
December  
 
 Helsinki hosts a five--sided meeting of Russian and French Foreign 
Ministers, the US Deputy Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
2009 
  
January 
 Meeting of Presidents and Foreign Ministers of the two countries in Zurich. 
Co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Yuri Merzlyakov, Matthew Bryza, Bernard 
Fassier, and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office Andrzej Kasprzyk also participate. 
February 
 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its annual report 
indicates that Azerbaijan has an army of about 67,000 men, while 
Armenia’s army numbers 42,000 – some 35 per cent less. Azerbaijan also 
surpasses Armenia for the number of reserve forces available for 
mobilisation, with 300,000 against Azerbaijan’s 200,000. Azerbaijan 
commands three times more tanks and armored vehicles than Armenia. 
Azerbaijan also has a three-fold supremacy over Armenia in warplanes.  
March  
 Referendum passed to abolish a law limiting the President to two terms in 
Azerbaijan.  
May  
 Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet at US Embassy in Prague.  
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 Vladimir Kazimirov, former head of Russia’s mediation mission and ex co-
chair of Minsk Group comments that all the sides of the conflict will  not 
agree to Turkey’s mediation. 
June 
 Dmitry Medvedev President of Russia, Serzh Sargsyan, President of 
Armenia, and Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan meet in Saint 
Petersburg. 
July 
 In a joint statement released at the G8 eight summit in Italy, the 
Presidents of the US, France and Russia express their commitment to 
resolving the NK conflict on the basis of the Madrid agreement in 2007. 
 Just four days after Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Medvedev 
announce support for settlement of the conflict, including the non-use of 
force, President Aliyev threatens, “Unfortunately, I cannot totally rule out a 
military solution, as we have the total right to restore our territorial integrity, 
based on international law,.” 
August 
 American Co-Chair Matthew Bryza announces in Tsahkadzor during 
“Euroforum,” that the OSCE Minsk Group cannot exert pressure on either 
Armenia or Azerbaijan. 
 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza says that 
President Obama shares the opinion that Armenia should return the 
occupied lands to Azerbaijan. 
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Appendix 3: 
 
The people of Nagorno Karabakh 
 
The modern Armenians are a mixture of the indigenous peoples of the 
ancient kingdom of Urartou - straddling North-eastern Anatolia and south-
western Transcaucasia - and Indo-Europeans who entered the region at the 
end of the 8th century B.C.615 But the Armenians were not the only people 
who lived in the region, (when?) as Muslims were present too. In other words, 
Muslims and Armenians together made up the majority of NK’s population, 
and only in the contemporary era did some Russians and other races settle in 
the region. According to extant information, in 1805, the population of NK 
consisted of 10,000 families, which fell to 7,474 in 1808 due to the Russo-
Persian war. The war forced the Caucasians to emigrate to Iran. In 1823, the 
number of families reached 20,095, of which 15,729 were Azerbaijanis and 
4,366 Armenians. This made up a total of 90,000 inhabitants.616 78 per cent 
were Muslim and 22 per cent were Armenian.  
 
During the annexation of NK by Russia, 80 per cent of the Karabakhi 
residents were Azerbaijani or Arrani and 20 per cent Armenian, but after they 
had been forced to immigrate to NK, their population gradually increased.617 
During the Russo-Persian war (1826-1828), 18,000 Armenian people were 
forced to move to NK (according to an Azeri source, the number was 18,000 
families.)618 Also, from 1828 to 1830, 40,000 Armenian families from Iran and 
84,000 from Turkey settled in Karabakh and Yerevan. At that time NK was 
one of the states governed by Yelizavetpol. During the presidency of Stalin, 
and after these obligatory migrations, the Armenian population grew to about 
four times that of the Azeris. However, Armenian sources provide other 
justifications for the demographic changes in the region. However, what 
seems certain is that the demographics of NK changed during the 150 years 
of affiliation with Russia.619 
 
In 1823, 158 villages out of a total of 556 belonged to the Armenians and the 
remaining 398 to the Azeris. According to the 1832 census made in these 
villages, 8,000 families out of a total of 20,420 were Armenian.620 But during 
the following years, the forced emigration of Armenians continued even up to 
the early 20th century, in such a way that, from 1896 to 1908, 400,000 
Armenians relocated to the Caucasus, especially to NK.621 
 
According to the census of 1897, 54,841 families inhabited NK, of whom 
29,350 were Azeri, 18,616 Armenian, and the rest from other nationalities. 
Also, according to the 1917 census, from among the whole population of 
574,194, 317,861 persons (55.4 per cent) were Azeri and 243,627 (42.6 per 
cent) were Armenian, with the remainder from other races. 
 
In 1979, the number of inhabitants of NK was 162,200, of whom 123,076 
were Armenians (75.9 per cent) and 37,264 Azeri (23 per cent), with the rest 
from other races. According to the census of 1989, the number of Karabakhi 
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inhabitants was 189,020, of whom 76.9 per cent were Armenian and 21.5 per 
cent Azeri, with the remainder from other races such as Russians, Kurds and 
Jews. The population density was 43 persons per sq/km.622 
 
Other sources confirm the above numbers. For instance, according to one 
source, in 1970 the composition of the Karabakhi population was 80.5 per 
cent Armenian, 18.1 per cent Azeri, 0.9 per cent Russian, and the remainder 
from other races.623 
 
According to other sources, the total population of the autonomous NK was 
157,200, of whom 81 per cent were Armenians, 18 per cent Azeris, and 1 per 
cent Russians.624 
 
In 1988, in his book about the history of the Caucasus, Chrysanthopoulos, the 
first Greek ambassador to the Republic of Armenia, described NK, as an 
enclave with a population of about 182,000 people, 75 per cent of whom were 
Armenian.625 
 
It should be mentioned that from the end of the war until now, all other 
nationalities have left NK except the Armenians, so the ethnic composition of 
the population has become homogeneous. Nevertheless, the critical security 
and economic situation has forced thousands of Armenians to leave the 
region. The current population is estimated at 100 to 160 thousand people.  
 
Regarding population density, it has been calculated that about 86 per cent 
reside at an altitude of between 500 and 1500 metres, about 10 per cent live 
at an altitude of less than 500 metres, 3 per cent between 1500 and 2000 
metres and 1 per cent at an altitude of more than 2000 metres. 42 per cent of 
the inhabitants are city dwellers. According to the January 1977 census, the 
proportional density of the population was 35.5 persons per sq / km. (The 
density in the 1989 census was 43).626  
 
Culture and Monuments 
 
From ancient times to the present, many languages and dialects have been 
spoken in NK, such as Indo-European languages, the ancient Iranian 
language (Pahlavi), Armenian, Alsti, Talyshi, Kurdish, Tati, and Assyrian from 
the Semite stock. These include Turkish and Turkmeni dialects since the 
Turks and Huns attacked from the north and the Seljuks from the south and 
the states near the Caspian Sea; not to mention the Azeri language, which 
was well-known among the Turks in recent centuries.627  
 
The presence of different tribes and the currency of different languages in NK 
gave rise to a multiplicity of cultures and beliefs. The worship of natural forces 
like the sun and stars was prevalent in some parts of the region. Some 
vestiges of Jewish communities have also been found in the region. At the 
end of the third century, a number of events such as the Perso-Roman wars 
and the severity of the Zoroastrian priests persuaded the inhabitants of 
Armenia to convert to Christianity. The Georgians followed them in 303 A.D. 
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during the Parthian dynasty. In the 5th century A.D., Christianity spread in the 
north of Karabakh (Daghestan) and some of the inhabitants came to believe 
in it, while on the other side of the Arax River, the Azeri people held on to 
their belief in Zoroaster.628 
 
During the Achaemenian period, some signs of Zoroastrianism were found in 
the Caucasus. Although Christianity was common in most parts, the 
Zoroastrian religion started to spread among the Persians especially during 
the Sassanid and Parthian eras. 
 
The existence of holy places like Bagh-van in Baku, (Lit. forever fire temple), 
Girl tower, Anahit temple, Azergashsb (fire temple), Shiz (fire temple), Takht 
Soleiman (castle), … during the time of the Atropat and Moghan dynasties 
are evidence of the religious and cultural status of the region at the beginning 
of Islamic expansion. 
 
The Muslim advance in the Caucasus started in the south in 642 A.D with the 
inhabitants of Derbent, and in 645-646 A.D the natives of Armenia recognized 
Islam. In 654 A.D, the Muslims took possession of Georgia and in 661 the 
Azeris and Arranis converted to Islam. Therefore, we can claim that Karabakh 
was one of the territories conquered by the Muslims.629 
 
The great cultural development dates back to the era of Ghuz and Seljukian, 
when the long-term residence of the Turks in some parts of the Caucasus 
and Azerbaijan changed the language of the older inhabitants and close 
contact and inter-marriage resulted in the Azeris and Arranis and most other 
tribes being looked upon as Turks, and the language, while keeping some 
Persian and Arabic words, tended to be Turkish. After the Mughols under 
Holakukhan had attacked and taken possession of Azerbaijan and Arran 
(which coincided with the Turkish immigration to the region), the situation 
totally changed. 
 
Although the Ottoman rulers oppressed the people, when Islam spread to the 
region, the Christians sought Iranian support and Iran became a safe haven 
for them. In this regard. The support of Shah Abbas I (the Iranian monarch) 
and the concessions which he granted to the Christians confirm this matter. In 
fact, there is no evidence of conflict between the Iranian Muslims and 
Armenians and Georgians (apart from some governmental injustices). 
Therefore the Christians of the Caucasus always believed that, after Armenia 
and Georgia, Iran was their homeland. 
 
Islam and Christianity – the two great religions in the region – have left 
hundreds of historic and cultural traces, such as mosques, churches, 
petrographs, music, literature, paintings and poems - some of which date 
back to the early years of development of the two religions in the region. 
Some sources estimate that the number of Armenian remains, such as 
buildings, churches, and so on is fifteen thousand.630 
 
The Iranian civilizations left other obvious traces in the region. The 
prominence and the fame of these Iranian, Islamic and Christian vestiges in 
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Karabakh are too many to be disclaimed. Although, after the war, with the 
increased homogeneity of the population, there was a fear that these relics, 
which belonged to the Islamic era might be destroyed, the Azerbaijani 
government has always protested and worried about the destruction by the 
self-proclaimed Karabakh of its cultural artefacts.  
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Appendix 4: 
  
Early History of the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict 
 
The Period of Persian Dominance 
 
Despite the bravery and sacrifices of Abbas Mirza`s army and Iran’s friends in 
the Caucasus, the Gulistan Treaty was concluded and Iran's historical and 
absolute sovereignty over Karabakh came to an end, as a result of the first 
Russo-Persian war. 
 
In 1816, General Alexei PetrovichYermolov was appointed as Commander-in-
Chief of the Russian forces in the Caucasus. Under orders to spare no effort 
to suppress the Moslems, he played an important role in weakening Iran's 
position with respect to Islam and the future of the Caucasus. 
 
He started his work in the Caucasus in the belief that the death of one 
Moslem would bring prosperity to 100 Russians. 631  He destroyed the 
traditional ruling system over Karabakh and organized the former supporters 
of the Khan into a Tsarist county council.  
 
The setting up of a new socio-political structure in Karabakh compelled the 
Khans and the tribes to migrate beyond the Arax River. Soon, factors such as 
the withholding of their coveted lands, the receiving of distressing news about 
Moslem conditions in the Caucasus and Karabakh, along with provocations 
by the banished Khans, fierce battles between the Iranian and Russian forces 
and, more importantly, the proclamations of the Islamic authorities for a jihad, 
forced the Qajar Shah into another war against Russia for which he was ill-
prepared. Thus, Abbas Mirza left the royal seat in Tabriz for Karabakh with an 
army consisting of tens of thousands of men. Abbas Mirza achieved great 
victories in the early battles and liberated many parts of Karabakh, but his 
defeat in Ganja against the Russian forces under the command of General 
Paskevich changed the course of the war.632 
 
In the end, the Treaty of Turkmenchai, was concluded between Iran and 
Russia, together with a commercial agreement, on the 10th February 1828. 
Based on the peace treaty, the provinces of Nakhichevan, Yerevan, Talysh, 
and Shora-gail were handed over to Russia. Iran also undertook to pay five 
million korror in gold to Russia as indemnity. The Arax River was thenceforth 
defined as the border between the two countries and naval movement in the 
Caspian Sea belonged exclusively to the Russians.633  
 
As a result of this treaty, Iran not only lost its domination over the Caucasus 
but the treaty also paved the way for Russia to have an enhanced presence 
in Iran’s political, economic and even security sphere. 
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Map 1 shows the loss of Persian dominance up until 1828. The map also 
shows how the Iranian land mass was reduced as a result of the shifting of 
the border. 
 
 
 
The Period of Tsarist domination 
 
With the annexation of Karabakh by Russia, an important historical period 
had begun in the fortunes of the region. The Russian authorities decided to 
reconstruct all borders, identity and historical notions (identities) in the region 
of the Caucasus. In the first phase, they set about zoning the area so that the 
newly-established administrations were incompatible with the racial and 
cultural organization of the region. They did this because they recognized that 
stabilizing and perpetuating their sovereignty required the existence of 
continued tensions and conflicts among the tribes and nationals of the 
empire. Besides, all Russian plans were aimed at expropriating the Caucasus 
from the Iranians and the Ottomans and turning it into an inseparable and 
integral part of the Russian empire.634 
 
In the early stages of capturing the Caucasus, the Russians intended to 
deprive the Iranians and Ottomans of their influence. To this end, they 
supported the Armenian nation and protected them because their loyalty and 
cooperation was necessary to strengthen Moscow's hegemony in the region. 
In this respect, they established an Armenian province comprised of 
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Nakhichevan and Yerevan in such a way that there was no unity between 
them either geographically or racially. 
 
Another important and decisive change made by the Russians after the 
annexation of Karabakh, and a factor which played a vital role in its future 
development, was a transformation of the demography which entailed the 
loss of the Moslem majority in the region. At the beginning of the 19th century, 
the Russians made every endeavor to put their expansionist goals into 
practice, claiming to support Christianity. Thus, in the war with the Ottomans, 
they encouraged the Armenians of that country to move to the Caucasus and 
in the first stage of this plan about 100,000 Armenians relocated there. They 
also arranged a special plan for Armenia settlement in certain regions such 
as Karabakh.  
 
The emigration of Armenians from Iran was carried out according to Article 13 
of the Turkmenchai Treaty and about 50,000 Armenians transferred to the 
Caucasus. Thus, in the first years after annexation, about 150,000 families 
moved there and this issue caused a noticeable alteration in the demography 
of Karabakh. In fact, the loyalty of the Karabakh Armenians prompted the 
Russians to alienate the Armenian people in the area. 
 
As for the transformation in the administrative structure, it should be 
mentioned that after the annexation of Karabakh by Russia, the latter 
dissolved the Karabakh Khanate and transformed it into a Karabakh province 
in 1822. 
 
Having stabilized their control, the Russians revised the whole administrative 
organization of the Caucasus and dissolved the Armenian province in 1844. 
This time, they divided the region into two governorships: Georgia or Imeretia       
(consisting of the former Armenian provinces of Akhalkalaki, Lorri and part of 
Ganja) and the Caspian or Khazar (consisting of the eastern part of the 
Caspian Sea and Karabakh). Later on, Karabakh became part of the state of 
Shamakhi which was completely destroyed by an earthquake in 1859 and the 
county town was transferred to Baku. Karabakh was situated in this state as 
before.  
 
From 1868 onwards, the administrative structure of the region was radically 
changed and the Caucasus was divided into five provinces by Russia. 
Karabakh became part of the newly-created Elizavetpol province (Elizavetpol 
was the new name for Ganja), and Karabakh was situated between Shusha 
and Zangezur in this province. 635  It is noteworthy that in 1883 two new 
districts called Jivanshir and Jebrail came into existence during the 
organization of Shusha. The divisions continued until 1921. 
 
In that year, during the creation of the Soviet Republic of Armenia, a vast 
area of historic Karabakh (known as Zangezur) was annexed to Armenia. In 
1923, the mountainous regions of Karabakh (the whole of Jivanshir and the 
highland parts of Shush and Jebrail) were handed over to the Armenians. 
Thus, ''The Province of Autonomous Mountainous Karabakh" came into 
existence. 
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Throughout the 19th century, the principal Russian policy in the region was to 
weaken the Moslems within the empire, in such a way that the Tsarist period 
in Russia was considered to be the moment when the isolation of the 
Christian Caucasians came to an end in the Moslem-dominated world and 
marked the beginning of the subordination of Moslem Caucasians by a 
Christian, European society.636 
 
The 19th century was an important period for Karabakhis. It may be described 
as a "transitional period" from feudality and political-social independency to 
administrative, governmental and bureaucratic relations. In other words, the 
19th century linked the rulership of the Khans in the 18th century to the 
administrative and provincial government of the 20th century. 
 
The end of the 19th century saw the appearance of a new factor in the geo-
politics of Transcaucasia as national movements emerged representing the 
indigenous people of the region, especially the Georgians and Armenians.637 
In 1896, Tsar Nicholas II granted the general governorship to prince Golitsyn, 
and he made every effort to ‘Russify’ the population. (It should be noted that 
according to some sources, between 1865 to 1897, population growth was 
190 per cent; from 12,462 people in 1965 to 36,113 in 1897.)638 By closing 
Armenian schools and cultural institutes and seizing the property of the 
Armenian and Georgian churches as well as granting some administrative 
advantages to Moslems, Prince Golitsyn incited the Caucasian tribes against 
each other.639 This was in line with his “divide and rule” policy. 
 
In this period, as a result of harassment by the Russians and the Ottomans, 
many Armenians formed political and nationalistic parties in order to combat 
the hostile acts of these governments. These parties, who were increasingly 
moving towards extremism, started their activities among the Armenians of 
the Caucasus and Karabakh. 
 
In these conditions, the Armenians kept up a relentless and intense 
propaganda campaign while the Ottomans adopted a hostile and 
contemptuous attitude towards them, which finally led to greater antagonism 
between the Moslems and Armenians in the Caucasus and created a tense 
atmosphere between them. 
 
With Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, anarchy spread 
throughout the country. The tsarist government provoked racial problems in 
the Caucasus to prevent the Caucasians from revolting. 
 
However, the 1905 Russian revolution and an embarrassing string of defeats 
increased the Russian populace's dissatisfaction with the inefficient and 
corrupt Tsarist government and proved a major cause of the Russian 
Revolution of 1905. The causes of the 1905 Revolution went far back into 
Russian history. It was the product of more than a century of discontent and it 
encouraged the national and political identity of the Caucasian tribes. 
Thereafter, the issue of nationality was the subject of political debates among 
the reformist and revolutionary groups in Russia and the Caucasus. Thus, the 
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political and social ground was prepared and those widespread social 
movements that occurred all over Russia leading to the 1905 revolution, 
turned into an internal struggle between the Armenians and Moslems in the 
Caucasus. In this respect, the problem of the Armenians, who were in the 
majority in the mountainous part of Karabakh but in a minority in the Ganja 
province in general, was exacerbated. 
 
After the 1905 revolution, an assembly was held to establish a new 
administrative organization whereby it was hoped that the governmental 
problems would be resolved democratically by developing zemesto (local 
administrative communities). The Armenians tried to place the mountainous 
areas of Karabakh under one single zemesto (comprising 365,000 
Armenians, 134,000 Moslems and 28,000 from other nationalities) to find a 
remedy for the cultural and social problems faced by the Armenians in 
Karabakh.640 
 
As the Russian government authorities adopted a more favourable policy 
towards the Armenians at this time, their plan was initially approved, but 
because of the repression of reaction in Moscow, it was neglected like other 
promised democratic reforms. 
 
From 1905 to 1906, bloody and distressing clashes which were the result of 
Russian foreign policy in the region took place between the Armenians and 
Moslems in Baku. These brutal events spread to Karabakh too, and Shusha 
was twice surrounded by Moslems but after a few days’ resistance, the 
Armenians were victorious. 
 
Briefly, the unstable conditions among the Caucasian tribes continued until 
World War One and the Russian Revolution. During the First World War, 
although the Caucasus region nations did not take part in the conflict, one of 
the major goals of the Ottomans, who did participate, was to regain that area. 
Specifically, during the reign of their extremist war-hawking party under the 
leadership of Anvar, Talat, and Jamal in 1913, their main aim was to gain 
access to the Turkish-speaking regions of the Caucasus, Iran and Central 
Asia to compensate for the coveted lands of the Ottomans in Europe and 
Asia and to establish another empire in the region, to be known as 
"Turkistan”. But, because of their defeat by the Russian army, this plan 
remained ineffective. 
 
It should be noted that the Bolsheviks did not have very much influence in the 
Caucasus, so the different tribes and nationalities kept their unity under the 
rule of the Transcaucasus Commissariat after the coup of October 1917. In 
other words, the Bolsheviks only had influence in the Baku City Council, while 
parties like Dashnak, the Social Democrats and Mosavat (Equality), had 
greater sway among Armenians, Georgians and Moslems in general. 
 
Karabakh became virtually autonomous after the 1917 revolution as the 
council in Shusha was responsible for administering it. This council, which 
had held three joint congresses, was comprised of Moslem and Armenian 
representatives. The Bolsheviks succeeded in some of their actions in 
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Karabakh too, the result of which was the formation of rural unions in Shusha, 
and Jivanshir. However, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks plunged into war in 
Shusha. At the Bolshevik assembly held on 31st August 1917 it was decided 
to form the Red Army to fight against anti-revolutionaries and to rerun the 
council elections. The first assembly of the Caucasian Bolshevik's 
organization was held in Tiflis in October 1917 and approved the right of 
autonomy for all nationalities.641 
 
By 1918, the Russian army evacuated the Caucasus and when they were 
gone Russia's vast southern territories were effectively unguarded. After a 
year of inactivity, the Turks finally went on the offensive. The Turkish army 
launched its campaign in late January of 1918.); the Dashnaks were waiting 
for such an opportunity to take their revenge on the Moslems, the result of 
which was the destruction of 211 villages and the murder of thousands of 
them.642 
 
By this time, the Caucasus was in a state of anarchy, the Bolsheviks and 
other parties were at war, and racial conflicts were ignited in different regions. 
The Organization of the Caucasian Bureau, managed by the three nations, 
was weakened because of severe disagreements among their 
representatives. In such a situation, the Ottomans attacked the Caucasus, 
making the most of this opportunity (despite its failure and the continued 
withdrawal from the Damascus and Mesopotamian fronts). 
 
Map 1 shows the inflows and withdrawals of the various forces who were 
involved in these conflicts 
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The Turkish all-out attacks commenced in January 1918 and aimed at an 
early arrival at Baku and the conquering of the city from the Bolsheviks. The 
Caucasian Bureau was dissolved on 26th May and Azerbaijan and Armenia 
declared independence on 28th May.643 
 
In these developments Armenia was the main loser, because it was forced to 
submit to Turkey’s conditions in the Treaty of Batum on 4th June, and to limit 
the size of Armenian-inhabited region to a small area, because of the risk of 
Turkish advances and to prevent a repeat of the 1915 genocide in the 
Caucasus. The Turkish forces, under the command of General Nuri Pasha, 
reached Ganja after passing through Armenia in late June. 644  The Turks 
declared Ganja the capital of the Republic of Azerbaijan and left quickly for 
Baku. 
 
Karabakh had become virtually autonomous after 1917 and a council in 
Shusha, made up of Moslems and Armenians, elected representatives to 
administer it. This happened when there were violent racial clashes between 
the Armenians and Moslems in regions such as Baku and Yerevan. Generally 
though, Karabakh enjoyed peaceful conditions, but in late May, with the 
amalgamation of the Nuri Pasha army with the forces of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Karabakh took on special importance. The situation had now 
changed because control of the Nakhichevan-Zangezur- Karabakh border, as 
a safe and appropriate route connecting the Anatolian Turkish-speaking 
regions to the Caucasus, was of vital importance. Although the Yerevan 
administration was resigned to this state of affairs, the Armenians of 
Zangezour and Karabakh refused to submit to Turkish demands, and since 
the Ottoman forces were preparing to march towards Baku and were at war 
with the military forces of the Baku council, the Karabakhi Armenians took 
advantage of this opportunity to reorganize. On the 15th August, the first 
congress of the Karabakhi Armenians was held in Shusha attended by 
representatives of all the towns and villages inhabited by Armenians, and 
soon after the National Council had assembled, they declared Karabakh 
independent. 
 
This time, the representatives of Nuri Pasha came to Shusha and asked the 
first congress to recognize Azeri sovereignty over Karabakh, surrender it to 
the Ottomans and allow their forces to enter Shusha. But the congress met 
the envoys with a negative response and they went back without achieving 
their goal. Meanwhile, during the negotiations in late August between the 
envoy of the Republic of Armenia, Kajaznuni and Khalil Pasha, they 
discussed Karabakh and Zangezour. Kajaznuni asked the Ottoman 
government not to support Azerbaijan's claim to hegemony over these 
regions, arguing in favour of the Armenian majority there. 
 
On the 20th September, the Second Congress of the Karabakh Armenians 
was convened. The assembly sent a delegation to the commander of the 
second Ottoman division, based at Aghdam, for the purpose of negotiation. 
 
Sultanov became the Governor-General of Zangezour and Karabakh and this 
was confirmed by Britain. 
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Simultaneously, following the Ottoman withdrawal from the area, a delegation 
consisting of the Shusha mayor and the commanders of the four-fold regions 
of Karabakh settled in Shusha and administered the regional office. On the 
26th January, the Armenian government described this appointment as a 
violation of its territorial integrity and condemned it.645 In contrast, Azerbaijan 
took its right to the region for granted and considered it incontestable.646 The 
conflict was now well and truly established The Armenian representatives 
made a request to put the issue of Karabakh on hold until the joint conference 
of the Caucasian republics had been convened in Istanbul to settle the 
regional problems. But the Ottomans demanded that they disarm and 
surrender so as to allow the Turkish forces to march on Shusha. After 
capturing Baku on the 15th September, Nuri Pasha was able to muster extra 
forces and suppress the Karabakhi Armenians. Thus there was no time for 
the third congress, which was to be held on 1st of October 1918, to examine 
the situation. 
 
Two days later, Jamal-Jived Beg, the commander of the Ottoman division in 
Aghdam, presented a 24-hour ultimatum to the Council, ordering it to submit. 
The Armenian men were ready to defend despite the lack of soldiers and 
military equipment, but the National Council sent a delegation to Aghdam to 
negotiate with the Turks. This approach turned out to be fruitless, because a 
Turkish force of 5,000 men had already advanced from Askeran valley to 
Shusha before the conclusion of the ultimatum. The Ottoman army was 
deployed in a sector between Zengezour and Karabakh, and because the 
forces of General Andranik were engaged in a number of local clashes it was 
impossible for them to help Shusha. Thus, Grassim Melik-Shahnazarian, the 
Mayor and the representative of the Shusha Armenian conservative party, 
requested the third congress to submit to Turkish demands, after taking into 
consideration their capture of the lower area of Shusha and the risk of an 
Armenian massacre. 
 
Shusha surrendered, but in each of the four regions of Karabakh, a partisan 
force was formed to defend themselves against the Ottomans. The struggle 
continued, and some changes came about during the victories on the World 
War One fronts, and this exacerbated Karabakh`s problems. 
 
By defeating Germany and its allies, the First World War was concluded and 
the Ottoman government submitted to the conditions for renouncing the 
conflict, one provision of which was the evacuation of the Caucasus by the 
Ottoman forces. Although many units of the Ottoman army remained to annex 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, initial pressure faded. Another consequence of 
the Ottoman defeat was the deployment of British military units in the 
Caucasus. On 14th November 1918, a division of the British army under the 
commander of the British forces, General M. Thomson, was stationed in the 
north of Iran. They entered Baku through Anzali to observe the withdrawal of 
Turkish forces from the region. 
 
At the conclusion of the war in late October 1918, the military commanders of 
Armenian Karabakh requested General Andranik Ozanian to advance 
459 
towards Shusha to restore Armenian sovereignty in the region.647 After taking 
some Moslem villages, he finally entered the province, but before reaching 
Shusha, in the village of Avdallar, he received a message from General 
Thomson in the eastern Caucasus, written by two French and English 
officers, 648  asking him not to go any further. The General stopped and 
returned to Goris, in the centre of Zangezour.649 
 
This time, the Armenians thought of themselves as a minor ally of the Allied 
forces because of Azerbaijani ties with the Ottomans and Georgian links with 
Germany. The British government however supported Baku, as it had its eye 
on its oil resources650 and on strengthening its reputation and authority in 
India’s Moslem colonies and Mesopotamia through the adoption of a friendly 
policy. 
 
On the 28th December 1918, the British authorities announced their 
recognition of the Baku government and agreed to place Zangezour and 
Karabakh under the authority of Baku until it had presented the Karabakh 
conflict at the Paris peace conference. 651  This formally recognized 
Azerbaijan's claim to Karabakh in early 1920.652 
 
On 15th January 1919, the Azerbaijani government appointed Dr. Khosrov 
Beck. 
 
On 10th February 1919, the fourth Armenian Karabakh Congress was held in 
Shusha. It was declared in the meeting that NK, as part of the Republic of 
Armenia, had never recognized the authority of the Azerbaijani 
government.653 
 
While the conference was going on, Khosrov Beck arrived in Shusha 
accompanied by a detachment of soldiers, under the command of Major 
Monk Maison, to negotiate the question of Azerbaijani authority. But after a 
month, the negotiations concluded without success. 
 
In the spring of 1919, a delegation was sent to Goris by the British authorities 
and the Mosavatians which asked Andranik to hand over Zangezour to 
Azerbaijan but he entrusted the administration to the representatives of the 
Republic of Armenia and set off for Echmiadzin on 2nd April. 
 
Zangezour’s defence against the Turks was soon to be led by another 
famous Armenian partisan, “Nzhdeh”. Andranik’s disappearance caused a 
relative weakening of the Armenian Karabakh position. 
 
On 23rd April 1919 Colonel Shuttleworth, who replaced General Thomson as 
Commander of the British forces, arrived in Karabakh and gave instructions 
that the region should obey the orders of Governor-General Sultanov. The 
fifth assembly opposed Shuttleworth’s demand and declared that “Azerbaijan 
has always been and remains today an ally and accomplice of the Turks and 
of all the cruelties committed by them against the Armenians in general and 
against the Karabakh Armenians in particular.”654 
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After the refusal of the National Council to submit to this demand, 
Shuttleworth announced that he would be unable to prevent the Azerbaijani 
government from employing whatever measures it chose to resolve the 
situation. Consequently, Sultanov cut off all roads leading to the Karabakh 
plain and all trading with the Armenians was forbidden on threat of death. The 
blockade gradually brought famine to the mountainous areas of Karabakh, 
and at the same time, Sultanov organized terrorist brigades of Kurds - ‘two of 
them led by his brothers. As a result, more Armenian villages were 
destroyed.655 The plundering of villages and other similar acts that happened 
in Karabakh provoked strong reactions from the Armenians, Georgians and 
the US representatives in the region. So the US delegation asked their 
spokesmen in Paris to convince the British authorities to dismiss the Ottoman 
officers from Zangezour and Karabakh. This led to an interim summons of 
Khosrov Beck Sultanov to Baku. Despite the promise of the British forces 
commander in the Caucasus to remove him and other criminals from the 
proceedings, he was reinstated in Karabakh after a few weeks. 
 
On this occasion, Sultanov asked for the sixth Karabakh Armenian meeting to 
be held in Shoshakand in the western suburb of Shusha on the 29th June. 
Beck Rostam Bikov, as the representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
attended the meeting and made a number of promises. The Armenians 
agreed that in return for a guarantee of complete administrative and cultural 
autonomy for Karabakh, three conditions had to be met: firstly, they would not 
appoint non-Armenians to administrative posts in the region; secondly, they 
would not disarm Armenian military units; and thirdly, not dispatch forces to 
Zangezour through Karabakh until the final settlement of the Paris peace 
conference. In return Armenia would agree to Azerbaijan's interim sovereignty 
over the region.  
 
To that end, a three-person Armenian delegation was sent to Baku to finalise 
these demands (one of whom was murdered on the way). The other two 
negotiated with the Azerbaijani authorities and returned to Shusha 
accompanied by Sultanov. The Azerbaijani government accepted the 
proposals with some modifications. On the return journey to Shusha, 
Sultanov treated them kindly so as to reassure and encourage the Armenian 
moderate political party. He also allowed the traffic and trade route to 
drought-stricken Shusha to be reopened.656 The seventh meeting was held in 
Shoshakand on the 12th August to examine the status quo and to make the 
final decision about compromising with Baku. Finally, on 19th August it was 
decided to accept the provisional sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
until the status of Karabakh had been finalized in the Paris peace conference 
and to permit the administrative organization of the National Council to 
remain in the region.  
 
In a ceremony, on the 22nd August 1919, the delegation of Karabakh 
Armenians signed the document relating to Azerbaijan’s provisional 
sovereignty over Karabakh. In early September, the Azerbaijani authorities 
began to concentrate forces and equipment in Evlakh for an operation in 
Zangezour. (Why did they launch this attack?) They launched their attack in 
early November, but after a number of clashes they had to withdraw. On 23rd 
461 
November, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Prime-Ministers reached an 
agreement to abandon the conflict and to settle their differences peacefully in 
Tiflis. However, the local skirmishes continued in Zangezour as before.  
 
The British government was forced to withdraw its military forces from the 
Caucasus for several reasons, amongst these was the cost of war damage, 
the need to recall and grant leave to the soldiers and also the pressure to cut 
military expenditure. 
 
Another important event that happened at that time was the renewal of the 
Turkish administration and their further influence and interference in the 
political developments of the Caucasus. 
 
In the spring of 1919, the Republic of Azerbaijan officially declared that 
Azerbaijani-Armenian political relations would only be normalized if the 
regions of Karabakh, Zangezour, Ordubad, Julfa, Nakhichevan, Surmalu, 
Sharor and Vadibaazar (meaning the Karabakh-Zangezour-Nakhichevan link) 
were placed under the control of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The situation 
went from a warming of ties and then hostility and then a warming and so on. 
 
Worrying about the increasing strength of the Turkish Resistance Movement, 
the British government, which had supported Baku since its deployment in the 
Caucasus, decided to check the movement by handing over Nakhichevan to 
the Republic of Armenia. However, considering its geographical position and 
the majority Moslem population, it was difficult for Armenia to maintain its 
dominance over Nakhichevan.  
 
Another regional development, which had a great effect on the future of the 
Caucasus concerned the USSR. By developing its authority on the northern 
borders of the Caucasus, Moscow adopted a strategy based on challenging 
the European colonial powers, who opposed the Bolshevik system.  
 
The Karabakh-Nakhichevan-Zangezour link was thought of as the best way to 
establish a permanent transit road and to send military equipment to Mustafa 
Kamal Pasha Considering the Armenia-Azerbaijan problem which prevented 
the developing of bonds between Turkey and Russian, Mustafa Kamal`s 
proposal, which was to subdue Armenia and integrate Azerbaijan with the 
territory of the USSR, was accepted by the Russians. 
 
At this juncture, contrary to what was agreed at the seventh meeting, Khosrov 
Beck Sultanov ordered the Karabakh Armenians (who previously accepted 
provisional Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh - a situation that had 
lasted until the Paris peace conference finalized the matter) to agree to the 
unconditional and de facto sovereignty of Azerbaijan. He sent a letter to the 
Karabakh National Council in which he threatened that if they did not obey his 
demand, he would raise Karabakh to the ground. He first surrounded 
Karabakh with Azerbaijani troops and then on 19th February 1920 called on 
the Armenian Council to agree unconditionally to the integration of Karabakh 
with Azerbaijan. The 8th Congress, held on February 28th to discuss the future 
status of Karabakh encountered differences of opinion and divisions between 
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the two factions. One group comprised the military commanders of the 
different regions of Karabakh, the other was the Dashnaks, who made up the 
majority of the representatives (96 persons) and who called for resistance 
and opposition to Sultanov`s ultimatum, stressing the bitter experiences 
caused by Azerbaijan's indirect sovereignty during the past few months. 
Another group was made up mostly of Armenian Bolsheviks or Shusha 
merchants, (45 to 50 persons) who deemed it advisable to compromise. 
 
At the 9th Congress of the Dashnak party held in Yerevan from the 12th-15th 
November, 1919, the Karabakh question and the need to restore the province 
to Armenia was discussed, and Arsen Michealian was sent to Karabakh to 
supervise and coordinate the military operations. This time, Dashnaks` 
military committees in Varanda, Khachen, Dizak and Jivanshir decided to 
take control of Karabakh by means of an extensive campaign. Also, the Dro 
forces were ordered back from Zangezour. The revolt, launched at dawn on 
23rd March 1920 with an assault by Armenian units in Khankendy, Askeran, 
Dizak and other parts, failed and Sultanov’s army controlled the situation 
once again. 
 
On 23rd April, the 9th Congress of the Karabakh Armenians was held in the 
village of Taghavard and declared that Karabakh was an inseparable part of 
Armenia, although they had no power to realize the claim. Soon after this, the 
Bolsheviks reached the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. On 27th April, 
Serge Mironoghlou Kirev, accompanied by 75,000 soldiers of the 11th division 
of the Red Army, arrived in Baku without any resistance and the Bolsheviks 
took over the Republic of Azerbaijan.657 
 
On 29th April, Davoud Hosseinev, the Defence Commissar of the Soviet 
Republic of Azerbaijan gave the Armenian government an ultimatum to 
withdraw its forces from Karabakh to Zangezour within three days. In this 
communiqué confirmed by Kirev, Orjonikdze and Lovandovski, the major 
executors of Moscow's policy in the region, it was made clear that if the 
revolutionary committee of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan did not 
comply, their action would be considered a declaration of war. 
 
The Armenians were forced to accede to the Bolsheviks’ demand. Thus, 
General  Dro submitted to the Russian stipulations and handed over his 
armaments and provisions to the Armenian Bolsheviks. He evacuated 
Karabakh on 12th May. The Sovietization of Karabakh was announced by the 
11th Congress of the Karabakh Armenians, which was convened on 26th May 
and supervised by the Bolsheviks.658    
 
Since the Bolsheviks had approved the independence of Georgia by 
concluding an agreement on 7th May, the Armenian authorities opened 
negotiations with Moscow concerning the recognition of their independence 
and territorial integrity (consisting of Zangezour, Karabakh and Nakhichevan). 
 
But after a few rounds of talks between the Bolsheviks and the Armenians, no 
decision was made regarding these cities. After the Bolsheviks had resolved 
the crisis, a regiment of the 11th division of the Red Army attacked Zengezour 
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through Karabakh, and captured Goris on 5th July. Simultaneously, a division 
of the Bolshevik forces plunged into war with Dro’s forces in Kazakh, from the 
Karabakh north-west. Consequently, the Armenian government called for a 
withdrawal from the conflict and negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Armenia 
agreed to the Red Army’s occupation of the three disputed regions and, on 
10th August 1920, signed an agreement with Russia which from now on 
occupied Karabakh, Zangezour and Nakhichevan in order to create 
favourable conditions for an equitable solution to the territorial disputes 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
On 13th September 1920, the Turkish army attacked the territory of the 
Republic of Armenia and, after two months, captured the regions of Kars, 
Ardahaand and Sari-Ghomesh. Because of this attack, the Republic of 
Armenia was broken up and its authority was ceded to Bolshevik Russia on 
2nd December 1920. Afterwards, during an assembly of the party, Stalin 
stressed that it was not feasible to hand over the disputed areas to Dashnak 
Armenia. He hinted that this would be possible if Armenia was to become a 
communist state. Thus, the Turkish attacks, on the one hand, and the 
Bolshevik pressure, on the other, finally forced the Revolutionary Committee, 
which had been held in Baku and attended by the Armenian Bolsheviks, to 
enter Yerevan on 29th November where it announced the setting up of the 
Socialist Republic of Armenia. 
 
Karabakh in the Russian Era  
 
Following the annexation of the Republic of Armenia by the Soviet Union on 
30th  November, Narimanov, the President of the Revolutionary Committee of 
Azerbaijan, sent his Armenian counterpart an astonishing telegram, stating 
bluntly: “As of today, the old frontiers between Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
declared to be non-existent. Mountainous Karabakh, Zangezour, and 
Nakhichevan are recognized to be integral parts of the Socialist Republic of 
Armenia."659 The next day Orjonikidze described it as a historic document 
unprecedented in the history of humanity.660 
 
Thus, the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan agreed unilaterally that Nakhichevan, 
Zangezour and Karabakh should be part of Soviet Armenia. In his speech on 
2nd December, before the Baku council, Narimanov described these regions 
as inseparable parts of Armenian. Stalin on 4th December wrote in Pravda: 
“Soviet Azerbaijan is willingly turning over Zangezour, Nakhichevan, and 
mountainous Karabakh to Soviet Armenia…Soon the old hostility between 
Armenia and its neighbouring Moslems will be settled."661 Let everyone be 
advised that only the Soviet Union's government was able to settle the old 
conflict between the two nations.”662 
 
After securing the Bolshevik position in Moscow, the Soviet Union gradually 
revealed its main regional policy towards Caucasian issues, as they did not 
need any enduring policy for Armenia any more. Through the negotiations in 
Moscow, which led to an agreement on 16th March 1921, the Bolsheviks and 
Turks agreed that Nakhichevan was an autonomous province under the 
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protection of Azerbaijan and as such could not be assigned to any other 
government.663 
 
By transferring Nakhichevan to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan on 1st 
December, the first step towards nullifying the declaration of the Azerbaijani 
revolutionary committee had been taken, and following this matter, a review 
of other warring areas was started. In early May the Caucasian bureau of the 
Moscow government sent a mission composed of representatives of the three 
republics of the Caucasus to investigate the settlement of the border issues, 
but it was obvious from the start that they had basic disagreements. 
Narimanov insisted on control of Karabakh, but on considering the people's 
rebellion, especially in Zangezour, and the weak position of the Bolsheviks in 
the region, it was thought advisable to place stress on the annexation of the 
mountainous region of Karabakh by Armenia. Thus, on 12th June, a 
declaration was issued by Alexander Miasnikian, the Armenian Prime 
Minister, stated that: “based on the declaration of the revolutionary committee 
of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and the agreement of the Soviet 
Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, we declare that from this moment the 
mountainous region of Karabakh is an integral part of the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Armenia.”664         
 
Askanaz Mravian was appointed as the official representative of upland 
Karabakh by the Armenian government. This was when Narimanov 
considered that granting control of Karabakh was merely a provisional form of 
"hush money". He implicitly adopted a big stick policy, pointing out the 
prospect of reforming the anti-Soviet Union groups in Azerbaijan.665 During 
the June meetings, Bekzadian, the Armenian representative, proposed a 
revision of unjust divisions dating from the Tsarist era, especially regarding 
Akhalkalki and Karabakh, With 72 per cent and 94 per cent of the Armenian 
population, respectively, situated within Georgia and Azerbaijan, the 
Georgian and Azeri representatives objected and he found himself in a 
minority, so he referred the issue to the Caucasus bureau for investigation. 
 
Thus, the Communist party, which was administrating that bureau, decided to 
hold a special meeting and study the border problems of the region. 
Narimanov and Mravian, the governor of Karabakh, were asked to go to Tiflis 
with great urgency. Stalin, who was in a sanitarium in the north of the 
Caucasus, came to Tiflis and one of the special meetings of Caucasus 
bureau was held in the presence of 51 local Soviet officials and four 
proposals were put forward, namely:  
 Karabakh was to be within Azerbaijan. 
 To resort to a referendum throughout Karabakh attended by the whole 
of the Azeri and Armenian population.  
 The unity of the mountainous part of Karabakh with Armenia. 
 The carrying out of a referendum only in the mountainous region of 
Karabakh (the Armenian sector). 
 
After lengthy discussion, a resolution to transfer upland Karabakh to Armenia 
was carried, despite Narimanov`s opposition. However, Narimanov 
demanded that the matter be reconsidered by the Central Committee of the 
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Russian Communist party, for a final decision. The bureau accepted his 
recommendation.666 On 5th July, after presenting the proposals and voting, 
and under pressure from Stalin, it was forced to accept the transfer of 
Karabakh to Azerbaijan.667 In view of the need to inaugurate national peace 
between the Moslems and Armenians, and mindful of the economic links 
between the mountainous and lower areas of Karabakh and of their 
permanent ties with Azerbaijan, it was decided to leave upland Karabakh 
within the frontiers of Azerbaijan and to give it a large measure of regional 
autonomy, with the town of Shushi as its centre, forming part of the 
autonomous region.668 
 
This decision was a part of Stalin's “divide and rule” policy for the 
nationalities. By placing the Armenians of Karabakh inside Azerbaijan as a 
“hostage”, the Armenian SSR would be less likely to act against the wishes of 
the Kremlin.669 
 
Thus, the issue of Karabakh was officially settled. Although there is no clear 
proof of a change in the opinion of the authorities of the Soviet Union 
regarding the issue of Karabakh, the reason for this is obvious. After 
effectively “Sovietizing” Georgia and suppressing the Dashnaks in 
Zangezour, they did not need to agree with the Armenians. On the other 
hand, Azerbaijan's economic and strategic importance as a window onto the 
eastern revolution and, above all, its special role in Moscow-Ankara political 
relations - which were still enjoying a warm and successful period - had an 
effect on Russian change in policy. 670  It is noteworthy that Stalin's other 
decision in the decade of the 1920s was to establish the Kurdistan 
autonomous region, thereby aiming to create an artificial border on the 
demarcation line between Armenia and Karabakh.671 
 
On 19th July 1921, in his report explaining the Caucasian border issues to the 
Executive Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Narimanov, the President 
of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, stated that “mountainous 
Karabakh remains an integral part of Soviet Azerbaijan, preserving its right to 
internal autonomy within the framework of the Soviet Union's constitution and 
under a regional executive committee.”672  
 
However, the granting of autonomy was followed by a period of unrest in the 
region. As a result of the continuing turmoil, the Communist Party assigned a 
committee to look into the matter. After a six-month study, the committee 
presented a report to the chairman. Subsequently, based on the proposals of 
the committee, the regions of Lachin, and Kalbajar were separated from 
Karabakh. Also, the territories of Shamkhor, Khanlar, Dashkesan and 
Gulistan, most of whose inhabitants were Armenians, were detached from 
north Karabakh. Finally, on 24th July 1923, the creation of the Nagorno 
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was declared. On 10th August of the same 
year, its capital was transferred from Shusha to Khankendi. In honour of 
Stepan Schaumian, a famous Armenian communist, Khankendi was later 
renamed Stepanakert.673 
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It should be noted that despite all the Communist claims and extensive 
propaganda regarding the final settlement Karabakh through the creation of 
an autonomous province, the differences and tensions were in effect never-
ending, because the Azeris disagreed with granting autonomy and the 
Armenians claimed it was not enough. So both sides decided to take steps to 
achieve their particular goals, even after a settlement. 
 
During the 1920s, a secret organization known as "Karabakh" was active 
throughout the region and supported the cause of the Armenians. In 1929, 
after the intensifying of Turkification, some demonstrations were staged in 
favour of annexation of Karabakh by Armenia. One should mention that the 
efforts made by Khanjian, the first secretary of the Armenian Communist 
Party, to restore Armenian hegemony over Karabakh led to his death in July 
1936. Similar measures taken by Harutunian, the successor of Khanjian from 
1945 to 1949, produced no results though it did not lead to his demise.674     
 
During Stalin’s reign, any measure taken to protest the statue quo was 
harshly suppressed. According to some sources, it most probably happened 
at the same period when the Armenians of Karabakh had been treated 
unjustly and in such a manner that the level of cultural development in that 
region was lower than other regions of Azerbaijan and the Karabakhis were 
deprived of cultural and educational exchanges with Armenia, such as radio, 
books, and so on.675 
 
However, after the death of Stalin and the period of relative calm associated 
with the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, a new phase started by 
highlighting the issue of Karabakh. During the Khrushchev era, this was 
acclaimed as “the rehabilitation of the nations”. It created an open climate for 
“destalinization”, and a revision of the strategy of the federation. It also 
supported the competence and authority of the republics. This led to the 
expressing of patriotic feelings in some regions, especially in Karabakh. 
 
From 1960 onwards, together with the 40th anniversary of the “Sovietization” 
of Armenia, hopes were raised about the re-annexation of Karabakh by 
Armenia. 
 
On 19th May 1963, a petition signed by 4,500 Armenian Karabakhis was 
delivered to Khrushchev, requesting the annexing of NK to the Republic of 
Armenia and freedom from the hegemony of Azerbaijan. This petition also 
pointed out the continuation of Azerbaijan's discriminatory and aggressive 
policies against the Armenians.676 
 
But Khrushchev, who intended to revise many Stalinist policies quickly 
realized that paying heed to nationalist feelings and granting concessions to 
the nationalities would not resolve the problem – it would have caused it to be 
intensified and would lead to a rise in racial unrest. Thus, he ignored 
Armenia's demand and the Karabakh issue remained unsolved under him.  
 
Finally, the unanswered demands of the Armenians, and their sense of 
collective failure to gain sovereignty, wounded their sensibilities and provoked 
467 
popular demonstrations and protests. These protests which were held in 
Yerevan and Karabakh were suppressed. 
 
After Khrushchev was removed from office, during the ceremonies of the 50th 
anniversary of the Armenian genocide on 24th April 1965, a demonstration 
was staged by a crowd of a hundred thousand people in Yerevan and one of 
their slogans was the annexation of the coveted lands by Armenia.677  
 
After Khrushchev, Armenian leaders and famous figures corresponded with 
the Soviet leaders. This had no impact, apart from the fact that greater 
pressure and force was unleashed on the Armenians. This led to more 
emigration from Karabakh.  
 
Under the regimes of Brezhnev, Andropov and Cherninko, who followed after 
Khrushchev, no great change occurred to the status of Karabakh, until 1985, 
when Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as Secretary-General of the USSR 
Communist Party.  
 
After Gorbachev swept to power on 11th March 1985, he made efforts to 
terminate the “Brezhnev stagnation” and to nullify it. The first Congress held 
during the time of Gorbachev was convened in February 1986 and was not 
very encouraging for the people of that country, especially because he 
described the people of the Soviet Union as a social–international population 
in which there was friendship and respect for national cultures among the 
different societies.678 But subsequent developments confirmed the failure of 
the concept of internationalism and the lack of effectiveness of his policies 
and measures and finally led to the overturning of his comments regarding 
the races. 
 
On 5th March 1987, it was a geologist and a member of the Communist Party, 
Suren Aivazian, who, in a long letter addressed to Gorbachev, described the 
conditions of the Karabakh Armenians and expressed their demands. This 
letter, like previous ones, reported the conditions of Karabakh within the 
framework of party theories, but because it was expressed under 
perestroika 679 , it gave rise to new developments in the history of the 
Karabakh conflict.680  
 
The number of sporadic incidents increased quickly from 1987 onwards, and 
letters demanding unification started to flow in to the Moscow authorities.681 In 
August 1987, a petition prepared by the Armenian Academy of Sciences with 
hundreds of thousands of signatures (in Armenian) requested the transfer of 
NK and Nakhichevan to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. (SSR).682 
The summer of 1987, and in August, a vast petition in ten volumes with more 
than 75,000 signatures from Karabakh and Armenia was sent to officials in 
Moscow. 683  Gradually, these measures transformed the popular and 
organized support and the staging of demonstrations in Yerevan. We can 
point to the "Karabakh Committee", among others, as being formed around 
the Karabakh ideal. This committee became vitally important in the course of 
time. In early 1988, a delegation of Karabakh Armenians left for Moscow to 
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deliver a copy of the letter of Armeno-Karabakh Unity and other documents to 
Demichio, the Vice- President of the USSR.684  
 
In early February, several demonstrations were launched for the annexation 
of the region to Armenia. This time, the officials of the Communist Party 
arrived in Karabakh from Azerbaijan in order normalize the situation, by 
stopping the demonstrations and ending the petitioning. But the 
demonstrators staged a sit-in at the regional bureaus of the party, and the 
governmental and party authorities joined them. 
 
Although the delinquent authorities would inevitably be called to the regional 
bureaus and reprimanded, what this episode did reveal was that the 
Communist Party was losing its power in the region.  
 
On 20th February, the Soviet parliament, in an extraordinary session, adopted 
a resolution calling on the soviets of Azerbaijan and Armenia to make every 
effort to reach "a positive decision concerning the transfer of the region from 
the SSR of Azerbaijan to the SSR of Armenia.”685  
 
This decision, which was legally and officially approved, was an 
unprecedented measure, which was confirmed by the labour organizations 
affiliated to the Communist Party such as the Youth Party. However, leaders 
of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan and even Armenia expressed a 
negative reaction to the resolution. Massive demonstrations took place in 
support of the declaration, with the number of participants reportedly ranging 
from 700,000 to one million people.686 
 
Nevertheless, the people were still assured of Gorbachev`s promises. Sylva 
Kaputikian and Zori Balayan went to Moscow to meet Gorbachev, who asked 
for a month in which to bring about a renaissance in Karabakh.687 In return, 
he asked them to return to Yerevan and ask the people to be calm. 
 
During this period, the Armenians and Azeris staged numerous protests in 
Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert to fight for their rights. They demanded that 
Moscow make a quick decision to their advantage. On the one hand, 
Gorbachev`s government was under pressure from the Armenian control of 
the ruling government and, on the other, was worried about the risks of 
complying with Armenian demands, which could have led to a chain reaction 
leading to other groups. This issue put the ruling party in an embarrassing 
situation and forced them to make contradictory and rushed decisions, which 
dissatisfied both parties.688  
 
These developments gradually turned into direct clashes and between the 
Armenians and Azeris. The violence reached its peak when an incident 
occurred in Sumgait, an industrial township in the suburbs of Baku. This 
region had a population of 200,000 people, of whom 18,000 were Armenians. 
On 26th February a group of Azeris who had escaped from the border regions 
entered the area. As these refugees arrived, it was rumoured that Armenians 
had attacked them. 
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A wave of violence followed in the city, despite pleas to calm the situation, 
violence lasted for three days, during which many people were killed and 
wounded. The official number of dead was 32 people, but many observers 
believed that the figure was at least 500. Thousands of Armenians emigrated. 
The rebellion was only quelled when disciplinary and army units were 
deployed in the region.689  
 
The Sumgait incident was the first display of bloody conflict and influenced 
Karabakhi developments in two ways. First, this event made the peaceful 
settlement of the crisis almost impossible, and second, it increased the 
distrust and suspicion of the people towards the governmental authorities 
because of their slow response to tackle the violence. Because of this and the 
delay by the judicial officials to try those responsible for the violence, the 
government authorities probably considered that the best way of suppressing 
the new wave of reformism and liberalism was to add fuel to the conflicts and 
racial tensions as they had done in 1905. 
 
After the news about Sumgait had been published, Yerevan, which had been 
calm for a while, became a restless region once again. On 8th March, a 
massive protest rally was staged in memory of the Sumgait victims.690 Also in 
the middle of March, a large crowd gathered in front of the office of the local 
Committee of the Communist Party and asked for a party plenum to be 
convoked. Finally, the party held the plenum on 18th March, and was thereby 
forced to confirm the resolution ratified on 20th February, stating the 
annexation of Karabakh by Armenia.  
 
When the one-month deadline for Gorbachev to investigate and make a 
decision came to an end, the previous signs and the deployment of military 
units in different parts of Yerevan were not encouraging news for the 
Armenians. Thus, considering their experiences and recollections of 
Moscow's actions, they found that this time Russia intended to resort to force 
to solve the problem. 
 
On 23rd March, the President of the Supreme Council of the USSR issued 
orders regarding the economic and cultural development of NK and disproved 
the probability of its annexation by Armenia. The Supreme Council also 
allotted 400 million roubles for cultural and economic affairs, including the 
construction of the Lachin-Stepanakert freeway, the broadcasting of 
Armenian-speaking programmes on Karabakh TV, and the restoration of 
destroyed monuments, aiming to distract public opinion and to purge hatred 
from people’s hearts, but the scheme failed to attract public approval.691 
 
After the withdrawal of the law enforcement agencies of the USSR Ministry of 
the Interior from different parts of Yerevan, political demonstrations were 
organized once again, and the first official rally on 1st May, Labour Day, 
turned into a massive protest for the unity of Karabakh. Making changes in 
the leadership of the Communist Party was another USSR reaction to the 
developments. But the modifications were fruitless, because the opposition 
groups all but caused the Communist Party to cease to function and to lose 
470 
control of affairs, even though it was still the only organized power in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
The dismissal by Gorbachev of Heydar Aliev from the Azerbaijani Communist 
Party Chairmanship damaged the strength and self-confidence of the entire 
running of the party in the Azerbaijan Republic, because it was believed that 
his high rank in the K.G.B and his membership of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would guarantee the interests of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. Moreover, his successor, Kamran Bagirov, had a 
weak and inconsistent role regarding the NK crisis. On the one hand, he had 
damaged Azerbaijan’s reputation by preparing the ground for events like 
Sumgait, and on the other, regarding the escalating crisis of Karabakh and its 
virtual separation from Azerbaijan, he had not taken any independent 
measures, instead simply repeating the orders of Moscow.692 Abdul-Rahman 
Vezirov, as a senior party official made every effort to re-establish the missed 
opportunity and authority, and made several changes in its local organization.  
 
On 12th June 1988, by virtue of article 70 of the Soviet Union Constitution, the 
Karabakh Council approved the secession from Azerbaijan and the 
annexation by Armenia by a unanimous vote, stating the right of self-
determination of the nations and voluntary associations of the corresponding 
SSR republics. The same evening, by invoking Article 78: “the territory of a 
union republic may not be altered without its consent”, the leadership of the 
Azerbaijani Supreme Council nullified the Karabakh resolution. 693  On the 
other hand, at the national level, some Azerbaijani intellectuals and authors 
tried to oppose the Armenians’ efforts for the secession of Karabakh from 
Azerbaijan through measures such as publishing open letters. For example, 
while protesting against the events of November 1988, the Azeri hawks, 
mindful of the 200,000 Azeris residing in Armenia, had highlighted some 
issues like autonomy and cultural freedom.694  
 
Finally, on 15th June, after a workers’ strike and the closing of Yerevan’s 
schools and commercial centres, the Supreme Council of Soviet Armenia 
adopted a resolution in which it formally gave its approval to the idea of 
joining NK to Armenia.695 But in order to make the resolution permanent, it 
had to be ratified by the Azerbaijani Supreme Council. But the Council 
nullified it on 17th June.696  
 
Gorbachev reaffirmed the inviolability of the internal frontiers of the republics 
at the congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), but then 
a new wave of protests launched in Yerevan, finally led to a public strike on 
5th July. However, there were still hopes for perestroika, so the Karabakh 
Committee asked the people to end the strikes until an extraordinary meeting 
of the Supreme Council of the USSR could be held to examine the recent 
resolutions of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Supreme Councils.  
 
This time, the forces of the Ministry of the Interior were deployed in Yerevan 
once again, and this itself indicated the response of the leadership of the 
USSR. Thus, the heads of the Supreme Council, citing Article 78, claimed 
that joining Karabakh to Armenia was contrary to the Constitution, but the 
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Council promised to improve the way of life in Karabakh. Besides, it 
committed itself to appointing a delegation to examine Armenia's claim so as 
to restore normal conditions to the region. The delegation started its job in 
early August 1988 but the results were not acceptable to the Armenians. 
 
From that time onwards, the Karabakh movement changed its policy from one 
where it persisted in legally confronting the ruling regime, to one where it 
appealed directly to the central government. It declared a state of emergency 
in both the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan and asked all journalists to 
leave the region, stressing that any gatherings or industrial action were illegal, 
but the strikes continued throughout Karabakh. Moreover, the revolts and 
demonstrations of the people in Yerevan increased to such an extent that 
they forced the Armenian Supreme Council to invite some members of the 
Karabakh Committee to hold an extraordinary meeting. The Armenian 
government tried to prevent the Supreme Council from holding the meeting, 
but the Karabakh Committee invited representatives and held a reunion in the 
Opera House in Yerevan and approved its plan in the Supreme Council. The 
Armenian government declared that the gathering had been illegal and tried 
to oppose it by proclaiming a state of emergency.697 
 
On the other hand, despite the position of the Soviet Union authorities 
regarding Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh, the developments in 
Armenia and Karabakh and the increasing disaffiliation from the Baku 
authority had a worrying influence on Azerbaijani public opinion. On 17th 
November, there was a massive demonstration in Baku to protest against the 
weakness of the government in restoring complete sovereignty over 
Karabakh. 698  The Azerbaijani intellectuals, who were worried that 
developments in Armenia and Karabakh would finally lead to the approval of 
the Soviet Union authorities and the secession of Karabakh from Azerbaijan, 
sent a petition to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and 
asked that Azerbaijan's sovereignty be guaranteed.  
 
Simultaneously, a sentence of execution for one of the instigators of the 
Sumgait event was confirmed. This too caused a new wave of anti-Armenian 
rallies and protests in Azerbaijan. One of the main centres of the protests was 
Ganja with an Armenian population of approximately 140,000 people. The 
circumstances became so critical that the Russian commander of the troops 
deployed there asked Moscow to grant permission to move the Armenians 
out of the town. In Baku, a crowd of about 800,000 people flocked onto the 
streets and asked for the Armenians to be deported from Azerbaijan and 
Karabakh. At the same time, about 300,000 Armenians and Azeris were 
forced to leave their homes. Their hatred and indignation had a considerable 
influence on intensifying the animosity and the heightening of tension in 
Armeno-Azeri relations. 
 
On 11th October 1988, the Communist leaders of the Republics of Azerbaijan 
and Armenia met in the capital of Karabakh to find a peaceful solution to the 
conflict. At the same time, the Central government promised to solve the 
Karabakh problem and brought it up in the main congress of the assembly. 
This reduced the strikes to some extent, but the action of the Central 
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government in arresting three Azeris, who had organized and had a hand in 
the Sumgait racial massacre, upset the Azeris once again and the 
negotiations of the Presidents failed. 
 
The policy of the Central government which switched between legitimized the 
Armenians and sometimes appeasing the Azeris, was to try to maintain a 
fragile balance and this policy had a considerable influence on the outlook 
and the new course of action of both presidents. Soon, Moscow's efforts to 
appease the two Presidents and stress the observing of a good neighbour 
policy and a peaceful settlement of the dispute came to nothing because the 
Presidents did not agree upon certain issues, such as ridding the region of 
Soviet troops and the withdrawal of the Armenian militias from Karabakh. The 
most important indication of their shared opinion was the failure of the central 
government. On the one hand, stressing the "enormous wrongdoing" of the 
centre which had created the Karabakh problem in 1920, the Armenian 
President regarded Moscow's invitation to peace and negotiation as a political 
game. The presence of the Soviet army in Karabakh, in particular, was proof 
of their dishonesty and the rightness of his claim. On the other hand, to most 
Azeris Gorbachev’s appointment of Armenians as his advisors was at odds 
with his decisiveness and they believed that the K.G.B was trying to impose 
the Armenian claim based on a territorial swap. Such conclusions brought 
about a stalemate in the negotiations and destroyed the Azeris’ confidence. 
 
On 3rd December 1988 when the situation in both Republics threatened to get 
out of control, a terrible earthquake struck Armenia. This greatly helped the 
USSR and especially the Armenian government to capture leaders and 
members of the Karabakh Committee, thereby stabilizing its shaky position 
and authority in the region. But it failed to use the situation to divert public 
attention from the Karabakh issue 
 
Simultaneously, on 12th January 1989, the Supreme Council of the USSR 
decided to stress keeping Karabakh within the Republic of Azerbaijan and to 
impose a “special government administration” on Karabakh, under the direct 
control of Moscow. Hence, a commission consisting of nine people (five 
representing the central authorities, three Armenians and one Azeri), took 
control of the Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The Commission was solely 
responsible to the Supreme Council. For their own reasons, both the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities were satisfied with the initiative taken by 
Moscow and they considered it a step forward in achieving their goals. The 
Azeris construed this measure as a re-affirmation of their territorial integrity 
and eventually they were satisfied, because of the dissolution of the local 
party and governmental machinery which was totally under the control of the 
Armenians. 
 
The Armenians also considered it as nearing the end of 68 years of 
Azerbaijani domination over Karabakh and held out some hope for a positive 
outcome and future. However, most Armenians were in doubt as to whether 
Moscow's policy would solve the Karabakh problem or not.  
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After three months of calm following the earthquake, the lack of an 
investigation into the status of Karabakh resulted in considerable 
dissatisfaction and unrest and finally led to public strikes in May 1989. These 
prompted negotiations to be initiated between party officials and 
representatives of the Karabakh Armenians, on the one hand, and the 
regional special government administration on the other. The start of 
negotiations, along with the release of some Armenian political activists 
eased the tension.  
 
On 17th June, a group of Anti-Communist parties and movements formed a 
coalition with the Karabakh Committee and set up the Organization of the 
Armenian National Movement, which was recognized by the Armenian 
Supreme Council on 27th June, and asked its leaders to attend the meetings 
of the Supreme Council as advisors. 
 
In Azerbaijan too, most people were pessimistic about the setting up of the 
“special government administration”. In March, when the Armenian Supreme 
Council was preparing to officially recognize the opposition parties, the 
Azerbaijani Popular Front Parliament conducted a pro forma election, and 
despite the presence and activities of a multitude of opposition groups and 
parties, which had been formed during the unrest of November, the outcome 
of the election was never going to correspond with the people's vote and 
opinion. From the winter of 1989 onwards, through the intellectual efforts of 
figures like Neimet Panakhov, Ismail Sheykhli, Abulfazl Elchibey, Yusif 
Samedoglu, and Etibar Mamedov, a political front was formed. This was 
composed of different people and groups. Also, the Azerbaijani Popular Front 
held an assembly in the middle of July 1989 after inviting representatives 
from all over the country. 
 
It is worth noting that, contrary to the opinion of party officials, this Front 
considered that the “special government administration” had negated 
Azerbaijan's sovereignty; hence, they staged massive demonstrations and 
strikes to nullify it and restore Azerbaijan's direct control over Karabakh. 
Taking into account its great influence among railway workers, one of the 
major tools of this Front was the economic sanctions imposed on Armenia 
and Karabakh in August 1989, especially considering that about 80 per cent 
of Armenia’s imported commodities were carried by Azerbaijan's railway. This 
decision forced the Azerbaijani authorities to negotiate with the leaders of the 
Popular Front under pressure from Moscow. This was to terminate economic 
sanctions against Armenia and Karabakh and to lessen the massive wave of 
demonstrations and strikes in the republics, and finally to recognize the Front. 
 
In Karabakh, because of the intensification of the activities of armed groups, 
the racial confrontations turned into military operations. The economy of the 
region was also crippled due to a cut in oil exports and the obstruction of 
cargo traffic and passenger trains. 
 
Under such conditions, the Karabakh Armenians set up a founders’ 
parliament and a National Council to take over the reins of Karabakh. On 5th 
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September, the Council, as its first step, asked the UN to intervene so as to 
guarantee the security of Karabakh. 
 
Therefore, Moscow's “special government administration”, which was lacking 
in the necessary power and influence, was increasingly weakened. Seeing 
that this special administration had come to an end, Moscow opened 
negotiations with the Baku authorities from autumn 1989 onwards and 
decided to restore Karabakh to Azerbaijani authority. Thus, on 28th 
November, the direct command of the Soviet Union was abolished by the 
Soviet Union Supreme Council, and Karabakh was returned to Azeri control. 
It was decided that a new delegation would be formed and sent to Karabakh 
to administer it through the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan. 
 
In response to this development, the Armenian Supreme Soviet construed 
Moscow's decision as being illegal and asked the Soviet Union Supreme 
Council to nullify it and to promulgate the incorporation of NK into the 
Armenian Republic.  
 
Nonetheless, the dissolution of the “special government administration” was 
seen as a success for Azerbaijan, as they had no control over Karabakh in 
practice. So, the Popular Front, which had turned into the most important 
component of Azerbaijan's political power, was invaded on two fronts. On the 
first front, Karabakh, the siege was intensified and the Azeri armed groups 
increased their activities. The Armenian TV station was captured and blacked 
out. Then, Azerbaijani troops tried to cut off the air routes - the only line of 
communication with the outside world – by means of explosions on the 
landing-field of Karabakh`s only airport. These actions turned to armed 
encounters between hundreds of thousands of people in districts like Khanlar 
and Shaumian. On the second front, the forces were concentrated inside 
Azerbaijan and struggling for power. In Baku, the Popular Front's 
sympathizers seized the governmental buildings, and some other cities were 
also captured by the Popular Front itself.  
 
In a situation where the Popular Front was making significant gains and the 
organization of the Communist Party was looking incoherent, the people 
launched attacks on those Azerbaijani cities with significant Armenian 
populations. Despite the opposition of Popular Front leaders and the 
presence of the Soviet army in the region, the struggle continued and finally 
led to Armenian emigration from Azerbaijan and a declaration of martial law 
by Moscow in Azerbaijan and Karabakh. On 20th January1990 17,000 
Russian military forces were deployed around Baku intent on advancing into 
the city. The massive intervention of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan’s capital, 
Baku, in which it is estimated that up to 150 people died, brought to a close 
the initial period of perestroika in Azerbaijan, and initiated a coup against the 
Popular Front in order to restore the Communist Party to power in 
Azerbaijan.699 
 
Thereafter, the idea was broached in Azerbaijan that Moscow's policy was 
biased towards the fulfilment of Armenia's goals and plans. Thus, it was 
suggested that they ought to settle the Karabakh problem without Russian 
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help in order to prevent hostile manoeuvres by Russia. This was why the 
Armenians also believed that Moscow was neglecting them, in spite of the 
1990 developments. This assured them about the central government's 
strategies and new moves.  
 
In short, after the military attacks on Baku, Vezirov was ousted from the 
Chairmanship of the Communist Party and was succeeded by Ayaz 
Mutalibov, the Secretary of the Cabinet Council.700 Ayaz Mutalibov, as the 
only candidate to receive the vote, was elected in the presidential election, in 
spite of his weakened position during the August 1991 coup.  
 
On 18th October 1991 the Republic of Azerbaijan like the other republics 
declared its independence. At the same time, Armenia's Nationalist 
Movement gained a straight majority and the Communists were unseated 
after 70 years. On 14th August, Levon Ter-Petrossian, one of the members of 
the Karabakh Committee and the representative of Armenia's Nationalist 
Movement, was elected President. He installed the new government and 
appointed Vazgen Manokian, another official of the Movement, as the Prime 
Minister. A year later, in September 1991, an overwhelming majority of voters 
approved the referendum on independence, and Armenia officially declared 
its independence on the 23rd September.701 
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